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‘Big Data’ and the General Data Protection Regulations have been a prevailing feature of 
legal discourse in recent years, with interest in data protection law generally reaching a 
hitherto unprecedented pitch. Yet almost wholly outwith the parameters of current debate, 
the police in England and Wales are collating, storing and retaining on their Police National 
Computer data relating to offences and offenders (suspected or convicted) which now 
encompasses over twelve million citizens.  
While there has been a growing acknowledgement of, and concurrent interest in, the legal 
and social ramifications of utilising this data for vetting purposes, research as to the actual 
data collation and retention process has itself been neglected almost entirely. Indeed, 
such is the over-reliance on presumption, and the general inattention paid to this area, 
that no-one even seems to have noticed that, despite the repeated use of the phrase 
‘criminal record’, no authoritative definition of it exists, or that the police appear to have an 
effective carte blanche as to what data they can collate, how they store it and how long 
they retain it. 
The purpose of this research is to address the deficits in the existing literature by asking 
four key questions; what data have the police been collating, are they acting concurrent 
with their Data Protection obligations regarding the collation and storage of the data and 
is the police retention of this data justiciable with regard to their stated purpose(s) for 
retaining it? It is the perhaps the last of these questions which perhaps invites the most 
multi-faceted debate. The police posit that an isolated conviction for theft recorded a 
decade or more previously is of ‘operational value’ to them in their crime detection and 
prevention duties. This research intends to critically examine that proposition, holding the 
police to account and asking whether there are questions for the police, and those 





Introduction to the thesis 
 
1.1 Purpose of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an extensive, overarching and original analysis of 
the police collation, storage and retention of criminal records in England and Wales.  
 
This analysis purports to identify in the first instance what criminality data is being collated, 
where it is being stored and for what duration. This will begin with a critical chronology 
aiming to identify and analyse the historical development of criminality data collation, 
tracking it from infancy to the modern, centralised collection. In essence, this is intended 
to establish what the collators of data have presumed to mean by the phrase ‘criminal 
record’. The analysis will then move to systematise the police and criminal justice 
justifications for the collation and retention of the data, and to offer an evaluative 
commentary on whether the rationale commonly offered for the data retention justifies its 
collection. 
 
The focus of the research will then diverge to provide a comprehensive evaluation and 
analysis of the current police practice of retaining criminality data against their concurrent 
statutory obligations under the applicable data protection legislation. This will be 
undertaken in three stages. The first is a critical inquiry into the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 19841 (‘the DPA 1984’), the processes by which criminal records data were 
held whilst that Act remained in force and the potential failings of the police in adhering to 
their obligations under it. The second is a fundamentally similar critical inquiry into the 
pertinent provisions of the Data Protection Act 19982 (‘the DPA 1998’), collation processes 
during the applicable period and an identification of potential breaches of that legislation. 
The third stage involves a comprehensive examination of the police practices of criminality 
data retention, with especial focus on the nature of the data being retained and the 
timeframes involved with a view to evaluating whether these practices are consistent with 
                                                          
1 1984, ch.35 
2 1998, ch.29 
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the data protection requirement of ensuring that data holdings not be ‘excessive’3 or ‘for 
longer than is necessary’ for the stipulated purpose(s).4  
 
This final analysis will draw on recidivism studies, a brief comparative analysis with the 
retention policies for near identical data in Scotland, a more lengthy comparative analysis 
between retention of criminal records data and the concurrent application of legal 
principles to other types of criminality data retained in separate police databases and also 
the potential for a legal challenge to be brought in future on the basis that the present 
processes for retaining criminal records data runs contrary to, and arguably infringes, the 
Government’s human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘the ECHR’)5 to allow for recommendations for future reconsideration of present practice 
to be made. 
 
1.2 Background to the research area 
In 2017, when offering an analysis of the latest, in a seemingly now ceaseless, judicial 
challenge to the disclosure of a ‘criminal record’ for employment vetting purposes, 
Professor Liz Campbell opined that:  
 
Much judicial and academic ink has been spilled of late on the scheme governing 
the retention and use of personal data by the police and third parties such as 
employers. Of course, information relating to people’s…criminal record is of 
significant operational value in detecting, tracking and resolving criminality’.6  
 
With all due deference to the learned Professor, her statement is only partially accurate. 
As the next chapter of this thesis illustrates at length, the police in England and Wales 
certainly are the custodians of an enormous repository of personal data relating to crime 
and (suspected and convicted) criminals.7 This has been so since broadly the middle of 
the nineteenth century when the various piecemeal local schemes for accumulating data 
with the intent of assisting area policing were replaced by a statutory obligation on the 
                                                          
3 Ibid, sch.1, pt.I, s.3 
4 Ibid, sch.1, pt.I, s.5 
5 Formally titled ‘The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Rome, 4.XI.1950’ 
6 L. Campbell, ‘Criminal Record and Human Rights’ (2017) 9 Criminal Law Review 696 
7 Which is henceforth referred to simply as ‘criminality data’. Such is the paucity of literature in this area 
that the author could not find an alternative definition to use in the undertaking of this research. 
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Metropolitan Police to retain data relating to certain types of offender8 and today the police 
hold, on various systems, an enormous repository of data relating to millions of living 
citizens.  
 
For example, the police hold a vast repository of fingerprint and DNA data9 on those 
suspected of, cautioned, warned or reprimanded in respect of, or convicted of criminal 
offences.10 On the National DNA Database (‘NDNAD’), there are (at 31 March 2018) 
6,196,278 subject profile records and 590,404 crime scene profile records11 held by the 
Home Office who ‘run [NDNAD] on behalf of UK police forces’.12 The former involves the 
taking of an entire genome sample of every suspect the police arrest,13 while the latter is 
DNA samples taken from crime scenes intended to be matched to the former to help track 
offenders.14 According to the Home Office, this yields significant operational value to the 
police; between April 2001 and March 2018, it is claimed that 675,395 individual samples 
were matched to unsolved crimes.15  
 
The taking of fingerprints from suspects and crime scenes was the brainchild of Sir Francis 
Galton and Sir Edward Henry, who trialled the technique in Bengal then brought it to 
Scotland Yard in 1901.16 Today, IDENT117 is the ‘National Fingerprint Database' and the 
repository for all electronic fingerprint scans taken from any suspect arrested18 or from 
crime scenes themselves.19 This is another vast repository of personal data; at March 
2018, IDENT1 held 8,012,521 individual fingerprint records and 2,259,139 crime scene 
records.20 Again, the system is ‘operated by the Home Office’ although the police ‘own the 
data they enrol upon it’ but, unlike NDNAD, the police have direct access to the system.21 
Unlike NDNAD, there is no attempt to quantify the ‘results’ produced by IDENT1, but 
                                                          
8 See ch.2.4 of this research 
9 Referred to throughout this research collectively as ‘biometric criminality data’ or ‘BCD’ 
10 See ch.9.4 for a detailed examination of the legal parameters of what BCD is being collected, when 
and for how long it is now stored. 
11 National Police Chief’s Council and the Home Office, ‘National DNA Database Strategy Board Annual 
Report 2017/18’ (February 2019) APS Group (HMSO) 10 
12 Ibid 9 
13 Ibid 7 
14 Ibid 8 
15 Ibid 7 
16 See ch.2.4 of this research 
17 Above n.11, 32 
18 Ibid  
19 Ibid 33 
20 Ibid 38 
21 Ibid 37 
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anecdotal examples abound as to its effectiveness22 and indeed, despite some recent 
missteps, fingerprint evidence has become cornerstone of police criminal investigatory 
practice.23 
 
Likewise, photographic images have been taken from those suspected, and convicted, of 
offences largely since the technology to do so has existed: such images24 were being 
routinely collected by prisons as early as the 1780s and have formed part of the statutory 
police data holding since the 1860s.25 Today, custody images are taken of all suspects 
arrested on suspicion of a criminal offence and are held on local police data systems 
before being uploaded (by all but nine police forces at February 2017) for use of all police 
officers in England and Wales onto the Police National Database (‘the PND’). At July 2016, 
the PND held 19 million custody images.26 Custody images ‘are a standard feature of 
everyday policing’, used to help identify suspects, offenders and witnesses27 and are 
nowadays digitally searchable using facial recognition software.28 
 
So far as this type of personal data is concerned, Professor Campbell’s proposition holds 
true and the last fifteen years or so has indeed seen a proliferation of academic and judicial 
debate as to the legislative frameworks which govern the collation and retention of this 
data. This proliferation is evaluated at length, for comparative purposes, in chapter nine 
of this research and what emerges is that, so far as this type of personal criminality data 
is concerned, three correlating, if interdependent, tenets hold broadly true: 
 
i. the subject matter is easily identifiable and well defined, and; 
 
ii. the use of the subject matter is broadly uncontroversial (with the exception of 
facial recognition software for custody images, which has attracted some 
concern) with a general, and broadly evidentially based, presumption that such 
data has operational police use and, therefore; 
 
                                                          
22 Ibid 35 – 36  
23 M. M. Houck, Forensic Fingerprints (Elsevier 2016) XV 
24 Now ordinarily referred to as ‘custody images’ (see Home Office, ‘Review of the use and retention of 
custody images’ (February 2017) 1) and henceforth so referred to throughout this research. 
25 Above n.16 
26 Home Office, ‘Review of the use and retention of custody images’ (February 2017) 2 
27 Ibid 1 
28 Ibid 19 
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iii. almost all of the academic debate, and judicial challenge, concerning this type 
of personal data has focused on the collation and retention of the data, rather 
than the use of it, with a particular focus on compliance with data protection 
legislation and human rights protections. 
 
By contrast, very different tenets seem to apply to ‘criminal records’. Indeed, ‘criminal 
records’ are themselves something of a nebulous concept: it is a phrase routinely (and 
perhaps lazily) used but incredibly difficult to define. Confusion abounds. In 1998, Uglow 
wrote of ‘access to police and criminal records’,29 indicating surely the existence of both 
as separate entities, and spoke of ‘a [central] collection of records of those who have 
committed recordable offences’ while the police held ‘information about non-recordable 
offences, cautions and a certain amount of intelligence in relation to suspected crimes’. 
The new PHOENIX application,30 he surmised, would result in an amalgamation of these 
into one record collection.31 How much of this might constitute a person’s ‘criminal record’ 
was not made clear.  
 
Uglow was not alone in struggling to identify the demarcation between a ‘police record’ 
and ‘criminal record’. When the Shadow Home Secretary Anne Widdecombe told her party 
conference in 2000 that a new hard-line policy on ‘soft’ drugs would mean ‘criminal 
records, rather than cautions’, for perpetrators, she caused such confusion that she later 
tried to clarify that there would be a ‘police record’, but not a ‘criminal record’. After finding 
that the intended ‘clarification’ merely obfuscated matters even further, Widdecombe 
conceded that ‘the law is very confused about what a criminal record is’.32 
 
Campbell, meanwhile writes of ‘a complex and overlapping legislative framework 
governing the retention and disclosure of cautions, reprimands and convictions in 
particular’.33 It must be presumed, therefore, that these are what she believes constitutes 
a ‘criminal record’. Professor Terry Thomas, arguably one of the leading authorities on 
criminality data who has been publishing research into the collection, retention and use of 
                                                          
29 S. Uglow, ‘Criminal records under the Police Act 1997’ (Apr. 1998) Criminal Law Review 235 
30 See ch.3 for a full examination of PHOENIX and the collection of record it contains. 
31 Above n.29, 236 – 7  
32 A. McSmith, ‘No retreat on Tories’ cannabis hard-line’ The Telegraph (London, 7 October 2000) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1369256/No-retreat-on-Tories-cannabis-hard-line.html> 
accessed 13 May 2019  
33 Above n.6, 697 
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‘criminal records’ since the 1980s,34 seems to suggest otherwise. Indeed, his seminal 
2007 work on criminal records opens with the following proposition: 
 
The criminal courts impose sentences on people convicted of crime, and at the 
same time a record of that conviction and sentence is made. The criminal record 
thus created is the subject of this book.35 
 
The approach, perhaps best considered as the ‘traditional view’ of the constituents of a 
‘criminal record, finds support from the Home Office36 but it might be wondered whether 
Professor Thomas would stand by that definition today. As chapter two of this research 
first suggests,37 and chapter three confirms, the criminality data held by the police certainly 
extends beyond a bare record of those convicted of offences in court; cautions, for 
example, while originally intended to deal informally with low-level and juvenile offending, 
were included in central records as early as 1995 at the suggestion of a Home Office 
Scrutiny Committee. Although not ‘a court conviction’, there are now considerable grounds 
for supposing that these form part of a ‘criminal record’.38 
 
Not only is there a dissonance between the existence of a uniform definition of ‘criminal 
record’ data as compared to the clear extant definitions for ‘other’ criminality data but there 
is also a considerable paradigm shift in the judicial and academic interest between each 
dataset. While the focus for custody images and BCD looks at legality of the collection 
and retention of the raw data, so far as ‘criminal records’ are concerned, the ‘much 
academic ink’ spilled has examined almost exclusively the use of the data itself. This has 
predominantly manifested itself in challenges to the disclosure of ‘criminal records’ for 
vetting purposes, which has transposed into public view the scale and volume of 
criminality data the police retain regarding individuals outwith the collection of court 
conviction data.39  
 
                                                          
34 See, for example, T. Thomas, ‘The Exchange of information between the police and social services 
departments’ (1986) 8(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 215 
35 T. Thomas, ‘Criminal Records: A Database for the Criminal Justice System and Beyond’ (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007) 1 
36 Above n.32 
37 See ch.2.6 of this research; records of those acquitted of serious or sexual offences were being 
retained by some criminal record offices as early as 1970. 
38 See ch.4.4.3 of this research for a full examination of the caution record on PHOENIX. 
39 See ch.8.5 of this thesis for an examination of the use of ‘criminal records’ for employment vetting 
purposes, including an extrapolation of the data used for that purpose. 
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By contrast, there has been an almost complete dearth of ink spilled, judicial, academic 
or otherwise, into the collation and retention of ‘criminal record’ data itself. This is largely 
because the police have enjoyed an almost complete and unfettered hegemony on what 
they collect, where they store it and for how long for as long as they have held records.40 
There exists no express statutory framework, comparable to that for DNA or fingerprint 
data41 or indeed at all, regulating criminal record data collection, storage and retention and 
there has been precisely one judicial challenge to the police hegemony.42 At April 2019, 
neither the House of Lords nor the Supreme Court have yet to consider the issue as part 
of any judicial challenge.  
 
This apparent neglect of interest is especially peculiar when it is noted that, since 1984, 
the police have had statutory obligations to manage their collection of criminal records in 
accordance with data protection legislation. Remarkably, this author can find almost no 
prior attempt to identify whether the police have fulfilled those obligations. Additionally, 
and in direct contrast to all other types of criminality data, the usefulness of the criminal 
record data for police operational purposes appears to be presumed and there is a rather 
self-evident paradox at the heart of such a presumption; how useful can a computerised 
record of court convictions really be in helping police to investigate an unsolved murder, 
for example?43 
 
What emerges is that, so far as ‘criminality data’ is concerned, three tenets hold broadly 
true and should be contrasted to those for BCD and custody image data, namely that: 
 
i. the subject matter is extremely difficult to identify and poorly defined, and 
 
ii. the use of the subject matter is controversial with an apparently limited 
evidential basis for the usefulness of the data for police operational purposes, 
and; 
 
iii. almost all of the academic debate, and judicial challenge, concerning this type 
of personal data has focused on the use of the data, rather than the collation 
                                                          
40 This is discussed at length in chapters 3 and 7 of this research. 
41 Per s.63D of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as discussed at ch.9.4 of this research. 
42 Chief Constable of Humberside Police and oths v The Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 
1079 
43 This issue is discussed at length at various points of the research, particularly ch.4.2 – 4.3 and ch.8.4. 
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and retention of it, with a particular focus on compliance with data protection 
legislation and human rights protections. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the research is being undertaken. 
 
1.3 The four research questions 
This research aims to address four key questions which have been neglected for so long 
by researchers in this area. These are as follows: 
 
1. What is a ‘criminal record’? 
 
There is no statutory definition of ‘criminal record’.44 The first research question aims 
to remedy that lacuna by providing a contemporary definition of ‘criminal record’ which 
accurately reflects that which has been, and continues to be, ‘recorded’. 
 
The ‘traditional view’ is that a ‘criminal record’ is a formal record of court convictions 
and sentences. It is hypothesised, however, that this ‘traditional view’ will not be borne 
out by the research into what records are actually being kept, and that the research will 
in fact show that far more ‘criminal’ data is being, and has always been, ‘recorded’. 
 
The aim of chapters two and three, therefore, is to identify what ‘criminal’ data is being 
‘recorded. In the absence of any statutory guidance to the contrary, chapter two will 
commence by seeking to identify what ‘criminal’ data was being ‘recorded’ by those 
earliest protagonists engaged in that collation process. For the purposes of this 
research, the aim is to identify ‘criminal’ data where this is given it’s adjectival dictionary 
meaning: ‘that which has ‘the character, or is the nature, of a crime’45 while ‘record’ will 
be given its noun form, so that the research will identify that ‘criminal data which is 
‘inscribed on a tangible medium and is retrievable in perceivable form’.46 In this way, 
chapter two aims to provide a ‘literal’ definition of ‘criminal record’.  
 
                                                          
44 Above n.33. Perhaps the closest attempt comes in s.62 of the Criminal Justice and Data Protection 
(Protocol No.36) Regulations 2014/3141, which provides that a ‘UK Criminal Record’: ‘…in England and 
Wales [is] information in any form relating to convictions on a names database held by the secretary of 
state for the use of police forces generally’. This rather concurs with Thomas’ ‘traditional’ definition. 
45 B. A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, Thompson Reuters 2009) 430 
46 Ibid, 1387 
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As the research will show, in 1867 Parliament imposed a statutory obligation on the 
police to compile a central ‘record’ of ‘Habitual Criminals’.47 From that point forth, this 
thesis will focus attention on what criminality data was being collated pursuant to that 
(and those subsequent as enacted by later legislation) statutory obligation; by whom, 
where and how it was stored and for how long. The research will be guided by, but not 
limited to, the statutory obligations imposed; the research intends to determine whether 
the collections amassed met, or indeed exceeded, the statutory requirements.  
 
Chapter two will chart this collation process throughout the history of the paper 
repositories of data collated by the Metropolitan Police and the Criminal Record 
Offices.48 Chapter three will continue to chart the data collation exercise throughout the 
period of computerisation initiated by the implemented of the Police National 
Computer,49 again identifying what criminality data is being ‘recorded’, how is it being 
recorded, by whom and for how long it is being retained. The third chapter will conclude 
by providing a detailed examination of the data currently being held on the PHOENIX 
application of the Police National Computer. This will allow the research to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the research question set.  
 
2. In collating and storing criminal record data, did the police comply with the 
data principles contained in Schedule 1, Part I of the Data Protection Act 
1984? 
 
When American academic James Rule published an account of his observations of the 
operations and practices at the National Criminal Records Office at Scotland Yard in 
1970, he claimed that the collection of records was so vast that it was almost impossible 
to retain a complete and accurate national ‘criminal record’,50 while reports of unlawful 
access to the records were so rife that Lord Gardiner told the House of Lords in 1973 
that private investigators were ‘openly saying that they could anybody’s criminal record 
for about £7’.51   
 
                                                          
47 See ch.2.4 of this research. 
48 See ch.2.4 – 2.6 of this research. 
49 See ch.3.2 of this research. 
50 See ch.2.6 of this research. 
51 H.L Deb. 6 June 1973, vol.343, col.115  
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In light of these findings, and the entrenched resistance of both the Home Office and 
the police to the implementation of data protection legislation (both generally and in its 
potential application to the police), it is hypothesised that it is unlikely that the police will 
have adhered to the applicable Data Principles contained in Schedule 1, Part I of the 
DPA 1984.  
 
There can be little question that the collection of criminal records constitutes ‘personal 
data’ for the purposes of the DPA 1984; the statute definition provides that ‘personal 
data means data consisting of information which relates to a living individual who can 
be identified from that information’.52 Reflecting the identifiable potential issues of 
concern, chapter five of this research will provide a critical evaluation of extant resource 
material with an especial focus on potential breaches of the fifth and eighth data 
principles; the requirement to ensure that data held be accurate and kept up to date53 
and that appropriate security measures be taken to ensure unauthorised access to 
personal data.54  
 
3. In collating and storing criminal record data, did the police comply with the 
Data Principles contained in Schedule 1, Part I of the Data Protection Act 
1998? 
 
The enactment of the DPA 1998 imposed more stringent data obligations on police 
chiefs in respect of their criminal record data holdings. It is hypothesised that, if this 
research finds that the police were in breach of their obligations under the DPA 1984, 
then they are also likely to be in breach of their obligations under the later legislation. 
 
The approach undertaken in chapter six, which aims to address directly this research 
question, is almost identical to that taken in chapter five. The research aims to identify 
extant reliable legal materials and to coalesce these into a critical narrative which 
examines at length potential breaches of the applicable Data Principles. As with chapter 
five, the foci is whether breaches have occurred in the collation and storage of the 
criminal records data, and a more ‘broad brush’ approach is taken in this chapter, 
however, with each principle being examined and evidence of potential breaches 
                                                          
52 Per s.3 of the Data Protection Act 1984 
53 See chapter 5.4 of this research. 
54 See chapter 5.5 of this research. 
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highlighted as they arise (with the exception of Data Principles three and five, which 
are dealt with in later chapters).  
 
4. Is the current regime for retention of criminal record data on the PHOENIX 
application ‘excessive’ and/or is the data being held for ‘longer than is 
necessary’ for its stipulated purpose? 
 
This research question involves a detailed examination of whether the retention policy 
for criminal record data was compatible with the third and fifth DPA 1998 Data 
Principles respectively. 
 
This research question takes its terms of reference from both the provisions of the DPA 
1998 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Humberside Police 
and oths. v The Information Commissioner.55 This case was the first, and to date only, 
consideration by an appellate court in England and Wales of whether the retention 
policies for criminal record data are compliant with the third and fifth Data Principles. 
The Court of Appeal held that the police were the ultimate arbiters of what data they 
needed for their operational purposes and that essentially was ‘the end of the matter’.56 
 
It is hypothesised that this approach is flawed in several respects. It is flawed because 
it accepts the police view of what is operationally valuable which does not appear to be 
supported by empirical evidence. It is flawed because it misinterprets the manner in 
which criminal record data is used for the various purposes cited by the court as 
justifications for a near indefinite retention period. It is also flawed because it is 
predicates that the collection and retention of criminal record data does not invoke 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 
 
This research question is approached by evaluating each of the requisite elements in 
turn, with the particular focus throughout on minor and ‘inactive’ criminal record data. 
In chapter four, the research details the most common justifications (‘or purposes’) for 
the collection of criminal record data. These include those specifically cited by the Court 
of Appeal in the Five Constables case57 as well as brief consideration of the other 
potential purposes which might be utilised in future to justify a lengthy retention of the 
                                                          
55 Ibid n.42 and henceforth referred to as the ‘Five Constables case’. 
56 Ibid [43] 
57 At ch.4.2 – 4.4 of this research. 
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data.58  Each of these is considered in sufficient detail to ascertain whether the 
justifications stand scrutiny, assisted, where possible, by a consideration of academic 
and other extrinsic source material to substantiate the positions enunciated.  
 
Chapter seven provides a substantive, critical analysis of the police retention policies 
up to, including, and subsequent to the decision in the Five Constables case. This is 
done by undertaking substantive primary and secondary legal research into the police 
policies in situ at each applicable point, critically analysing these policies to identify 
retention periods, trends and practices to identify and attempt to explain any 
inconsistencies in the approach taken by the police during their lengthy collection of 
records. It will also examine whether the police had put into practice their retention 
policies and whether the Court of Appeal pronouncement that the historic practice of 
deleting old and minor records was instituted for data protection reasons is accurate. 
 
Chapter eight of this research aims to provide a critical re-evaluation of the decision in 
the Five Constables case and, specifically, the justifications provided by the police (and 
upheld by the Court) for the near indefinite retention of all criminality data on the 
PHOENIX application. This is done by examining in turn each of the key tenets of the 
police position; namely that the criminal justice system requires all data be collected,59 
that they are obligated to retain data because of the Soham murders60 and that the data 
has critical use for their own operational purposes. A comparison with the record 
retention system in Scotland is offered, along with a detailed analysis of whether 
criminological studies into offending, propensity, recidivism and desistence supports 
the police contention that even very minor and inactive records aid them in the 
prevention and investigation of offences. It is intended to provide an evidence-based 
analysis of whether the decades of criminological, sociological and legal research into 
these areas supports, or disapproves, of that police proposition.61 
 
Chapter nine of this research then moves to consider the proposition, stated in the Five 
Constables case, that Article 8 of the EHCR does not apply to the collection of criminal 
records data. This will involve a detailed, critical evaluation of pertinent primary legal 
source material, specifically the lead decision of the appellate courts in England and 
                                                          
58 At ch.4.5 of this research. 
59 See ch.8.2 of this research. 
60 See ch.8.3 of this research. 
61 See ch.8.4 of this research. 
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Wales and the European Court of Human Rights to determine whether the position 
offered in the Five Constables in 2009 stands scrutiny today, and whether a new 
challenge might be successful utilising the ECHR where data protection legislation is 
insufficient for that purpose. 
 
1.4 Originality of the research 
The collection of criminal records has begun, in recent years, to draw significant academic 
attention, but almost the entirety of that attention has been focused on the use of criminal 
records, predominantly for employment vetting purposes.62  
 
There is, so far as this author is aware, almost no extant research into the collection of 
records itself; what has been collected, where it is stored and why it is being used. This 
research, so far as is practicable, intends to eschew entirely an analysis of record use 
except to identify whether that use justifies the fact of collating and retaining the data itself. 
This focus is original and will add significantly to the body of existing research by 
undermining the seemingly widespread assumption that the data must be collated and 
retained as it is currently. 
 
Originality also stems from each of the four research questions. As has been indicated, 
there is no legal or other universally accepted definition of ‘criminal record’. This research 
will demonstrate precisely what is being recorded, where and for how long it is retained. 
In this regard, it intends to rectify the omission in the extant literature by offering a 
research-based definition of ‘criminal record’. It will provide an analysis of whether the 
police have committed breaches of data protection legislation; an original analysis on the 
basis that such is entirely omitted from the existing literature.  
 
Moreover, the attempt in this research to systematise the various justifications for the 
extensive retention of the data, to analyse these critically with direct reference to empirical 
studies and to then scrutinise the present position with direct reference to recent judicial 
authority is also original and will add, in this author’s view, something of considerable 
importance to the extant debate on criminal records. 
 
                                                          
62 See, for example, J. Grace, ‘Old convictions never die, they just fade away: the permanency of 
convictions and cautions for criminal offences in the UK’ (2014) 78(2) Journal of Criminal Law 121 and 




Whilst perhaps once not considered as such, identifying an appropriate methodology is 
now (rightly) considered one of the ‘core components’ of legal research.63 What follows is 
a discussion on potential methods of legal research pertinent to this thesis, and an 
analytical discussion of the methodology selected, along with the methods inherent to this 
and justifications provided for utilising these. 
 
1.5.1 Why the Doctrinal approach will not work 
Cahillane and Schweppe confirm that ‘black-letter or doctrinal analysis’ is at the heart 
of traditional legal research and method’.64 It is, according to Salter and Mason: 
 
A research methodology that concentrates on seeking to provide a detailed and 
highly technical commentary upon, and systematic exposition of, the content of 
legal doctrine. This doctrine is interpreted as if it were a separate, independent and 
coherent ‘system of rules’. The priority is to gather, organise and describe legal 
rules, and offer commentary upon the emergence and significance of the 
authoritative legal sources that these rules contain’.65 
 
At its core, doctrinal legal research involves a search to identify ‘what the law is in a 
particular area’.66 This is done by ‘using as raw materials the work of the legal system 
itself; constitutional documents, primary and secondary legislation and recorded court 
judgments’; the so-called ‘primary’ legal source materials.67 Once these are identified, 
collated and analysed, doctrinal legal research will move to the collation and analysis 
of supplementary, relevant legal materials; journal articles and other written 
commentaries on the case law and legislation; the so-called ‘secondary sources’. 
These will often be selected with a historical perspective, allowing for the compilation 
of a chronology of legal development. It is the synthesis of these materials, focusing on 
judicial reasoning and legislative enactment, that forms the embodiment of the doctrinal 
approach.68  
                                                          
63 L. Cahillane and J. Schweppe, Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Clarus Press 
2016) 1 – 2  
64 Ibid, 21 
65 M. Salter and J. Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (Pearson Longman 2007) 49 
66 M. McConville and W. H. Chui, Research Methods for Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh University Press 
2017) 20 – 21 
67 Above n.63, 23 




The central purpose of ‘black-letter’ approach to legal research is to identify a series of 
legal rules by identifying and analysing a smaller subset of general legal principles.69 
The methodology ‘can be seen as analogous to a social science literature review’ in 
that it involves ‘a systematic, explicit and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating 
and synthesising the existing body of completed and recorded work produced by 
researchers, scholars and practitioners’.70 Although often appearing prima facie 
simplistic, doctrinal legal research is ‘complex, multi-layered and distinctive’71 and 
‘demanding, useful and satisfying work’.72 It allows, as a basis, for the mapping of areas 
of law which have been previously unexplored.73 
 
The author has elected not to follow a strictly doctrinal approach in the conducting of 
this research. This is for a number of reasons. The first is that, it is submitted, the first 
research question cannot be tackled in a doctrinal manner, as there exists no primary 
definition of ‘criminal records’ – indeed, it is this lacuna in the legal canon which gives 
rise to the desire to answer the first research question.  
 
The remaining three research questions involve research and subsequent analysis 
which must reach beyond a purely doctrinal approach. This is because these will 
require; 
 
i. an examination of not just the legal rules governing to the collation, storage 
and retention of data, and; 
 
ii. a detailed critical analysis of how those legal rules apply to a specific 
collection of data held by a particular social institution, and; 
 
iii. a subsequent critical analysis of whether the processes implemented by 
that institution are justiciable, with reference to particular social, economic 
and criminal justice factors. 
                                                          
69 Above n.64, 44 
70 Above n.65, 25 
71 Above n.63, 21 




Such an approach therefore lends the research to a methodological approach (or 
approaches) outwith the doctrinal method. Even as regards the fourth research 
question, which might theoretically be tackled by a purely doctrinal approach,74 there is 
an obvious incentive to move beyond the doctrinal approach. In the Five Constables 
case, when making their determination as to the appropriate retention period applicable 
for the PHOENIX data, the Court declared that: 
 
If the police say rationally and reasonably that convictions, however old or minor, 
have a value in the work they do that should, in effect, be the end of the matter. It 
is simply the honest and rationally held belief that convictions, however old and 
however minor, can be of value in the fight against crime and thus the retention of 
that information should not be denied to the police.75 
 
This, it is submitted, is not a doctrinal approach. It is an approach which interprets the 
positive meaning of primary legislation by specific reference to the alleged operational 
requirements of a social organisation. It is a means of creating doctrine by reference to 
the manner in which the law operates, or at least, is claimed to operate. This lends itself 
to an alternative research methodology; that of the socio-legal researcher. 
 
1.5.2 Making the case for a (mostly) socio-legal approach 
The socio-legal method is difficult to define because of the depth and breadth of 
research conducted under its broad tent.76 Some have attempted to narrow it’s 
parameters,77 but the modern consensus is that the socio-legal approach involves an 
examination of ‘law in context’;78 that is to say, an examination of both the ‘law in books’ 
(as might concern the ‘doctrinal’ researcher) and ‘law in action’79 in order to provide an 
analysis of the law in its rightful context as a ‘social phenomenon’80 – the product of the 
                                                          
74 Indeed, chapter nine of this research arguably provides an attempt to do this, albeit by analogous 
reference to European jurisprudence flowing from similar, related but different criminality data 
collections. 
75 Above n.42 [43] 
76 F. Cownie and A. Bradney, ‘Socio-legal studies. A challenge to the doctrinal approach’ in D. Watkins 
and M. Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2018) 42 
77 C.M Campbell and P. Wiles, ‘The Study of Law and Society in Britain’ (1976) 10(4) Law and Society 
Review 547, 548 – 9    
78 D. O’Donovan, ‘Socio-Legal Methodology: Conceptual Underpinnings, Justification and Practical 
Pitfalls’ in L. Cahillane and J. Schweppe, Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Clarus 
Press 2016) 109 
79 Above n.66, 6 
80 Above n.76 
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influence of social forces and interests on internally constructed rules and process.81 
Allott summarises the socio-legal approach as being based upon the notion that: 
 
Law seems to have a special status among social phenomena by reason of its 
forms, it’s rituals, it’s specialised language, it’s special rationality even, and even 
its specific social effects. But, on the other hand, law is clearly embedded in the 
totality of the social process which is its cause, and on which is has substantial 
determinative effect, not least in providing the continuing structure of society.82 
 
The breadth of research conducted under the umbrella of ‘socio-legal work’ has led one 
researcher to claim that any legal research ‘which lies outwith the internal perspective 
of doctrinal methodology’ is properly considered socio-legal research.83 Salter and 
Mason, meanwhile, assert that ‘the meaning of socio-legal studies cannot be decided 
once and for all. This is because it largely depends upon types of activity carried out by 
those who identify themselves as contributors to this movement’.84 
 
Socio-legal research is conducted because the researcher believes that while the 
language of the law has importance, that this cannot be considered in isolation from 
the interrelationship between the law and society, politics and morality.85 It therefore 
follows that socio-legal research is an interdisciplinary endeavour, allowing the lawyer 
engaged in legal research which incorporates methods and materials from different 
disciplines, such as economics, politics, history, social sciences and the humanities.86 
Indeed, as Cownie and Bradney note:  
socio-legal studies has encompassed the use by academic lawyers of a very wide 
range of disciplines… it is now difficult to think of any discipline in the social 
sciences or the humanities that has not be used by scholars working in the socio-
legal mode’.87  
                                                          
81 Above n.65, 122 
82 P. Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 
2002) 36 
83 C. McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632 
84 Above n.81 
85 L. Lammasniemi, Law Dissertations. A Step-by-Step Guide (Routledge 2018) 74 
86 Economic and Social Research Council, ‘Review of Socio-Legal Studies: Final Report’ (Swindon, 
1994) 1 
87 Above n.76, 43 
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Proponents of socio-legal research generally claim it to be an ‘exciting, wide-ranging 
and varied area of research activity’88 and ‘the most important scholarship currently 
being undertaken in the legal world’.89 Socio-legal research has emerged as a popular 
‘alternative’ to doctrinal analysis; Cownie’s research estimated that, by 2004, around 
half of research-active legal academics described themselves as being ‘socio-legal 
researchers’ while many of those who did not categorise themselves as such were 
actually engaged in work ‘indistinguishable’ from colleagues who did describe 
themselves as socio-legal researchers.90  
Socio-legal research is useful because, according to Jolley, it allows for a critical 
analysis of the ‘law in action’; a socio-legal researcher will concentrate not just on the 
law itself but will also conduct a ‘close study of the actions (and omissions) of legal 
officials’.91 Such an approach is well-suited to research of the kind undertaken in this 
thesis, where the focus to all four researcher questions lies largely with the activities of 
the police; specifically in their compilation of criminality data (the first research question) 
and their subsequent actions in collating, storing and retaining that data (the remaining 
research questions). 
This type of socio-legal study aims to examine the ‘gap’ between the law in books and 
the way in which legal officials act in accordance with that law – that identified by Jolley 
as ‘the significant difference between the legal form of a particular measure and it’s 
actual effect and practical force’.92 In the case of the second and third research 
questions particularly93, this approach allows for the thesis to identify in the first instance 
what the ‘legal form’ is (the Data Protection legislation), then the manner in which the 
police have compiled, stored and retained criminality data before moving to identify the 
‘gap’ as a means of attempting to answer those research questions. The first research 
question must, by necessity, take such an approach to address the lacuna in the ‘books’ 
where no legal definition of ‘criminal records’ exists.  
The ‘broad church’ approach which is typical of socio-legal research may result in 
definitional difficulties, however, according to the Socio-legal Studies Association the 
                                                          
88 Above n.85 
89 R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Clarendon Press 1995) 
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question ‘what is socio-legal research’ can be answered by the identification of three 
principle strands of socio-legal research.94 These are: 
 
i. Higher level social theories of law disconnected from empirical studies; 
 
ii. Theories developed in the middle-range that are ‘grounded’ in the findings 
of empirical research (and which in turn aim to prompt further empirical 
studies to test the validity of their theoretical claims); 
 
iii. Policy driven projects that are entirely empirical.95 
 
It is intended for this research to join the second of these three strands. In attempting 
to answer the second, third and fourth research questions, the author will attempt to 
make theoretical postulations based, or perhaps even ‘supported’, by the quantitative 
data predominantly made available by official government publications or by the 
empirical work of academics made available via peer-reviewed, published research.  
 
In chapter three, for example, almost doctrinal exposition and analysis of what is 
contained on the PHOENIX database is interwoven with empirical data to make 
analytical evaluations of the material contained in that database as a means of working 
towards answering the first research question. Chapters five and six draw together data 
provided by Governmental statistics to identify potential ‘defects’ in the police 
implementation of the various Data Protection Principles, while chapter eight particular 
aims to tackle the fourth research question by reference to various theoretical positions 
regarding the ‘operational usefulness’ of criminality data which are supported, where 
possible, by empirical data obtained either in official sources of from previous academic 
research.   
According to Bradney and Cownie, the socio-legal researcher ‘must be prepared to use 
a far wider range of sources in both paper and electronic formats than would be the 
case for a black-letter project’.96 While the doctrinal researcher is primarily concerned 
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with the primary and secondary legal source materials, the socio-legal researcher uses 
these as the ‘legal’ grounding of the work but will also seek to ‘often draw from source 
materials that are not purely legal, and from other disciplines.97 Lammasniemi claims 
that the common research materials of the socio-legal researcher include; statutes, 
secondary legislation, case law, reports from Government, non-governmental 
organisations and other stakeholder organisations, academic scholarship from law and 
other disciplines and, occasionally, from empirical research conducted by the 
researcher or others.98  
In this way, it is possible to identify the ‘method’ of the socio-logical researcher; utilising 
the doctrinal scholar’s primary legal source materials to identify ‘the law in books’ but 
then identifying the necessary ‘extrinsic’ materials and analysing these to critically 
evaluate the ‘law in action’. In the context of this thesis, the necessary extrinsic 
materials are likely to be numerous; reports by the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Information Commissioner’s Officer and particularly the police themselves are all 
expected to play a substantial and integral role in identifying the ‘law in action’ so far as 
the second, third and fourth research questions are concerned.  
Moreover, the recognition that this area of research is as firmly embedded within the 
sphere of ‘criminal justice’ as much as it is within ‘law’ makes a cross-over with the 
social-sciences almost inevitable, particularly with Criminology. This thesis invokes 
significant elements of academic criminological research and various criminological 
concepts and analyses are evident throughout,99 though perhaps the most notable 
example is at chapter 8.4, where criminological concepts such as desistence play a 
central role in an analysis of the continuing need to retain criminality data for operational 
purposes. 
The overlap in this research with the doctrinal approach is self-evident. This thesis will 
necessarily invoke doctrinal methods in aiming to identify the ‘law in books’; this will be 
made evident throughout the research.100 There is a growing recognition of the synergy 
between doctrinal and socio-legal methods101 and indeed, it has been suggested that, 
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properly synergised, socio-legal research can be utilised to improve doctrine.102 It is the 
recognition of this that shapes this research in its attempts to answer the second, third 
and fourth research questions and, moreover, in the recommendations which are 
made103 to amend both law and practice in response to the research findings. 
The generation of, and reliance on, empirical data is often considered one of the 
common elements which differentiates socio-legal research from doctrinal. While not 
entirely accurate,104 this thesis will nonetheless attempt to utilise empirical data in 
support of the theories and critical evaluations made, where this is appropriate.  One 
of the principle criticisms which has been levelled at socio-legal research generally is 
that lawyers engaged in it often do not have the necessary methodological training 
required to conduct good quality quantitative data.105 In recognition of this weakness, 
this research will instead secondary analysis of primary data collated and published by 
others.  
 
This is a form of quantitative analysis familiar to the social scientist known simply as 
‘secondary quantitative analysis’. This method, engaged particularly in chapter 8.4, 
involves the quantitative reproduction of secondary data reported in other sources. 
Secondary quantitative analysis of this type effectively ‘uses ‘old’ data for new ideas’106 
and is a useful form of research for the type undertaken here in that there is 
considerable time and cost savings in not having to undertake the primary data 
collection.107  
 
The first type of data to be utilised in this research is that produced by peer-reviewed 
publications. The mechanism of peer-review should ensure that the data is of ‘good’ 
quality’. The second type of data to be utilised is that produced by the Government in 
official statistics. This data is a staple of legal, criminological and criminal justice 
studies108 and, despite the limitations inherent in these,109 it is submitted that these 
represent a realistic’ metric by which certain assessments can be made; for example, 
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police ‘clear-up’ rates, if they can be measured at all, can at present only be realistically 
so done by reference the data produced by the police and the Ministry of Justice who 
are responsible for these.  
 
The purpose of employing this empirical method is to attempt to identify the ‘law in 
action’; to ‘fill in the gap’, and to provide support for theoretical positions offered, 
particularly in attempting to answer the fourth research question. 
 
1.5.3 The Scotland ‘comparison’ 
At chapter 8.4.2 of this thesis, the research will provide a critical, evaluative 
commentary of the processes in situ for the collation, retention and deletion of criminal 
records in Scotland.  
 
This might, at first glance, appear to introduce a comparative methodology into this 
thesis. The term ‘comparative law’ is in itself difficult to define110 but legal comparative 
research is broadly thought, at it’s simplest, to involve finding out what the law in a 
particular country is, and making comparisons to that in another country.111 The 
purpose of that comparison is usually intended to be that ‘the national legal system of 
the observer will benefit by offering suggestions for future development, providing 
warnings of possible difficulties, giving an opportunity to stand back from one’s own 
national system and look at it more critically’.112  
 
There is a growing trend towards comparative legal research, despite there being no 
standard method either for selective the comparator or for conducting the comparative 
research, 113 because the aim of identifying possible ‘solutions’ or legal amendments is 
considered a ‘valid’ reason for conducting comparative legal research.114 
 
However, it is not intended to conduct a ‘comparative’ study with the position in 
Scotland, in the ordinarily prescribed meaning of the term. This is because direct 
comparison between differing jurisdictional approaches to the collation and retention of 
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criminal records is fraught with difficulty and (arguably at least) not particularly 
instructive.  
 
In the United States of America, for example, there is no federal legislation for the 
central collation of criminality data. Instead, this is collated and stored variously by local 
police forces, state databases and federal repositories and the data consists 
predominantly of arrests and ‘encounters’ with police, rather than court convictions.115 
Moreover, there is no data protection legislation in the United States of America to 
which criminal record data might be attached). 
 
In Australia, meanwhile, there is a central organisation responsible for the 
dissemination of criminal records (‘CrimTrac’)116 but the data itself is not centralised 
and is instead held by the individual police forces in each state117 and is collated and 
retained in accordance with the polices or legislation applicable to each state.118 Again, 
there is no ‘national charter of rights’ which bears comparison to the ECoHR and 
criminal record data is considered ‘public’ data in Australia,119 which lends it no 
protection from any data protection legislation. 
 
A brief comparison between England and Wales and EU member states was conducted 
by the UK government’s Independent Reviewer for Criminality Information in 2009. 
Even this review, which largely consisted of comparison between countries bound by 
similar privacy and data protection legislation, illustrated the especial difficulties in 
comparative analysis on criminal record data processes. Some of the more enunciated 
of these were that different jurisdictions have different means of disposing with criminal 
matters, particularly in respect of out of court-disposals (such as cautions) and some 
jurisdictions differentiate in their treatment of juvenile offenders, while others do not. 
Some criminal record collections are maintained by the police, some by ‘criminal record 
offices’, some by a specified government department and others still by the prosecuting 
authority of that country. Several countries have detailed statutory provisions outlining 
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the mechanisms for collating, storing and retaining criminal record data, while others 
have no statutory mechanisms at all. Some countries do not even store the data on 
computerised systems.120   
 
All of this is intended to illustrate the rather peculiar difficulties in attempting a 
comparative study as regards the collation, storage and retention of criminal record 
data between differing jurisdictions. Countries which might ordinarily be considered 
‘sound’ comparators are, for differing reasons, arguably not so in the context of this 
research. The reality is that there is no consistency of approach which can be identified 
by states with criminal record collections; whether that be in how the collections are 
‘governed’, what is collected, how it is stored, who stores it and for how long.121  
 
This is largely because each jurisdiction has different and competing social, economic, 
political and industrial concerns which underpin the system they have implemented; 
American jurists, for example, find themselves wrestling with the issue of free public 
access to criminal records, afforded to citizens in the wake of the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, and the disadvantage suffered by black and other ethnic minority 
groups who have (disproportionately) received criminal records,122 rather than any 
concerns regarding either privacy or data protection. 
 
The rather inevitable result of this is that a comparative analysis is not suitable for 
research of the type proposed by this thesis. The analysis of the position in Scotland 
does not intend to represent a ‘comparative’ analysis in the meaning ordinarily ascribed 
to it as a legal research methodology, because it is not intended to make 
recommendations for either legislative amendment or enactment based upon the 
analysis of the system because it is not possible for this author to state with any 
authority that the system in situ there is ‘better’ (or, indeed, any ‘worse’). Instead, that 
analysis is offered in order to illustrate an important point; namely that the position in 
England and Wales is not the only position that could be taken without prejudicing the 
expressed purposes for criminal record data collation, storage and retention outlined 
and analysed in chapter four. 
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An analysis of the criminal record collation and retention system in Scotland, is, it is 
submitted, instructive and indicative for a number of reasons which would not apply to 
an alternative jurisdiction and which are oft alluded to by comparative legal researchers. 
These are as follows: 
 
i. Although Scots Law utilises a different criminal prosecution system than that in 
England and Wales, there are broad similarities which make a comparison less 
onerous than other jurisdictions. Criminal cases operate on a two-tier system, 
where the demarcation line is between ‘serious’ and ‘minor’ offences.123 
Decision on bail are impacted by the previous antecedent history of the accused, 
and these are a statutory factor to be considered in any bail application.124 
Previous convictions and other antecedent matters are admissible as ‘bad 
character’ evidence in criminal trials, albeit in more limited circumstances than 
in England and Wales.125  
 
Criminal conviction details are also a relevant factor in determining sentencing 
of the defendant after conviction,126 and a range of broadly comparable court 
and out-of-court disposals are available under Scots Law, including the 
provision of fines,127 community sentences,128 custody,129 ‘Recorded Police 
Warnings’ (which are broadly comparable to cautions in England and Wales) 
and ‘Anti-Social Fixed Penalties’ (broadly comparable to PNfD in England and 
Wales).130 
 
ii. In spite of Scotland having a separate legal system to England and Wales, it 
shares much primary domestic legislation, including key legislative provisions 
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relating to criminal records (and this research) such as the Data Protection Act 
1984, the Data Protection Act 1998, the Data Protection Act 2018 and Police 
Act 1997 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.131 This means that the 
police in Scotland and those in England must largely operate within the same 
legislative framework; indeed, ‘Data Protection’ is a ‘reserved matter’ for which 
the devolved Scottish Parliament has no power to legislate and is instead bound 
by legislation from Westminster.132 
 
iii. The system of criminal record collation and retention in Scotland has run almost 
parallel to that in England and Wales. Although outlined in depth at chapter 2 of 
this research, some indicative examples of this include the statutory imposition 
of a police obligation to initiate a ‘criminal record register’ in Edinburgh under 
the provision of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871,133 the creation and operation 
(within a decade or so) of police ‘criminal record offices’ modelled on that 
opened at Scotland Yard134 and the opening of a ‘Scottish Criminal Record 
Office’ in Glasgow during the period of decentralisation in the 1960s.135 The 
SCRO computerised it’s records in 1988136 and the current system, the Criminal 
History System (‘CHS’), performs a ‘similar service’ to the PNC in England and 
Wales.137  
 
iv. Policies for data collation, storage and disclosure have also run almost parallel, 
with the major changes initially stemming from circular documents,138 followed 
by Part V of the Police Act 1997 and the creation of ‘Disclosure Scotland’; a 
public-private partnership which almost exactly mirrors the CRB/DBS in England 
and Wales.139 As is the case in England and Wales, the policies which govern 
the collation, storage and retention of criminal records data on CHS are not 
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prescribed by statute but are instead delegated to the police; formerly instigated 
by the Scottish equivalent to ACPO (‘ACPO Scotland’) and now Police 
Scotland.140 
 
v. Such is the interrelationship between Scottish police and their English 
counterparts that police in England and Wales routinely co-operate with their 
Scottish counterparts in criminal records and related criminality data matters. 
Scottish police have access to the PNC, including the PHOENIX database, and 
are able to create and amend records, including the routine uploading of CHS 
data onto the PNC.141 A similar data sharing arrangement is in place for the 
PND; Scottish forces have access to the PND and information from the Scottish 
equivalent (‘The Scottish Intelligence Database’) and CHS are uploaded onto 
the PND for use by English and Welsh police forces.142  
 
It is for these reasons that an instructive analysis of the system for criminal record data 
collation, storage and retention in Scotland is pertinent to a doctrinal analysis of the system 
in England and Wales. It is not a ‘comparative analysis’ as it is not intended to show that 
one system is ‘better’ than another; in fact, the purpose of this analysis is to illustrate by 
way of comparable example that there is an extant alternative system of retention in situ, 




In order to test the hypothesis that the traditional view that ‘criminal records’ are centrally 
held records of court convictions, this research will utilise a doctrinal approach to ascertain 
what records have been collected, what records continue to be collected and whether 
these merit a reconsideration of the traditional definition.  
 
In order to test the hypothesis that the police are likely to have committed breaches of the 
DPA 1984 and the DPA 1998, this research will use a doctrinal approach to identify 
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whether there is evidence to suggest that this has taken place, when, how and, if possible, 
why. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that the police policy regarding the length of time that 
records are retained is ‘excessive’, the research will invoke a mixture of doctrinal, 
comparative and quantitative methods to identify legal, social and economic rationale for 
questioning the status quo. The research will conclude by making conclusions and 





The historical development of a national collection 
of criminal records in England and Wales 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Criminal data collection is not a new phenomenon in England and Wales. The general 
public perception that criminal activity is socially disruptive and there is, therefore, a public 
interest in recording information relating to the individuals involved, has existed since at 
least the mid-eighteenth century in England and Wales.1  
 
This chapter aims to provide an abridged, critical chronology of the development of a 
national collection of criminal records in England and Wales. In doing so, it is intended to 
identify the principal staging points in the building of the modern criminal record collection, 
identifying the early origins of data retention, and critically evaluating who collected data, 
what was being collected and why collections were undertaken at all. The identification of 
these elements is intended to assist in framing the analysis of the modern collection, both 
as comparators and also as a means of asking whether lessons might be learned and, if 
so, whether they have. 
 
2.2 1730 – 1869: the embryonic collections  
The first formal criminal record collection involved the institution of a public office at Bow 
Street in 1739, where a justice was available to record reports of crimes.2 In 1748, Henry 
Fielding was appointed as Chief Magistrate at Bow Street.3 He then appointed a register 
clerk to take details of crimes reported, stolen items and the names of those suspected 
and/or convicted of offences.4 John Fielding succeeded his half-brother and in 1754 he 
opened a rudimentary ‘criminal records office’5 to collect allegations of criminality, notes 
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of warrants issued, convictions and sentences.6 This data was disseminated routinely to 
local policing groups and magistrates, expressly to assist in the apprehension of wanted 
criminals.7 This was done by publication in 1771 of the Quarterly Pursuit and the Weekly 
or Extraordinary Pursuit,8 which in 1786 became the Hue and Cry.9 Criminality data 
continued to be retained at Bow Street until 1780, when the entire collection was destroyed 
(perhaps deliberately10) in the Gordon Riots.11 
 
Shoemaker and Ward have argued that these early collections were motivated by ‘a broad 
moral and empirically driven desire to better understand the criminal and the causes of 
crime.’12 It is submitted, however, that it is unlikely that these rudimentary collections were 
instituted through mere criminological curiosity. In truth, Henry Fielding came to Bow 
Street ‘during a crime wave’.13 He had three conjoined objectives: ‘to establish a 
systematic criminal intelligence and information gathering apparatus; to create a coherent 
police administration centre and to develop a preventative strategy for crime 
management’.14 John Fielding created the ‘Bow Street Runners’ – a collection of paid 
thief-takers which formed the basis of what many consider the first rudimentary police 
force15 – in the hope of achieving his brother’s second and third aims. His criminal record 
collection was instituted, it is submitted, to meet the first. 
 
The Fielding brothers didn’t simply use their criminal record collection for philanthropic 
purposes. They also used them to make money. The original Bow Street list formed the 
basis of Henry Fielding’s ‘Universal Register Office’ – a rudimentary employment agency 
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which opened in London in 1749.16 Fielding used his collection here for the purpose of 
employment vetting, pronouncing that, in return for sixpence paid: ‘no servant shall ever 
be registered who cannot produce a real good character from the last place where he or 
she actually lived’.17 The desire of both Henry and John Fielding’s to generate profit from 
policing criminality was widely recognised: McMullan latterly described the Bow Street 
Runners as ‘monied police encouraged to engage in civil mercenary work, taking their 
profits from state rewards, fees and private enterprises’.18 
 
From around 1780, criminality information was being collated locally ‘without compulsion 
from the central state’,19 particularly at prisons, where staff were especially active in 
collecting information on their inmates.20 The Home Office was instituted in 1782, but as 
‘crime was not a high priority for Home Office officials’, it initially took little interest in 
criminality information.21 This was hardly surprising: Parliament was responding to the 
‘crime wave’ by simply increasing the number of capital offences. The so-called ‘bloody 
code’, intended to prevent offending by deterrent, 22  meant that by 1815, the number of 
capital offences on the statute book stood at around 225.23 The principal alternative was 
transportation. Although in some limited use previously,24 transportation was formally 
incorporated onto the statute books in 1718 in the hope that it would both remove criminals 
from society and solve a labour shortage in the colonies, particularly in North America.25 
The American Revolution ended the practice there and instead convicts were sent to New 
South Wales.26 
 
Where an offender faced a death sentence or permanent transportation, there is little 
purpose in retaining criminality data regarding him, save for statistical purposes. 
Deceased offenders do not commit further offences, and while those banished from the 
country may reoffend, they do so elsewhere and thus outside the scope (and concern) of 
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the government. The retention of information relating to those offenders would, therefore, 
have been unduly cost-prohibitive for the newly formed, and funding deficient, Home 
Office. However, transportation was not ordinarily intended to be permanent; indeed, 
periods of ‘seven years minimum’ were usually thought to provide the desired deterrent 
effect.27 It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that the Home Office was prepared to 
take control of a rudimentary collection of criminal conviction data started by the City of 
London in 179128 when it became too expensive for the City to maintain it in 1793.29 This 
marked the first time that a criminal record collection lay in the hands of the government 
in England and Wales.   
 
In 1800, transported convicts in New South Wales were being offered an embryonic form 
of parole known as a ‘ticket-of-leave’. This allowed the convict to obtain work prior to the 
conclusion of their sentence, under supervision and on the condition that the ‘ticket’ would 
be revoked if a new offence was committed.30 The ticket itself contained ‘identifying 
information about the convict and characteristics and details of their criminal history’.31 
This allowed the Home Office to put its newly obtained collection of criminality information 
to some use, sharing data with prison administrators and local magistrates in Australia. 
Although transportation became unpopular and pressure mounted to abandon it,32 the 
ticket-of-leave’ system was considered a success.33 The Penal Servitude Act 1853 ended 
transportation in all but exceptional cases34 and made two fundamental changes to 
domestic law: it introduced imprisonment as the predominant alternative means of 
punishment35 and brought the ‘ticket of leave’ system to England and Wales.36  
 
This resulted in criminality information being used by the state in England and Wales for 
the first time in the administration of justice, with convictions data being used to inform the 
decision of the Office of the Director of Convict Prisons on whether a ticket should be 
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issued.37 However, the system ran into almost immediate problems. Criminologists 
familiar with modern media crime reporting would recognise the contemporary 
lamentations that convicts with tickets re-offended38 or that the system was excessively 
lenient, which turned public opinion against the system and generated a widespread fear 
of the ‘habitual criminal’.39  Men with tickets therefore found it difficult to find work,40 which 
in turn encouraged them to lie about their identities41 or, ultimately, to return to 
criminality.42  
 
Sir Walter Crofton, responsible for implementing a similar system in Ireland, lamented that 
the system was failing in England because ‘we entirely neglected to adopt the colonial 
safeguards, viz, the supervision of the liberated convict and his re-confinement to prison 
in the event of misconduct’.43 When the Home Office tasked the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police to provide a report on the ticket-or-leave men, they were told that the 
police ‘could not find or produce a single man of them’.44 When the police did eventually 
find one, officers were accused of revealing their identifies to employers and often became 
overzealous in returning them to custody.45 Despite reforms introduced by the Penal 
Servitude Act 1864, the system was considered by 1869 ‘an absolute failure.’46  
 
2.3  1869 – 1910: national statutory and police criminality data collation 
The failure to properly supervise ticket-of-leave men meant that ‘the Victorians…wanted 
a national system of registering known criminals.’47 The result was the Habitual Criminals 
Act 1869 (‘the HCA 1869’)48 which is ‘now taken as the starting point for the statutory 
                                                          
37 P.J. Murray, ‘Not so bad as they seem: The Transportation, ticket-of-leave, and penal servitude 
questions, plainly stated, and argued on facts and figures, with come observations on the principles of 
prevention, in a letter addressed to Matthew Devenport Hill’ (1857) Knowsley Pamphlet Collection 13 – 
14  
38 Above n.33, 17 
39 T. Thomas, Sex Crime, Sex Offending and Society (Routledge 2015) 42 
40 W. I. Aislabie, The Ticket-of-Leave System in Australia and England Volume 1 (Effingham Wilson, 
London 1857) 4 
41 Ibid, 7 – 8  
42 Ibid, 5 
43 W. Crofton, ‘Convict systems and transportation: a lecture delivered at the Philosophical Institution, 
Bristol, on the 22nd December 1862’ (LSE Selected Pamphlets 1963) 3 
44 L. Radzinowicz and R. Hood, The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian and Edwardian England 
(Clarendon 1990) 249 cited in T. Thomas, Sex Crime: Sex Offending and Society (Routledge 2015) 42 
45 Above n.33, 18 
46 Above n.39, 43 
47 Above n.38, 19 
48 T. Thomas, ‘National collection of criminal records – a question of data quality’ (November 2001) 
Criminal Law Review 886, 886 – 887 
33 
 
collation of the United Kingdom’s repository of criminal records’.49 Section 5 of the HCA 
1869 provided that ‘a register of all persons convicted of a crime shall be kept’ and that 
responsibility for the list lay with the police in London and Dublin. An ‘Alphabetical Register 
of Habitual Criminals’ was duly created, maintained at Scotland Yard50 by the 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, who became known as ‘the Keeper of the 
Records’51 and published routinely in bound volumes.52 The intention behind the register 
was clear: one MP declared it to be nothing less than: ‘a wholesale system of police 
surveillance, so that a considerable portion of the people would be in a state of out-of-
door imprisonment, tied, as it were, by the leg to the police’.53 
 
The scope of the proposed scheme was enormous and, in fact, ‘the number of persons 
registered accumulated so rapidly…that the register was almost useless from its bulk’.54 
Other problems quickly manifested. Those wishing to consult the register had to travel to 
London or Dublin to do so,55 limiting its usefulness in the provinces. The register omitted 
any offences/offenders in Scotland, as the HCA 1869 made no provision for their 
inclusion.56 There were no provisions made for the identification of offenders; the reigster 
was simply a list of names and convictions, with little to match records to individuals save 
sporadic photographs provided by prison staff.57 This meant that ‘a convict could evade 
official knowledge of his prior convictions simply by giving a false name’.58 
 
Parliament attempted to rectify these problems by implementing the Prevention of Crimes 
Act 1871, which repealed the 1869 Act59 and introduced more wide-ranging provisions. 
New registers were to be established in London,60 Edinburgh,61 and Dublin62 and only 
those convicted twice or more were included in it.63 Conviction details and photographs 
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were to be provided by prison governors on a prescribed form. 64 Governors who did not 
comply risked a fine of up to twenty pounds.65 Arrangements were made for convict 
prisoners to print the records as they were updated, and the prints were circulated to police 
forces and prisons nationwide.66 The first volume contained 12,164 names with 21,194 
convictions listed against them.67  
 
The identification problem persisted68 and a ‘Register of Distinctive Marks’ – ‘an ambitious 
if cumbersome attempt to describe systematically the vagaries of the human body’ – was 
instituted in an attempt solve it.69 The intention was to provide the police with ‘all 
information necessary to establish a prima facie identification of any person suspected of 
being an habitual criminal…These two books give the particulars necessary to assist the 
police in their attempts to check the habitual criminal in his career’.70 The reality, however, 
was that the sheer volume of data collected continued to cause problems because many 
of those listed ‘were not habitual criminals in the ordinary sense’.71 Searches sometimes 
resulted in ‘false-positives’, so that the wrong record was attached to the wrong person, 
leading to them being incorrectly labelled a repeat offender.72 The production of annual 
bound volumes, rather than in card index as propounded by jurist Arnould Bonneville de 
Marsangy some thirty years previously, 73 meant that records were often out of date as 
quickly as they were published; a particular problem for a system which relied on given 
names, convict descriptions, bodily markings and photographs, which is many cases 
might change quite markedly over even a single year.74 
 
Moreover, the entire process was extraordinarily laborious. By 1875, the London 
Alphabetical Register contained some 150,000 names and some 30,463 photographs. 
Manual searching of this vast repository took a very long time and yielded comparatively 
few results: in 1872, for example, the police obtained just 373 positive identifications.75 
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Even an abridged register, created in 1877 to try to mitigate the problems of scale and 
labour, did not significantly improve matters; indeed, the police barely used it76 and ‘the 
knowledge in the heads of policemen on the beat’ was still the principal means utilised to 
detect crimes and apprehend suspected offenders.77  
 
Against this backdrop, a 1874 Home Office report declared the entire system ‘a 
comparative failure’78 but did not recommend that it be halted. Rather, in 1877, the task of 
maintaining the Alphabetical Register was transferred to the Prisons Department of the 
Home Office,79 who opened a Habitual Criminals Registry (‘the HCR’) for that purpose.80 
Meanwhile, the police constabularies in Liverpool and Birmingham, still bedevilled by the 
inherent difficulty in obtaining information from the Alphabetical Register and under a 
statutory duty to supervise convicts, began to keep their own collections.81 These 
registers, however, were not intended to be as comprehensive as that kept at the HCR, 
and the force in Liverpool, for example, still used the national register when searching for 
a suspect on the basis of description evidence.82  
 
The Metropolitan Police, also struggling to fulfil their supervisory obligations and no longer 
in possession of the Alphabetical Register,83 attempted to rectify their problems by 
establishing a Convict Supervision Office at Scotland Yard (‘the CSO’).84 The CSO 
collated their own criminality data separate from, though often confused with, that of the 
HCA.85 This was deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the CSO, which included 
visiting convicts at prison prior to release, helping to obtain employment86 and verifying 
residency post-release87 and was, therefore, essentially ‘probationary’ in nature88 The 
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CSO also kept their own registers of distinctive marks, convict descriptions89 and a 
photograph collection.90 
 
The CSO collection reflected the Metropolitan Police’s belief that, despite the comparative 
failures of the statutory registration schemes, the majority of crimes were committed by 
‘habitual’ criminals and such individuals should therefore be monitored.91 The CSO’s 
primary criminal record function was, therefore, surveillance; during the first six years of 
its operation, the CSO claimed it had ‘kept track of most habitual offenders and convicts 
released on licence’92 and officers claimed that the register’s capacity to allow the police 
to monitor such men was ‘of inestimable value in the prevention of crime’.93  
 
The data was not just used for crime prevention, however. The CSO record collection has 
been described as ‘the first systematic attempt to create a centralised source of police 
information for the purposes of suppressing deviancy’.94 The perceived value of criminality 
data in detective work began to emerge, with police officers investigating new offences 
matching witness accounts and details found at crime scenes with descriptions and 
pictures held in the CSO registers.95 Building on these principles, in 1883 the CSO used 
their records to print and disseminate to all forces the Police Gazette; a successor to Hue 
and Cry96 which provided confidential ‘intelligence’ relating to ‘people wanted, new crimes 
committed and offenders being discharged from prison’.97  
 
The use of criminality data for the detection, rather than the prevention, of crime was 
perceived to be relatively novel in the nineteenth century but it was, in truth, little more 
than a more large-scale re-application of the principles first espoused by the Fielding 
brothers at Bow Street a century before. However, this model of utilising criminality data 
as ‘intelligence’ to inform detective work – a rudimentary form of what a century later would 
become known as ‘intelligence-led policing’98 – was mimicked by several provincial 
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forces99 and was credited with what many Victorians referred to as ‘the English miracle of 
falling crime rates’.100 
 
The reality, however, was that this perception was a mirage. A Departmental Committee 
established to investigate the official crime data found it ‘next to useless’.101 Moreover, the 
reality of the CSO’s supervision programme was found to be rather different than that 
painted by the CSO themselves: in reality they were ‘haphazard and unbureaucratic’102 – 
in 1888, the CSO assigned twelve staff to supervise some 32,000 convicts.103 
Underfunded and understaffed, police forces were incapable of effecting proper 
supervision104 and the same problems of absconding,105 lack of public support106 and over-
zealous policing107 which undermined the ticket-of-leave programme began to infect 
convict supervision so that the perceived reality which emerged was that ‘if a man is 
determined to do wrong all the supervision in England will not prevent it. The police cannot 
always watch a man’.108  
 
The revelation that supervision was not preventing crime did little to discourage the police 
from collecting criminality data. Encouraged by the apparent usefulness of the data in 
detective work, both CSO and the Habitual Criminals Registry continued to collect data 
with a renewed focus on building repositories of information useful to Criminal 
Investigation Departments (CID). Guided by little more than a desire to collect as much 
information as possible, the CSO did not learn from the mistakes of the first habitual 
criminals register and their collection became so unwieldy that the time and effort required 
to yield positives results was wholly disproportionate: one parliamentary committee found 
in 1893 that 21 officers took 57.5 hours to search the register for 27 prisoners and yielded 
seven identifications.109  
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Such problems probably explain why the CSO failed to become the hub of criminal 
intelligence as it had intended,110 despite the decision of a Home Office committee to 
return custody of the Alphabetical Register to Scotland Yard in 1894,111 consolidating the 
national collection once more into a single repository in the hands of the Metropolitan 
Police. 
 
The major problem in trying to accurately identify an individual in and tie him to his criminal 
history among a collection of hundreds of thousands of records persisted. The CSO 
initially attempted to resolve this by recording yet more information, including more 
photographs, initials, distinctive marks (including tattoos) and a classification of the 
individuals’ modus operandi.112 This was then supplemented by the implementation of the 
anthropometric system113 devised by the head of their counterpart organisation in Paris, 
Dr. Alphonse Bertillon, in 1882,114 which involved the physical measurement by calipers 
and recording of eleven different bony parts of the suspect’s body, taken under controlled 
conditions.115 Bertillon claimed that his system worked because the odds of two people 
having the same measurements were 4,191,304 to 1.116 
 
This system had a number of limitations; the intricate measurements required meant it 
was inefficient, it did not reflect natural changes to the body over time or through illness 
and it was expensive and heavily dependent on the quality of the work undertaken by the 
technicians involved.117 The identification problem was evidently unresolved, in spite of a 
growing acceptance that ‘the usefulness of criminal records depends on the ability to 
fasten upon each human being an identity from which he cannot escape’.118  
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In 1900, a committee chaired by Henry Belper119 was convened by the Home Secretary 
to consider the most appropriate means of attaching criminal records to individuals.120 The 
choice was between anthropometry or an alternative system proposed by Sir Edward 
Henry, the Inspector General of Police for the Bengal Province of India.121 Henry was not 
convinced by the anthropometric system and liaised with Sir Francis Galton to produce an 
alternative.122 Galton was convinced that the marks on the hand and fingertips were a 
permanent123 and unique124 identity marker and, having unsuccessfully attempted to 
persuade the government in 1873 to adopt fingerprinting as a means of criminal 
identification,125 he turned over all his work to Henry in 1890.126 
 
Henry developed a classification for use in Bengal127 and, by the time the Belper 
Committee was convening, the ‘Henry Classification System’ had helped secure its first 
criminal conviction when a thief was matched by his criminal record to a bloody mark left 
at a crime scene in Bengal in 1898.128 An independent review of his system, conducted in 
1897 by the British Indian Government, had concluded that fingerprinting was simpler, 
cheaper, quicker and more reliable than the anthropometric system and so they 
abandoned the latter in favour of the former.129 The Belper Committee recommended that 
England and Wales do likewise.130 Henry was subsequently made an assistant 
commissioner of the Metropolitan Police131 and duly opened a Fingerprint Registry at 
Scotland Yard on 1 July 1901,132 with three officers from the anthropometric department 
at Scotland Yard were tasked with converting their anthropometric criminal record 
collection into useable fingerprint records.133 In 1902, one of the officers matched the 
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criminal record of Harry Jackson to fingerprints found at the scene of a burglary in London, 
and subsequently obtained the first conviction in England to rely on fingerprint evidence.134  
 
Although the value of fingerprinting as a detective tool was not initially realised – at this 
stage ‘police departments were primarily interested in using fingerprints to index criminal 
records’ and fingerprinting for investigating crimes was ‘a mere side-line to the real work 
of maintaining a criminal record archive135 – the identification problem was solved. The 
improvement in efficiency was marked: the number of positive identifications of offenders 
and their criminal records using the anthropometric system in 1901 was 410; in 1902, the 
change to fingerprinting yielded 1,722 comparable identifications.136 Attempts to compile 
a comprehensive fingerprint register began in earnest and by 1909, the Fingerprint 
Registry had compiled 140,000 records137 and fingerprinting remains the pre-eminent 
means of identifying offenders today. 
 
Around the same time that fingerprinting was solving the identification problem, efforts 
were finally being made to implanted Bonneville de Marsangy’s solution to the problem of 
publishing bound volumes of records which are out of date almost immediately upon 
publication.138 His solution was to ‘treat criminal bodies as librarians treat books’139 and 
create an index-card system. This system, first trialled for criminal records data by police 
in Liverpool,140 allowed for records to be contained in alphabetical ordered files which were 
simply amended as the need arose, without disrupting the order of the records.141 A similar 
system was successfully trialled at the CSO in 1896142 and then expanded to all of 
Scotland Yard in 1904.143  
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The Convict Supervision Office and the Habitual Criminals Registry were formally merged 
in 1905144 but this combined registry, whilst vastly improved, still failed to become ‘the first 
port of call’ for provincial forces and comparable local facilities were instituted at Wakefield 
and Hatfield, among others.145 Scotland Yard responded by revamping the Police Gazette 
in 1910 to  improve the sharing of criminal intelligence from Scotland Yard to provincial 
forces (including new intelligence on ‘travelling’ and ‘expert’ criminals).146 This meant there 
finally existed something approaching ‘a reliable criminal records system’.147 In 1913, the 
Habitual Criminals Registry was merged with the Fingerprint Agency, and the Criminal 
Records Office (‘the CRO’) was opened at Scotland Yard.148  
 
What is clear, therefore, is that, from the kernel of the isolated 18th century initiatives at 
Bow Street and a smattering of local prisons, the nineteenth century saw an exponential 
growth of interest in the collation of data relating to offenders and their offences. The state, 
previously disinclined to so much as count how many offenders were consigned to the 
gallows and the hulk, suddenly deigned it pertinent to institute two national registers and 
to collect huge amounts of criminality data, ranging from convictions handed down in court 
to the caliper measurements of an offender’s elbow. The desire to collect, and to ensure 
collection was accurate, led directly to the development of one of the cornerstones of 
modern forensic science.149  
 
What is not at all clear is what drove this expansionist programme. The author has 
previously highlighted the proposition that ‘criminological curiosity’ drove the programme 
of criminal record collation,150 while Higgs argues that the criminal record collection was 
symptomatic of a wider process which saw England becoming an ‘information state’,151 
with those in charge simply ‘devoted to the collection and manipulation of personal data 
about their subjects’.152 In essence, this argument provides that the government started 
collecting data became it could; a collection for collecting’s sake. Others have suggested 
that initiatives to chart criminal behaviour and document those responsible were a form of 
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‘nation modelling’; an attempt to explain social and economic issues though an 
‘understanding of national trends’.153  
 
It is submitted that, although there are elements of truth in all of these theories, the 
practical reality is that the data was collated by those involved intrinsically believed that it 
would somehow help in the prevention of crime. The Fielding brothers thought criminal 
records would help their rudimentary police force prevent crime. The legislative 
programmes of the mid-late nineteenth century came about because Parliament were 
concerned that habitual offenders might commit more crime if released unsupervised back 
into society. Supervision meant, in effect, crime prevention. Such was the prevalence of 
the doctrine that criminal records aided in crime detection that Vollmer wrote in 1918 that 
‘only unimportant cities or cities who inhabitants are lacking in civic pride lack identification 
bureaus’.154 
 
2.5 The Criminal Records Office: the ‘crooks clearinghouse’ 
The amalgamation of the three principal national collections of criminality information into 
the Criminal Records Office (‘the CRO’) at Scotland Yard was intended to form ‘a national 
registry of crimes and criminals’.155 The CRO brought a period of comparative stability to 
the criminal record process itself – it’s mechanisms remained largely unchanged from its 
inception up to the late 1980s156 – by embarking upon a criminality data collation and 
storing exercise which was ‘systemised in a manner and to an extent not hitherto 
attempted’.157 
 
What was also clear was that the purpose of the collection had changed. Winston 
Churchill, upon being appointed as Home Secretary in 1910, declared himself against 
making specific provisions for supervising habitual offenders, describing the extant 
legislation as ‘unsatisfactory’.158 While expressing his admiration for the work of police in 
fulfilling their ticket-of-leave obligations, he told Parliament on 20 July 1910 that the entire 
‘ticket of leave’ system had a ‘negative value as regards rehabilitating offenders’.159 He 
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immediately suspended the system and asked for legislation to be brought to abolish it;160 
this speech effectively ended the police supervision of habitual offenders.161 
 
The apparent end of the need to retain criminal records did little to temper the collection 
of them. Instead, a new justification came to the fore: that criminal records would help 
detectives solve crimes. Such was the speed that this new prevailing thought that by 1915 
‘criminal record files had become the principal part of the equipment of every detective 
bureau in Europe’.162 Vollmer claimed that the ability to properly identify a man and attach 
his criminal record to him not only encouraged the suspect to plead guilty more readily,163 
but also helped in intelligence gathering because: 
 
the delinquent changes his demeanour towards [the police] as soon as he learns 
his identity is known…the defiant attitude vanishes and the hitherto silent and 
sometimes combative suspect is quite a talkative and congenial sort of fellow, 
ready to tell all he knows about himself, his associates and his fence.164 
 
In light of these renewed foci, the CRO took charge of the vast register of criminal 
convictions in the Alphabetical Register, joined them to the CSO’s old register and 
renamed it the ‘Central Registration Records’.165 This amounted in 1913 to some 200,000 
records.166 This data was collected for any person who was convicted of any offence by 
the assizes, the quarter sessions or the court of summary jurisdiction which resulted in a 
sentence of one month imprisonment or more.167 These were submitted to them by local 
forces and prisons, who then input the data into the collection.168 This conviction data was 
supplemented by fingerprint identification data – the inclusion of anthropometric data by 
now abandoned169  – which ensured the correct record was attached to the correct 
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offender.170 The process was now much more efficient: in 1913, the number of positive 
identifications was 10,677.171 
 
The CRO’s extensive collection of fingerprints led to it being described in 1915 as ‘the 
clearinghouse for all information relating to identification’.172 Although local forces 
continued to maintain their own local records, it was claimed that ‘for all cases, Scotland 
Yard is consulted’.173 The CRO repository consisted of prints supplied to them by prison 
officials, who took them from prisoners who were either remanded or ultimately convicted 
and sentenced to a period of one month imprisonment or more.174 Where a suspect was 
acquitted after having been fingerprinted, that the prints would be destroyed and ‘the 
person left with a clean sheet, so far as Scotland Yard is concerned’,175 although Fosdick 
found that ‘there are occasional exceptions’.176 By 1935, this ‘Fingerprint Index’ contained 
over half a million records.177 For those not fingerprinted, photographs were instead taken 
and a description noted on a ‘description form’.178  
 
The Central Registration Records, described by one officer as ‘a veritable who’s who of 
the criminal world’,179  was a collection of ‘hard’ criminality data. It was a factual record 
because a person’s convictions, fingerprints and photographic image are factual per se – 
unless falsely recorded or amended in some way, a record of a person’s criminal 
convictions merely lists the offences for which a person was charged, brought before a 
court and either an admission, or a finding, of guilt made, while a fingerprint indentation is 
a copy of what is contained on an individual’s finger. Likewise, a person’s face is factual, 
intrinsic personal identification data. 
 
All of this data was presumed to assist in the work of detecting offences. Despite 
Churchill’s ambivalence and the failure of supervision, for many, the problem of habitual 
offenders remained unresolved. It was by now recognised that a small number of 
recidivistic offenders committed large numbers of offences. This explain why Fosdick 
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believed that: ‘the prime requisite in the office equipment of a detective bureau is a criminal 
record file. The police must be acquainted with the criminal propensities of specific 
individuals’.180 
 
The CRO’s attempt to detect crime through the use of the Criminal Registration Records 
was bulwarked by a secondary system called the ‘Central Identification Records’.181 Data 
here was divided into four sections. The first was the ‘Crime Index’,182 which contained 
information relating to offenders similar to that originally taken from the old distinctive 
marks registers183, but whose central tenet was the modus operandi system; the brainchild 
of Major Llewelyn William Atcherley, the Chief Constable of West Riding Yorkshire 
Constabulary,184 who believed that habitual criminals were ‘creatures of habit’ who ‘were 
inclined to develop, refine and follow behaviour in their crime with which they were 
comfortable’ – their modus operandi.185 Atcherley opened his own ‘workable 
clearinghouse’ in Wakefield in 1896 based on this principle186 which was sufficiently 
successful that a variation of his system was adopted by the CRO in 1913187 and it even 
appeared in revised form in the United States in 1919.188  
 
By the 1930’s the ‘Crime Index’ became known as the ‘Method Index’.189 A ‘Single 
Fingerprint Index’ was added in 1930. This contained a single fingerprint of anyone 
convicted of breaking and entering offences.190 A ‘Photograph Collection’ was also added 
for the ‘most important criminals listed in the method index’, along with a ‘Wanted Index’ 
of suspects who had not yet been apprehended: this was ‘a comprehensive, central listing 
of persons wanted for arrest, detention or questioning by the police’.191 A ‘Property Index’, 
which documented items lost or stolen, was also instituted to allow items to be traced to 
crime scenes and returned to lawful owners if recovered.192  
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The Central Identification Records were an attempt by the police to undertake a 
rudimentary, but systematic, attempt at intelligence gathering and ‘offender profiling’.193 
This information is ‘soft’ police intelligence: information held by the police which is attached 
to the criminal record held against an individual but which is often not ‘factual, but 
speculative or untested.194 While ‘the police have always collected soft intelligence on 
people’195 the CRO were engaged in something altogether different. Here was the collation 
and retention of data, much of it subjectively ascertained, specifically in order to found an 
investigation into a crime which had not yet occurred: a form of preventative detective 
work. This gave rise to a new type of police officer: the bureaucratic officer exhibiting ‘an 
unshrinkable passion for processing statistical information and extolling the value of his 
work’, particularly in curbing the activities of the habitual criminal.196  
 
Anxious to avoid the access problems of the past, the CRO opened its repository to 
officers nationwide by wire, open for enquiries between 9am and 6pm every day.197 This 
was claimed to have resulted in some 286,000 total identifications by 1928:198 a figure 
which rose in one account to ‘little less than 400,000’ by 1934.199 The Police Gazette was 
by 1929 being issued daily as an internal publication disseminated only to the police.200 
This contained details of men arrested, descriptions of wanted men and also details of 
those convicted in court.201  
 
There exist several contemporary accounts of the CRO, written largely by police officers 
who worked there or by those who were granted access to the office by those who did. 
Almost universally, these paint a picture of hyper-efficiency, extreme importance and 
pride. Martienssen described the CRO as containing ‘detailed particulars of every known 
criminal, filed under a system which has done more than anything else to put Scotland 
Yard ahead of every other police force in the world’.202 Dilnot enthused about CRO staff 
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as ‘specialists [who] do their work with cold deliberation and machine-like precision’.203 
Moylan claimed that ‘the identity of an arrested criminal can quickly be determined, and 
that of the unknown author of a crime can often be arrived at’.204 Woodhall went even 
further, stating that ‘the officers become so skilled at their work that, after one examination 
of a set of prints, they can turn up instantly the past record of the person whose prints they 
are…they rarely make a mistake’.205  
 
This notion of the CRO as being routinely capable of near instantaneous crime detection 
was encapsulated by the Metropolitan Police as ‘catching thieves on paper’206 It must be 
taken with a generous pinch of proverbial salt. The notion that CRO officers were able to 
identify criminals after a single peruse of a set of fingerprints or that 770,000 possible 
suspects might be narrowed down to a single man due to a quick search and the 
knowledge of a single officer stretches the bounds of credibility to an barely tenable 
degree.  
 
Yet this ‘romanticised view of the CRO’207 persisted into the 1950s; possible, at least in 
part, because of the widespread public support afforded the police.208 This was largely 
attributable to the BBC’s Dixon of Dock Green, whose portrayal of the eponymous P.C 
Dixon strongly reinforced ‘the quintessential representation of the ideal British bobby’209 
as a benign yet protective force for consensus-based law and order.210 This afforded the 
Metropolitan Police sufficient credibility to continue to make claims that CRO officers were 
so in-tune with their duties that ‘as soon as a crime is reported, they are usually able, 
without looking at their cards, to name several ‘likely starters’.211  
 
The reality, though, was rather different. The generally positive perception of the police of 
the 1950’s is now generally regarded as little more than a ‘potent myth’.212 The truth was 
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that ‘beneath the rosy view that dominated popular perspectives, there was undoubtedly 
a more sordid reality of corruption and abuse.’213 A Royal Commission, chaired by Sir 
Henry Willink, was instituted in 1962 to investigate some of the more lurid claims of 
corruption and incompetence214 and many of the 111 recommendations made were 
implemented by the Police Act 1964. Anecdotal evidence also began to emerge which 
questioned the supposed efficiency of the CRO. One MP asked the Home Office three 
times how long it takes for the CRO to trace a fingerprint, and was eventually told that a 
search could take ‘between ten minutes and five hours’.215  
 
This might explain the Home Secretary was moved to admit that ‘the provincial police…do 
not, in fact, call in Scotland Yard today with the unanimity of which writers…always depict’. 
In fact, in 1953 they ‘asked for help in seven cases’.216 The reality was that, despite 
Parliament pronouncing in 1934 that ‘the system of keeping criminal records is no longer 
based on regions’,217 local collections continued to run parallel to the main scheme and, 
as the CRO grew, so did they. Atcherley’s Wakefield operation was ‘working very 
successfully’218  and had become the de facto CRO for the north of England.219 Prior to 
the outbreak of the First World War, a clearing house had been instigated in 
Birmingham.220 In Scotland, eleven different forces had established their own smaller 
version of the National CRO.221 A response to a Parliamentary question confirmed in 1933 
that the forces of South Wales, Gwent and Dyfed-Powys Police had made ‘joint 
arrangements’ for the collection, retention and use of their own collection of criminal 
data.222  
 
In 1938, the Home Office recommended that regional ‘clearing houses’ be instituted in 
Liverpool, Cardiff and Bristol, so long as these continued to formally recognise the primacy 
of the national CRO at Scotland Yard.223 Thomas claims that ‘informally, this was a 
recognition of continued problems in accessing the London records and the unreliability 
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of their content’.224 Whatever the explanation, in 1952 a working group of chief constables 
presented the Home Office with a report which recommended the formal recognition of 
regional criminal records collections.225 The result of this was that during the 1950’s and 
1960’s a number of Regional Criminal Record Offices (‘Regional CROs’) were set up.226 
By 1956, the Wakefield operation had been converted into a Regional CRO, as had that 
in Birmingham, and another six had opened by 1959. 227 A Scottish CRO was opened in 
Glasgow in April 1960.228   
 
A fairly detailed account of the workings of the Birmingham Regional CRO (or ‘Mid-cro’, 
as it was apparently known by police)229 was provided in the Police Journal in 1961. Some 
sixteen forces were said to contribute to the records held there,230 which oversaw a 
geographical area of around 100 miles and a population of around 5.5 million.231 Mid-cro 
operationally mirrored the National CRO; they operated five main collections of records: 
court convictions, a method index, a fingerprint index, a stolen property index and a 
photograph collection.232 The main collection of criminal records by 1961 held 75,371 
records. Most of these were ‘fresh’ records: records of individuals who had come to the 
attention of the police in the previous five years.233 Around 100,000 fingerprints had been 
taken and retained.234  
 
Information was passed between the Regional CROs and the National CRO by facsimile 
machine, which was installed at all of the CRO offices. This allowed for photographs and 
fingerprints to be sent and checked more quickly.235 The dissemination of information from 
the National CRO continued by publication of the Police Gazette and Informations, though 
this was restricted to crimes and criminals with ‘national importance’.236  
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2.5 James Rule’s account of the CRO system 
Between April 1970 and December 1971, the Metropolitan Police and several of the 
Regional CROs gave American academic James Rule extensive access to the workings 
of the CRO system. Rule’s seminal account237 of what he saw cast such doubt on the 
rose-tinted accounts proffered by police officers that the Home Office commented pre-
publication that substantial portions should be ‘left out’ and ‘fundamental changes’ be 
made to others.238  
 
Rule described each criminal record folder as consisting of three main forms. The first was 
‘the criminal record file’. This was a list of all recorded convictions against an individual – 
offence description, date, court and sentence.239 The second was the ‘descriptive form’, 
completed every time a person was charged with an offence and containing a description 
of the alleged offence, the circumstances of the arrest and a physical description of the 
individual (including a photograph).240 The third was an ‘antecedent history’: an abridged 
summary of relevant factors which the police subjectively believed to be relevant to an 
offender and their offending. Almost as standard, this would make reference to the 
offender’s place of residence, his family circumstances, education, financial situation, 
employment status and history and known associates.241  
 
Almost identical records were available at the Regional CROs, although the files may 
include additional information – some CRO’s included press clippings of offenders in their 
files, for example,242 while others also included ‘notes’ compiled by the police when 
investigating an individual for a subsequent offence. Rule was unable to provide 
substantial detail on these, as the police were ‘often chary about discussing them’.243 
Moreover, regional files would ordinarily only contain information on convictions obtained 
in the geographical ambit of the Regional CRO.244 The net result was that files held at 
Regional CROs were not uniform, with some forces maintaining very up-to-date and 
detailed files on known offenders, but others only updating files when convictions were 
secured.245 Rule also noted that individual CIDs at police stations had their own ‘local’ 
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records, on which they kept whatever information on offences and offenders their felt 
appropriate, in whatever form they deemed necessary.246 
 
The problems with such an enormously fragmented information-sharing system were 
highlighted in vivid clarity. The use of criminal record files in the bringing of a prosecution 
clearly involved a significant bureaucratic process. The process commenced by 
completing the descriptive form and sending this by courier to the National CRO and which 
ended with the file being returned with a new conviction added to it was nowhere near as 
quick as police had claimed. In fact, it expended a lot of labour and an enormous amount 
of time.247 For example, the time taken for Regional CROs to send a descriptive form and 
fingerprints to the National CRO, get these checked, and have the necessary information 
returned to them was ‘at least a week, and often more’.248 This was because National 
CRO staff were so busy dealing with enquiries relating to the Wanted and Missing Persons 
Index (a list of some 65,000 persons either missing and those wanted by law enforcement 
agencies for outstanding matters and deemed priority)249 that they often could not process 
requests on the criminal record files in good time, or even at all; Rule saw one check was 
returned and marked ‘no trace’ (i.e. no record held) on a man known with certainty by the 
Regional CRO to have a criminal record.250  
 
These delays were, in essence, the justification for having Regional CROs despite the 
obvious duplication in their work. Regional CROs were at least were able to provide some 
data ‘within the day of receipt’ and were used instead where ‘a record’ had to be brought 
at short order to the Magistrates Court.251 The problem with that ‘solution’ was that an 
offender might have numerous convictions listed under their name at different Regional 
CROs and, where this occurred, these records would likely be incomplete. Rule observed 
that communications between Regional CROs to allow for such records to be 
synchronised was ‘not strictly adhered to, especially given the difficulty of determining a 
criminal’s place of residence’.252 Even where efforts were made to record all convictions, 
things did not ‘work perfectly…and some convictions go unrecorded’.253  
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In short, even the supposedly ‘complete’ national records were not so. Rule confirmed 
David Steer’s earlier work which found a significant variance between forces, with one 
force reporting 98% of convictions to the National CRO but another reporting only 68%.254 
Steer believed this reflected a reluctance on the part of the police to report offences where 
the offender was not fingerprinted: this was only undertaken at the time when an offender 
was arrested and charged with an offence by the police, rather than summonsed by a 
magistrate.255 In a later study, after the fingerprinting rules were amended, Steer found 
that around 96% of all convictions were being reported to the CRO.256 While this certainly 
reflected an improvement on his study a decade earlier, this still meant that the supposed 
‘definitive’ record was incomplete. 
 
Attempts to manage the scale of the collections also involved the destruction of records. 
Descriptive forms and other records relating to an offence were usually destroyed if the 
accused was subsequently acquitted,257 though this practice was not uniformly 
undertaken, with some Regional CROs retaining photographs of those acquitted where 
these ‘updated’ an existing file, while others retained fuller records if the acquittal related 
to especially serious allegations, particularly sexual offences.258 Processes were also in 
place to delete old, inactive records: a process described as ‘weeding’. In 1970, 46,000 
records were ‘weeded’ at the National CRO, though Rule felt this was likely a result of 
staff coming to files suitable for weeding, rather than any conscious effort to search 




By 1973, alongside the national collection of records held at the National CRO, there not 
only existed nine other collections maintained by Regional CROs and those maintained at 
the ‘Group Record Offices’ but also locally held record collections at each of the forty-
seven police forces. This, according to James Rule, resulted in a ‘pyramid of information 
exchange’: the National CRO providing the authority at the top, the regional offices 
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working in collaboration with it and each other to provide information to police ‘users’ at 
the base.260 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, it was intended that the Criminal Records Office in 
London would form a central ‘clearinghouse’ for crime and criminals. What is clear from 
the conscious process of decentralisation and fragmentation which came in the 1950s and 
1960s was that this notion had failed. This failure was apparent seemingly to all parties: 
the police were calling for the ‘regionalisation’ of criminal records by 1961,261 the 
development by National CRO staff of the ‘District 6’ operation showed that they were no 
less desirous of decentralisation than anyone else and Parliament’s complicity in the 
Regional CROs seemed to acknowledge they had come to a similar conclusion. If further 
evidence were required, the implementation of the Criminal Law Act 1967 to ‘repeal 
obsolete or unnecessary enactments’,262 included the repeal of ss.6 – 7 of the Prevention 
of Crimes Act 1871, formally removing from the statute books a requirement on the police 
to make a central record of offenders. This meant that, from 1967, there was no statutory 
basis for the collection of criminal records at all.263 
 
Why did centralisation fail? The answer appears to lie in a combination of factors. Firstly, 
the sheer volume of records at the National CRO had grown to an almost unmanageable 
level. By 1960, when many of the Regional CROs had been instituted, demand on the 
National CRO was enormous; 733,104 searches were conducted against their records 
that year, an increase of over 67,000 on the previous year and an additional 226,301 
convictions were added to the records. 264 In the same year, 40,924 motor vehicles were 
added to the property index as having been stolen and the Police Gazette circulated 
details of 12,821 cases.265 By 1970, the National CRO were adding half a million new 
records to their files, and were in possession of a total of around 2.5 million criminal 
records.266 This was an enormous collection – far greater than that originally envisaged 
by the originators of the ‘national clearinghouse’ notion, when it was said that ‘it might 
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reasonably be foreseen that it is not likely to exceed half a million, and may possibly be 
kept down to nearer 400,000’.267 
 
The problems with such an extensive collection are, at least in part, fairly self-evident. The 
collation of so much data using paper and card indexes meant that individual records were 
enormous – one officer described in 1962 that ‘a CRO file is almost a biography’268 – and 
the storage of two and a half million enormous ‘biographies’ required a full floor of New 
Scotland Yard.269 It is obvious that very large collections of manually held criminal records 
‘cannot be maintained with the same speed and accuracy’ as smaller ones and by 1971 
the National CRO alone employed over 400 staff.270 Operational problems also inevitably 
followed: the dissemination of information from such a vast collection was inevitably slower 
than it might have been. Regional circulation information was much quicker.271 Moreover, 
regional collections could be tailored to retain information directly relevant to the local 
force(s): local stolen property indies could contain details not deemed worthy of record at 
national level, for example.272  
 
By the early 1970’s, then, the notion that the CRO at Scotland Yard would form a national 
‘clearing house’ for crimes and criminals appeared to have died. Detectives still wanted 
access to criminal records to help them solve crimes, but they needed it quicker and more 
individually tailored than the National CRO could provide. The process of decentralisation 
and fragmentation was so complete, and the problems so endemic to the criminal record 
collection process, that it seemed that only computerisation of the criminal records, if 
possible, might bring the records back to a centralised collection of value to operational 
policing. 
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3.1  Introduction 
With the notion of a hyper-efficient CRO presiding over a ‘British library of crime and 
criminals’ exposed as a myth and the reality of the Metropolitan Police struggling to 
effectively collate, store and manage literally millions of hard-copy ‘biographies’ of known 
offenders now in the public domain, attention turned to affecting a solution which would 
allow the police to continue to use criminal records to help investigate offences. By 1970, 
the obvious solution appeared to lie in computerisation 
 
This chapter will examine the path towards the computerisation of the national criminal 
record collection and the exponential increase in records retained that this brought. 
Explanations for the expansion will be sought, and critical comment on what purported 
policing aim this sought to achieve, and whether increased collection furthered those aims, 
will also be offered. Ultimately, it is intended that this chapter will decisively address the 
first research question; identifying what, as matter of literal fact at least, the police are 
retaining in their ‘criminal records’ so that an accurate definition might be offered in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 
3.2 The Police National Computer (‘the PNC’) 
As has been seen, the CRO was operating in 1970 largely in the same way it was in 1913. 
The benefits of computerisation were obvious to the Metropolitan Police by the 1960s; 
envious comparisons with computerised systems newly installed in the United States 
noted that: 
 
The equipment the police have in the present day can only be described as archaic. 
In the whole of Britain there is not a single computer or data processing machine 
in use by the police. A single fingerprint may take ten men six weeks to find. A 
computer in New York can compare 100,000 fingerprints in three hours…The 
police must have this sort of equipment’.1 
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In fact, preliminary research into the possibility of computerising the various police record 
collections (including the CRO’s) began in 19642 and the Home Office formally notified the 
police of their intentions in December 1965.3 By 1967 the project was being openly 
discussed in Parliament: Lord Stonham telling the House of Lords that the Government 
intended to provide ‘direct and immediate’ access to everything being held manually at 
the CRO’s: names, lists of previous convictions, modus operandi, fingerprints and the 
Wanted and Missing Persons Index.4 By 1969, the Home Office invited the police into the 
consultation process,5 then on 28 January 1970 the Home Secretary formally announced 
plans to purchase and install the Police National Computer6 at a cost of around £16m.7 
This was an official recognition that the entire CRO system was suffering from ‘very 
considerable problems’.8  
 
Ministers explained that the PNC would allow officers ‘on the beat’ to radio requests for 
information to colleagues who, using video display terminals, would be able to access it 
near instantaneously and return the requested intelligence.9 Each police force was to be 
equipped with at least one terminal and 600 specialist officers were trained to use it.10 It 
was expected that the system would be operation by 1972. In fact, the PNC did not ‘go 
live’ until 1 April 1974 and in the initial phase only the national file of stolen motor vehicles 
was added to it.11 This allegedly reduced the time required to make a check ‘from ten days 
to a matter of a few seconds’.12  
 
While such hyperbolic statements ought reasonably be treated with a degree of suspicion, 
it is clear that the PNC was a new and ‘incredibly powerful tool’13 which was ‘revolutionary 
in its impact and arguably represents the single most important contribution of the Home 
Office to policing in this country since the creation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829’.14 
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The police quickly began adding more of their data collections to the PNC. The CROs 
fingerprint collection went live in 1976.15 This amounted to the uploading of 2,484,437 sets 
of fingerprints.16 By the end of 1977, the entire DVLA database of vehicle ownership – 
17.7m records – had been added to the PNC.17 This required additional resource to 
maintain; the ‘PNC Unit’ at Hendon, which maintained the PNC, by now employed about 
450 staff18 and the cumulative cost to this point to the Home Office was almost £15m.19  
 
Yet there was no attempt to upload the criminal record collection. In 1977, a ‘Names Index’ 
(now the ‘nominal index’) application was added. The Home Office claimed in December 
1977 that this listed some 3.8 million individuals.20 The Names Index was not a ‘criminal 
record database’, though – it was simply a list of those individuals against whom paper 
records were held at a CRO, warning officers that the individual in question had a criminal 
record.21 A year later, the ‘Index of Wanted and Missing Persons’ was added.22 Checks 
against this index were long considered a priority for police and CRO staff23 and remained 
so due to officers’ use of so-called ‘stop-check’ searches; an officer on the beat 
encountering a suspicious individual and asking for a check on whether s/he was wanted 
for any offence.24 The PNC must undoubtedly have improved the speed of such checks 
and freed up resource at the CROs.  
 
By 1980, the PNC held 19 million vehicle registrations, 3.25 million fingerprint sets and 
3.8 million criminal names. The system was handling almost 11 million requests for 
information on individuals, mostly made by police officers on the street.25 Yet it still 
contained not a single criminal record. The decision not to include the criminal records in 
the early tranche of uploads has never been publicly explained, but it is submitted that the 
decision simply must have been taken that the information contained in the criminal 
records was no longer considered an operational priority.  
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Meanwhile, in 1980, the National CRO was renamed the National Identification Bureau.26 
It is submitted that this provides further insight into the use of the criminal record repository 
at this time; the testimony of police officers extolling the virtues of criminal records as a 
crime prevention and detecting tool seemed to have dried up and the focus instead was 
on using records as means of identifying individuals stopped, checked and brought into 
custody, and little more. In 1980, new technology was finally brought to bear on the 
national collection of criminal records, but instead of being added to the PNC, the decision 
was taken to convert the National CRO records to microfiche.27 New convictions were 
reported to the NIB by local forces and then added by NIB staff to the records. Only 
recordable offences were listed – i.e. any offences which might potential incur a prison 
sentence.28  
 
In 1985, work finally began on adding some criminal records to the ‘Names Index’; where 
an individual was convicted of a new recordable offence on or after 1 January 1981, the 
entire National CRO record held against that person (if any) was subsequently added.29 
This proved problematic: the PNC was by this point almost operating at full capacity; by 
October 1991, the PNC held just over 39.57 million vehicle records, 4.3 million fingerprint 
records, just under 5.4 million criminal names and 3.95 million conviction records.30 Plans 
were announced to upgrade to a new system (‘PNC2’). To help fund the upgrade, 
suggestions were made by the Conservative government to privatise the new system, 
though this was ultimately rejected amidst concerns over confidentiality and security.31 
PNC2 was intended be approximately ten times more powerful than its predecessor.32 
Consisting of 2,600 terminals, 200 printers and 4 police local computers,33 it was originally 
intended to go online at the end of 199034 but the system went ‘on-stream’ in stages and 
the criminal names, fingerprints, wanted and missing persons, disqualified drivers and 
convictions data were migrated and operational by November 1991.35 
 
                                                          
26 Above n.3, 25 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Above n.3, 28 
30 ‘Police National Computer’, HC Written Answers 22 October 1991, vol.196, col.530 
31 HC Deb 7 December 1989, vol.163, col.461 – 62  
32 HC Deb 18 October 1991, vol.196, col.598 
33 Above n.3, 29 
34 ‘Police Computer’ HC Written Answers 24 July 1990, vol.177 
35 ‘Police National Computer’, HC Written Answers 29 November 1991, vol.199, col.657 
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More organisations were given access to the ‘police’ national computer; ‘read only’ access 
to the system was granted to the Home Office, HM Customs and Excise and the DLVA 
and proposals to give access to ‘other Government Departments’ were being considered 
by ministers.36 Local authorities were also now ‘pressing hard’ for access to the system.37 
The size of the collection continued to grow: now 4.2 million convictions38 were stored, 
along with 4.3 million fingerprints and 5.5 million criminal names and disqualified drivers.39 
It was claimed that the PNC was now ‘an established part of police operations…now as 
much part of the police back up as the police car and police radio. It is a tool to help police 
officers investigating and detecting crime and bringing offenders to justice’.40 
 
3.3 PHOENIX – the ‘Criminal Justice Record System’41 
Some seventeen years since the PNC came online, the national collection of criminal 
records were still not computerised. The impetus to finally computerise the collection came 
when the problems with the hard-copy records at the NIB became sufficiently well 
publicised that it was impossible to ignore them. A Scrutiny Committee appointed to 
investigate the situation42 found that the criminal record collection was ‘in a very 
unsatisfactory state’.43 It recommended that a new approach, tailored towards the entire 
criminal justice system, be taken.44 Records should be computerised to PNC2 and that 
the Regional CRO’s, which cost £2.5m a year in staffing costs alone, would become 
superfluous and should close.45 It also suggested that a new central agency be created to 
control the collection and that the new agency be able to charge for access to users, 
including the police.46 
 
While the Government eventually rejected the notion of creating a new, fee-charging 
agency to look after the records, it did agree with computerising them and work began on 
the new PNC2 application required to accommodate them. In 1992, the Home Office told 
                                                          
36 ‘Police Computer’, HC Written Answers 15 October 1992, vol.177, col.719 
37 ‘Police National Computer’, HC Deb 3 February 1992, vol.203, col.105 
38 Note – ‘convictions’, not ‘criminal records’. Each offender counts as one entry on the nominal index 
but may have tens, or even hundreds, of convictions. 
39 ‘Police National Computer’, HC Written Answers 7 July 1992, vol.211, col.126 
40 HC Deb 3 February 1992, vol.203, col.109  
41 Home Office, ‘PHOENIX, Putting you in the picture’ (London: Police Department, Science and 
Technology Group 1995) 
42 Home Office, ‘The National Collection of Criminal Records: Report of the Efficiency Scrutiny’ (HMSO: 
London 1991)  
43 Ibid, para.19 
44 Ibid, para.23 




Parliament finally announced formal plans to transfer the entire NIB criminal record 
collection to PNC2; confirming the widened scope for the records, the Home Office told 
Parliament that: 
 
[The] national criminal records system will become an indispensable aid to the 
better functioning of the whole of the criminal justice system. It will be of significant 
benefit to the police in investigating and detecting crime. Comprehensive and 
accurate information on antecedent offences will assist in the prosecution of cases 
and in sentencing, and it will help the prison service to determine the appropriate 
prison regime.47  
 
This new PNC application was to be called the ‘Police Home Office Extended Names 
Index’, or PHOENIX. The inputting of criminality information onto PHOENIX would be done 
locally, by police officers using PNC terminals, rather than by the NIB.48 The Regional 
CROs were, as recommended, closed. The Government put to tender the contract for 
converting the back-record collection to PNC and eventually awarded the contract to PCL 
Group on 5 July 1994 for the conversion of three million records microfiche records over 
eighteen months49 at the cost of £8.8 million.50  
 
PHOENIX ‘went live’ on 22 May 1995 and, on the same date, the NIB was renamed the 
National Identification Service (‘NIS’).51 PHOENIX replaced the ‘Names Index’  and 
includes a description of the individual listed, details of offences alleged or committed by 
that individual and details as to whether the individual was reported as ‘missing’ or 
‘wanted’ or a ‘disqualified driver’.52 it listed some 5.3 million criminal histories and over 17 
million searches were being made annual against the PHOENIX application alone.53 The 
principal advantage of PHOENIX was that individual officers could immediately access 
and update criminal details from any of the 10,000 terminals provided to police forces, 
while others granted ‘read only’ access to it could view the data required equally quickly.54 
                                                          
47 Above n.40  
48 Above n.3, 36 
49 ‘Computer Contracts’, HC Written Answers 8 July 1994, vol.246, col.331 
50 ‘Criminal Records Database’, HC Deb Written Answers 5 November 1996, vol.284 
51 Above n.3, 37 
52 Above n.48 
53 ‘Police National Computer’, HC Written Answers 7 June 1995, vol.261, col.185 
54 Above n.48 
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Court staff would pass disposals information directly back to police forces for PHOENIX 
input.55 This removed the remit of the NIS to centrally maintain the criminal records.  
 
PHOENIX remains the PNC application where criminality data stored and continues to be 
used in largely the same manner with which it was introduced in 1995, save that it now 
also includes information on individuals who have been granted firearms licences and 
those who have ‘certain court orders made against them’.56 What is notable, though is that 
volume of criminal records has grown exponentially: in 2008, PHOENIX contained over 
8.6 million records,57 by 2014 the total had reached 10,520,92958 and the total number of 
criminal records at September 2017 was 11,166,266.59  
 
The research to this point has sought to ascertain what, historically, the state and the 
police have collated under the banner of ‘criminal records’. The purpose of the remainder 
of this chapter is to attempt to identify what criminality data the police are capturing on 
PHOENIX and whether these offer any explanation for the growth in the volume of records 
collated. In doing so it is intended to offer a contemporary analysis of what the police now 
are collating under the banner of ‘criminal records’ and, per the first research question, to 







                                                          
55 S. Mason, ‘A common sense approach: a review of the criminal record regime in England and Wales 
(Report of phase two)’ (Home Office 30 November 2011) 10 
56 See Home Office, ‘Police National Computer (PNC) Guidance (version 5.0)’ (23 January 2014) 7. 
Presumably these refer to non-conviction orders such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Criminal 
Behaviour Orders, injunctions, restraining orders and suchlike which might feasibly be of interest to 
police and criminal justice agencies 
57 National Policing Improvement Agency, ‘Memorandum by the National Policing Improvement Agency’ 
(NPIA December 2007) presented to the Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State 
(HL 2008 – 09, 18–I)  para.6 
58 Home Office, ‘FOI Release. Nominal Criminal Records on the Police National Computer’ (FOI release 
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3.4 The PHOENIX criminality data: what the police are collecting 
PHOENIX is not merely a repository of criminal matter disposal information. Offence 
details, bail conditions, ‘warning signals’,60 modus operandi and distinguishing marks are 
just some of the other criminality data retained by the police on PHOENIX61 The retention 
and use of this so-called ‘soft information/soft intelligence’62 are subject to various 
important criticisms which are largely outwith the subject of this research.63 However, the 
bulk of the PHOENIX repository relates to the disposal of criminal matters as they progress 
through the criminal prosecution process in England and Wales; the traditional concept of 
‘a criminal record’.64 A detailed examination of what is being stored is offered below: 
 
3.4.1 Non-conviction data 
An individual has no record against them on PHOENIX until or unless they are arrested. 
Only once an individual is arrested will officers create a ‘nominal record’ containing the 
personal details of the arrestee and details of the alleged offence(s) against them. The 
record is marked ‘CJ Arrestee’ (‘Criminal Justice Arrestee’), so that officers accessing 
PHOENIX can differentiate between those convicted of offences and those not.65  
 
If an arrest results in a police decision to take ‘no further action’ (‘NFA’), a charge which 
results in a discontinuance prior to trial, or if the individual is ultimately acquitted, then 
the record is not deleted; the nominal record is simply retained on PHOENIX and the 
non-conviction disposal moved to a file marked ‘Event History’.66 A formal Policy issued 
by the National Police Chief’s Council (‘the NPCC’) in 2015 states that ‘an Event History 
will be recorded even though an individual has come to the attention of the police on 
                                                          
60 These have proven controversial since their existence became known: it was revealed (see D. 
Campbell and S. Connor, On the Record – Surveillance, Computers & Privacy (Michael Joseph 1986)) 
in the 1980’s that markers included ‘mental’ (for those suffering mental health issues) and ‘alleges’ 
(makes false allegations of the police) while the Data Protection Registrar was moved in 1993 to 
intervene on the retention of HIV/AIDS warning markers (Data Protection Registrar, ‘The ninth report of 
the Data Protection Registrar’ (HMSO June 1993)). Whilst important, critical evaluation of the use of 
‘markers’ lies outwith the scope of this research.  
61 K. Povey, ‘On the Record: Thematic Inspection Report on police crime recording, the Police National 
Computer and Phoenix Intelligence System data quality’ (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary July 2000) 
132 and also Home Office, ‘The PNC User Manual, v.15.02’ (December 2015) 10 
62 T. Pitt Payne, ‘Employment: the shadow of the past’ (6 November 2009) 159 New Law Journal 1530 
63 See, for example, C. Baldwin, ‘Necessary intrusion or criminalising the innocent? An exploration of 
modern criminal vetting’ (2012) 76 Journal of Criminal Law 140  
64 T. Thomas, ‘Criminal record of police record?’ (3 November 2000) 150 New Law Journal 1629 
65 National Police Chiefs Council, ‘Deletion of Records from National Police Systems’ (2015), para.1.5.4  
66 Ibid, para.1.5.3 
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one occasion and regardless of whether that resulted in the person being convicted of 
an offence’.67  
 
It is, therefore, perhaps more accurate to describe PHOENIX as a national collection 
of individuals arrested, rather than a collection of criminal convictions. The inclusion 
and retention of all arrests will inevitably lead to an increased number of records; it is 
self-evident that there are more people arrested in total than there are people cautioned 
or convicted of offences and the number of individuals included on PHOENIX would be 
immediately reduced if such records were not retained. 
 
3.4.2 Reprimand and Warnings68 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 divested upon the police legal authority to issue 
reprimands and final warnings under the ‘Final Warning Scheme’ (‘the FWS’), which 
provided that, except where the offence was so serious that the juvenile must be 
immediately charged, the suspect should be reprimanded for a first offence, given a 
final warning for a second and charged for a third.69 Among the pre-conditions for 
issuing the reprimand or a final warning, the juvenile must have made a clear and 
reliable admission of guilt to an offence, have no prior convictions and there be no 
public interest in a prosecution.70  
 
The FWS was designed to be reformative, rather than punitive71 and neither a 
reprimand nor a warning carried immediate punitive sanction.72 Warnings and 
reprimands were always issued in private73 and were therefore not a matter of public 
record.74 They were not designed to be, 75 nor are they legally considered, a conviction76 
while statutory guidance issued in 2001 reassured police that reprimands and warnings 
                                                          
67 Ibid, para.1.6.7 
68 Authorised by para.3(1)(b) of the National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000 
SI 2000/1139  
69 Home Office, ‘Final Warning Scheme: guidance for the police and youth offending teams’ (Home 
Office Communication Directorate November 2002), para.4.4 
70 Per section 65(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
71 R v Durham Constabulary ex. Parte R (FC) [2005] UKHL 21 [4] (Lord Bingham) 
72 Ibid [6] 
73 Above n.69, para.9.20 
74 The Queen (on the Application of R) v The National Police Chiefs’ Council and others [2017] EWHC 
2586 [58] (Justice Green) 
75 Above n.69, para.12.13 
76 Above n.71 [14]. In Lord Bingham’s view, the key determination was that neither a warning nor a 
reprimand incurred any immediate punitive element: ‘The determination of a criminal charge, to be 
properly so regarded, must expose the subject of the charge to the possibility of punishment, whether 
in the event punishment is imposed or not’. 
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did not constitute a criminal record.77 Encouraged by the Home Office to engage with 
the FWS, and reputedly in favour of it themselves,78 the police duly issued hundreds of 
thousands of reprimands and warnings; in 2006 – 07 alone, some 127,326 were 
issued.79   
 
Restorative justice projects are routinely accused of net widening,80 but it is submitted 
that such an accusation against the FWS is well-founded. Notwithstanding the police’s 
initially support for the scheme, which facilitated greater engagement with it, they also 
found themselves required to meet new Government ‘key performance indicators’, 
which (perhaps inevitably) discouraged them from using the kind of ‘informal 
warnings’81 which had been traditionally used82 to deal with juvenile offending:83 Quite 
simply: 
 
A lot of police officers don't deal with things that way because we're performance 
led, we're performance driven, therefore an arrest for burglary is a performance 
figure because this is rammed down our throats 24 hours a day.84 
 
Even where the police felt able to use informal disposals, official guidance made it clear 
that police retained only ‘strictly limited discretion to take informal action’ and that 
‘informal action should be taken only in exceptional circumstances’.85 This was a 
marked shift in direction from previous policy, which had encouraged forces to divert 
children out of the criminal justice system by means of informal warnings, words of 
advice or by taking no action at all,86 and meant that the ‘first formal step on the ladder, 
the reprimand’, is becoming a routine response even for very trivial offences’;87 for 
                                                          
77 Home Office,’ Final Warning Scheme’ – Guidance for Police’ (April 2000), para.75 
78 I. Walters, ‘The Policing of Young Offenders’ (2007) 47(4) British Journal of Criminology 635, 648 – 
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80 A. Morris, ‘Critiquing the Critics’ (2002) 42(3) British Journal of Criminology 596, 602 
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84 Above n.81 
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example, between 2002 and 2006, 98 children were warned or reprimanded for 
attempting to purchase alcohol.88  
 
It is submitted, in fact, that the FWS became a system with ‘a never-ending reach’.89 
One study found that the number of children being processed by the criminal justice 
system increase by 11.4% from 2001/2 to 2005/6.90 Individual instances of possible net 
widening are evidenced in subsequent litigation; a warning issued to an 11 year old boy 
in relation to the theft of a bicycle91 and reprimands issued to four 12-year-old girls for 
jointly stealing a £20 sarong.92  
 
The police and the government eventually became disenchanted with the FWS93 and 
it was abandoned in 201294 by which time well over half a million reprimands and 
warnings had been issued,95 all of which to children96 and many of which would have 
been dealt with informally in the years immediately preceding the implementation of the 
FWS. By 2002, the Home Office had abandoned the pretext that these did not constitute 
part of a criminal record; 97 each warning or reprimand meant a nominal entry onto the 
PHOENIX application, accompanied by photographs98 and fingerprints.99 
 
3.4.3 Cautions 100 
An adult caution is ‘a formal warning that may be given by the police to persons aged 
18 years or over who admit to committing an offence’.101 Referred to since their 
inception as ‘police cautions’ or ‘formal cautions’, these are now properly referred to as 
                                                          
88 HL Written Answers 3 November 2008, vol.705, col.3WA 
89 B. Goldson and J. Muncie, Youth Crime and Justice (Sage 2006) 216 
90 M. Telford, ‘Youth justice: new shoots on a bleak landscape – Director of Public Prosecutions v P’ 
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96 Above n.71 [1] 
97 Above n.69, para.12.4 – 12.5  
98 Per s.64A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
99 Above n.71 [6] 
100 Above n.68 
101 Ministry of Justice: ‘Simple Cautions for Adult Offenders: guidance for police officers and Crown 
Prosecutors’ (13 April 2015) at para.6  
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a ‘simple caution’.102 There has never been any statutory basis for the administration 
of simple cautions – they are merely ‘a discretionary procedure adopted by the police’103 
which has been in situ since at least 1929104 and very likely much earlier.105 In theory, 
a simple caution is a possible disposal for any offence, subject to the statutory 
restrictions on their use in indictable (and some triable either way) matters.106 In 
practice, however, simple cautions ‘are primarily intended for low-level, mainly first-
time, offending’.107 Home Office guidance is now routinely produced108 to assist the 
police and prosecutors in their use and the present position is that a simple caution 
must only be given when a suspect makes ‘a clear and reliable admission of guilt’,109 
where there would be sufficient evidence to prosecute the offender, if required110 and 
where either the police or the CPS believe it is in the public interest to issue a simple 
caution.111  
 
‘Simple cautions’ are now distinguished from ‘conditional cautions’, which are issued 
pursuant to a statutory framework112 which allows for conditions to be attached to a 
caution with which the offender must comply.113 There are statutory requirements for 
the issuing of these, including that a prosecutor is satisfied that there is sufficient 
evidence to prosecute and that a caution is an appropriate means of disposal114 and 
that the offender admits the offence.115  
 
A parallel programme exists to caution juveniles. This was initiated in limited form in 
1929 and reflected a general principle that ‘the straightforward retributive response 
which is proper in the case of an adult offender is modified to meet the needs of the 
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individual child’.116 Section 5(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 formally 
recognised the provision of juvenile cautions and, like adult cautions, these could only 
be issued if the juvenile freely admitted the offence.117 Juvenile cautions were outlawed 
when the FWS was implemented118 but provision to issue conditional cautions was 
made in 2008119 and simple cautions for juveniles replaced the FWS in 2012 .120 
 
Cautions are advantageous to the recipient because although the issue of a caution is 
usually ‘a sensitive, certainly embarrassing and probably shameful part of [an 
individual’s] history’, they are issued in private and, therefore, like reprimands and 
warnings, they do not form a matter of public record.121 Simple cautions ‘carry no 
immediately disagreeable consequences for the offender’122 and at common law they 
are not a form of sentence, nor are they a conviction.123 Unlike reprimands and 
warnings, which were issued at the discretion of police officers, a caution can only be 
issued if a suspect consents to it.124  
 
In view of the advantages inherent to the caution as compared to a prosecution, many 
suspects unsurprisingly choose to accept one. This is particularly so as regards juvenile 
offenders, where a significant proportion of offences have historically been so disposed: 
by 1993, 90% of boys and 97% of girls were diverted from the court system to police 
cautioning.125 In broadly the same period, the cautioning rate among adult offenders 
was around 11%.126 
 
One of the long-standing, principal benefits those cautioned was that, although often 
recorded on local police force systems,127 cautions were not formally recorded by any 
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of the CROs and were not considered part of a ‘criminal record’.128 A Home Affairs 
Committee reviewing criminal records in 1990 baulked at the notion of disturbing the 
status quo, describing the central retention of cautions as ‘a radical innovation’ which 
was ‘not practical’.129 However, just one year later an Efficiency Scrutiny recommended 
that, once the criminal records were computerised, all cautions be collated and 
recorded130 with the Government soon-after confirming that cautions would henceforth 
form part of the national collection of criminal records.131 The police began adding 
cautions to the PHOENIX database on 1 November 1995.132 
 
The decision include cautions in central records has several possible explanations. The 
first is that computerisation, by negating entirely the practical problems of storing 
millions of records, opened the theoretical possibility of storing far more criminality 
data.133 PNC2, with its vastly improved storage capabilities, made the retention of 
cautions a practical feasibility, and therefore by extension facilitated it. This had been 
foreseen by the Data Protection Registrar, whose caution in 1990 that ‘the capacity of 
PNC2 should not become a motivating force for information to become excessive’134 
was not heeded. Moreover, PNC2 was encouraging a move towards ‘intelligence-led 
policing’; a supposed ‘proactive’ policing strategy based on focusing resources in 
accordance with reliable intelligence of crime and criminals.135 It was argued that such 
an approach could only be taken if the full ‘intelligence picture’ was available, including 
instances of trivial offending such as that disposed of by cautions.136 Finally, at the time 
that the decision to include cautions was taken, plans were well advanced for bringing 
legislation which would expand significantly access to criminal records for employment 
vetting purposes. Those proposals required the retention of cautions.137 
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Whatever the explanation, the decision to include cautions on PHOENIX meant that 
the number of individuals who had criminal records grew accordingly: in 1998 alone, 
some 109,700 juvenile cautions were issued.138 This accumulation was almost certainly 
accelerated by the institution in 2000 of central government targets aimed at increasing 
the volume of offences resulting in an ‘offender brought to justice’; defined as when an 
offence had taken place and the police were able to identify the perpetrator and either 
issue a caution, reprimand or warning or when the suspect was charged.139  
 
It is submitted that these targets effectively forced police officers to deal formally with 
extremely trivial matters that might ordinarily be dealt with informally; indeed, the Chair 
of the Youth Justice Board resigned in 2007, bemoaning a ‘disastrous’ policy which 
encouraged police to ‘pick a lot of low-hanging fruit’.140 The targets were only removed 
in 2008 and almost certainly account for the marked decline in cautions issued since: 
some 362,895 were issued in 2007 as compared to 83,989 in 2017. 
 
That notwithstanding, the number of cautions issued during that period and since 
remain very substantial: between 2002 and 2017, the police issued approximately 
3,688,000 cautions.141 The precise number of nominal records which include only one 
caution is not known142 but it is submitted that there must be hundreds of thousands of 
such records due to the nature of the circumstances in which cautions are properly 
administered. It is further submitted that the decision to include cautions in the criminal 
records, almost always issued in respect of first time, trivial offences, substantially 
widened the scope of a ‘criminal record’ and encompassed within it hundreds of 
thousands of people who would not have been so engaged prior to the computerisation 
of the national collection. 
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Table. Figure has been rounded to the nearest thousand. 
142 The Home Office claim that the PNC does not make any distinction between disposal type on 
PHOENIX, and that it would require a software re-write to do so; see Home Office, ‘FOI Request. 
Number of people with criminal convictions on the PNC’ (FOI Reference CR33517, What Do They 
Know? 13 November 2014) 
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/number_of_people_with_criminal_c#incoming-595350> 




3.4.4 Penalty Notices for Disorder  
Penalty Notice’s for Disorder (PNfDs) were created by the Criminal Justice and Police 
Act 2001 (‘the 2001 Act’),143 which provided that where a constable suspects an 
individual has committed a specified offence144 s/he may give him a penalty notice145 
which, upon the payment of a specified fee, will discharge any liability to be convicted 
for that offence.146 The individual in question must be over 18 years old147 and must 
pay the specified fee within 21 days or risk court proceedings being instigated against 
them.148  Commonly referred to as ‘on the spot fines’,149 they are intended as ‘a quick 
and effective alternative disposal option for dealing with low level, anti-social and 
nuisance offenders’150 – examples of offences which might attract a PNfD include shop-
thefts with a value of under £100 (plus VAT)151 and criminal damage valued at under 
£300.152 
 
PNfDs are different at law to reprimands, warnings and cautions. In interpreting the 
legislation which governs them, the Court of Appeal explained that: ‘the issue of a notice 
is not a conviction. It is not an admission of guilt nor any proof that a crime has been 
committed…[a person accepting a PNfD] was not admitting any offence, not admitting 
any criminality, and would not have any stain imputed to his character’.153 For these 
reasons, it is sometimes (erroneously) said that ‘a PNfD does not create a criminal 
record’,154 yet the reality is that the police do record PNfDs on PHOENIX (where they 
relate to a ‘recordable offence’);155 a person subject to such a PNfD will have a nominal 
record created/updated against their particulars and the PNfD is entered into the ‘Event 
History’ index.156  
                                                          
143 As subsequently amended by s.132 and Schedule 23 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act 2012 
144 These are listed in s.1 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
145 Ibid at s.2(1)  
146 Ibid at s.2(4)  
147 Ministry of Justice, ‘Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs)’ (24 June 2014), para.1.10 
148 Above n.144, s.5(1)  
149 This is the most commonly used term, particularly in the news media: see ‘Shoplifters to get fine let-
off’ BBC (30 May 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6703813.stm> accessed 16 May 2019 
150 Above n.147, para.1.1 
151 Ibid at para.3.13 
152 Ibid at para.3.19 
153 R v Hamer [2010] EWCA Crim 2053 [15] (Thomas LJ) 
154 R v Gore and Another [2009] ALL ER (D) 139 (Jul) [11] (Lord Chief Justice) 
155 A. Edwards, ‘In Practice: Criminal Law – Conditional Cautions’ (29 May 2008) Law Society Gazette 
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Supporters of PNfDs claim that they free the courts from a cluttering of trivial matters 
which would consume significant resource and that the (very) public imposition of them 
act as a deterrent.157 They also claim that those who are ‘wrongly’ issued a PNfD have 
the right to refuse it and challenge the allegation in court.158 Critics, however, claim that 
they are a rudimentary form of summary justice, with officials ‘sitting as judge and jury, 
interpreting the law as they see fit’.159 Indeed, one academic claimed that: ‘police 
officers are giving out PNfDs to people who have not committed any criminal 
offence…[and] are being given out where the use of some discretion could remove the 
need to take any formal action at all’.160  
 
These criticisms are (at least partially) reinforced by media reports of egregious 
examples of PNfDs issued for littering to a man who dropped a ten pound note on a 
pavement161 and a woman who was feeding ducks.162 As to the possible recourse of a 
suspect to the court to challenge a PNfD, critics counter that ‘only a handful [of those 
issued PNfDs go to court, for obvious reasons. Only one percent are actually 
challenged’.163 
 
This lends PNfDs to similar ‘net widening’ criticism as those raised against warnings, 
reprimands and cautions; the police have issued 1,535,521 between 2005 and 2017.164 
Precisely how many of these were recorded on PHOENIX is not known, but it is 
submitted that it must be quite a significant number: between 2005 and 2009 alone, 
199,692 PNfDs were issued in respect of shop theft, 325,180 in respect of harassment, 
alarm or distress while another 215,517 were issued in respect of drunk and disorderly 
                                                          
157 R. Epstein, ‘Summary Justice: fast – but is it fair?’ (29 November 2008) 172(48) Justice of the Peace 
and Local Government Law 791 
158 Above n.153 [13] and also per s.4(2) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
159 See R. Appleton, ‘Pavement Injustice: the tyranny of on-the-spot fines’ (The Manifesto Club 9 
February 2012) 
160 K. Reid, ‘Is there a problem with PNDs?’ (19 October 2013) 177(42) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 
687 
161 M. McGivern, ‘Cops hit man with £50 fine – for dropping £10 note in the street’ Daily Record 
(Glasgow, 11 June 2009) 
162 L. Finnigan,’ Litter Wardens suspended after woman fined £80 for feeding ducks’ The Telegraph 
(London, 30 September 2016)  
163 Above n.157 
164 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal statistics annual report: chapter 2, Penalty notices for disorder’ (4 May 
2012) and Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice Statistics, Quarterly: Out of Court Disposals Tools 
(December 2017)’ (17 May 2018) 
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behaviour.165 Each of these is a ‘recordable’ offence (see below) and therefore should, 
and very likely would, have been recorded onto PHOENIX.  
 
3.4.5 Convictions166 
A conviction is ‘a legal, conclusive finding of guilt’.167 There has never been an attempt 
to compile a complete register of all convictions in England and Wales. The first criminal 
record register168 aimed to collate the names of ‘all persons convicted of a crime’ 
(authors emphasis). It did not require that a register of all convictions be kept. After 
even this limited collection became unusably voluminous, the second register required 
the registration only of those who had been convicted twice or more of an imprisonable 
offence.169  
 
By 1912, the National CRO was had expanded its collection to any person convicted 
of any offence which resulted in a sentence of one month imprisonment or more.170 
Although this re-incorporated first-time offenders into the ambit of the collection, the 
Metropolitan Police continued to delineate between ‘serious’ and ‘minor’ offences, 
where ‘serious’ was measured by the sentence handed down. The resultant criminal 
record collection was far smaller than that in other countries.171 The Metropolitan Police 
made their decision independent of any legislative amendment or addition to their 
collection powers; indeed, between 1967 and 1984 there existed no statutory 
requirement or authority to collect any records yet the police simply continued to 
compile their record of ‘serious’ offences.172 No legal challenge to that decision was 
ever brought and Parliament willingly deferred entirely to the supposed operational 
requirements of the police.173  
 
Section 27(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE 1984’) provided 
that ‘the Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for recording in national 
                                                          
165 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal statistics annual report: chapter 2, Penalty notices for disorder’ (4 May 
2012) 
166 Above n.68, section 3(1)(a) 
167 R v Farinacci [1993] OJ No 2627 (QL) (Arbour J A) 
168 Per s.5 of the Habitual Offenders Act 1869 
169 Per s.7 – 8 of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 
170 C. Matthews, The Police Code and General Manual of the Criminal Law (15th edn, Butterworths and 
Co 1912) 51 – 52  
171 B. Thompson, The Story of Scotland Yard (Grayson & Grayson 1925) 201 
172 The Home Office cautioned in 1976 that those relying on criminal record checks should take care as 
‘not all criminal convictions are recorded’ (above n.1, 85). 
173 HC Deb 9 June 1964, vol.698, col.729 – 30  
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police records convictions for such offences as are specified in the regulations’. In 
January 1986, the first such regulations mandated that ‘recordable offences’174 be kept. 
A ‘recordable offence’ is any offence where the offender 'could incur a prison sentence, 
whether or not they had’.175 In addition, four other specified offences were listed as 
‘recordable’176 and the police were required to record all convictions obtained against 
an individual who is convicted of multiple offences in the same proceedings.177   
 
This legislation appeared to mark a clear re-shift from collecting information relating 
specifically to offenders onto offending: the clear intention was to record all relevant 
convictions, rather than to simply compile a list of offenders. The list of recordable 
offences was subsequently extended in 1989178 and 1997, when 43 additions were 
made.179 The National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000,180 
attempted to consolidate increasingly disparate provisions by revoking all previous 
applicable regulations but retaining the basic definition of a ‘recordable offence’181 and 
the requirement to record multiple convictions where one in the proceedings was 
recordable.182  
 
It also provided an exhaustive list of 52 specified, non-imprisonable but nonetheless 
‘recordable’ offences to be included on PHOENIX.  This included such disparate 
offence as drunkenness in a public place,183 throwing missiles onto a football pitch,184 
unlawful possession of a police uniform,185 various public order offences including 
failure to follow instructions186 and riding a pedal bicycle without the owner’s consent187 
- all of which now fell to be recorded.  
 
                                                          
174 R v Chief Constable of B and another ex. Parte. R [1997] Lexis Citation 4824 (Laws LJ). Thomas 
(above n.3, 26) notes that the term ‘reportable’ was widely used at the time, and that ‘reportable’ and 
‘recordable’ became synonymous. By the 1990’s, ‘recordable’ was the primary term used. 
175 Per the National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985/1941 at 
Reg.2(1) and also above n.3 at 25 – 6  
176 Ibid, Reg.2(1)(a – c) 
177 Ibid, Reg.2(3) 
178 The Police National Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 1989, S.I. 1989/694 
179 Per Reg.2 of The National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 1997, 
S.I. 1997/566 
180 Per Reg.2 of The National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000/1139 
181 Ibid, Reg.3(1) 
182 Ibid, Reg.2(3) 
183 Ibid, Schedule of Specified Offences, para. 4 
184 Ibid, Schedule of Specified Offences, para. 12 
185 Ibid, Schedule of Specified Offences, para.30 
186 Ibid, Schedule of Specified Offences, para.37 
187 Ibid, Schedule of Specified Offences, para.52 
74 
 
What was apparent was that Parliament intended to expand the definition of ‘recordable 
offences’ to include many offences which are not ‘serious’. That must inevitably mean 
that more individuals fell within the ambit of the PHOENIX collection. Indeed, further 
amending regulations in 2003,188 2005,189 2007,190 2012191 and 2016192 indicates that 
Parliament is perpetually engaged in increasing the list of specified recordable 
offences, which in turn will mean that those captured on the PHOENIX collection will 
continue to grow. 
 
That notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to envisage the PHOENIX record as a 
largely complete criminal record collection save exceptional omissions. Even with 
frequent statutory enactments increasing the scope of central record collection, 
PHOENIX still contains only around half of all court convictions; the remainder are 
recorded locally on individual police force systems.193 It is submitted that this is 
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The attempt to consolidate the list of non-
imprisonable recordable offences into a single piece of legislation has palpably failed. 
The current piecemeal approach, which sees incremental additions and removals made 
by an almost ceaseless implementation of amending legislation, makes it extremely 
difficult to know what is ‘recordable’ and what is not. It is, therefore, easy to envisage 
that very many people will not know whether they have ‘a criminal record’ until or unless 
they take steps to determine this. It is submitted that the widening use of criminal 
records194 makes such confusion unacceptable. 
 
It is further submitted that the current prescribed list of non-imprisonable but recordable 
offences is arbitrary and produces absurd results. This research has already 
highlighted offences which are ordinarily trivial but recordable, yet conversely, there are 
a number of offences – such as driving without insurance195 causing unnecessary 
                                                          
188 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2003, S.I. 2003/2823 
189 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/3106 
190 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/2121. 
These amendments included adding ticket touting at specified football matches to the list of recordable 
offences. 
191 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2012, S.I. 2012/1712 
192 National Police Records (Recordable Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, S.I. 2016/1006 
193 S. Mason, ‘A common sense approach: a review of the criminal record regime in England and Wales 
(Report of phase two)’ (Home Office, 30 November 2011) 17 and also see above n.82 
194 This is the subject of the next chapter of this research 
195 Contrary to section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 
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suffering to animals196 and reproducing British currency notes197 –  which are often not 
trivial at all but nonetheless remain unrecordable.  
 
There are two diametrically opposed potential solutions. The first is that more offences 
should be designated as recordable. This approach was advocated in 1990 by a Home 
Affairs Committee198 and was reiterated during an independent review of the criminal 
records in 2010, which stated that it was desirable to obtain ‘a more complete set of 
central records to support public protection arrangements’.199 The natural extension of 
this argument is that all convictions should be recorded. This has been technically 
possible since the implementation of PNC2 and would bring some obvious advantages. 
A complete record might further some of the purposes of retaining the record discussed 
in the next chapter. Furthermore, it would end the need for routine amending legislation 
of the kind currently produced. It would also end any confusion as to what is recorded 
and create a simple, ‘bright line’ position which the public would understand.  
 
Conversely, there are those who believe that there are too many offences now 
recorded. In 1992, Liberty said that they ‘were not convinced’ that there was a need to 
record all offences on the PNC. They were concerned that this would mean a doubling 
of those who were fingerprinted, with or without consent. Others, including former 
senior police officers,200 have bemoaned the recording of trivial offences as 
counterproductive to reformative and restorative programmes; one commentator 
responded to the making of begging a recordable offence201 by claiming that ‘we should 
be encouraging more local partnerships and not using the comparatively inefficient and 
unsuccessful criminal justice system to deal with problems of this sort’.202 It is also 
evident that recording all offences would significantly widen the net of those included 
on PHOENIX. Such an approach would inevitably result in PHOENIX containing 
millions of new ‘criminal records’. 
 
Despite the incursions made by ‘specified’ offences, it appears that Parliament accords 
with the general premise that central records should be, as they have always been, 
                                                          
196 Contrary to section 4(1) and (2) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 
197 Contrary to section 18 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981. 
198 Above n.127, paras. 29 – 30  
199 Above n.193, 18 
200 Above n.154 
201 Above n.188, Reg.2(5) 
202 A. Turner, ‘Respect and Responsibility’ (29 March 2003) 167 Justice of the Peace 221 
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predominantly a record of the most ‘serious’ offences. This explains their determination 
that ‘recordable’ offences broadly equate to ‘imprisonable’ ones. The problem is that 
very many offences are theoretically imprisonable, but in practice rarely result in such 
disposal; for example, any offence under s.1 of the Theft Act 1968 is recordable 
became it carries a theoretical disposal of up to seven years imprisonment,203 yet 
hundreds of thousands of theft cases are trivial – in 2017, there were some 385,000 
incidents of shop-theft.204 It is doubtful that the majority of such offences would be 
deemed ‘serious’. If the Government intends to record ‘serious’ offences only, it should 
find a better way to define ‘serious’. The present definition, which incorporates offences 
which might result in the issue of a caution, cannot reasonably be said to do so. 
 
It is, therefore, submitted that the definition of ‘recordable offence’ should be 
reconsidered. A position which invites entirely different criticisms from alternate ends 
of a spectrum appears entirely unsatisfactory. This author suggests that the 




The CRO system of compiling criminal records imposed practical limitations of what could 
be collected, stored and maintained. Computerisation was expected to alleviate those 
limitations, but progress was very slow and seemed to suggest that, despite police and 
political proclamations to the contrary, the criminal record collection was not quite as 
important to policing and criminal justice as claimed.  
 
Despite this, the introduction of a faster, larger computer brought an opportunity not just 
to finally computerise the existing records but ultimately to collect and store far more new 
records than previously envisaged. The introduction of PNC2 coincided with a series of 
central government policy decisions which deliberately, and significantly, widened the net 
of those falling within the ambit of the central collection of criminal records. Some, such 
as the extension of ‘recordable’ offences, have attracted support among many in the 
criminal justice system and are justiciable on several grounds.  
 
                                                          
203 Per s.7 of the Theft Act 1968 
204 This figure is for 2017: see Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales, year ending 
December 2017’ (28 April 2018) Table 3 
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Others, however, are less easily defended. The inclusion of those dealt with by caution –  
a mechanism specifically developed, and operated for centuries, to keep minor and one-
off offending out of the central collection of records – added millions of such offenders into 
the system for the first time, particularly once the government introduced formal police 
detection targets which encouraged increased issuing of cautions. Likewise, the FWS, 
which mandated formal police engagement in situations where previously officers had a 
wide operational discretion to deal informally with low level youth criminality and forced 
police to centrally record those warned and reprimanded, brought into the scope of 
centrally collected criminal records millions of children; now formally criminalised in many 
cases for petty acts which previously would have gone unrecorded. The introduction of 
PNfDs have seen the creation of central criminal records for individuals who have not 
been convicted of a crime or even admitted to committing one in circumstances where the 
very existence of a criminal act has not been evidentially tested in any way. 
 
The immediate impact of these conscious policy decisions was the creation of millions of 
new nominal listings, often recording very trivial and occasional offending. This marked a 
clear departure from the prevailing doctrine of almost one hundred and fifty years of 
criminal record collection, which concentrated on documenting only the most serious and 
recidivistic offenders so that police might better investigate crime. The almost unavoidably 
obvious conclusion must be that this expansion occurred for no better reason than that 
PNC2 allowed it.  
 
So far as the first research question is concerned, what is now evident is that the 
‘traditional’ view of a criminal record being merely a list of court convictions cannot stand. 
In the literal sense at least, the ‘criminal records’ have expanded significantly beyond that 
point. If PHOENIX must now be considered the criminal records, then the data contained 




The contemporary justifications for PHOENIX 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As has been shown, the stated purpose(s) for the collation of criminal records is an 
extremely malleable concept which has been re-posited on numerous occasions. Henry 
Fielding hoped to use criminal intelligence to inform police work and prevent crime,1 the 
first national collections aimed to aid supervision of released convicts2 while the National 
CRO hoped to provide a ‘clearinghouse’3 for crime and criminals in the benefit of solving 
offences reported to them. 
 
There is no express statutory purpose for the modern collection of criminal records on 
PHOENIX, although the Data Protection Act 2018 does provide obliquely that data 
retained for ‘law enforcement purposes’ (which presumably includes criminal records) is 
used for ‘the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of 
threats to national security’.4 This is not dissimilar to the purpose provided by police to the 
Data Registrar in 1995; namely that criminal records are used in ‘the prevention and 
detection of crime: apprehension and prosecution of offenders; protection of life and 
property; maintenance of law and order, and rendering assistance to the public.'5 
 
This type of generic and overly-simplistic exposition paints an unsatisfactory depiction of 
the modern utilisation of criminal records in England and Wales; in fact, there are now an 
extraordinarily wide range of circumstances in which the PHOENIX data is used. There is 
not scope within this research to provide a detailed critical evaluation of each one of these, 
but, in order to provide an essential context to the analysis of whether the present policy 
for the collation, storage and retention of data is ‘excessive’ (per the fourth research 
question) which follows in subsequent chapters, and also to allow for an evaluation of the 
justicability of the expansion of the PHOENIX records outlined in the previous chapter, 
some critical analysis must be provided. 
                                                          
1 J. McMullan, ‘Policing reform and moral discourse: the genesis of a modern institution’ (1998) 21(1) 
Policing: An international journal of police strategies and management 158, 159 
2 HC Deb 4 August 1869, Col. 1261 cited in T. Thomas, Sex Crime, Sex Offending and Society 
(Routledge 2015) 44 
3 R.B Fosdick, European Police Systems (The Century Co. 1915) 327 
4 Per Pt. 3, Ch.1, s.31 of the Data Protection Act 2018. 




What follows in this chapter, therefore, is an attempt to identify the principal purposes for 
which the PHOENIX collection is used and, where appropriate, to offer some critical insight 
into some of the avenues of challenge which might be raised against that utilisation which 
necessarily feed into the detailed critical evaluative research offered in chapters seven to 
nine of this thesis which deal with the fourth research question. 
 
4.2 The ‘criminal records help to prevent crime’ purpose 
The presumption that collecting and retaining a collection of known offenders helps to 
prevent crime can be traced back to the middle of the 18th century. It is predicated on two 
universally recognised, correlating statistical observations; firstly, that prior offending is 
among the most reliable predictors of future offending6 because, secondly, a 
disproportionately large volume of crime is committed by a relatively small number of 
‘prolific’, recidivistic offenders. This pattern, surmised by the Fielding brothers at Bow 
Street,7 was identified in a semi-systematic manner by Patrick Colquhoun, who in 1806 
concluded that ‘it is known that many convicts…return to their old courses’.8 Indeed, it was 
a fear of the ‘habitual offender’ that directly resulted in the first national criminal record 
collections; in 1915, Fosdick found that between 60 and 70 percent of those convicted of 
crimes in England between 1900 and 1912 had at least one previous conviction. This led 
him to proclaim that ‘the bulk of crime is committed by those who have been previously in 
the hands of the police’.9  
 
The notion that a small number of recidivistic offenders commit disproportionately large 
numbers of offences continues to permeate crime prevention discourse.10 The Home 
Office reported in 2001 that, of an active offending population of around 1 million 
offenders, some 10% were responsible for more than half of all reported offences.11 More 
                                                          
6 M. Redmayne, Character Evidence in the Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press 2015) 31 
7 B. S. Godfrey, D. Cox and S. Farrall, Serious Offenders: a historical study of habitual offenders (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 6 
8 P. Colquhorn, Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis (7th edn, Patterson Smith Publishing 1806) 99 
9 Above n.3, 316 
10 Audit Commission, ‘Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively’ (HMSO 1993) 54, para.125 
11 Home Office, ‘Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead’ (HMSO, 2001) 
80 
 
modern data from the Ministry of Justice shows that there are around 121,000 ‘persistent 
offenders’12 who between them have committed more than 2.7 million convictions.13 
 
The very existence of this pattern is accurately observable only through the systematic 
collection of criminal records. The problem which the police and Home Office have 
grappled with since this pattern became apparent is precisely how to utilise this knowledge 
to prevent crime. One possibility is to closely ‘supervise’ those who are known to be 
offenders so that they cannot commit further offences. This was the strategy adopted by 
the Victorians to curb ‘habitual’ offenders, but supervision is time, cost and labour 
intensive14 and could conceivably in modern parlance give rise to serious human rights 
considerations. The failure of ‘ticket of leave’ supervision meant that idea that criminal 
records could be utilised to prevent crime fell thereafter into abeyance in favour of 
alternative approaches based firstly on police visibility and patrol, then, by the 1970’s a 
‘reactive’ approach to crime which focused on responding to reported offences, rather than 
ostensibly attempting to prevent them.15 
 
This approach did so little to reduce crime levels in areas where it was adopted that one 
oft-cited analysis witheringly concluded that: 
 
The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best-kept secrets of modern life. 
Experts know it, the police know it but the public does not know it.; Yet the police 
pretend that they are society’s best defence crime. This is a myth. First, repeated 
analysis has consistently failed to find any connection between the number of 
police officers and crime rates. Second, the primary strategies adopted by modern 
police have been show to have little or no effect on crime.16 
 
It was the perceived failure of this reactive approach,17 along with the implementation of 
the PNC2, which enabled the development of a number of alternative policing models in 
                                                          
12 This is defined as an individual who has eight or more convictions or other crime disposals registered 
against them on the PNC. See Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice Statistics quarterly, England and 
Wales, September 2016 to September 2017’ (18 February 2018) 7, fn.14 
13 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice Statistics quarterly, England and Wales, September 2016 to 
September 2017’ (18 February 2018) 7 
14 This is largely why the Victorians abandoned it: see HC Deb 20 July 1910, vol.19, col 1353 
15 T. Jones, T. Newburn and R. Reiner as cited in A. Liebling, S. Maruna and L. McAra, The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University Press 2017) 779. ‘Reactive’ investigation is explored at 
length in the next section of this chapter. 
16 D. Bailey, Policing for the Future (Oxford University Press 1994) 3 
17 Ibid, 780 
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the early 1990s. Although these are overall now summarised by Reiner et al as consisting 
largely of ‘little more than fancy labels and promotional devices, rather than genuine 
developments in policing styles and tactics’,18 it was from this period that the notion of 
‘proactive policing’ emerged. Described by Innes as involving ‘the prediction and 
prevention of criminal offending’,19 proactive policing realigned the purpose of police as 
being those responsible mostly for crime prevention, rather than offender detection.20 This 
led to the development of various models for ‘trying to determine which individuals and 
groups are likely to engage in criminality of different kinds’,21 including ‘community 
policing’22 and, more pertinently so far as criminal records are concerned, ‘problem-
oriented policing’. 
 
The central premise of ‘problem-oriented policing’ is that the core of policing should be to 
deal effectively with underlying police-recurrent problems rather than simply to react to 
incidents calling for attention one by one as they occur’.23 The intention to was to make 
police work more ‘analytical’, identifying ‘patterns’ and aiming to solve the underlying 
cause of these, rather than seeing crime as a ‘one-off’ discrete event.24 Methods such as 
the SARA process and the ‘Problem Analysis Triangle’ were rolled out in various police 
forces during the 1990s with varying degrees of success.25 
 
In England and Wales, this ‘problem oriented approach’ was extended into a variant 
known as ‘intelligence-led policing’ (‘ILP’): a ‘nebulous concept’26 first mooted by the Audit 
Commission in 199327 which broadly intended to prevent crime ‘through proactive policing 
targeted by criminal intelligence’ aimed at removing prolific offenders from circulation.28 
Police forces employed specialist data analysts to pore through criminality data29 and 
                                                          
18 Ibid 
19 P. Cane and H.M. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 25 
20 P. Joyce, Criminal Justice: An Introduction (Routledge, Oxford 2017) 197 
21 Above n.19 
22 Above n.17 
23 K. Bullock and N. Tilley, Crime Reduction and Problem-Oriented Policing (Willian Publishing 2003) 1 
24 Above n.15, 781 
25 Ibid and also above n.20, 199 
26 I. Walters, ‘The police, young offenders and intelligence-led policing’ (2006) 79 4 Police Journal 305 
27 Above n.10, 57, para.129 
28 J. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (Routledge 2011) 6 
29 Ibid, 95 
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provide ‘intelligence’ to specialist groups (or ‘squads’) of detectives who then identified 
‘targets’ who were monitored and ultimately arrested, if necessary.30  
 
What is evident is that the influence of the IRP and ‘Proactive’ models have been influential 
in shaping policing doctrine for the last two decades towards ‘an ongoing surveillance of 
populations at risk and of risk’,31 that these were widely implemented as policing models 
in England and Wales between 2000 – 2005, that these were especially directed towards 
repeat offenders32 and that these necessitate the collation of ‘vast stores of information’.33 
Indeed, ILP and other forms of proactive, or even ‘predictive’ policing rely on a steady flow 
of ‘big data’,34 particularly data relating to offences and offenders.   
 
It is not the intention of this research to determine ‘whether ILP works’. It will suffice instead 
to say that ILP is not universally regarded as being effective; either as a model for 
preventing crime or in the way that police officers have implemented it. Advocates of ILP 
argue that it is based on empirical criminological research and ‘there is some evidence 
that it is an effective strategy in law enforcement terms’.35 For example, one study in 
Minneapolis found that the identification, and subsequent increased police presence in, a 
‘crime hotspot’ identified through data analysis resulted in a ‘clear, if modest, general 
deterrent effect’36 while Ratcliffe, a strong supporter of ILP as a process and a means of 
making policing more ‘cost-effective’, highlighted successful identification and specific 
targeting of repeat offenders as evidence that ILP, properly undertaken, can be effective.37 
 
Indeed, ILP was initially lauded as successfully reducing crime rates but criticism began 
to emerge which claimed that the focus on repetition of offending over seriousness of 
offence was ‘a deep confusion’,38 while others argued that the reduction in crime since ILP 
was introduced was ‘in the main, coincidental’ and that the potential for crime reduction 
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through ILP had been ‘widely exaggerated’.39 In 2003, James published an analysis of the 
effectiveness of ILP as a means of preventing crime and claimed that there was little 
evidence that it had actually reduced crime.40 This position was repeated at length in 2011 
by Alach, who outlined all of the perceived problems with ILP and then provided that: 
 
All of the above criticisms of ILP would be moot if there were clear evidence of the 
outcome effectiveness of ILP. Unfortunately for supporters of ILP, there is none, 
and some of its supporters have stated so quite explicitly. In none of the counties 
which have embraced, or are embracing, ILP, is there an obvious indication that 
these new policies and procedures have led to improved policing, however that be 
defined.41 
 
What emerges is that there remains no general consensus as to whether the model of ILP 
is in itself sufficient justification for the collation, storage and lengthy retention of criminal 
record data for the purpose of preventing crime. What also emerges is that there also exist 
significant questions as to whether ILP has been actually implemented by police officers 
‘on the ground’. This is because ‘many police departments lack the skill to conduct 
rigorous evaluation’42 of the intelligence data and because ‘crime mapping creates tension 
with some of the fundamental cultural beliefs of street-cops that theirs is a craft-based 
occupation’.43  
 
The latter issue has been observed in more than one study; both Gill (in 2000)44 and Cope 
(in 2004) provided both qualitative and quantitative analysis45 of police forces which 
showed a general mistrust of data analysts by police officers (particularly those who were 
civilian, rather than police officers). Cope particularly identified a number of weaknesses 
in the way in which ILP was being ‘adopted’; poor data quality,46 variable quality of analysis 
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produced,47 poor police training leading to weak understanding of the analysis produced48 
and a police persistence on seeing analysis as simply a means of identifying ‘targets’ who 
might lead to arrests49 were all identified as unrectified issues. 
 
Perhaps more significantly, however, was Cope’s analysis that there persisted a general 
clash of cultures between the police and the analysists which meant that analysis was 
often simply not acted upon at all; one interviewee told Cope that: ‘the biggest frustration 
of analysts is the fact that people do not action the work that we produce. We're constantly 
asked about crime levels and what's going on about it but at the end of the day the analysts 
only produce recommendations. If they're not acted on, there's nothing more that we can 
do’.50 As Ratcliffe (correctly) notes; ‘this is hardly the model of operation architects of ILP 
laid out, and is more indicative of a problem of implementation rather than conceptual 
design’.51  
 
That may be so, but it must call into question just how useful data, and particularly criminal 
record data, is so far as police operational crime prevention practices are concerned. ILP 
has now been supplemented with various related, but somewhat different initiatives such 
as the ‘Prolific and Other Priority Offender Programme’, which involves the co-operative 
(predominantly with probation and ‘Youth Offending Teams’) policing of prolific offenders 
in the hope of preventing reoffending52 and ‘evidence based policing’, which involves the 
hiring by police of professional academic researchers to make policing recommendations 
based on analysis of the police’s own trove of criminality data.53 More basic examples 
include simple electronic tagging of known offenders so as to monitor them and undertake 
‘crime mapping’ exercises.54  
 
What is clear is that, if policing models based on ILP or ‘evidence-based policing’ continue 
to be the preferred model for forces, data will need to be collated, stored and retained so 
that the ‘intelligence’ or ‘evidence’ required can be gleaned. This will include the retention 
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of criminal records data. However, as the relevance and quality of the data will necessarily 
impact on the capacity of it to be considered ‘intelligence’ which might assist officers in 
the prevention of future offences, it is submitted that the need extends only to provide the 
criminal record data for ‘active’ and/or serious offenders, for reasons analysed in greater 
depth in chapter 8.4 of this research. 
 
4.3 The ‘criminal records help to detect offenders’ purpose 
It is often tritely stated that the collection of criminal records helps to solve crime; indeed, 
the National CRO referred to the ‘catching thieves on paper’.55 What was meant by this 
was never expressly provided. Some criminality datasets have measurable utility in linking 
suspects to offences. The usefulness of fingerprints as a crime detection device, for 
example, is obvious; indeed, the national computerised fingerprint database, IDENT1, 
holds (at 31 December 2017) some 8,093,575 records which can be searched against 
crime-scene prints for precisely this purpose.56 Likewise, the National DNA Database, 
which holds DNA samples on 5,374,062 individuals,57 has obvious crime detecting 
potential and indeed both ‘are used extensively in the criminal justice system in England 
and Wales’.58 Custody photographs were uploaded to police systems in April 2014, along 
with an automated search facility.59 This collection of around 21 million images (as of 
January 2018) also has an obvious usefulness in helping police and witnesses to positively 
identify suspects and others relevant to an investigation,60 while modus operandi data held 
on the PNC61 has obvious useful intelligence properties and has underpinned ILP,62 
among other modern policing methodologies. 
 
The usefulness of the PHOENIX list of criminal disposals held against a specified 
individual in helping to solve crime is, however, far less clear. There are a number of 
contentions usually raised. The first is that, when faced with a new crime with which s/he 
is tasked to solve, the diligent police officer will look to the ‘criminal record’ as part of the 
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‘overall picture’ of an offender which, when taken together with the other criminality data 
outlined above, can help identify the suspect or suspects responsible.63 This is very vague, 
and whether such an approach actually produces any quantifiable results is unclear; even 
the police admit that the usefulness of the record in this context is ‘not easy to quantify’.64 
Another justification is that a criminal disposal fixes an individual to a particular location at 
a particular time. In this context, the actual disposal itself doesn’t much matter but the 
location of the offence, the arrest and the disposal itself, which together place an individual 
to a particular geographical point at a particular time. It is suggested that this may, 
therefore, be useful in investigating an unrelated offence.65 It is not known how often the 
police use criminal disposal data for this purpose, but it is submitted that, in a time of GPS 
tracking devices in very many vehicles and every modern mobile telephone being sold, 
there must surely alternative means of fixing individuals to particular geographical 
locations66 as and when required. 
 
The most common justification espoused relates to the ‘recidivism’ notion; namely that 
those individuals with criminal records are more likely to commit offences than those who 
do not. This gave rise to what Moylan described as criminal records being ‘a means of 
enabling new crimes to be traced to old criminals’67 and the recidivistic behaviour of a 
significant proportion of those who commit offences continues to play a prominent role in 
modern criminological68 and policing practice.69  
 
The knowledge that ‘criminals…have a general propensity to commit crime’70 is one thing. 
The judicious use of that knowledge for crime detection purposes is quite another. The 
popular image, perpetuated by the media and facilitated by the police themselves, of 
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police detective work ordinarily involves officers arriving at the scene of the crime, closely 
observing the scene and witnesses, extracting ‘clues’ before using deductive reasoning 
and inferential logic to piece together these seemingly disparate ‘facts’ to solve the case.71  
 
The reality is very different. Palmiotto claims that the response to a report of a crime to 
the police takes three stages. The first involves a ‘preliminary investigation’ being 
conducted by a police officer (usually a patrol officer) who receives the report of an 
offence. The purpose of this is to make a determination as to whether the offence is 
‘solveable’. To that end, the officer will take statements from any witnesses, secure CCTV, 
potential forensic evidence and other sources which might show that an offence has taken 
place and by whom and, most importantly, about who might have committed the offence 
and where that person (or persons) might now be.72 Police often refer to ‘the golden hour’; 
this is the period immediately preceding the commission of an offence where the available 
information which might ultimately allow for the detection of the offender is most readily 
obtainable.73 If this ‘preliminary investigation’ suggests that there is little prospect of 
‘solving’ the case, and particularly if the matter involves a ‘minor’ offence, then that will 
often be the end of the matter and no further investigation will take place. Palmiotto claims 
that very many investigations will end at this point, as the resources required to investigate 
further are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the likelihood of ‘solving 
the case’.74 
 
Conversely, where the initial investigation reveals that either a ‘serious’ crime has taken 
place, or that the chances of solving the case are high, then the investigation moves to 
the next stage; an investigation conducted by either a specialist detective or a team of 
detectives.75 This investigation will focus on the identification of possible suspect(s).76 In 
many cases, the identification of the suspect will become quickly apparent through an 
analysis of the material obtained in the preliminary investigation; identification by a 
witness(es), CCTV footage of a perpetrator, forensic evidence linking an individual to the 
offence etc. In homicide offences, for example, several studies have shown that the 
perpetrator is relatively straightforwardly identifiable, and in these cases the police 
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investigation gravitates ‘to a significant degree’ towards building a prosecuting case 
against the suspect.77 
 
In all of these circumstances it is extremely difficult to envisage what role, if any, criminal 
records held on PHOENIX plays in the crime detection process. However, far more difficult 
detective work is where the identification of the suspect is not immediately apparent and 
the crime is sufficiently serious that an investigation must take place; the ‘whodunit’ 
cases.78 In this case, detectives ordinarily focus initially on those individuals known to the 
victim, particularly those with the ‘means, motive and opportunity’ to commit the offence. 
Innes claims that ‘equally important, though, in the police’s eyes is whether any of those 
near the victim have a previous criminal history’.79 Where this does not yield ‘results’, once 
friends and family are eliminated from an enquiry (and the especial focus will primarily fall 
on those who have previous convictions), the next port of call is to analyse the 
characteristics of the crime and to try and match this to ‘known, local, active offenders’ to 
generate a new pool of suspects.80 This search of ‘suspect populations’ will allow for the 
identification of individuals who are subsequently arrested, detained and interrogated in 
the hope that they either confess to the offence or reveal useful information which 
implicates their criminal associates.81 It is only once these individuals are eliminated from 
the enquiry that, according to Innes, ‘the police will genuinely open up the scope of their 
inquiries to consider anyone as a possible suspect’.82 
 
This approach to identifying suspects, likened to a ‘fishing expedition’ by several 
criminologists,83 is often described as a means of ‘suspect centric’ crime investigation, 
focusing resources on known offenders and, when crimes are reported, seeing if these ‘fit’ 
information held by police so that a link might be drawn between them.84 It is in this manner 
that the repository of criminal records data on PHOENIX might reasonably be presumed 
to aid in the detection of crime. The introduction of the Queries Using Extended Search 
Techniques (‘QUEST’) software onto PHOENIX in July 1998 enabled this approach to 
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proliferate in electronic form, with the promise to officers that ‘provided that the information 
entered into PHOENIX is up to date, QUEST will find who you are looking for’.85  
 
By contrast to those detectives using criminal records to help ‘identify suspects’, many 
officers appeared to be not using PHOENIX for anything much at all. Indeed, QUEST was 
intended to alter the perception of many police officers that PHOENIX was little more than 
‘a record keeping and reference tool’.86 Whether it did so is open to debate; in 2005, police 
management were sufficiently concerned that the Police Journal was persuaded to run a 
ten article publicity campaign to highlight the investigative usefulness of QUEST, with one 
telling officers that they needed to ‘wake up to the investigative opportunities they were 
missing out on’.87 
 
What emerges, then, is that very many offences are ‘investigated’ and investigations 
closed without any use of the PHOENIX repository at all. Of those investigations which 
proceed sufficiently to merit a consideration of PHOENIX, a significant number of officers 
do not appear to use criminal records very much, or even at all, while those who do use 
them ordinarily do so as a means of investigating offences by effectively ‘rounding up the 
usual suspects’88 in order to try and identify possible suspects.  
 
It is not the purpose of this research to evaluate the effectiveness of this method of 
investigation, but some general concluding points might be considered. The first is that it 
is not clear whether this means of investigating is an effective means of identifying 
suspects or ‘solving’ cases. Homicide investigations typically yield very high conviction 
rates (up to 90%) but this is ordinarily because of the resources attached to then and that 
most homicides are committed by friends or family of the victim, so the suspect is quickly 
identified.89 By contrast, overall it has been said that ‘when taken as a whole, most criminal 
offending is not even investigated’90 and, even where investigations do take place, the 
most recent set of Home Office data shows that in 48% of instances the case was closed 
without a suspect being identified.91  
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It is also clear that the ‘suspect-centric’ approach has led to repugnant results. The Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was enacted, at least in part, to rectify the practice of 
some detectives to respond to reported offence by rounding up ‘known offenders’ and 
coercing confessions upon which convictions could be obtained; a practice described by 
Johns and Maguire ‘relatively easy’ prior to the implementation of PACE.92 In some 
instances, these were obtained through extreme violence; one example in Sheffield 
involved the use of a rhino whip by a detective to extract confessions.93 Conversely, the 
police conviction that crimes are predominantly committed by ‘known’ offenders has led 
to investigations where the true perpetrator has evaded capture because the detectives 
were looking ‘in the wrong place’. Instances include the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ investigation, 
where the police mistakenly ‘put all their eggs in one basket’ and, in doing so, allowed the 
perpetrator to continue killing.94 
 
The net result, it is submitted, is that there must be some considerable doubt as to whether 
the collation and retention of criminal records can be justified on the basis of their 
operational useful to the police in crime detection. There appears to be a general 
presumption [authors emphasis] that this data is useful but, except other than in the 
manner outlined above, it is difficult to see what use these records hold. Morris,95 for 
example, claims that the PNC plays ‘a vital part’ in criminal investigation, but offers no 
further explanation as to how this is or why he thinks such. Similarly, in an eight-page 
exposition of ‘evidence’ which aids police investigations, Joyce notes simply that 
‘PHOENIX has developed from it’s initial role as a record sharing facility to become an 
investigative tool’,96 but again offers no further explanation as to how this is so.  
 
This is perhaps not surprising. Whilst there is an obvious logic in the requirement to hold 
criminal record data relating to serious (cases where the police will almost always conduct 
more than a ‘preliminary investigation’) or repeat offenders (who might reasonably be 
considered a suspect in a new offence) there is no obvious reason why old, minor or 
inactive records might assist in the detection of offences in any way. If this proposition is 
                                                          
92 T. John and M. Maguire, ‘Criminal intelligence and the National Intelligence Model’ in T. Newburn et 
al, above n.75, 202. 
93 Above n.20, 210 
94 Above n.76, 46 
95 B. Morris ‘History of Criminal Investigations’ in Newburn et al, above n.75, 32 
96 Above n.20, 128 
91 
 
not correct, then there should now perhaps be offered by the police an evidence-based 
explanation as to how this is so. 
 
The inherent weakness identified here in the argument that the police require the collation, 
storage and retention of records must be borne in mind as this research progresses to 
answer the fourth research question in chapters seven, eight and nine of this thesis. 
 
4.4 The ‘criminal records help to prosecute offenders’ purpose 
The criminal justice system presently in situ for the prosecution of suspected offenders in 
England and Wales unquestionably depends upon a record of some [author’s emphasis] 
criminal data. A summation of the use of criminal records in this context is that: 
 
The defendant’s record (previous convictions, cautions, reprimands, etc) may be 
taken into account when the court decides not only on sentence but also, for 
example, about bail, or when allocating a case for trial.’97 
 
This summation hugely understates the perceived importance, and practical utilisation of, 
criminal records in the prosecution process: the reality is that the PHOENIX collection of 
criminal records permeate the entire prosecution process. A concise examination and 
where, how and why these are used is as follows: 
 
4.4.1 Pre-trial disclosure and bail applications 
The initial decision on whether to charge a suspect will be taken by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (‘the CPS’) after a review of ‘all formal disposals’ held against a 
suspect on PHOENIX.98 To facilitate this (and the other uses outlined below), the CPS 
have access to ‘read only’ access to PHOENIX and some other PNC data.99 
 
Once a suspect is charged, PHOENIX plays an integral part of the decision-making 
process regarding bail. The police100 and the courts101 have the authority to refuse bail 
if one of the statutory grounds are made out. The custody officer who makes the police 
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bail decision will have access to PHOENIX and will very likely take that record into 
consideration when making a bail determination because the ‘antecedent history’102 of 
the accused is a statutory factor which must be considered if it ‘appears to be relevant’ 
to the bail decision.103  
 
Although the magistrates are entitled to ask for a copy of the defendant’s antecedents 
(and the CPS will usually have these to hand),104 antecedents will ordinarily be 
introduced as part of a CPS submission that bail should be refused because the 
accused may commit further offences. This will often be ‘substantiated’ by reference to 
the PHOENIX record, which may show that the defendant has a history of committing 
many other (often unrelated) offences, the same (or similar) types of offence as that 
with which he has been charged105 or if the reason for the defendant’s offending is 
ongoing or if the defendant has previously committed offences whilst on bail.106 As the 
decision regarding bail is essentially one of whether the defendant can be trusted to 
answer to bail if granted,107 it may also be relevant if PHOENIX shows any prior 
disposals relating to dishonesty offences or if the defendant has previously absconded 
when granted bail. PHOENIX will also be consulted to see if the defendant is subject 
to any current/outstanding court orders (community orders, suspended sentence etc). 
In any of these situations, the CPS will argue that the defendant cannot be trusted 
sufficiently to be bailed.  
 
The current statutory provisions on bail certainly require that a collection of criminal 
records be retained, but the reality is that many of the submissions made in bail 
hearings regarding antecedents are largely reiterations of those which justify the 
collection of records for crime detection and prevention; in essence, they offer 
variations of the argument that ‘X should not be bailed because X is a recidivist’. Even 
if this argument is accepted, and antecedents do play a legitimate role in making a bail 
decision, then it is submitted that this still does not provide a conclusive justification for 
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retaining all convictions, regardless of how minor or aged they may be. A single aged 
conviction for absconding from bail may well be relevant. A single aged caution for shop 
theft will rarely, if ever, be so. 
 
The use of criminal record data permeates both pre-trial and trial processes. The CPS 
must include a copy of the defendant’s criminal record108 as part of the ‘initial details of 
the prosecution case’ disclosed prior to the first court hearing in a criminal 
prosecution.109 The CPS have a statutory obligation to disclose to the defence any 
material which might undermine the CPS case or assist the defence.110 This is taken 
by the CPS to include the criminal record of any prosecution witness, including the 
complainant, where that might give rise to a defence that the offence was committed 
by someone else (including possibly the witness111) or where the conviction(s) go to 
the credibility of the witness. As with bail, particular focus will fall on prior disposals 
involving dishonesty or those specific to the issue of witness credibility, such as 
perverting the course of justice.112  
 
4.4.2 The use of PHOENIX data as ‘bad character evidence’ 
While it was not uncommon for advocates to ‘accidently’ leave in view a list of the 
defendants prior convictions on their desks while conducting trials,113 the general rule 
historically was that previous disposals should not be revealed to the court during trial 
so as to not prejudice the presumed innocence of the defendant.114 That is no longer 
the case, and immediately prior to trial, an application may be made to adduce evidence 
of ‘bad character’ under the various provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘the 
CJA 2003’).115   
 
It is not the purpose of this research to conduct a critical analysis of the ‘bad character’ 
provisions of the CJA 2003. What follows is an abridged summary of the development 
of the use of bad character provisions so as to provide an insight as to how the 
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PHOENIX repository of criminal record data (or at least something comparable to it) is 
considered ‘necessary’ to allow for their operation. An (intentionally) brief overview of 
the arguments in favour of, and against, bad character evidence is offered, again for 
the purposes of highlighting to the reader the impact that potential future developments 
might have on the PHOENIX repository. 
 
Although an application to adduce bad character evidence may be made by the 
defence as regards a prosecution witness,116 it ordinarily involves the CPS adducing 
‘evidence of, or a disposition towards, misconduct’,117 where ’misconduct’ is ‘the 
commission of an offence or other reprehensible behaviour’.118 Such evidence ‘cannot 
of itself prove guilt. The prosecution must adduce other evidence to substantiate their 
case before the jury or magistrates are permitted to take [the defendant’s] bad character 
into account’.119 
 
Evidence of bad character can only be adduced if one or more of the seven ‘gateways’ 
provided for by s.101 of the CJA 2003 are made out. These include where the bad 
character evidence may indicate that the defendant has a ‘propensity’ to commit 
offences of the kind s/he is standing trial for or where the defendant is alleged to have 
a propensity to be untruthful.120 This quite evidently involves adducing records held on 
PHOENIX. Single prior convictions are less likely to establish ‘propensity’ than lengthier 
records;121 one obvious implication for prosecutors is that they have a vested interest 
in disclosing as many previous convictions held on PHOENIX against a defendant as 
permissible, in the hope of establishing the admissibility of them. For this reason alone, 
the CPS will argue that a complete record of all criminal disposals is necessary. 
 
It is not merely convictions which might be adduced as bad character evidence. 
Although PNDs are inadmissible as evidence of bad character,122 there is a 
presumption that cautions are generally admissible as bad character evidence,123 
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reprimands have been adduced to show both propensity and a lack of credibility124 and 
acquittals have been adduced as evidence of bad character, particularly as regards 
propensity.125 Where an arrest results in a ‘no further action’ disposal and the CPS have 
written to the accused to tell him that the matter is closed in perpetuity, the PHOENIX 
‘event history’ record of it can nonetheless be used as evidence of bad character.126 
The CPS are even entitled to elect not to charge a suspect with the tactical intention of 
instead using the arrest information as bad character propensity evidence in respect of 
a different offence.127  
 
The provisions of the CJA 2003 mostly work against the defendant, but there are 
occasions where a defendant will ask that the judge make a direction as to his/her ‘good 
character’. This has historically meant that where a defendant has no previous 
convictions on their criminal record, the judge would direct a jury that the defendant is 
more credible and less likely to have a propensity to commit the alleged offence than a 
person of bad character.128 The modern position is different. Once a judge has 
permitted non-conviction, bad character evidence to be admissible, to give a good 
character direction ‘makes no sense’129 and the judge is obliged to give a bad character 
direction, even if the defendant has no prior convictions.130  
 
Good character, therefore, now means ‘far more than having no previous 
convictions’.131 Only where a person has no previous convictions and no other alleged, 
admitted or proven ‘reprehensible conduct’ is s/he is entitled to be considered of 
‘absolute good conduct’ and receive the benefit of a ‘full’ good character direction.132 If 
the record shows old, minor and irrelevant disposals, the judge has a discretion to direct 
s/he is of ‘effective good character’133 and therefore receive a full good character 
direction.134 
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The CJA 2003 provisions have been controversial since their inception135 and it 
perhaps worth reiterating that it not within the scope of this research to evaluate at 
length their merits, or otherwise. However, some general comments might be made. 
The question of what constitutes ‘bad character evidence’ and when it is of ‘probative’ 
value or ‘relevant as to credibility’ is very subjective and the decisions are usually made 
firstly by counsel (who have the first decision on whether to raise the issue or not) and 
then by the judge (who then decides whether to allow an application and how to direct 
the jury as to the ‘value’ of the evidence). Extreme subjectivity usually gives rise to 
inconsistency, as evidenced by the extremely [authors emphasis] lengthy line of case 
authority generated by the CJA 2003 provisions. Additionally, the admissibility of bad 
character evidence can significantly delay trials and confuse juries; one case saw three 
months of a trial taken up by an examination of witnesses and others relevant only to 
supposed bad character of the defendant.136 
 
Moreover, the very admissibility of bad character evidence remains a controversial 
subject. There is a suspicion among some that the CJA 2003 was introduced by 
politicians for largely political purposes; the prime minister claimed the CJA 2003 was: 
‘designed to make it clear that we’re not going to have people playing the system and 
getting away with criminal offences that cause real misery’.137 Quite what was meant 
by ‘playing the system’ was never clarified but what is clear was the intention to facilitate 
more jury convictions, or, more specifically, to convict defendants who would not be 
convicted on the strength of the case at hand alone.  
 
While this approach (unsurprisingly) attracted the support of the police,138 and some 
practitioners139 it also attracted significant criticism. A Law Commission report into the 
extant law of bad character evidence published in 2001 advocated a far lesser reform 
than that ultimately pursued. The Commission were concerned that bad character 
evidence unduly prejudiced mock jurors,140 particularly where the offences disclosed 
were sexual (especially against children),141 and that there was little evidence that a 
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dishonesty offence meant an individual was generally untrustworthy’.142 The Bar 
Council were concerned that the extension of bad character admissibility would (once 
more) encourage the police to ‘round up the usual suspects’, rather than conduct 
thorough investigations.143 Liberty went further, claiming that the provisions 
compromised the right to a fair trial, because previous convictions show only that ‘they 
are the type of person more likely to commit such offences, not that they are the person 
who committed this offence’.144 
 
The PHOENIX collection makes the admissibility of ‘character’ (‘bad’ and ‘good’) 
evidence possible, and while the admissibility provisions exist in anything like their 
current legislative form, a record of criminal disposal information is essential. It does 
not, however, follow that a complete record be retained, because the development of 
the law relating to bad character indicates clearly that old, minor and irrelevant offences 
are not necessarily admissible, nor even likely to be so. This is especially likely to be 
so when dealing with juvenile disposals or out-of-court disposals. 
 
This research does not seek to determine whether such evidence should be admitted, 
but the author will rather submit that character admissibility evidence is relatively new, 
rather subjective, potentially prejudicial and there remains some fervent opposition to 
its use. If this is a principal justification for retaining the PHOENIX data, then it is 
submitted that it is a controversial one. 
 
4.4.3  Sentencing offenders 
If a defendant pleads guilty, or is found guilty after a trial, the court will move to sentence 
the defendant. Once the determination of guilt is made, the defendant’s antecedent 
history is ‘unlocked’145 and the Crown will provide a full list of antecedents for 
consideration by the court as part of the decision on sentencing. This long-standing 
practice146 currently involves the provision of personal details and a PHOENIX printout 
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of all recorded prior convictions and cautions. If there are cautions and convictions held 
on local police force systems, rather than PHOENIX, these should also be provided 
using the prescribed forms.147 Where the defendant is to be sentenced in the Crown 
Court, the police should also provide ‘brief details of the circumstances of the last three 
similar convictions and/or convictions likely to be of interest to the court’.148 Where the 
new conviction(s) impacts upon an outstanding court order, such as a suspended 
sentence, community order or conditional discharge, details of the order should also be 
provided.149 
 
PHOENIX records of past convictions have long played an important role in sentencing. 
The Crown will adduce previous convictions into evidence during sentencing either with 
the aim of persuading the court that an offender is dangerous and so the public need 
protecting from him/her, or that particular types of disposals are (in)effective and should 
be (re)considered or that the defendant has become a ‘persistent’ offender or 
conversely has shown evidence of remorse or rehabilitation.150 The traditional legal 
position was that a first-time offender would be sentenced on the basis of being of prior 
‘good character’ and that every subsequent conviction on their record resulted in a 
progressive loss of mitigation, which would be reflected in sentences of increasing 
severity on each new conviction.151 
 
PHOENIX records of past convictions152 have, however, assumed a greater importance 
in sentencing since s.143(2) of the CJA 2003 effectively made them a statutory 
aggravating factor. This is justified on the basis that an offender is more culpable, and 
the offence more serious, if an offender has prior convictions: the so-called ‘retributive’ 
or ‘just deserts’ theory of sentencing.153 It is often stated simply that the provisions of 
s.143(2) force courts to ‘treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor’154 and 
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indeed this has been treated as a definitive justification for the retention of the 
PHOENIX collection155 but the statute does not provide that all previous convictions are 
aggravating. Rather, there are two factors which will determine whether the prior 
convictions are so: whether the previous offence is ‘relevant’ to the current offence156 
and whether the previous convictions are recent to the new conviction.157  
 
The practical reality is that there will be a subjective judicial assessment of whether a 
conviction is ‘relevant’ or sufficiently ‘recent’ to be considered an aggravating factor. 
This is in keeping with the subjective nature of sentencing generally, which has become 
more prescriptive since the introduction of sentencing guidelines in 2003 but which still 
often turns on whether the decision maker is ‘soft’ or ‘tough’ as compared to their 
peers.158 Some previous convictions will be considered by some judges to be too old 
to be relevant to the instant case, some convictions will dispose of offences which bear 
no resemblance to the present one, some will actually go some way to explain the 
current offence (and may therefore mitigate it) while in some cases a lack of prior 
convictions will act as no mitigation because a ‘clean record’ is almost a pre-requisite 
for involvement in the offence (offences in respect of drug trafficking, for example).159  
 
The impact of prior convictions on sentencing is very widely researched and largely 
outwith the scope of this research, but some general points may be made. The scope 
of prior convictions on sentencing is enormous; one study in 2005 found that over three 
quarters of summary offenders and 88% of those convicted of an indictable offence had 
previous convictions.160 Despite regular media and public criticism for perceived 
leniency in sentencing, particularly the most recidivistic offenders161, since the 
introduction of s.143(2) of the CJA 2003, there has been a marked upward recent trend 
in punitive disposals, record prison populations and concurrent concerns regarding 
‘sentence inflation’.162 Indeed, the s.143(2) provisions and the existence of previous 
convictions can transform a trivial offence into a potentially imprisonable one. 
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In R v Nourine,163 a man who stole a smartphone from a woman in a department store 
was initially sentenced to two years imprisonment, despite being apprehended at the 
scene and making a guilty plea, largely because he had 18 previous convictions for 
similar offences.164 The sentence was reduced on appeal to ‘only’ 42 weeks 
imprisonment.165 Similarly, in R v Evans166 a man stole £230 from a bookmaker’s till in 
an opportunistic theft and then pushed a staff member while affecting an escape.167 He 
was given a twenty-seven month prison sentence after the judge treated 25 previous 
convictions, mostly for dishonesty offences, as aggravating factors.168 The Court of 
Appeal, recognising the difficulty in striking a balance between what the sentencing 
guidelines indicate for the offences looked at in isolation and a suitable punishment to 
the particular offender’169 decided that the trial judge had given excessive weight to the 
prior convictions but nonetheless sentenced the defendant instead to eighteen 
months.170 
 
Such use of previous convictions in sentencing is unlikely to garner much sympathy for 
the offender affected by it. The public generally are in favour of the ‘recidivistic premium’ 
and studies have shown that they view previous convictions to be the most important 
factor in determining sentence, other than the seriousness of the crime itself.171 A 
majority of victims of crime take a similar view.172  
 
It is submitted, however, that there exists legitimate questions to be asked as to whether 
the views of the public and victims should be the prevailing voices in sentencing 
offenders, or whether old, minor or irrelevant convictions have any real merit in 
sentencing offenders or, ultimately, whether a system which effectively transforms 
otherwise relatively trivial offences into imprisonable ones truly accords with notions of 
‘fairness’ or ‘justice’. 
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4.5 The (multitude) miscellaneous uses of criminal records 
When the PNC was originally mooted, politicians, wary of civil liberty and privacy 
concerns, were in earnest to reassure the public that access to the system would be strictly 
limited to only specifically trained and authorised police officers and officials.  By 1992 the 
position has shifted slightly, so that the Home Office, the DVLA and HM Customs and 
Excise had ‘read only’ access,173 but there remained a hesitancy to extend access to the 
database. The position in 2018 is very different and the PNC is now routinely accessed 
by police and non-police organisations. Indirect access is available through the ACRO 
Criminal Records Office (‘ACRO’), whose website advises that any organisation who 
wishes for them to become ‘your PNC services provider’ should email them ‘to discuss 
products and pricing plans available’.174 In 2016 – 17, ACRO provided PNC services to 34 
non-policing agencies, including the RSPCA, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and 
the Gambling Commission.175  
 
Direct access to the PNC for non-police organisations is determined by the ‘PNC 
Information Access Panel’ (‘the PIAP’), constituted by members from the National Police 
Chief’s Council, the Association of Police Authorities and the Home Office. Very little public 
information relating to the PIAP, or to those organisations whom the PIAP have authorised 
to access the PNC, exists, though a Parliamentary response by the Home Office in 2009 
indicated that the role of the PIAP involved determining whether: a) ‘a lawful and justifiable 
reason for the granting of access’ existed; b) what access should be granted for that 
purpose; and c) ensuring those granted access were able to comply with data protection 
legislation, keep the data secure and provide suitable training for those with access.  
 
Those who have access are subjected to audit from HM Inspectorate of Constabulary.176 
A Home Office missive lists some 31 non-police agencies with direct access to the PNC.177 
A later request in 2011 saw the Home Office list 18 police organisations with ‘full access’ 
(the capacity to read and amend records) and a further 32 agencies granted ‘partial 
access’ (the capacity to read the ‘names file’ on the PNC) by the PIAP.  
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This is still an incomplete list – the minister lists only some of the ‘other’ organisations 
granted ‘partial access’ outwith the PIAP process, such as the Royal Air Force police, the 
Probation Service and HM Courts Service178 – yet it is perhaps the closest to a publicly 
available ‘complete’179 list available. Thomas told a House of Lords committee in 2007 that 
‘no definitive list [of agencies with direct access] appears to exist’180 while a Freedom of 
Information request to the Home Office in 2015181 resulted in the disclosure of a partial list 
of agencies accompanied by a terse caution that: ‘the list provided is not exhaustive. Other 
cross-governmental departments and agencies have access but we will neither confirm 
nor deny the names of those departments’.182 
 
It is therefore, not possible to provide a definitive list of those who have access to 
PHOENIX and for what purpose. It is, however, possible to identify some of those with 
access and to identify what the data is used for. Some of the most pertinent examples are 
offered below: 
 
4.5.1 The ACRO Criminal Records Office (‘ACRO’) 
ACRO was formed in 2006 to ‘help organise the management of criminal record 
information and improve the links between criminal records and biometric 
information’.183 Initially little more than four staff working from ‘a temporary 
accommodation in a police car park’,184 ACRO now employs over 300 staff185 at its 
offices at Hampshire Police headquarters and is the unofficial successor to the now 
defunct NIS. 
 
ACRO, unsurprisingly, has ‘full access’ to PHOENIX and use it for a multitude of 
purposes. PHOENIX data is used to compile ‘Police Certificates’. These certify whether 
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a named individual has any ‘criminal history’ on PHOENIX, and, if so, what.186 These 
are issued to help individuals apply for a visa to enter certain countries (e.g. the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand) where the production of a ‘Police Certificate’ is a mandatory 
part of the screening process.187 PHOENIX data is also used to produce ‘International 
Child Protection Certificates’, which reveal whether a named individual has a ‘relevant 
criminal history’ when s/he intends to work with children outside the UK.188 Over 11,000 
such certificates were issued in 2016 – 17.189 
 
ACRO are also responsible for managing the UK’s responsibilities in the international 
exchange of criminal records. In 2008, the EU laid down a Framework Decision190  
which effectively imposed upon EU member states a legal obligation to ensure that EU 
citizens accused of crimes be treated the same as national citizens so far as criminal 
proceedings in each member state are concerned.191 It is submitted that this must 
impose a concurrent obligation on members states to retain, and provide access to, 
national criminality data. Equality of treatment is impossible if the necessary data is 
unavailable.  Measures to ensure compliance with the framework were required to be 
in place by 15 August 2010.192 So far as the UK was concerned, PHOENIX was 
sufficient to ensure compliance.  
 
The European Criminal Record Information System (‘ECRIS’), which went ‘live’ in April 
2012, allows for the sharing of PHOENIX data with all but three EU member states.193 
Requests for information from PHOENIX by EU member states, and for criminal record 
data held by EU states requested by UK police forces and other agencies, are managed 
by ACRO.194 It is not clear how this process will be affected by the UK’s cessation from 
the European Union, though it is generally presumed that a mutual cooperation 
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arrangement will be sought to allow this data transfer to continue.195 Plans are also now 
well advanced to improve the sharing of criminal records of non-EU nationals; an EU 
Proposal for a Regulation was issued in June 2017196 to which the UK opted in on 23 
October 2017.197 
 
ACRO add details of prosecutions brought by agencies who only have ‘partial’ access 
to the PHOENIX database, such as the RSPCA, the Environment Agency and the 
Prison Service. In 2016 – 17, 1,259 records detailing 3,427 convictions were added.198 
They also deal with all subject-access requests relating to the PNC and PHOENIX, 
manages requests to delete data from PHOENIX and convert historic microfiche 
criminal records where the offender again ‘comes to notice’.199 In 2016 – 17, over 
165,000 subject access requests were received200 and some 5,402 microfiche records 
were converted to the PNC.201 
 
4.5.2 HM Prison and Probation Service202 
Before an offender is sentenced, HM Prisons and Probation Service may be asked to 
provide a ‘pre-sentence report’ to inform the sentencing decision and staff are provided 
with ‘read only’ access to PHOENIX for that purpose.203 A report is mandatory where 
the court is considering either a custodial sentence204 or community order205 and 
otherwise a discretionary part of the magistrates court process.206 The report, which 
may be in writing or delivered orally,207 is intended to assist in determining the most 
suitable method of dealing with an offender208 and will include reference to the 
defendant’s previous convictions, which are used to help determine the seriousness of 
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the offence and the risk of future offences posed by the defendant.209 Once more, this 
sees criminal convictions used in accordance with the ‘recidivistic’ argument, and the 
same criticisms raised previously apply once more. 
 
Prison staff are entitled to access to a prisoner’s previous convictions when they are 
newly sentenced or remanded, or when they are being considered for release on 
licence/curfew.210 These are used to risk assess the prisoner.211 A PNC terminal is 
installed in some prisons and those without access are entitled to ask the nearest prison 
with access to provide them with the details they need.212 A Public Accounts Committee 
in 2006 expressed surprised that only 43 of 113 prisons had direct PNC access, and 
the Home Office conceded that this made matters more ‘difficult’ than universal access 
would.213 A Freedom of Information request by Unlock in 2009 revealed that the number 
of prisons with access had increased to 47214 but it appears that universal access has 
not yet been provided. 
 
4.5.3 Child protection and MAPPA  
Local authorities (‘LAs’) have had access to criminal records for the purpose of vetting 
possible foster and adoptive parents since the 1930s.215 However, although still used 
for that purpose, the predominant modern use of PHOENIX by LAs is in the 
performance of their child safeguarding functions. Each LA has a statutory duty to 
safeguard and protect the welfare of children216 and to make arrangements to promote 
co-operations between them and relevant partners217 to ensure that children are 
protected from harm and neglect218 and to protect their economic and social well-
being.219  
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One such ’relevant partner’ is the appropriate chief police officer.220 This means close 
co-operation between the police and social services, who work together to safeguard 
children primarily through the child protection case conference (‘the CPCC’) process. 
Where concerns regarding a child’s welfare are raised by social services, an initial 
CPCC will be convened in order to ‘bring together, in an inter-agency setting, all 
relevant information and plan how best to safeguard and promote the welfare of the 
child’.221 This will often lead to police involvement and official guidance makes clear 
that ‘the police will hold important information about children who may be suffering 
significant harm as well as those who cause such harm. They should always share this 
information with other organisations and agencies where this is necessary to protect 
children’.222 
 
This usually means providing details of criminal records. The police have acted in this 
capacity since at least 1976, providing criminality data to CPCCs under the authority of 
various Home Office circulars.223 Each force is able to determine a policy as regards 
the disclosure of criminal records, provided that they meet the national guidelines for 
data sharing and data protection legislation, but as an example, Wakefield Council and 
West Yorkshire Police’s agreed current policy is that: 
 
Police information regarding criminal history and convictions and intelligence is 
often directly relevant to assessing risk to children and within the home 
environment. This information will be shared at conferences unless there is a 
circumstance which may compromise operational or criminal investigations.224 
 
Less arrangements for the sharing of criminality information between the police and 
other agencies have existed for decades: West Yorkshire Police and their probation 
counterparts had a data sharing arrangement during the 1980s which attracted national 
attention225 and which went beyond the simple sharing of information for operational 
purposes but rather involved the disclosure of criminal information as a means to try 
and prevent crime among known offenders.  
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This ‘informal’ disclosure of criminal records information by the police non-police 
agencies and members of the public as a means of actively preventing potential 
criminality was approved, in tentative terms, in R v Chief Constable of North Wales ex. 
parte Thorpe226 where local police received a report from another force warning them 
that two particularly dangerous and notorious paedophiles had moved to a caravan site 
in the area.227 After extensive discussions between both police forces, the probation 
service, social services and the applicants themselves, the recipient force decided it 
appropriate to disclose, prior to the Easter school holidays (and the resultant influx of 
children),228 to the owners of the caravan site that two particularly recidivistic 
paedophiles were living on the site.229 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the police decision to disclose. They held that the police 
have an ‘overriding duty to protect the public, particularly children and vulnerable 
people’230 so that although ‘disclosure should be made only where there is a pressing 
need for that disclosure’231 it may be justified if it is required to fulfil the police’s 
overriding duty.232  
 
This decision provided the impetus to create more formal arrangements for sharing and 
disclosing criminal information to the public through ‘Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements’ (‘MAPPA’). MAPPA were created by the CJA 2003233 and provide a 
statutory obligation on the police and other agencies, such as HM Prisons and 
Probation, local housing authorities, the Department for Work and Pensions and social 
services, to ‘assess and manage the risk provided by certain offenders’.234 It does this 
by designating three categories of offender who require monitoring: specified sexual 
offenders, specified violent offenders and ‘dangerous offenders’.235 At March 2017, 
there were 76,749 MAPPA offenders236 and where an offender falls within the ambit of 
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MAPPA, the police may elect to disclose to non-police individuals and agencies details 
of the offender’s criminal record in order to prevent the offender committing new 
offences.237 
 
The decision in Thorpe attracted little academic or media attention and it is outwith the 
scope of this article to offer a detailed evaluation of the merits, or otherwise, of that 
decision or the MAPPA processes which followed it.  
 
However, some comments might be made. It is submitted that disclosures made under 
MAPPA will almost inevitably have far reaching consequences for those subjected to 
them. In Thorpe, the couple in question eventually fled the caravan site and ‘went to 
ground, their whereabouts not known to the authorities’ by the time the appeal was 
heard.238 It cannot be conductive to the authorities to have known sex offenders ‘go to 
ground’ where they cannot be monitored effectively. Equally concerning is the 
possibility for vigilante action which now routinely follows the disclosure of such 
information. In the midst of the current ‘paedophile panic’, the revelation to the public 
that a convicted paedophile is nearby might trigger violent and dangerous 
repercussions.239  
 
Even where MAPPA interventions are able to track offenders, there have been 
instances of serious reoffending. One instance in 2009 saw an offender under a 
MAPPA commit the murder of a seventeen year old girl.240 This illustrates that, 
ultimately, the MAPPA process suffers similar problems to the (strikingly similar) ‘ticket 
of leave’ system over a century ago, namely that ‘however stringent the…oversight of  
the MAPPA process, there will still be periods of each day and night when the individual 
has a degree of autonomy of movement – and a determined criminal will find a way to 
reoffend’.241 
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What is notable is that those subject to MAPPA are so subjected because they commit 
serious offences and the offending is recent to the MAPPA intervention. There is no 
suggestion that MAPPA would be utilised to deal with those convicted of minor 
offences, cautioned for similar offences or where those convicted have not come to 
police notice for any relevant period of time. In short, the removal of old and minor 
criminality data would have, it is submitted, a minimal impact on the MAPPA process. 
This ought to be borne in mind when contemplating the analysis offered in chapters 
seven and eight regarding the fourth research question. 
 
4.5.4 Other PHOENIX data utilisation  
PHOENIX use outwith the above listed purposes is very extensive, and it would be 
impractical to attempt to provide an exhaustive list here. Instead the author intends to 
provide an illustration of some of the more prevalent alternative uses. 
 
Criminal convictions have a long history of use for national security purposes which can 
be traced back to the early years of the Cold War. This has meant an enhanced 
background screening of people working in Government or in other particularly 
sensitive posts.242 After many years of vetting by a disparate collection of independent 
agencies, the predominant organisation responsible for security vetting is now the UK 
National Security Vetting which was launched on 1 January 2017. Vetting for National 
Security involves, among other elements, a check of the PHOENIX collection.243 Other 
organisations who have direct access to the PNC for national security vetting include 
the National Air Traffic Systems Ltd, despite their having no legal authority to do so 
between 2006 – 2016.244 
 
The Royal Mail is another longstanding user of PHOENIX data, having first had access 
to criminal conviction data in 1975 to assist them in bringing private prosecutions 
against those who commit offences against Royal Mail Group.245 PNC terminals were 
installed in the mid-1990’s into the investigative department of Royal Mail Group and 
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the PIAP later re-approved ‘read and update access’.246 PHOENIX is broadly used in 
the same way that the CPS use it during the preparation and bringing of 
prosecutions,247 though an attempt was made in June 2014 to persuade the PIAP to 
allow PHOENIX to be used as a simple employee screening tool. The PIAP refused to 
allow this and an appeal was unsuccessful.248  
 
Similar provisions are provided to the Post Office, who have a single PNC terminal 
which provides direct access to PHOENIX249 which is used so infrequently that the audit 
team who inspected them wondered whether they needed retraining to encourage 
greater use,250 the Environment Agency251 and the Financial Conduct Authority, who 
used their direct access to pursue prosecutions but also to check the criminal history 
of people applying for positions in the financial sector and people named in consumer 
credit applications despite having no valid authority to use the PNC for almost two years 
between 2014 – 2016.252 Other organisations as disparate as Thurrock Council253 and 
the Gangmasters Licencing Authority254 also have access for crime investigation 
purposes. 
 
Youth Offending Teams, responsible for dealing with juvenile offenders, are provided 
information from the PNC by police to assist them in their work.255 The Children and 
Family Court Advisory and Support Service use PHOENIX to help them in their child 
safeguarding duties.256 PHOENIX data is used to vet potential jurors.257 Those who 
make a claim for compensation through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
                                                          
246 Ibid 
247 Ibid, 10 
248 Ibid, 13 
249 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: An inspection of Post Office Ltd’ (May 2016) 4 
250 Ibid, 11 
251 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: A pilot inspection of Environment Agency’ (May 2016) 6 
252 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: An inspection of the Financial Conduct Authority’ (May 2016) 8 
253 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: An inspection of Thurrock Council (May 2016) 4 
254 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: Gangmasters Licencing Authority (May 2016) 6 
255 I. Walters, ‘The police, young offenders and intelligence-led policing’ (2006) 79(4) Police Journal 305 
256 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Use of the Police National Computer by non-police 
organisations: An inspection of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service’ (May 
2016) 8 
257 Code for Crown Prosecutors, ‘Jury Vetting: Overview of Jury Checks’ (7th edn, Crown Prosecution 
Service 2013)  
111 
 
will be subjected to criminal record checks and may face a reduction in, or a refusal of, 
any award if such a record exists.258 The rules are applied very stringently and have 
given rise to criticisms in the media after victims of sexual offences were refused 
payments because they had criminal records.259  
 
Each of these miscellaneous uses of PHOENIX arise because of the availability of the 
data and because the organisations involved are permitted to use it. It is submitted that 
none would be prejudiced were old and minor criminality data removed from PHOENIX. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The justifications for a central collection of criminal records relate directly to how they are 
subsequently used. They are important because any recommendation on how records are 
to be collected, what should be collected and who should have access must take into 
account all of the predominant uses for criminal records.  
 
The precise nature of usage has proven to be malleable and oft-changing. Historically, the 
police, custodians of the PHOENIX data repository, have determined the justification(s) 
for retaining their criminal records; ordinarily posited as one or more ‘operational policing 
purpose’. However, the last two decades have seen a marked increase in the scope of 
criminal record use at the behest of Parliament, who have expanded the use of PHOENIX 
to include criminal trials, punishment, and pre-emptive public protection, among others. 
One natural question is to wonder why these supposedly important uses for criminal 
records took until the 21st century to come to fruition and it is possible, indeed it is 
submitted that it is likely, that in truth, the government set itself to using a database which 
had been installed at public expense to the tune of tens of millions of pounds. In short, the 
suspicion remains that records are being used simply because they are available to be 
used. 
 
Moreover, it is submitted that none of the justifications cited decisively determines that a 
complete record of all criminal disposals must be kept. Some, such as national security 
vetting, may appear more persuasive than others, but there is no substantive evidence to 
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prove that a person with a reprimand as a child on their record is a greater threat to 
national security than someone who does not. It is merely ‘presumed’ to be so. Likewise, 
the police justifications are very vague, do not appear to be evidence-based and rather 
demonstrate a continued deference to the police on operational matters which prior 
instances of police misconduct shows to be misplaced. Others, such as the use of 
PHOENIX information for bad character, as a statutory aggravating sentencing factor and 
as a disclosable fact relevant to civilians who live near sex offenders are very controversial 
and it is perfectly foreseeable that a different government with different views on criminal 
justice might entirely abandon some, or all, of them. In any event, each of these would not 
necessarily be impeded even in their present form if old, minor or juvenile data was to be 
removed from the PNC, or, at least, the argument that they would be so impeded is not 
immediately apparent. 
 
The author submits, therefore, that although these justifications must be borne in mind 
when considering the nature of the record collection, there is little in them, individually or 
cumulatively, which determines that all records must be retained indefinitely, as matter of 
law, policy or even ‘common sense’. An argument can be advanced against such a 
proposition in every instance. This is the essential context for the analysis which follows 






The national collection of criminal records and 
compliance with the Data Protection Act 1984  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Until 1967, the Metropolitan Police had a statutory obligation to collect a register of 
offenders. The reality, as has been seen, is that the Metropolitan Police were effectively 
provided with carte blanche to obtain, and retain, whatever criminality information they 
chose, subject to any potentially narrow limitations prescribed by the law of tort. Indeed, a 
Home Office minister neatly summarised the Government’s position in 1960 as being that: 
‘the Home Secretary’s responsibility is confined to a power to prescribe the form in which 
criminal records should be kept in the central register and the particulars which should be 
kept’.1 To otherwise interfere in the mechanisms of police investigatory work was 
considered an assault on police independence – unconstitutional, no less – and ‘a very 
important principle and a safeguard against the creation of a police state [which] should, 
of course, be retained in full force’.2 
 
Though broadly still maintained as principle, the advent of computerisation, and the 
concurrent potential for far greater record collation, storage and use, have seen numerous 
attempts to control, if not erode, the ability of the police to compile their criminality 
database. These have broadly focused on two separate, but intrinsically correlated, 
modern legal concerns: the right of individuals to respect for their privacy, and the need 
for those in charge of sensitive data to protect it, and in turn, protect those to whom the 
data relates. 
 
In attempting to directly address the second research question, this chapter aims to offer 
a critical evaluation of the data protection questions which arose around the enormous 
repository of police criminality data held on PHOENIX as the first data protection 
legislation was enacted. The research will identify how criminal records were collated, 
stored and maintained during the relevant period before making before considering 
whether those responsible acting concordant with the applicable legal protections afforded 
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by data protection legislation. It will conclude by examining the potential ramifications of 
the failure to bring those responsible for data breaches to account.  
 
5.2 Home Office resistance to data protection legislation 
By the turn of the 1970’s, the potential improvements in cost, storage and speed of 
computerising manually held record collections were obvious even to MP’s. However, 
those benefits were seen as being, at least by some Parliamentarians, offset by the civil 
liberty implications of larger and more intrusive central databases and the increased 
potential for damaging ‘leaks’ of data, particularly those involving ‘personal information’.3  
 
There followed a number of abortive attempts to try and curb the seemingly unfettered 
expansion of computerised databases. The first came in 1967, when Alexander Lyon MP 
introduced a bill which would have made an unreasonable and serious interference into 
personal privacy a cause of civil action, recoverable in damages.4 It was denied a second 
reading amidst claims that it might restrict press freedom.5 In 1970, Brian Walden MP 
introduced a bill which would have defined ‘privacy’ and put the protection of it on a 
legislative footing.6 It attracted considerable support but encountered strong opposition 
from the Home Office, who persuaded Walden to withdraw the bill so that a Royal 
Commission could consider the issue. 
 
The resultant Younger Committee (1972) were instructed to investigate whether legislative 
safeguards were required to protect privacy in light of the growth of computerised data,7 
but it was forbidden from considering public sector databases, including the imminent 
PNC, despite repeated lobbying to the Government to extend its remit.8 The Government 
announced another consultative exercise in response and said a White Paper would be 
issued, but, according to Campbell and Connor, ‘a general election conveniently 
intervened before further action was needed’.9 
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Another MP, Leslie Huckfield, attempted twice to advance a ‘Control of Personal 
Information Bill’ which aimed to provide a regulatory framework for the supply and control 
of personal data in ‘databanks’, overseen by a tribunal which would provide ‘licences’ to 
those holding data on 100,000 or more subjects.10 The first attempt in 1971 gained no 
traction at all, and while the second in 1972 fared better, it fell at the second reading 
stage.11  
 
In 1974, the Government promised to publish a White Paper on potential data 
safeguards,12 but it was repeatedly delayed until eventually it was published in ‘less than 
the usual vague terms’ and not much more became of it.13 Another committee, this time 
headed by Norman Lindop, was convened in 1976 to look again at the issues of data 
protection and privacy, albeit encompassing both private and public sectors.14 The final 
report, which recommended that an independent, statutory Data Protection Authority be 
set up and authorised to enforce a range of legally enforceable Codes of Practice with full 
legal powers of search and seizure, alarmed the Home Office so much that it was withheld 
for six months before it was finally released into the Commons library.15  
 
The Government and the Home Office responded to Lindop’s detailed recommendations 
by completely ignoring them and instead issued yet another consultation; a process which 
saw them ‘consult all the people who had previously been consulted and who were 
concerned, all over again’.16  
 
The reality which was now apparent was that successive Governments were actively 
hostile towards ‘data protection’. Their only genuine concern regarding data was that it 
was ‘secure’, so that only the data owner (or those authorised by them) were able to 
access it.17 Similarly, the Home Office wanted data protection legislation ‘like they wanted 
a hole in the head’.18 When asked whether legislation would be passed to allow citizens 
access to the records held against them on the PNC, the Home Office simply replied; 
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‘no.’19 Indeed, such was the obfuscation of the Home Office, a House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee convened in 197920 to investigate the absolute lack of progress found 
that, since 1967, the Home Office’s data responsibilities had been examined by no less 
than forty Royal Commissions and other committees for the net product of seventeen 
different reports resulting in zero legislative developments.21 
 
Ultimately, events overtook the Home Office. On 28 January 1981, the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Data (‘the 1981 
Convention’) was opened for signature by the Council of Europe.22 The 1981 Convention 
established various safeguards regarding the ‘quality’23 and ‘security’24 of personal data, 
created a right of subjects to access data relating to themselves25 as well as imposing a 
duty on signatories to instigate an ‘authority’ responsible for the general oversight of data 
and compliance with the Convention.26 The UK signed on 14 May 1981 but could not ratify 
it until it passed the necessary domestic data protection legislation.27 
 
There existed a special provision relating to collections of criminal records, namely that 
these could not be ‘automatically processed’ unless domestic law provided appropriate 
safeguards.28 In this context, ‘processed automatically’ referred specifically to operations 
carried out ‘by automated means’: i.e. computerised collections.29 This was therefore 
beneficial to the Metropolitan Police: although the 1981 Convention might apply to the 
PNC, it did not apply to the National CRO collection of criminal records, which remained 
in paper form at that time. And, in any event, even had the provision applied, it is likely 
that the police would have sought to derogate such an obligation as being ‘necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety or the suppression of criminal 
offences’.30 The net result was that the ‘police were effectively exempt’.31 
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It is not entirely clear why the Government signed the 1981 Convention; doing so 
effectively ‘put a pistol to the Government’s head’.32 It is submitted that the likely reason 
was that the 1981 Convention forbade the transfer of personal data to or from a signatory 
country to a non-signatory country.33 This created serious commercial concern that UK 
businesses might not be able to trade with companies in signature countries.34 Reports 
began to surface in the media that UK companies were uncompetitive with international 
competitors because the UK did not have comparable data protection legislation with 
eleven other Western nations. Assurances were sought in Parliament35 but when the 
Home Office tried to deny there was a problem, they were openly contradicted by business 
leaders.36 The net result was an unlikely alliance of industry, trade unions, consumers, 
civil libertarians and commerce all calling for domestic legislation.37 
 
Then, on 9 February 1982, The Sun reported that they had hired private detectives to 
obtain personal information relating to Michael Meacher MP,38 who had a matter of weeks 
earlier made (yet another) abortive attempt to introduce data protection legislation via a 
Private Members Bill.39 The private detective obtained a detailed cache of personal 
information. In response to Meacher’s complaints at Prime Minister’s Questions, and in a 
speech which allegedly ‘stunned and dismayed’ the Home Office, 40 Margaret Thatcher 
informed him that ‘the Home Secretary will be introducing a White Paper this year. We 
agree that legislation is urgent. I hope that it will come forward in the next session of 
Parliament’.41  
 
5.3 The Data Protection Act 1984 
Perhaps the only organisation as openly hostile as the Home Office to the possible 
implementation of data protection legislation were the Metropolitan Police. The first 
‘interim guidance’ on the PNC, produced by the Home Office in 197642 contained only one 
part of one sentence – a comment that police would aim to ‘limit data held to the minimum 
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necessary’ – which related to any data protection concern other than ensuring that the 
data was ‘securely stored’. This laissez-faire approach arose because, according to 
Campbell and Connor, the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police presumed that the 
PNC and any other police system would be exempt from any potential data protection 
legislative provisions.43 
 
This belief that ‘wide exemptions’ would be given to the police, and especially the 
Metropolitan Police, was echoed by Lindop after they were called to give evidence before 
his Committee and effectively refused to provide detailed response to issues raised.44 The 
Metropolitan Police sent three officers, including the Assistant Commissioner, who opened 
their evidence by informing the committee that they thought the panel unnecessary and 
untrustworthy, telling the chair that ‘there are members of your committee whose loyalty 
we cannot take for granted’.45 The police then refused permission to record their 
evidence.46 When questioned about possible data protection legislation, the three police 
officers stated simply that if data protection legislation was to be brought, that they should 
be exempted from it.47 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Lindop felt moved to 
write in protest (in vain) to the Home Secretary about the attitude of the police48 and note 
in the committee’s final report that the Metropolitan Police had been ‘particularly unhelpful 
to their enquiries’.49 
 
All of this notwithstanding, the Home Office now had little choice but to produce domestic 
data protection legislation. Their aim was to ‘do the bare minimum to satisfy the 1981 
Convention’.50 The result, after another White Paper51, another General Election and two 
more bills,52 was the Data Protection Act 1984 (‘the DPA 1984’),53 which received Royal 
Assent in July 1984. 
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The DPA 1984, like the 1981 Convention before it, referred specifically to ‘personal data’: 
data consisting of information which relates to a living individual who can be identified from 
that information’.54 Criminal records, of the kind retained by the CROs, would 
unquestionably fall within this definition. The DPA 1984 instituted a Data Protection 
Registrar (‘the Registrar’),55 whose role included receiving the new, mandatory 
registration56 of ‘data users’57 or those operating ‘computer bureaux’58 and compiling these 
into a publicly inspectable ‘Register of Data Users’.59 The registering body was required 
to provide to the Registrar, among other details, a description of the personal data held by 
them and the purpose they were holding it.60 
 
Schedule 1 of the DPA 1984 provided eight general ‘Data Protection Principles’. These 
provided that (in slightly abridged form): 
 
1. Personal data shall be obtained, and processed, fairly and lawfully; 
2. Personal data should be held only for one or more specified and lawful purpose; 
3. Personal data shall not be used or disclosed in any matter incompatible with that 
purpose;  
4. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that 
purpose; 
5. Personal data shall be accurate and up-to-date; 
6. Personal data shall not be held longer than necessary for the stated purpose(s); 
7. Individuals are entitled to know if data is being held, to access copies of it (‘subject 
access’) and, where appropriate, to have it corrected or erased; 
8. Appropriate security measures shall be taken against unauthorised access to, or 
alteration, disclosure, destruction or accidental loss of personal data. 
 
Failure by any registered body to comply with the principles entitled the Registrar to issue 
an ‘enforcement notice’ requiring that the failure be rectified.61 The Registrar had a 
(limited) power to seek a warrant from a circuit judge to enter and inspect premises where 
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suspected breaches were taking place62 but s/he could only act in receipt of a complaint.63 
Failure to comply with an enforcement notice was an offence.64 
 
It had been expected (not least by the police themselves) that the police would benefit 
from wide ranging exemptions to the DPA 1984.65 The Lindop Committee, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given their experience with the Metropolitan Police, were of the contrary 
view, namely that ‘any…exemptions from the DPA 1984 should be precisely limited to 
national security. Police records…having no bearing on national security, should not be 
exempted’.66  
 
The DPA 1984 did contain provisions which protected the police from certain obligations. 
Personal data held for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime67 or the 
apprehension or prosecution of offenders68 was exempt from ‘subject access’.69 This 
reflected the Parliamentary view that ‘to provide a data subject with access to his file, 
where the file relates to police suspicions of his criminal activity, would be nonsense’.70 
Additionally, an exemption to (almost all) of the protections of the DPA 1984 was provided 
in the interests of ‘national security’. Such exemption was granted if a certificate, signed 
by a Minister of the Crown, was obtained confirming that the exemption was approved.71 
This has led to one academic suggesting that ‘national security’ provided a catch-all 
exemption to the Act and that subjects had ‘no rights of access’ to information on the 
PNC.72  
 
This author respectfully disagrees. In the course of this research the author has found  
no substantiating evidence to support those claims. Indeed, the contrary position appears 
the correct one. Certainly, Lindop made a clear distinction between ‘national security’ and 
‘police records’ and it is difficult to envisage that a list of someone’s criminal convictions 
might ordinarily involve a matter of national security. Indeed, the true position was 
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probably that the DPA 1984 was: ‘more effective in the case of the police than envisaged 
by critics’.73 The right to subject access of PNC records was subject to exemptions, 
certainly, but exemptions to the general principle that there existed a right to subject 
access.  
 
It was certainly Parliament’s view that the police, and their PNC, would be subject to the 
DPA 1984.  The Home Secretary told the Commons that: ‘…data held by the police for 
the purposes of crime prevention will be registered and accessible by the Registrar’.74 
Indeed, the police did register, as data users for both the PNC and their local force 
computer systems.75 The true position, then, is that the police were as bound by the DPA 
1984 as any other data user, subject to the limited exemptions in ss.27 – 28. This was 
confirmed in 1985, when Home Office minister Giles Shaw confirmed that: 
 
Under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1984, individuals will have access 
to data on the police national computer which relates to them, subject to the 
condition that grant of access will not prejudice the prevention or the detection of 
crime, or the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. The Act also provides for 
the rectification and erasure of inaccurate data.76 
 
So far as criminal records were concerned, however, there were caveats. Like the 1981 
Convention which preceded it, the DPA 1984 only applied to computerised databanks.77 
The DPA 1984, therefore, applied generally to the PNC and the ‘local police computers’, 
which by 1982 were being operated by 39 of the 51 police constabularies.78 It did not, 
however, apply to the paper-copy criminal records held at any of the CROs, nor did it apply 
to the collection of microfiche records.  
 
It is submitted that this explain the (otherwise difficult to justify) decision to convert the 
criminal records to microfiche, rather than direct to the PNC. The programme to convert 
hard-copy records to microfiche commenced in 1980: the same year that the Council of 
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Europe were drafting their 1981 Convention. The police would, therefore, presumably be 
aware that the 1981 Convention would apply only to computerised databanks and that 
any subsequent legislation implemented in compliance with the 1981 Convention would 
likely also do likewise.  
 
This submission might appear rather paranoid, but in giving evidence to Lindop, the 
Metropolitan Police threatened that the computerisation of criminal records would have to 
be ‘abandoned’ if data protection legislation was applied to it.79 It also occurred to 
Parliament (while the legislation was being debated) that there was a possibility that data 
users would be encouraged to, at least, retain paper files over computerising records to 
avoid the provisions of the DPA 1984.80 Indeed, as soon as the DPA 1984 came into force, 
computing organisations were advising their members on how to avoid the strictures of 
the Act: one guide advised simply that ‘the simplest thing to do is to return information to 
the old-fashioned filing cabinet’,81 while the National Computing Centre, whose staff 
included Eric Howe (soon to become the first Data Registrar), provided a pamphlet which 
advised data users to ‘keep records in a card index: you will be completely exempt’.82  
 
The police decision to start adding complete conviction records onto the PNC in 1985 only 
for those convicted of a new recordable offence on or after 1 January 198183 should be 
considered in this light. A conscious decision was taken to leave older, ‘inactive’ records 
in abeyance, where the eight Data Protection Principles, nor any other DPA 1984 
provision, would not be applied to them. Only the computerised criminal records added to 
the PNC after 1 January 1985 fell under the auspices of the DPA 1984.84 
 
The DPA 1984 was in effect until it was repealed on 18 July 1998 and its provisions applied 
until that date. Since its inception, the police have been bound by statutory restraints 
imposed by the DPA 1984 on the collection and storage of criminal records held (only) on 
the PNC. These imposed positive legal obligations which the police were obligated to 
adhere to in order to ensure compliance with the data protection principles. 
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5.4 Police compliance with the fifth DPA 1984 principle 
Despite police claims regarding the hyper efficiency of the CRO and the completeness of 
their records, rumours suggesting that the criminal record collection might not be entirely 
accurate have persisted for decade; James Rule in 1970 noted that ‘the system does not 
work perfectly…and some convictions go unrecorded’.85  
 
The true position was that the national criminal record collection was in a parlous state. In 
R v Kinsella,86 the Court of Appeal was forced to re-sentence a burglar when it transpired 
that the original disposal was made after consideration of antecedents which omitted a 
prior custodial sentence. Such omissions were not unusual. In giving evidence to a Home 
Affairs Committee convened to examine the work of the CPS, the London Criminal Courts’ 
Solicitors’ Association claimed that the criminal records at the NIB were so inaccurate that 
bail and sentencing hearings were routinely made on the basis of incorrect antecedents.87 
It described the practice of defence lawyers having to fill the gaps from their own 
knowledge of their clients as a ‘very worrying state of affairs’.88 The Law Society went 
even further, telling the committee that criminal records were ‘in a terrifying state of 
inaccuracy’ and that the number of instances where criminal records were wrong were 
‘very, very high indeed’.89 
 
Media reports then emerged claiming that ministers were considering taking control of the 
criminal records from the police and entrusting them to an executive agency instead. The 
Registrar even said that he was in favour of so doing.90 Meanwhile, a Home Affairs 
Committee were sufficiently alarmed by the apparent scale of the inaccuracies that they 
broke off from their analysis of the CPS to conduct a review of the criminal record collection 
first.91 This found serious problems: it took an average of 77 days for the police to notify 
the NIB of new information to be added to the record and over 30,000 records were still 
incomplete after two and a half years.92  
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The problem was that the police maintained responsibility for adding material to the PNC 
long after their responsibility for the prosecution of offenders had ended; in some cases, 
the police were sending officers to court to take manual records of convictions to later add 
to the PNC.93 The committee recommended that the Home Office issue urgent guidance 
to court clerks to speed up the flow of information94 but that, when full computerisation 
was achieved, that court clerks be the inputters of the conviction data.95 
 
The Home Office responding by announcing that an ‘efficiency scrutiny’ would be carried 
out to investigate further.96 This report97 found that the criminal record data was ‘in a very 
unsatisfactory’98 and ‘a very fragile’99 state and claimed that only full computerisation 
would solve the problem.100 New deadline targets for updating records were issued; arrest 
data should be sent to the NIB within five days and court results sent within ten.101 They 
also believed that an independent organisation should be created to oversee the record 
collection.102 The Home Office finally published the six months after it was received, 
conceding that there was ‘a need to improve the maintenance and use of the national 
collection of criminal records’.103 
 
Some of the inaccuracies went beyond simple errors and a lack of timeliness. One record 
noted that the individual’s ‘left eye glides to the centre of his face, where it is stopped by 
his nose’ when spoken to by police.104 Such ‘records’ led NIB staff to report that they ‘had 
a good laugh over the clangers…some officers aren’t too particular when they’re taking 
down particulars’.105 Other criminal justice agencies weren’t quite so amused; the 
chairwoman of the Magistrate’s Association told the media in 1994 that criminal records 
presented in court ‘were regularly defective’ and a source of ‘major frustration’.106 
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Despite the long-awaited computerisation of the records via PHOENIX 1995, the problems 
persisted. An internal review by the Police Information Technology Organisation (‘PITO’) 
in 1996107 generated sufficient concern that they asked a Home Office Police Research 
Group to investigate the situation and make a report. This, published in 1998 after a two-
year investigation,108 was ‘quite alarming in its findings’.109 It found that computerisation, 
rather than providing the ‘silver bullet’ to improving the data quality as had been hoped, 
was making matters worse, because without the centralisation provided by the NIB, 
individual police officers were either unwilling or unable to input data accurately, 
completely or quickly.110 Moreover, individual forces had adopted inconsistent policies for 
inputting data in accordance with their new PHOENIX roles and this meant a lack of quality 
control regarding accuracy, timeliness or completeness.111 Remarkably, police officers 
confessed to ‘making up’ information where they did not know, or could not remember, 
the correct data.112  
 
The inspection found that the time taken to record an arrest on the PNC could be ‘many 
weeks’.113 Other key agencies, such as the Magistrates and Crown Courts, were equally 
culpable, with one force reporting that the delay in getting conviction disposal data from 
one Crown court was up to twelve months.114 The result was continuing reliance on 
incomplete antecedents; one suspect was granted court bail as a first-time offender only 
for it to later transpire that he had six previous convictions ‘sitting in the police backlog’.115 
Seven recommendations for improvements were made, including the introduction of 
national standards for timeliness, the creation of a ‘national format’ for data input to ensure 
consistency and greater accountability for errors to individual and senior officers. It also 
recommended that officers be provided with more training on the ‘benefits’ of the 
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PHOENIX collection to alleviate the prevailing attitude among officers that it was little more 
than an administrative burden, rather than an investigative tool.116 
 
It was not just those in the criminal justice system who suffered as a result of inaccurately 
held records. Adverse consequences began to filter down to innocent individuals caught 
up by the parlous state of the records on the nominal index. In October 1986, one woman 
was refused a position in a special programme for delinquent teenagers after police 
mistook her for another person who shared the same maiden name and disclosed that 
person’s criminal record.117 In 1990, an innocent man named Neil Foster found himself 
wrongly arrested and charge for driving whilst disqualified when, in fact, the disqualified 
man in question was an entirely different Neil Foster. The truth only emerged at a 
magistrates trial, at which the innocent man was acquitted, by which time he had lost his 
job, his car and spent thousands in legal fees.118 In 1995 another man found that the PNC 
contained two recorded offences against his name, which he denied having ever been 
convicted of, when he was refused employment at the local council. In a remarkable 
admission, the chief superintendent of the police force which held the record said that 
‘bosses should not assume that records are accurate’.119 
 
What is clear is that, by the early 1990s at the latest, there was widespread knowledge 
that there existed ‘a serious problem concerning the accuracy of these records’120 with 
magistrates describing that ‘the problem of obtaining up-to-date convictions is 
nationwide’.121 What is not clear is why the Registrar did not intervene and issue 
enforcement notices against chief police officers and/or the NIB for what appear to be 
prima facie breaches of the fifth DPA 1984 principle. The Registrar certainly knew that the 
problems existed. In his 1991 annual report, he referred explicitly to the ‘efficiency scrutiny’ 
of the criminal records122 and made explicit comment of its report in his 1992 report, where 
he claimed to be ‘pleased to note the recognition of data protection requirements’ and 
that, overall, he ‘welcomed the report’.123   
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Quite why he was so effusive about a report which laid, in the clearest and most damning 
manner, the paucity of the police’s attempt to fulfil their data protection obligations is not 
immediately clear. Certainly, he made no mention of the problems in his 1992 
supplemental comments relating to the retention, use and disclosure of criminal data and 
seems to have neglected to note that the very thing which triggered the ‘efficiency scrutiny’ 
was that the collection of records was in an abominable state. Despite problems persisting 
throughout the remainder of the decade, the Registrar does not appear to have to taken 
any enforcement action against any chief police officer in respect of breaches of the fifth 
DPA 1984 principle.124 
 
There do not appear to be many plausible explanations for the apparent inactivity on the 
part of the Registrar. One possible justification is that, despite the significant problems 
faced by those reliant on accurate criminal record data, it does not appear that any formal 
complaint was raised by any individual or organisation directly to the Registrar. This seems 
extremely unlikely: one report in 1990 seems to indicate that such complaints were, in 
fact, being made,125 the Registrar himself confirmed in his sixth annual report that one 
complaint to him had involved the branding of an innocent individual as an attempted 
murderer in a nominal PNC record.126  
 
These notwithstanding, if this is the explanation for his inactivity, then it is an unsatisfactory 
one. By 1994, ordinary members of the public who read newspapers knew that the criminal 
record collection contained countless inaccuracies. The Registrar certainly should have 
known, and in fact did know, the very same. That alone should have been sufficient to 
warrant his intervention. If he was waiting to receive a ‘formal’ complaint, then his inaction 
might at best be described as unduly timid. 
 
A second possible explanation may be that, at this time, much of the collection remained 
in microfiche form; as has been seen, only those who came to police notice after 1985 
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had their full records uploaded to the PNC, so several million records remained undigitized 
and, therefore, outwith the remit of the Registrar. That may be so, but by April 1996 some 
2.1 million ‘complete’ criminal record were uploaded onto PNC2.127 These should have 
included the antecedents of Kinsella, whose ‘missing’ disposal occurred in November 
1989. These records did fall under the remit of the Registrar under the DPA 1984. When 
PHOENIX went live in 1995, the entire digital collection of records fell under the auspices 
of the DPA 1984. Once this occurred, the jurisdiction of the Registrar to act was confirmed 
entirely.  
 
Whatever the reason for inaction, it is submitted that, by no later than the end of 1992, at 
least some chief officers were in prima facie breach of the fifth data protection principle. 
Moreover, it is equally clear that the Registrar failed to issue enforcement notices when 
s/he ought to have done so. It is further submitted that, by failing to intervene at an early 
stage, the Registrar (at least partially) facilitated a lack of police action to correct the 
deficiencies which would ultimately have significant ramifications in the decade to follow.  
 
5.5 Police compliance with the eighth DPA 1984 principle 
As has been shown, in the formative period of data protection, the predominant concern 
of the Home Office and the police was that data was ‘secure’ so that only the police, or 
those otherwise authorised, could access the criminal records. This concern largely 
stemmed from the widespread knowledge that the criminal records were not secure from 
unauthorised access at all, though the source of the data breaches lay not with thieves or 
computer ‘hackers’, but with the police themselves. 
 
James Rule saw for himself the problems on unauthorised access to the criminal records 
in the 1970’s. He described how ‘virtually anyone familiar with the telephone number of 
the regional CRO and the routines for making such requests can eventually obtain the 
information he seeks; if not on the first try, then sooner or later’.128 This meant that the 
system was particularly vulnerable to retired police officers who took up work as private 
detectives and were employed by businesses who, for whatever reason, wanted access 
to the records.129 Retired officers, with their intimate knowledge of the system and close 
personal ties to others still employed at the CROs, were ideally suited to the task.  
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The issue was reported to the Younger Committee, who were told that ‘99% of private 
detectives and inquiry agents would have access somewhere along the line to criminal 
records’.130 When this was put to the Home Office, they told Parliament that the allegation 
‘was quite without foundation…the sources of information were not police sources’.131 That 
unconvincing rebuttal seemed to fly in the face of what was becoming a well-publicised 
problem with data security; Lord Gardiner told the House of Lords in 1973 that the Home 
Office position was simply ‘…wrong. One knows it as an ordinary person, one knows it 
from company directors who tell one’.132 
 
The issue clearly had not been much resolved by the following decade, as The Sun 
exposé of Michael Meacher’s personal data in 1982 amply demonstrated. Another 
newspaper investigation resulted in the disclosure of information to journalists who ‘fooled’ 
CRO staff by loosely impersonating serving police officers.133 After the implementation of 
the DPA 1984, the problems persisted. In 1988, a former detective constable was tried 
under the Official Secrets Act 1911 in respect of allegations that he passed criminal 
records to a private ‘investigation agency’. He was ultimately acquitted134 but an 
interesting insight was provided by a former chief superintendent, who testified on behalf 
of the defendant that he would condone leaking PNC information ‘if it was consistent with 
his overriding duty to the public and society’.135 In 1989, three more police officers were 
charged with offences under s.2 of the Official Secrets Act when a BBC documentary 
uncovered evidence that they were passing PNC data, including criminal conviction 
details, to five private detectives. All eight were convicted and handed suspended prison 
sentences of varying lengths.136  
 
The case was sufficiently grave that ACPO promised to review access arrangements to 
the PNC to prevent misuse and alleviate concerns from the Registrar that data may not 
be secure.137 This culminated in software upgrades in 1990 which logged officer ID’s when 
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they accessed the PNC records, along with random checks by senior officers. The police 
claimed this made unauthorised use of the system far more difficult138 and led the Home 
Office to claim that access to the records was provided only in ‘tightly drawn 
circumstances.139  
 
The Home Office’s confidence proved ill-founded. In 1994, Scotland Yard was forced to 
launch an inquiry into what amounted to a ‘thriving black market’ of criminal records being 
sold by police officers to private detectives.140 In 1997, a Metropolitan Police officer was 
jailed for two years for selling criminal records information relating to two hundred 
individuals to private investigators.141 One week later, a Sunday Times investigation found 
serving police officers at Scotland Yard using their PNC access to set up investigating 
agencies to make extra money, while one detective constable offered to sell criminal 
records information from PHOENIX to an undercover journalist for fifty pounds, triggering 
yet another ‘anti-corruption’ inquiry involving senior officers.142 In West Mercia, one 
serving and two former police officers were jailed in 1999 after the serving officer 
conducted unlawful ‘background checks’ on 19 people and passed the details to the 
others, who had set up an ‘investigation agency’.143  
 
It is likely that the police will say that they took ‘appropriate’ measures to protect data 
subjects from this series of data breaches so that they discharged their obligations under 
the DPA 1984. However, it is submitted that the sheer volume of instances where security 
was breached, coupled with the widespread knowledge that such breaches were 
commonplace stretching back to the 1960’s, suggest otherwise. It is evident that whatever 
measures were taken by the police to prevent these breaches were ineffective; it seemed 
that after each breach, more serious than the next was uncovered, the subsequent inquiry 
concluded that new and more stringent countermeasures were to implemented, only for 
further breaches to be uncovered and this ‘cycle’ repeat almost ad infinitum. 
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It is, therefore, not clear why the police were not issued with enforcement notices by the 
Registrar in respect of what appears to be a litany of prima facie breaches of the eighth 
data principle. One week after the conclusion of the 1989 trial which saw eight men 
convicted for selling PNC data, the Registrar gave a public speech condemning local 
authorities for asking unlawful questions on poll tax forms. He said nothing as regards the 
issues of unlawfully accessing, using or selling criminal records.144 The subject is also 
conspicuously absent from all of his first ten annual reports. This, it is submitted, seems a 
remarkable omission. The author has deliberately selected media reports of data 
breaches in this section to highlight the extremely public nature of the debate regarding 
unlawful access and use of criminal records. It is inconceivable that the Registrar was not 
aware of the problem. To have a comprehensive knowledge of it all that was required the 
s/he read a newspaper.  
 
Once again, it is submitted that, by his (presumably deliberate) inaction, this time deferring 
to the various provisions of the criminal law to ‘deal’ with the matter instead, the Registrar 
not only failed to deal with a matter of considerable public importance but also encouraged 
police officers to seek, and facilitate, unlawful use of criminal records contrary to the eighh 
data principle and allowed data controllers to take ineffective preventative measures, safe 
in the knowledge that legal action would lie only with the individual officer(s) responsible, 
not them, which in turn discouraged the development of more effective countermeasures. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
The advent and growth of computerisation in the 1970’s gave rise to new concerns 
regarding privacy and civil liberties. These were particularly pertinent to the Police National 
Computer, which had the potential to provide a systematic data repository on huge 
swathes of the population. Despite procrastination and obfuscation from the Home Office, 
and outright hostility from the police, the Data Protection Act 1984 was enacted to assuage 
fears and provide controls on what data could be collated, how and where it could be 
stored and what responsibilities the police had regarding the accuracy and security of that 
data. 
 
What is evident is that the police, in the practices adopted by them in the collection, 
storage and retention of criminal records, appeared to be in prima facie breach of the DPA 
                                                          




1984 in two regards. The accuracy of their records and the secure storage of them were 
both sufficiently problematic that investigations into matters which might reasonably be 
considered DPA 1984 breaches were carried out with an almost monotonous regularity; 
by the early 1990s both had become ‘mainstream’ news stories. These breaches were not 
‘trivial’ in nature. They involved the unauthorised sale of sensitive personal data to 
unregulated individuals and meant that decisions in court regarding bail and sentencing 
were being made on the basis of factually inaccurate information. The former is an 
indefensible violation of an individual’s civil liberties and right to personal privacy. The 
latter brings the entire criminal justice system into possible disrepute. 
 
Despite the overwhelming evidence in support of taking action against the police, the 
Registrar, instituted to ensure compliance with the DPA 1984 and to protect the data 
subjects who fell within its ambit, elected to take no formal action. It is not clear why this 
approach was taken, although it is submitted that this might be explained by a (perhaps 
understandable) desire on the part of the Registrar not to ‘ruffle the feathers’ of an 
organisation who had forcefully repudiated the invocation of data protection principles to 
their work from the outset of their conception.  
 
Whatever the explanation for it, it is submitted that the second research question can be 
answered in the affirmative. It is also further submitted that this timorous approach had 
two important consequences. The first is that it meant that thousands of data users were 
the subject of unpunished data breaches. Not unnaturally, those affected may feel that 
they have been denied the justice afforded to them by the implementation of the DPA 
1984.  
 
It is submitted, however, that the second consequence would be more damaging still. By 
not taking firm action against the police while data protection legislation was in its infancy, 
and while the police were still grappling with the new oversight supposedly offered by the 
Registrar, it is submitted that the Registrar facilitated the continuing police breaches of the 
DPA 1984. His (and latterly her) inactions emboldened the police to downplay the 
significance of data protection. By not acting, the Registrar provided no motivation to the 
police to improve the security of their records or to securely store them. It also discouraged 
them to ‘weed’ inactive minor records, as will be examined at length at chapter eight of 
this research. Such actions were time, labour and cost intensive and involved, so far as 




of the police into what some police believed to be ‘an administrative chore’.145 It is easy, 
therefore, to imagine that the police would not undertake these tasks without an external 
imposition to do so placed upon them. 
 
It is submitted that, in short, the Registrar’s failure to take action emboldened the police 
to believe that the protections afforded by the DPA 1984 applied to them in nominal terms 
only, if at all. The author further submits that this error on the part of the Registrar would 
become a very damaging one if, or indeed when, the Registrar finally elected to take the 
police to task and was unable to do so or if, or when, the failings of the police to properly 
control their data finally manifested into a failure to exercise their ‘core’ functions. 
 
                                                          




Police compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 
in respect of the PNC PHOENIX application 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Outwith the provision for subject access, the introduction of data protection in 1984 did 
not bring any noticeable difference so far as criminal records were concerned. The police 
still had a seemingly unfettered discretion to collect an enormous amount of data regarding 
citizens and criminality, and to store and utilise it at their discretion. As outlined at length 
in the previous chapter, it is submitted that this was because the newly instituted Data 
Registrar showed an almost complete reticence to take the police to task, despite having 
numerous opportunities to do so as grievous examples of data breaches became 
apparent. 
 
This chapter will attempt to address the third research question by taking a near-identical 
approach to the previous chapter of this research, but in respect of the data protection 
legislation which succeeded the DPA 1984. This will involve firstly an examination of the 
development and implementation of a new set of data protection principles, before, in 
common with the previous chapter, attempting to identify and critically evaluate further 
instances of the police’s failure to adhere to the data protection principles and a critical 
analysis of the reaction of those charged with overseeing the new data regime will also be 
offered. Key lessons to be learned so far as the retention of criminality data is concerned 
will be identified and the chapter will conclude with comment as to how forthcoming 
developments might conceivably frame the future ‘data problem’ issue. 
 
6.2 The Data Protection Act 1998 
The DPA 1984 had made specific provision for criminal records; s.2(3) provided that the 
Secretary of State ‘may by order modify or supplement the DPA 1984 to provide additional 
safeguards’ for ensuring compliance with the Data Protection Principles.  
 
No such safeguards were ever enacted. The Council of Europe, conscious that their 1981 
Convention provided wide scope for police derogation, produced formal recommendations 
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on the control of data by the police.1 These included provisions that police only collect 
data for the prevention of ‘real danger’ or ‘the suppression of a specific criminal offence’,2 
unless otherwise approved by specific legislation, that the data be ‘accurate’3 and limited 
to the data required to perform ‘their lawful tasks’ and that police data should only be used 
for police purposes.4 The UK formally derogated from two of principles and adopted the 
others5 but as the recommendations were non-binding,6 the police and the Home Office 
were not legally obligated to follow them in any event. 
 
The problems with the DPA 1984, many of which were foreseen by opponents prior to its 
enactment, began to become apparent. Despite an extensive publicity campaign by the 
Registrar,7 levels of subject access were low, particularly those involving Government 
departments: cumulative charges for subject access to each registered executive 
databank could mean that the cost to an individual might reach some £900in total.8 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Home Office in 1988 received precisely 16 subject access 
requests.9 Subject access requests to chief constables regarding criminal records were 
‘usually’ granted, but some were denied on the basis of s.27 of the DPA 1984; a practice 
described by the Registrar as ‘questionable’.10 
 
It had been imagined that the Data Protection Registry would operate with a staff of twenty. 
By the end of 1984, the actual number of staff required was ‘more than 40’.11 Failure to 
register among businesses and organisations was rife: at 1994, only 180,000 of an 
estimated 3 million affected trading organisations had actually registered. The response 
of the Registrar was not particularly robust; in 1994, for example, the Registrar took action 
against 32 companies who did not register and, although fines were issued, the largest 
                                                          
1 Council of Europe, Regulating the use of personal data in the police sector (Recommendation No. 
R(87) 15, 17 September 1987)  
2 Ibid, Principle 2.1 
3 Ibid, Principle 3.1 
4 Ibid, Principle 5.1 
5 Ibid, fn.1. It is very debatable as to whether the UK has actually fulfilled the recommendations, though 
that discussion is somewhat outwith this research. An examination of state fulfilment of the 1987 
Recommendations is available at J. Cannataci and M. Caruana, ‘Recommendation R (87) 15: Twenty-
Five years down the line’ (Council of Europe 25 September 2013)  
6 Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (87) 15 (Council of Europe 17 September 
1987), para.20 
7 HC Written Answers 17 February 1988, vol.127, col.618 
8 HC Deb 19 May 1989, vol.153, col.655 
9 Ibid 
10 M. Colvin, ‘The Criminal Record and Information Systems in England and Wales’ (1992) 6 
International Yearbook of Law Computers and Technology 139, 146 
11 HC Deb 31 October 1984, vol.65, col. 1336 
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was £2000.12 Even where companies were registered, the DPA 1984 conferred no power 
to the Registrar to investigate possible breaches unless a complaint was made to them. 
 
By the start of the 1990s, the European Union were again taking an interest in data 
protection. The European Commission issued a proposal in September 199013 which 
aimed to provide ‘a high level of protection via a community system of protection based 
on a set of complementary measures’.14 This led to a five year ‘harmonisation’ process, 
using mainly amendments to the 1981 Convention and subsequent domestic laws15 
before the publication of a Directive16 on October 24 1995 which laid down the new 
principles and rules to be implemented in member states. The police were again given 
fairly wide derogations from the general principles17 – so much so that Haynes claimed 
that the Directive ‘did not regulate the police’18 – but, in fact, criminal convictions were 
expressly covered by Article 8(5), which provided that: 
 
Processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions or security measures 
may be carried out only under the control of official authority, or if suitable specific 
safeguards are provided under national law, subject to derogations which may be 
granted by the Member State under national provisions providing suitable specific 
safeguards. However, a complete register of criminal convictions may be kept only 
under the control of official authority. 
 
The UK, and other member states, were given three years to implement the directive into 
national law.19 The Home Office, perhaps unsurprisingly, were unconvinced that new 
legislation was required20, but Parliament nonetheless responded, after a lengthy process 
                                                          
12 L. Curry, ‘A stickler for our privacy: the new Data Protection Registrar is taking on banks’, The 
Independent (London, 19 September 1994) 
13 Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing 
of personal data, Com (90) 314 SYN 287 and 288 
14 Ibid, Part II, para.9 
15 B. Hayes, ‘A Failure to Regulate: Data Protection and Ethnic Profiling in the Police Sector in Europe’ 
(2005) Open Society 32, 34 
16 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (24 October 1995) 
17 Ibid, Art.3(2) 
18 Above n.15 
19 Above n.16, Art.32(1) 
20 European Standing Committee B, ‘Official Report’, (December 1994) cc.3 – 22, col.3 
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of reports, committees and debates,21 by bringing the Data Protection Bill22 which would 
become the Data Protection Act 199823 (‘the DPA 1998’) on 16 July 1998. 
 
The DPA 1998 did not, in truth, make significant changes to the legislative requirements 
so far as criminal records were concerned; indeed, the Registrar commented that the DPA 
1998 generally ‘is in substance very much the same as the current law: at least 80% of 
compliance flows from complying with the DPA 1984’.24 It did repeal, entirely, the DPA 
1984,25 but it replaced many of its provisions with very similar or identical provisions.  
 
One major change was that the DPA 1998 applied to computerised records26 and ‘those 
recorded as part of a relevant filing system’.27 This meant that PHOENIX fell under the 
auspices of the DPA 1998 along with the microfiche collection of criminal records for those 
who had not yet ‘come to notice’: a Freedom of Information Request made in the course 
of this research revealed that this still amounts to just over one million unconverted 
microfiche records.28  
 
The police were no longer ‘data users’ but instead ‘data controllers’: persons who (either 
alone or jointly) determine the purposes and manner in which the criminal record data is 
processed.29 With the responsibility for updating PHOENIX taken from the NIB in 1995 
and instead provided to individual police forces, this meant that each chief constable of 
the police forces contributing criminal records data to PHOENIX were joint data 
controllers. Any sub-contractors engaged by the police or the Home Office to work with 
the criminal records were ‘data processors’: any person (other than an employee) who 
processes data on behalf of the controller.30 Those whose records were held on PHOENIX 
were still ‘data subjects’.31 
                                                          
21 For a summary of these, see E. Wood, ‘Research Paper 98/48’ (HC Library, 17 April 1998) 11 – 12   
22 The Data Protection Bill [HL] Bill 158 of 1997 – 98  
23 1998, ch.29 
24 E. Frances, ‘Data Protection Bill 2/98, Costs of Implementing the EU Data Protection Directive’ (v.2.0, 
29 January 1998)  
25 Ibid, Sch.16, Part I  
26 Ibid, Part I, s.1(1)(a)  
27 Ibid, Part I, s.1(1)(c) 
28 Home Office ‘FOI Request – Collection of historic microfiche criminal records’ (FOI case ref: 49433 
What Do They Know?, 17 July 2018) 
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/collection_of_historic_microfich?nocache=incoming-
1205670#incoming-1205670> accessed 20 May 2019   






The DPA 1998 retained the operational rubric of protecting specified ‘Data Protection 
Principles’. These, listed in Schedule 1,32 are almost identical in nature (and largely in 
wording) to those in the DPA 1984, except that the second and third principles of the 
earlier Act had been merged into one principle33 and that a new principle had been added 
to ensure that personal data was not transferred by a data controller to any other country 
who did not have comparable data protections.34 
 
Criminal records were once more identified as ‘sensitive personal data’.35 This meant that 
especial provisions36 applied for the processing of criminal records, though a number of 
exemptions,37 such as where the data is required in connection with any legal 
proceedings,38 the administration of justice39 or where data is required for the exercise 
conferred under an enactment,40 were again provided. The net result of the exemptions 
was, it is submitted, sufficient te effectively exempt the police criminal record collection on 
PHOENIX from the especial provisions. 
 
In very similar provisions to the DPA 1984, those with criminal records were entitled to 
access them,41 subject to the police right to exempt themselves if withholding the 
information helped prevent or detect crime42 or in the prosecution or apprehension of 
offenders.43 A new protection was provided to the police, which also provided an 
exemption to the first data protection principle in the same circumstances where they 
might avoid subject access.44 Those who suffered damage or distress as a result of a data 
contravention were entitled to sue for damages45 while a Court order might be sought to 
rectify, block, erase or destroy inaccurate data.46 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid, Schedule 1, Part I, Principles 1 – 8  
33 Ibid, Schedule 1, Part I, Principle 2 
34 Ibid, Schedule 1, Part I, Principle 8 
35 Ibid, Part I, s.2(g)(h) 
36 Ibid, Schedule I, Part I, s.1(1)(a) 
37 Ibid, Schedule I, Part I, s.1(1)(b) 
38 Ibid, Schedule 3, s.6(a) 
39 Ibid, Schedule 3, s.7(1)(a) 
40 Ibid, Schedule 3, s.7(1)(b) 
41 Ibid, Part II, s.7 
42 Ibid, Part IV, s.29(1)(a) 
43 Ibid, Part IV, s.29(1)(b) 
44 Ibid and above n.41 
45 Ibid, Part II, s.13(1)(2) 
46 Ibid, Part II, s.14 
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The Registrar was given the new title of ‘Data Protection Commissioner’,47 though this title 
was removed in 2000 and the new title of ‘Information Commissioner’ (‘the Commissioner’) 
instead conferred.48 Data controllers were still obligated to report themselves to the 
Commissioner,49 along with details of the personal data held by them50 and the purposes 
for which it was held,51 so that the Commissioner could compile a public register.52  
 
The IC was expected to ‘promote good practice’ and ‘promote observance’ of the Act.53 
To this end, s/he could issue ‘information notices’ to compel the release of information as 
part of investigations into possible breaches of the DPA 1998,54 as well as ‘enforcement 
notices’ similar to those permissible under the DPA 1984.55 Failure to comply with an 
enforcement notice was an offence and a fine might be issued.56 Disputes over decisions 
made by the IC were to be dealt with by recourse to the Data Protection Tribunal,57 which 
in 2000 was renamed the ‘Information Tribunal’.58 
 
The question of whether the DPA 1998 applied to the PHOENIX collection of criminal 
records was definitively answered in the affirmative by the Court of Appeal in 2009.59 The 
DPA 1998 applied to the police and the PHOENIX collection until it was almost entirely 
repealed by the Data Protection Act 2018 on 25 May 2018.60 
 
As this research has shown, the chief constable data controllers responsible for the 
collation and maintenance of central criminal records under the auspices of the DPA 1984 
appeared to commit a number of prima facie breaches of the provisions of the Act. The 
author will now consider whether similar charges might be brought against chief 
constables as regards the DPA 1998. 
 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid, Part I, s.6(1) 
48 Per Part I, s.18 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, Ch.36 
49 The Data Protection Act 1998, at Part III, s.18(1) 
50 Ibid, Part III, s.16(1)(c) 
51 Ibid, Part III, s.16(1)(d) 
52 Ibid, s.19(1) 
53 Ibid, Part VI, s.51(1) 
54 Ibid, Part V, s.43 
55 Ibid, Part V, s.40 
56 Ibid, Part V, s.47(1) 
57 Ibid, Part I, s.6(3) 
58 Per Part I, s.18(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
59 [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 [33] 
60 Per Schedule 19, Part I, s.44 of the Data Protection Act 2018, ch.12 
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6.3 Police compliance with the first data principle 
According to Schedule 1, Part I of the DPA 1998, the first Data Principle required that 
‘personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully’. The enabling provision which allows 
for the lawful collection of criminal records is s.27(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act (‘PACE 1984’), which provides that: 
 
The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for recording in national 
police records convictions for such offences as are specified in the Regulations. 
‘Conviction’ includes a caution and a reprimand or a warning’ 
 
This is supplemented by the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002,61 
which provides that details of convictions, cautions, warnings and reprimands will be kept 
in ‘central records’; i.e. the ‘names database’ on the PNC.62 Where a conviction is obtained 
and recorded on PHOENIX via the various enabling mechanisms identified in chapter 3 of 
this research, it is so done ‘lawfully’.63 The same, however, cannot necessarily be said for 
arrests or cautions. An explanation of what is meant by this if offered below: 
 
6.3.1  Unlawful arrests 
A lawful arrest must either be carried out pursuant to a warrant64 or under s.24 of the 
PACE 1984. It has become apparent, through recent litigation, that there are instances 
where the police conduct unlawful arrests. These might involve an situation where an 
arresting officer cannot make out the necessary legal grounds: in Cumberbatch v the 
Crown Prosecution Service; Ali v Director of Public Prosecution,65 the Divisional Court 
held that an arrest is unlawful (and can be resisted by force) where none of the s.24 
PACE 1984 grounds can be objectively made out.66  
 
More commonplace is where the police place under arrest those who attend the police 
station voluntarily to ‘help police with their enquiries’. Professor Michael Zander states 
                                                          
61 2002 S.I No.233 
62 Ibid, reg.9, as inserted by reg.2 of the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Amendment Regulations 
2007, S.I No.700 
63 Per schedule 2, s.2(3) and schedule 3, s.7(1)(a) of Data Protection Act 1998  
64 Per s.1(1)(b) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 and Halsbury’s Laws of England, Criminal Procedure 
(2015), vol.27, para 144 
65 [2009] EWHC 3353 (Admin) 
66 Ibid [10] 
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that such practice is ‘common and routine’.67 He also believes that it is also ‘unlawful and 
should stop’.68 Instances of allegations made against teachers are often dealt with in this 
way, where the individual against whom the allegation is made attends the police station 
at a pre-arranged date and time and is duly arrested in the foyer by the investigating 
officer.69 Where such arrests have not resulted in the accused being charged, it is 
possible to challenge (by judicial review) the lawfulness of the arrest.70 However, the 
police response to a successful challenge is to add a note to the PNC to show that the 
arrest should not have taken place,71 rather than to delete it. 
 
In 2016 – 17, the police conducted 779,660 arrests.72 In the same period, the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (‘the IPCC’) received 2,589 allegations of 
unlawful/unnecessary arrest.73 It is not known how many unlawful arrests were 
conducted which did not result in a complaint to the IPCC.  
 
Similarly, although civil law provides redress to those who are wrongfully arrested,74 it 
has been held that the arrestee is required to show that the arrest was Wednesbury 
unreasonable.75 This is a high hurdle to overcome and suggests a considerable defence 
to police operational discretion. Moreover, an arrestee will ordinarily be denied access 
to legal aid to bring such a claim.76 This does not necessarily mean that an arrestee is 
not given access to court to make a claim, but rather that they will not be able to do so 
with legal representation funded by the state.77 According to the Ministry of Justice, this 
is because wrongful arrests are not among ‘the most serious allegations of misuse of 
                                                          
67 M. Zander, ‘Arresting someone who is helping the police with their enquiries’ (2010) 174 Criminal 
Law and Justice Weekly 309 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid, 310 
70 Jones v the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police (2006)  
71 Wren v the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (2009) A summation is provided by Zander, above 
n.67 
72 J. Hargreaves, H. Husband and C. Linehan, ‘Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, 
year ending 31 March 2017’ (Home Office Statistical Bulletin 20/17, 26 October 2017) 10 
73 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‘Statistics for England and Wales 2016/17’ (2017) 20 
74 See the dicta of Lord Keith in Hill v the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, 59 
75 Al Fayed and others v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 1579 
76 Per Schedule 1, para.21 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, as 
interpreted by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Sisangia) v the Director of Legal Aid 
Casework [2016] EWCA Civ 24 
77 Ibid [8] 
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power by public authorities’.78 Quite how many potential litigants this discourages is not 
known, but the reasonable presumption must be that at least some are so discouraged. 
 
It is not clear why the police retention of unlawful arrests on PHOENIX is not in 
contravention of the first DPA 1998 data protection principle. In circumstances where an 
unlawful arrest takes place but that there is no official determination that the arrest was 
unlawful, it is perhaps understandable that the data is retained. Where an arrest is 
demonstrably unlawful, however, it is conceivable that there is no lawful basis for the 
retention of data relating to that unlawful arrest on the PNC.  
 
The applicable provisions in the DPA 1998 are complex. The police may claim that they 
are exempted from the first data principle because unlawful arrest data is required ‘for 
the prevention or detection of crime’ or for the ‘apprehension and prosecution of 
offenders’.79. This may protect them in some unlawful arrest instances, but certainly not 
all. It is submitted that an arrest which is unlawful because the officers has no objective 
ground(s) to believe an offence has taken place must ordinarily involve arresting 
someone where no crime has occurred and where the arrestee is not an ‘offender’. In 
such a circumstance, it is difficult to see how the s.29(1) DPA 1998 exemption would 
apply. Similarly, where an unlawful arrest takes place as part of an investigation into an 
allegation and that investigation finds that no offence took place, it is submitted that the 
exemption cannot apply. The issue is more nuanced than the blanket exemption might 
suggest. 
 
Presuming that the exemptions are inapplicable, the first data principle will be satisfied 
provided that at least one of the conditions listed in Schedule 2 and one of those in 
Schedule 3 of the DPA 1998 are met. There are certain provisions in Schedule 2 which 
the police might invoke to legitimise the retention of unlawful arrest data. One provides 
that data may be retained if it has to be so done to fulfil a legal obligation of the data 
controller.80 However, there are no legal provisions which mandate the collection of data 
relating to unlawful arrests.81 It is not conceivable that the collection of unlawful arrest 
                                                          
78 J. Hyde, ‘Court overturns legal aid denial in wrongful arrest case’ (Law Society Gazette, 13 November 
2014) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/court-overturns-legal-aid-denial-in-wrongful-arrest-
case/5045066.article> accessed 20 May 2019  
79 Above n.44 
80 Per Schedule 2, s.3 of the Data Protection Act 1998 
81 Strictly speaking, s.27(4) PACE and subsequent regulations do not mandate the statutory collection 
of any arrest data. There is nothing in that provision which relates to arrest data at all. 
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data is required ‘for the administration of justice’.82 Such information would not form part 
of any decision on bail, bad character admissibility, sentencing or probation.   
 
The most plausible police defence is that the processing of unlawful arrest data is 
‘necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests of the police’.83 The ICO suggests 
that such a defence has three elements: the processing must be in pursuant of a 
legitimate interest, be necessary is respect of that interest and the individuals interests 
must not override the legitimate interest.84 It is submitted that the police would struggle 
to meet these three requirements: it is difficult to envisage how the holding of unlawful 
arrest data is ‘necessary’ in pursuing the legitimate interest of crime prevention, detection 
and bringing offenders to justice for much the same reasons as stated in the immediately 
preceding paragraph.  
 
In the absence of any Schedule 2 condition, the processing of such data is prima facie 
unfair and/or unlawful. It is submitted, therefore, that, where an arrest has taken place 
which is proven (either by subsequent police admission or by litigation) to be unlawful, 
then data relating to it was neither obtained nor processed lawfully and therefore should 
be deleted. 
 
6.3.2  Unlawful cautions 
It is not merely unlawful arrests which might give rise to a breach of the first data principle. 
There might also be concerns regarding cautions. There have long been anecdotal 
examples of people who accept a caution not because they are necessarily guilty of an 
offence but rather because the alternative – possible criminal prosecution – is too 
undesirable a risk.85 Indeed, the Lord Chief Justice in 2011 wondered ‘whether the 
convenience of avoiding the court process altogether may lead to an offender to admit 
to something for which he would have a defence’.86 In R (on the application of R) v 
Durham Constabulary and another,87 Baroness Hale recognised that there is always 
implicit, and occasionally explicit, ‘pressure’ to ‘admit it and we’ll [the police] will let you 
                                                          
82 Per schedule 2, s.5(1)(a) of the Data Protection Act 1998 
83 Ibid, s.6(1) 
84 The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Guide to the Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’ (4 June 
2018) 81  
85 A. Topping and B. Quinn; ‘Charles Saatchi: accepting police caution was better than the alternative’ 
The Guardian (London, 18 June 2013)  
86 Lord Judge, ‘Summary Justice In and Out of Court’ (John Harris Memorial Lecture, Draper’s Hall, 
London, 7 July 2011) 15 
87 [2005] UKHL 21 
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off with a caution’, particularly regarding juveniles.88 Cautions issued in such 
circumstances may not be ‘legitimate’, in the sense that they may record criminality 
behaviour on the part of those not guilty of committing an offence, but they do not strictly 
breach the Home Office requirements on issuing cautions because the recipient 
nonetheless has made an ‘admission’ to the offence. 
 
Of more concern are those circumstances where the Ministry of Justice guidelines are 
not followed in the issuing of a caution. This occurs largely because of a lack of a 
supervisory or oversight mechanism to review the issuing of cautions which are so done 
in private and ‘on police territory’.89 For example, although the current guidance 
expressly forbid the police from ‘inducing [a suspect] to accept a simple caution in any 
way’,90 it has been claimed that police ‘indications are often given before an interview 
that a caution is likely to be offered in the event of an admission’.91 These might help an 
individual decide to make a damaging admission and in the hope of accept the proffered 
caution.  
 
Such a claim was made in R (on the application of Lee) v Chief Constable of Essex 
Police,92 where the investigating officer told the duty solicitor prior to interview and private 
consultation that the solicitor’s client could (author’s emphasis) be eligible for a caution 
due to the suspect’s prior good character and the minor nature of the allegation.93 
Immediately after the interview ended, during which his client had admitted to the alleged 
offence, the solicitor told the interviewing officer that he had explained the ramifications 
of a caution to the suspect and that he would accept one.94  
 
The Divisional Court rejected the application to quash the caution, claiming that the 
investigating officer ‘did no more than inform [the duty solicitor] before his consultation 
with the Claimant that a caution might – and I emphasise the word “might” – be 
available…[the guidance] does not prohibit any mention of a possible caution by a police 
                                                          
88 Ibid [36] 
89 J. C. Donaghue, ‘Reforming the role of Magistrates: implications for summary justice in England and 
Wales’ (1 November 2014) 77(6) Modern Law Review 928, 948  
90 Ministry of Justice, ‘Simple Cautions for adult offenders’ (13 April 2015) para.71 
91 P. Hynes and M. Elkins, ‘Suggestions for reform to the police cautioning procedure’ (2013) 12 
Criminal Law Review 966  
92 [2012] EWHC (Admin) 283 
93 Ibid [7] 
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officer at any stage before a confession is made’.95 It is submitted that such a distinction 
must provide the police with an effective carte blanche to proffer blandishments to 
arrestee intended to encouraging admissions en route to the issuing of cautions, 
provided, of course, that the officer is sufficiently prudent as to not couch their proposition 
in too robust terms. It also risks the possibility of a solicitor misadvising a client to make 
an admission with a view to the offer of a caution which may, or may not, be forthcoming. 
 
Such cautions, however obtained, will be retained on PHOENIX and are almost certainly 
not subject to data challenge where a judicial review as to the lawfulness of them 
generally has failed. In fact, the position at judicial review is that the oversight provided 
by the courts to the police discretion to issue cautions is limited indeed. In Blackburn v 
Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis,96 Lord Denning made clear that the police 
act independently of the Executive;97 taken in that context, the Home Office/Ministry of 
Justice guidance produced on cautions is precisely that; guidance, and nothing more.98 
This helps to further explain the decision in R (Lee), where the fact that the police did not 
even consider the most recent Home Office guidelines was not held to fatally undermine 
their decision to caution.99  
 
A similar deference was shown in R (on the application of Manser) v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner.100 Here a caution was issued to Manser who, having returned to the 
scene of an unprovoked attack on her and seeing one of her assailants pinned to the 
floor by security staff, duly delivered a kick to her face.101 After being arrested for causing 
grievous bodily harm with intent,102 she was told at her subsequent police interview that 
her kick had caused the woman to ‘lose a front tooth, a split lip and a broken nose’.103 In 
fact, she had not broken the woman’s nose at all and the police failed, despite repeated 
requests, to provide any evidence to show such an injury was caused.104  
 
                                                          
95 Ibid [19] 
96 [1968] 2 QB 118 
97 Ibid, 136 b – c  
98 R (on the application of Stratton) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2013] EWHC 1561 [40] 
99 Above n.92 [31] 
100 [2015] EWHC 3642 (Admin) 
101 Ibid [9][10] 
102 Contrary to s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
103 Above n.100 [13] 
104 Ibid [33] 
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On the basis of the representation of the injuries caused and viewing the CCTV which 
showed her deliver the kick, Manser nonetheless made an admission during interview 
and accepted a caution for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.105 She later contested 
the caution as being unlawfully issued on the basis of the inaccurate representation and 
also on the basis that she only accepted the caution for ABH because she did not wish 
to risk contesting a prosecution on the charge of GBH. The Administrative Court held 
that there were no grounds to quash the caution.106 Although the police had not strictly 
followed the applicable guidelines, their failure was not ‘a clear breach of the guidelines’ 
sufficient to necessitate the quashing of the caution.107 Moreover, the offer of a caution 
for ABH, rather than a prosecution for GBH, was not to be construed as an ‘inducement’ 
because ‘a caution can be properly offered for a lesser offence even if the police are 
considering prosecuting for a more serious offence’.108 
 
Another example of the courts’ unwillingness to intervene in the absence of a ‘clear 
breach of guidelines’ was provided in R (on the application of Mondelly) v Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis,109 where the majority found that, despite the creation of a 
new statutory regime and applicable guidelines aimed principally at dealing informally 
with (or at least by not generally arresting) those caught in possession of cannabis, the 
applicant could not demonstrate that there had been a ‘clear breach of guidelines’110 
when he was arrested at home by police who had been investigating a burglary and 
knocked on his door by mistake.111 Walker J, however, disagreed, and said he would 
have quashed the conviction because ‘the caution issued to Mr. Mondelly clearly 
contravened the Commissioner’s policy on the simple possession of cannabis and for no 
good reason’.112  
 
This line of authority illustrates starkly the very subjective nature of the decision-making 
process which informs the issue of cautions and also the very subjective nature of the 
analysis of what constitutes ‘a clear breach of guidelines’, so far as judicial oversight is 
concerned. They also demonstrate the clear judicial reluctance to interfere in the 
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106 Ibid [39] 
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decision-maker’s subjective discretion where cautions are issued. However, examples 
of cautions being quashed can be found, and generally start from the decision in R v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte P,113 where the Divisional Court 
quashed a caution issued to a twelve-year-old boy arrested on suspicion of shop theft. 
This was ordered because the the boy had both been misled as to the necessary legal 
elements of the offence of shop-theft and there was no evidence at interview of any clear 
or reliable admission of guilt.114  
 
Simon Brown LJ confirmed that ‘the Court can properly intervene if a caution is 
administered in clear breach of the guidelines’115 but he warned that the court had a 
discretion to intervene in such circumstances and not more116 and that there was no 
intention ‘to offer any sort of general encouragement to those cautioned to challenge the 
legality of their caution’.117 
 
Soon after, in R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Thompson118 the 
Divisional Court quashed a caution issued to a man in respect of a public order offence119 
when he began shouting abuse at police officers who (wrongly) stopped him for driving 
whilst under the influence of alcohol.120 This was because the cautioning procedure used 
by the defendant police force informed him that being cautioned would remove the 
possibility of a court prosecution and ensure that he would not receive a criminal 
record121 before asking if they admitted the offence, effectively inducing him to 
confess.122 The general position of the law regarding the challenge of cautions issued 
was stated as being that: 
 
Judicial review is available as a remedy in respect of a caution; that this court will 
not invariably interfere, even in the case of a clear breach of the guidelines relating 
to the administration of cautions, as the availability of a remedy is a matter for the 
discretion of the court; that police officers “must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
                                                          
113 (1995) 160 JP 367 
114 Ibid, 367 – 8  
115 Ibid, 371 
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118 [1997] 1 WLR 1519 
119 Contrary to s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 
120 Above n.118, 1521 
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as to the nature of the case and whether the preconditions for a caution are 
satisfied;” and that it will be a rare case where a person who has been cautioned 
will succeed in showing that the decision was fatally flawed.123 
 
Although clearly intended to limit applications to quash cautions only to very narrowly 
prescribed, fact-specific circumstances, the decisions in P and Thompson have 
generated a reasonably lengthy line of subsequent litigation. In Abraham v 
Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis124 a black woman told a black man being 
arrested on the street that she ‘hope[d] to see you alive again’ as she walked past with 
her two-year-old child. The police officer responded by following her down the street, 
manhandling her and arresting her for assault.125 Abraham accepted a police caution on 
the advice of the duty solicitor, fully intending to get out of the police station as quickly 
as possible and bring an action for civil damages.126 The Court of Appeal, overturning 
the decision of the single judge to strike out her claim, agreed that ‘having been brought 
to the police station under a false pretext’127 and no doubt concerned as to her son’s 
welfare, she made an admission ‘to an account of events which both she and P.C Cook 
knew to be false’.128 Such an admission was not a true admission of guilt but rather one 
‘caused by, or at least contributed to’ by the unlawful arrest and false recounting of 
events.129  
 
In R (on the application of Wyman) v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary130 a 
student cautioned for sexual assault131 after a complaint was made by a woman he had 
‘provocatively’ danced with in a nightclub. Silber J found that the alleged ‘admissions’ 
made during the police interview were not ‘clear or reliable’ enough to show that he 
admitted that he did not have consent for touching the complainants bottom,132 nor that 
his touching was ‘sexual’133 and so the caution should be quashed.134  
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Another caution was quashed in Caetano v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.135 
Here, the police arrested a woman whose boyfriend returned home at 1am, drunk and 
proclaiming to have performed oral sex with another woman because ‘he could do 
whatever he wanted’, resulting in her slapping him twice. He then responded by putting 
his knee into her back and strangling her.136 The police, taking the view that as she struck 
first, she was the aggressor,137 duly arrested and interviewed Caetano before producing 
a summary of her interview for the custody officer which (falsely) claimed that she 
admitted to striking her boyfriend ‘in the face several times’ and that there was no 
bruising evident to substantiate the strangulation claims.138 In fact, Caetano had offered 
during interview to show the officers photographs on her mobile showing bruising, but 
they declined.139 On the basis of the summary, Caetano was cautioned by the custody 
officer. The caution was ultimately quashed because the decision maker had (based on 
the inaccurate interview summary) incorrectly categorised the alleged offence as 
‘domestic violence’, when the reality was very different and something sufficiently minor 
that there would have been no public interest in issuing a caution.140  
 
R (on the application of Stratton) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police141 a caution 
was issued to a woman after she admitted to throwing a bottle at a woman who had 
poured a drink over her at a public house.142 The claimant made an admission to 
common assault during interview but afterwards asked if the arrest would have any 
impact on her work as a children’s nanny. She was told it would not.143 Anxious to go 
home, she then signed what she believed to be ‘a sign out form’,144 but was in fact a 
caution on a prescribed form, which stated that the caution might be used against her in 
any future legal proceedings145 but which made no mention to any other potential 
adverse use of the caution. This, according to the Divisional Court, meant that she 
considered the form merely ‘a formality that would enable her to leave the station…she 
probably thought no more about it’.146 The failure of the police to intimate to an 
                                                          
135 (2013) 177 JP 314 
136 Ibid [4] 
137 Ibid [9] 
138 Ibid [11][12] 
139 Ibid [8] 
140 Ibid [44] 
141 [2013] EWHC 1561 
142 Ibid [7] 
143 Ibid [12] 
144 Above n.142 
145 Ibid [8] 
146 Ibid [52] 
148 
 
unrepresented individual who works with children the potentially serious ramifications of 
being cautioned meant that she could not be said to give informed consent to the caution, 
and so the caution was quashed.147 
 
What this relatively small sample of the unlawful caution litigation shows is that the 
concerns regarding the lawfulness of cautions issued by police, in the privacy of the 
station without immediate independent oversight, are at least partially justified and 
perhaps, it is submitted, in fact well-founded. Even in the small sample provided, it is 
evident that the police have issued cautions where there have been no good public policy 
reasons to do so, where there have not been reliable admissions to essential legal 
elements of the alleged offence, where arrests are affected on wholly inflated grounds, 
where the cautioning officer is provided with misrepresentations as to the material facts 
of the alleged offence by investigating officers, where officers have (deliberately or 
otherwise) misled the recipient as to the possible consequences of the caution and where 
the police have adopted procedures which facilitate an admission after the prospect of a 
caution has induced the suspect to confess.  
 
The ‘court approach’ first offered in Thompson means that ‘the practical issue of what 
was in fact happening in police stations was never properly considered’.148 Some people 
may be accepting cautions not because they actually committed an offence but because 
they would rather deal with the matter privately than deal with the potentially far-reaching 
consequences of possible media reporting on their prosecution.149 Moreover, the 
custody suite at the police station is a highly pressurised and frightening environment 
and it is submitted that the potential for poor decisions to be taken there, particularly by 
juveniles, those inexperienced in the custody process or the unrepresented, is obvious. 
Advice as to the caution and its ramifications provided by police might be wrong, either 
deliberately or inadvertently, because the police are not experts in criminal, employment, 
data protection, human rights or immigration law; just some of the areas potentially 
touched upon by the imposition of a police caution. Even where the suspect is 
represented, as in Caetano, the pressure on the individual may be such that the desire 
to leave custody is such that even an intelligent suspect who has taken legal advice may 
simply accept a caution which should not have been issued.  
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Quite simply, it is not possible to know precisely how many people truly do accept a 
caution because they just want to go home. What is known is that, so far as most 
detainees are concerned, how quickly they will be released from custody is ‘very often 
the primary concern’.150 The temptation to ‘seize it [a caution] as a way of securing 
immediate release from an unpleasant situation’ is obvious.151 Similarly, how many 
cautions have been issued in circumstances analogous to those raised in litigation is not, 
and likely never will, be known, but it is submitted that the litigated cases must merely 
represent the tip of an iceberg, and if even if only 1% of cautions are unlawfully issued, 
then between 2001 and 2013 alone this means that over 30,000 unlawful cautions were 
issued.152 
 
Where a caution has been ‘unlawfully’ issued but not challenged, it will be nonetheless 
recorded onto PHOENIX as a ‘factual’ part of an individual’s criminal record. Where the 
‘unlawful’ conviction is challenged and successfully quashed, the record might be 
expunged from PHOENIX; it appears that the question of whether it is so done depends 
on the nature of the order made by the court at the conclusion of the successful 
challenge. In P, the court ordered that the conviction be quashed and also required that 
‘it be expunged from the police’s records’.153  
 
None of the other cases referred to in this chapter refer to such an order with the 
exception of Wyman, which provides an interesting insight into the issue of whether the 
quashing of a caution means that record of it is expunged. Here, upon confirmation that 
the caution would be quashed, the judge invited submissions as to the wording of the 
subsequent order. Counsel for the claimant asked that the conviction be quashed, costs 
be awarded in the case and ‘that the Claimant then sought an order that all records 
relating to the caution be destroyed and that the said caution be expunged from all 
relevant records’.154 This was not contested by the police but instead they advanced two 
issues ‘which might assist the court’.  
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Firstly, if the caution was to be quashed, the record should be retained because the chief 
constable may take the view that a prosecution should be brought instead.155 The judge, 
while refusing to apply such a consideration in the instant case,156 did not dismiss such 
an idea as unlawful and, therefore, it is perhaps worth noting that there is an inherent 
risk that a person who successfully seeks to quash a caution as unlawfully issued might 
render himself liable to prosecution instead. Moreover, it will be recalled that s.29(1) of 
the DPA 1998 provides an exemption to the requirement that data be collected lawfully 
if it is required ‘for the prosecution of offenders’. The invocation of that defence in 
circumstances such as these might conceivably justify an extremely lengthy retention on 
PHOENIX; there is generally no time limitation on the bringing of a criminal matter and 
the threat of a potential prosecution therefore may hang, as a Sword of Damocles, for 
very many years.  
 
The second issue was that the retention of the record might be required to enable the 
Defendant to resist any civil action subsequently brought by the Claimant.157 This might 
have given rise to a police defence that such data is obtained and processed lawfully 
and fairly as it is necessary ‘for the administration of justice’.158 Such a position was, 
however, rejected by the judge, who simply provided that ‘the existence of the caution is 
a matter recorded in this judgment’159 and, indeed, the judge duly set out the wording of 
it in the appendix. In doing so, he effectively repudiated the necessity of retaining the 
record purely for litigation purposes. 
 
It is submitted that data obtained as part of the process of issuing ‘unlawful’ cautions is 
prima facie unfair and/or unlawful and should be expunged. This is particularly so where 
either the police accept, or a court orders, that the caution is ‘unlawful’ and must be 
expunged. It should not be required that the claimant in such cases ask that the 
applicable PHOENIX data be deleted. This should be done as a matter of course if it is 
not so being done. Attempts by the police to defend the collection and retention of such 
data must fail, it is submitted, on the same grounds that a defence to collecting unlawful 
arrest data must fail. The ICO has not issued any enforcement notices in relation to data 
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retained relating to unlawfully issued cautions. It is submitted that he may wish to 
consider the matter.  
 
6.4 Police compliance with the fourth Data Principle 
Accord to Schedule1, Part I of the DPA 1998, the fourth Data Principle requires that 
personal data shall be ‘accurate and, where necessary, up-to-date’. Problems with the 
accuracy of the criminal record data had persisted for over two decades and had resulted 
in a Police Research Group making several key recommendations to improve the data 
quality. A subsequent ACPO audit sought to examine compliance with the PRG 
recommendations. They found that ‘many forces had not implemented them, or even had 
plans to do so’.160 ACPO were sufficiently concerned that they issued an ‘ACPO 
Compliance Strategy for the Police National Computer’,161 which recognised that failings 
in leadership and training meant that many forces viewed ‘national systems primarily 
as…functions of record keeping’,162 rather than investigative tools, so that ‘a significant 
number of forces do not achieve the present standards’.163 It imposed a number of key 
indicators, including that arrests and charges be entered ‘in full’ onto the PNC inside five 
days, police bail details added within 24 hours and court disposals within 72 hours of 
coming to police notice.164   
 
The situation did not immediately improve. In 2000, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary conducted an audit into the PHOENIX data. It’s findings would have been 
quite shocking, were they not entirely predictable. The audit team found that none of the 
inspected forces had put in place an implementation plan regarding the PRG 
recommendations165 and that the level of understanding regarding PHOENIX’s 
investigative capabilities remained very low; one detective superintendent was entirely 
unaware as to how to use QUEST to search the PHOENIX data.166 It also found that many 
forces were trying to meet timeliness targets by quickly adding ‘skeleton’ records – 
sufficient to generate a new PHOENIX record but no more – which never progressed to 
full records because their existed no mechanism to check that these were populated 
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later.167 Inspectors asked for sight of the ‘PHOENIX Source Documents’ (‘PSDs’)168 which 
were to be input by PHOENIX staff on the day of inspection to examine when the 
paperwork was initially completed. They found that some of the documents had been 
drafted 278 days earlier; a situation described by inspectors as ‘unacceptable’.169  
 
Moreover, the inspectors found all manner of inaccuracies and omissions in the data itself. 
Postcodes, a ‘key search criterion’ in QUEST, were missing in more than half of the 
records added by six of the ten inspected forces.170 Inspections of one force showed that 
none of the PSDs to be input to PHOENIX included any descriptive details whatsoever, 
while another was found to have submitted incomplete PSDs in 37 of 40 inspected 
cases.171 One force had included adequate modus operandi data on precisely four 
records, against a total recorded crime figure of 140,874 offences, in the year prior to the 
inspection.172 Remarkably, omissions on the PSD led meant that some inputting staff 
‘would sometimes guess the details’.173 Dates of birth were found to be wrongly 
recorded,174 a man with a distinctive tattoo had evaded capture for some time because 
the ‘tattoo’ filed on his last PSD was left blank,175 heights, eye colours and builds were 
wrongly recorded or missing.176  
 
The overall picture was, according to the inspectors, ‘totally unacceptable’.177 That is 
perhaps being generous; in truth, the situation appeared to be wholly shambolic. The 
police tried to assuage fears by claiming that most of the problems lay ‘in the main with 
personal descriptive detail’, rather than convictions.178 That may be so, but it does not 
explain why the delay in adding arrest details onto PHOENIX varied from five days (in the 
best forces) to 92 days (in the worst), or why the delay in inputting court disposals onto 
PHOENIX once received by police varied from 15 to 354 days.179 Forces claimed they had 
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no recourse to check the accuracy of the data provided by court staff; unless reports 
contained an ‘obvious error’, data was simply input as received.180  
 
In 2001, the Home Office sent HMIC in once more to inspect police responses to the 
problem. The situation remained extremely grave. The target time for the input of 90% of 
arrest data being input to PHOENIX was one day. The national average at March 2001 
was ‘a totally unacceptable’ 55 days.181 Moreover, the backlog of case disposals which 
had not been updated on PHOENIX was absolutely enormous; it was calculated that some 
216,891 cases were ‘overdue for finalisation’ (i.e. had concluded months previously but 
the result not been added to PHOENIX).182 This backlog meant that police were 
permanently chasing their tails and ACPO made it a priority target to ‘validate’ every one 
of the outstanding disposals inside twelve months.183 After six months, the average time 
taken to record arrest data had fallen to ‘only’ 37 days.184 Better progress was made on 
the backlog, with 50% cleared in six months, but progress was being hampered by the 
increasing awareness that ‘some chief officers had simply not considered the issue to be 
a sufficiently high priority to warrant the effort required’.185 It was only after a second round 
of inspections in April 2002, and serious cajoling of some chief officers by the Inspectorate, 
that something approaching an acceptable state of affairs was reached, with average 
arrest data input down to ‘only’ 16 days,186 while the outstanding case backlog was down 
to 64,503, or 1,343 per force.187   
 
It is submitted that the long-standing problems with accuracy of the PHOENIX collection 
of criminal records constituted a prima facie breach of the fourth DPA 1998 data principle. 
The police were certainly concerned that they were at risk of being in formally sanctioned 
by the ICO; ACPO’s compliance strategy conceded in April 2000 that ‘at present the 
service may not meet the Registrar’s standards on relevance, accuracy and timeliness’ 
and warned both that ‘if our systems are defective, the Data Protection Act will increase 
                                                          
180 Ibid, appendix 8, paragraph 2.4 
181 Home Office, ‘Police National Computer: Data Quality and Timeliness – Report by HM Inspectorate 
of Constabulary’ (HMIC 2001) 14 
182 Ibid, 15 
183 Ibid, 16 
184 Ibid, 19 
185 Ibid, 21 
186 Home Office, ‘Police National Computer: Data Quality and Timeliness – Second Report on the 
Inspection by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary’ (HMIC 2002) 21 
187 Ibid, 24 
154 
 
the likelihood of litigation against the service’ and that ‘given the Registrar’s considerable 
enforcement powers, compliance is essential’.188  
 
The Registrar (or the Information Commissioner, as she became in 2000) was fully au fait 
with the situation. She later told a Home Affairs Committee that her office had ‘taken a 
keen interest in the quality and extent of criminal conviction data held on the PNC’189 and 
indeed she had been sent a copy of the PRG Report which initially highlighted the 
deteriorated quality of the criminality data.190 In response to growing concerns regarding 
the PHOENIX data, the assistant data commissioner issued a thinly veiled threat of 
enforcement action, telling Computer Weekly that ‘we would not take a different stance to 
breaches by the police than we would a commercial organisation. It will be in the police’s 
best interests to make sure it’s house is in order’.191 The poverty of the PHOENIX data 
was highlighted in the Information Commissioner’s annual report in 2001, where she 
provided that ‘substantial improvements’ were required.192 
 
Her response to the PGR research was to initiate meetings with ACPO and the Home 
Office which fed into the ACPO Compliance Strategy.193 Her response to the ‘alarming’194 
and ‘unacceptable’195 state of affairs highlighted in the HMIC inspection report in 2000 was 
to initiate more discussions with ACPO and the Home Office, rather than issue 
enforcement notices.196 The Commissioner justified this on the basis that ‘it has always 
been the Commissioner’s approach to seek compliance initially through agreement rather 
than formal enforcement action’197 though, if remedial action was not taken within a 
‘reasonable time, consideration would be given as to whether formal enforcement action 
would be taken’.198 
 
This author submits that the Commissioner’s approach was not correct, and she should 
instead have issued enforcement notices against chief officers, particularly once it became 
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clear in 2001 that some were continuing to take a belligerent, almost recalcitrant, attitude 
towards rectifying the deficiencies in the data. Her claim that ‘initial’ cooperative action is 
best might well be true, but the problem had been evidence for some fifteen years or more 
– it is not clear just how many years the Commissioner considers to be part of an ‘initial’ 
phase of arrangement, but it is submitted that fifteen or more might not reasonably qualify. 
It is further submitted that, by failing to act decisively, the Commissioner facilitated the 
breach and encouraged it to continue; recalcitrant chief officers might naturally find more 
encouragement to be so once it became apparent that enforcement action was not 
forthcoming. 
 
The Commissioner may argue that her approach has achieved the desired affect and 
facilitated improvements, but it is submitted that an analysis of subsequent problems 
which emerged through the disclosure of records for vetting purposes showed that 
inaccuracies persisted. In 2003, the government boasted that it had processed around 
1,000,000 checks and had an error rate of ‘just’ 1%; one MP noted pointedly that this 
‘means that 10,000 people were wrongly assessed’.199 In April 2004, an answer to a 
written Parliamentary question revealed that in the preceding twelve months, some 193 
applicants were wrongly labelled as offenders.200  
 
Academic criticism began to surface; in 2005, for example, Jan Miller reported that around 
one-third of employers had complained that checks provided inaccurate information.201 In 
April 2006 it was revealed in the Commons that some 1,472 mistakes had been made 
since March 2004.202 The BBC soon after reported that once such incident saw one 
woman mistakenly labelled a convicted shoplifter. A further question in Parliament in June 
2006 showed that the total number of complaints upheld relating to mistakes made from 
2003 to the end of the 2005/6 financial year to be 2,273.203 In 2007, the media reported 
that one woman had lost two jobs and was currently suspended from a third after ‘her’ 
criminal record continued to show, incorrectly, that she had drink-driving and drug-related 
convictions.204 In 2008 it was reported that 680 innocent people had been implicated in 
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criminal offences;205 one shadow minister duly noted that: ‘nearly 700 mistakes that could 
ruin people's lives is 700 too many’.206   
 
In December 2008 it emerged that the figures released regarding errors to date were, in 
fact, somewhat selective, and in fact the number of disputes which had resulted in an 
amended certificate were significantly higher than previously claimed; the total number of 
disputes regarding the accuracy of information provided from criminal records which 
turned out to be wrong was (from 2003) actually 12,255.207 There appeared to be no 
resolution to the now perennial problem of inaccurate records. In 2009, 1,570 erroneous 
checks either showed convictions against applicants who had none or which declared a 
person free from convictions when they had in fact been so convicted.208 In 2012, a 
Freedom of Information (FOI) request revealed that the total number of disputes raised 
against checks where the raw data on PHOENIX was simply wrong had reached ‘more 
than 3,500’.209  
 
The Information Commissioner’s response to this continued problem is to do nothing. A 
Freedom of Information Request sent by this author to the ICO confirmed that the 
Commissioner has still issued no enforcement notices against any police force in respect 
of data breaches concerning the accuracy of the PHOENIX record.210 It is submitted that 
the Commissioner’s continued inaction is inexcusable and has done little more than 
facilitate ongoing data protection breaches which now stretch beyond three decades and, 
for reasons exculpated in the remaining chapters, potentially have a significant detrimental 
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6.5 Police compliance with the seventh Data Principle 
According to Schedule 1, Part 1 of the DPA 1998, the seventh Data Principle required that 
‘appropriate technical measures be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of 
personal data’. The problem of unlawful access by police officers to data, which have 
occurred since the 1980s, show no signs of being properly addressed, or, at least, 
instances of unauthorised use and misuse continue to surface. In R v Rees211 a former 
detective inspector at Warwickshire Constabulary who had set up a private investigation 
agency was able to persuade a former colleague, a serving detective sergeant, to provide 
him with details contained in PHOENIX on some 29 occasions.212 Both were imprisoned, 
despite an elaborate attempt by the more senior former officer to claim that no offence 
had been committed because criminal record information was not ‘confidential’ as criminal 
convictions were a matter of public record; the Court of Appeal describing the use of the 
word ‘confidential’ in this context as ‘otiose’ and meaning nothing more than that the data 
is restricted to the police for policing purposes.213 In the course of the trial in this case, it 
emerged that the same force had recently dismissed another officer for similar PNC 
breaches.214  
 
At largely the same time, in R v Keyte215 another serving police officer was jailed after 
releasing PHOENIX information to several former police officers who had instigated 
private investigating agencies in return for small payments.216 The Court of Appeal 
reiterated that: 
 
 The integrity of the Police National Computer is of absolutely vital importance 
and it goes without saying that the public must have faith and confidence in it and 
a belief that private information relating to them will not be released by police 
officers for ulterior motives.217 
 
The use of PHOENIX data by private investigators was concerning enough, but it seemed 
that unauthorised or unlawful processing had spread to even more nefarious 
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circumstances. In R v Nazir218 an experienced officer persuaded a trainee in his charge to 
‘toss a coin’ for possession of a PND issued to a friend of the experienced officer.219 When 
the coin toss was lost, the new recruit reported the incident, after which the officer freely 
admitted that his intention was to destroy it before it appeared on PHOENIX.220 The officer 
in question was imprisoned for one month.221 It seemed that some officers were even 
prepared to use information on PHOENIX to help facilitate criminality. In R v Gellion,222 an 
intelligence officer saw information on the PNC which indicated that a family friend (and 
known criminal) was to be subject to police surveillance. The officer warned the criminal 
that this was to happen and evidence was destroyed as a result.223 It took a police ‘sting’ 
operation to trap the officer, who was eventually convicted of misconduct in public office 
and jailed.224  
 
The case of R v Hardy225 provided an example of an even more remarkable misuse of 
PHOENIX data. H, an experienced officer, was a long-standing friend of J; a known 
offender with a history of offences, including some involving serious violence.226 Once this 
association was discovered and it was found that H had looked up J on PHOENIX, H was 
formally reprimanded by his employer and warned to sever all ties with J.227 He did not do 
so. Instead, in 2006 J asked H if he ‘knew’ two men who J suspected was responsible for 
thefts from J’s partner’s public house. Very shortly afterwards, J was violently attacked by 
a different man, W.228 H duly looked up the two men J thought responsible for the theft, 
and W, on PHOENIX.229 J told H that he thought W would be arrested soon and so he 
needed to ‘get him quick’. J duly printed out the PHOENIX records of all these men and 
got his partner to copy them and hand them over to J, to ensure no fingerprints would link 
H to the printout.  Unfortunately for all concerned, the police had placed both H and J 
under covert surveillance and both were arrested as the information was handed over.230 
When interrogated, H defended his actions by claiming that the two men suspected of the 
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theft were ‘known heroin addicts who were responsible for a lot of crime in the area’ and 
that the police would not have dealt with the violent attack by W because J was a known 
offender with a history of violence himself. In short, he felt that ‘justice needed to be done’ 
and that the police and the criminal justice system would not facilitate this.231 
 
It seems that the misuse of criminal records data extended beyond even individual police 
officers deciding to bypass the criminal justice system in favour of allowing habitual and 
violent offenders to ‘punish’ criminals instead. An article in The Guardian in 2011 claimed 
that police ‘Operation Reproof’ had uncovered a ‘nationwide network of private detectives’ 
who were being fed information from the PNC by corrupt police officers on, among others, 
prominent Labour party politicians in 2005, including a criminal record check on Gordon 
Brown. It was further claimed that these were being requested by journalists under 
instruction from Rebekah Brookes, then editor of the now defunct and disgraced News of 
the World. The report concluded that it was ruled by a judge that bringing a prosecution 
against those involved would involve disproportionate costs in such a ‘trivial matter’, so 
the police investigation was brought to a close.232 It is not immediately evident why an 
unlawful investigation into the background of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer 
involving the illegal release of PNC data by serving police officers at the request of 
investigators acting for an editor of a national newspapers might reasonably be considered 
‘trivial’.  
 
The media continued to report on higher profile examples of illegal access to the PNC. In 
2007 a group of serving and former police officers were convicted of various offences 
relating to the PNC, including (the by now almost routine) dissemination of information on 
criminal records to private investigators.233 Mark Turner, another serving police officer, 
was jailed in 2010 after a trial showed he was passing criminal records to his criminal 
associates.234 Turner later came to prominence once more in 2015 when he was jailed for 
his part in a drug dealing gang.235 A 2011 article claimed that ‘over 200 staff’ in the 
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Metropolitan Police had been disciplined for unlawful access to the PNC in the preceding 
ten years. Over half of the incidents had been recorded in the previous three years.236 
 
A detailed analysis of the minutiae of these cases is not required. Rather, these 
demonstrate once more that the problem of unauthorised and unlawful use of criminal 
records data continues long after it was first publicised as a serious problem by James 
Rule in 1970. A Freedom of Information request by this author in the preparation of this 
research has confirmed that the Information Commission has not issued any enforcement 
notices against any chief officers relating to unauthorised or illegal access or processing 
of criminal records.237 It is not clear at all why this is so. It must be presumed that the 
Commissioner feels that that chief officers cannot be blamed for ‘isolated’ actions of 
‘rogue’ officers and that the preventative and responsive measures taken by chief officers 
generally provide a reasonable defence to any data protection breach.  
 
There is perhaps a measure of truth to such a submission. It is clear from the above-stated 
cases, for many years, logs have been taken of PNC access and that forces conduct ‘spot-
checks’ on these to monitor use.238 These continue to be taken; the current PNC user 
manual warns users that the PNC ‘allocates a unique number to each transaction carried 
out by a particular user’239 and that ‘each transaction (enquiry or update) is recorded 
against a date/time reference by the computer’.240  
 
Moreover, the cases illustrate is that training and guidance is provided to all officers about 
their responsibilities regarding the PNC.241 This practice continues today; police staff with 
PNC access are able to use the ‘PNC Training Bulletin Board’ – an online provision 
containing ‘PNC training related matters’.242 Further guidance is provided in the PNC user 
manual, which states simply that ‘users should be aware of the need to protect and handle 
personal data in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998’243 and 
that ‘the data is for policing purposes only’244 [emphasis in the original]. What is also 
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clear is that some officers are detected in their unlawful use of criminal records data and 
ultimately prosecuted. This indicates, at least, a degree of intent on the part of forces to 
investigate unlawful data processing and to prosecute where these are discovered. 
 
These measures might explain the Commissioner’s reticence to intervene. However, it is 
submitted that a more detailed examination reveals that the documentation assurances 
are undermined by serious flaws in some police force processes. The quality of the training 
being provided officers is certainly subject to question. As recently as 2005, for example, 
HMIC found that the Metropolitan Police had no written police regarding appropriate PNC 
use and that officers knowledge of their obligations regarding the data was so ‘limited’ that 
there existed a real risk of’ inappropriate and unlawful use by staff’.245 At West Mercia, 
there were some good training provisions in place but backlogs in rolling these out to all 
staff, so that ‘officers who had requested PNC training and required it as a core part of 
their role are still waiting for it’.246 At Northamptonshire, provision had been made for 
information security training to be provided by a bespoke computer package, but this was 
not being used and ‘handouts’ were being given to new staff during induction instead.247 
 
Moreover, whilst police auditing of PNC checks has discovered hundreds of officers 
unlawfully and/or unauthorisedly processing data on the PNC, it is not known how many 
undiscovered instances have taken place. The police do not audit every PNC transaction. 
In fact, official police guidance on how many checks should be carried out recommends 
only that police check ‘at least three transactions a day’, although ‘clearly a force which 
carries out a large number of PNC transactions would be required to check more than the 
minimum’.248 It is not clear what, in the context of this guidance, constitutes a ‘large 
number of checks’, or whether such a force would be compliant with the guidance if it 
conducted perhaps four or five checks per day.  
 
It is not certain that even this meagre baseline of transaction checks is being carried out; 
for example, HMIC inspectors found in 2005 that the Metropolitan Police were undertaking 
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precisely no transaction monitoring.249 A more persuasive instance of a data breach 
requiring urgent intervention by the Commissioner is difficult to envisage. Even where 
checks were being carried out, follow-up procedures by checking staff might not uncover 
unlawful use; in Suffolk Police, so many follow-up requests for evidence on why audited 
transactions had been made by officers came back with no supporting evidence that staff 
simply could not investigate them all,250 while at Northamptonshire Police, the legality of 
the PNC check was ‘automatically accepted with no further analysis’ if the auditing officer 
thought the explanation provided ‘looked legitimate’.251  
 
It is, therefore, submitted that what is clear is that the number of instances of misuse 
uncovered must be only a small proportion of actual unauthorised and/or unlawful criminal 
record processing. The DPA 1998 requires that the police take appropriate (author’s 
emphasis) technical and organisational measures to prevent unauthorised or illegal data 
processing. While the author accepts that some chief officers fulfilled their obligations252 it 
is also clear that others did not, with some taking measures which were not appropriate in 
that they were insufficient to prevent avoidable instances of data breaches, while other 
chief officers appeared to be taking no measures at all so that their policies might 
reasonably be accused of facilitating breaches. It is for these reasons, and in these 
instances, that it is submitted that the Commissioner was in error in not intervening, and 
in the most egregious examples, in not issuing enforcement notices against the most 
recalcitrant chief officers. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to directly address the third research question and, it is 
submitted, in doing so it has demonstrated a number of prima facie breaches of data 
protection legislation by the police as regards their PHEONIX collection of criminal 
records. One of these alleged breaches, relating to the police failure to retain accurate 
and up-to-date records, seems to have been made out in the most irrefutable terms; the 
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problem was sufficiently widespread that even Parliament was sufficiently well-informed 
and concerned that they investigated the matter on more than one occasion. 
 
The implementation of the DPA 1998 was intended to tighten data protection and give the 
ICO greater powers to investigate and sanction those responsible for it. However, for 
reasons which are not immediately apparent and for which no prescient explanation has 
ever been offered, the Commissioner failed to take any enforcement action against any 
police chief officer responsible as a data controller for the problems regarding the 
PHOENIX criminal record collection.  
 
This is especially perturbing as regards the inaccuracies in the data, which have persisted 
for almost four decades, were widely publicised and which have caused subsequent 
hardship for thousands of affected individuals. This issue presented an ideal opportunity 
for the Commissioner to take the police to task; the prima facie evidence of a data 
protection breach was mountainous and independently verifiable, the impact on 
individuals was measurable, the attitude of chief officers unapologetic and there existed 
sufficient political and public criticism at the obvious police failings that the Commissioner’s 
intervention would likely attract considerable support.  
 
It is almost impossible to envisage any chief officers successfully resisting an enforcement 
notice issued circa 2000–2004 in respect of inaccurate data on PHOENIX. Such a notice 
might have also served to warn other chief officers that urgent remedial action was 
required.  
 
It is submitted that the failure to issue any notice, on this or indeed any of the potential 
data breaches highlighted here, did precisely the opposite. It perpetuated the notion that 
the Commissioner was weak, or at least not sufficiently bold to take challenge police DPA 
1998 breaches. It encouraged chief officers to do nothing more than pay lip service to data 
protection, safe in the knowledge that no immediate adverse consequences would flow 
from it. The practical reality, therefore, was that the fear of Lindop and his committee in 
1978 had come to pass – in all but name, the police had obtained their exemption from 










The legality of the collection and retention of minor 
and inactive PHOENIX data 
 
7.1 Introduction 
It has never historically been the practice of the police in England and Wales to collect 
criminal record data for indefinite periods; Fosdick, for example, noted that the ordinary 
practice of the National CRO in 1913 was to delete the records of remand prisoners who 
were acquitted,1 leaving them with a ‘clean sheet’.2 Even records which showed 
convictions might conceivably be expunged; during the inter-war years the practice of the 
National CRO was to ‘constantly clear the records of dead men and those of still living 
men who are considered unlikely again to get into trouble’.3  
 
Although the process undertaken by the police which determined who might be ‘unlikely 
again to get into trouble’ does not appear to have been documented, this supposedly 
systematic process of deleting records has been historically referred to as ‘weeding’.4 In 
later years, ‘weeding’ processes developed to expunge inactive records which show only 
old and minor convictions. This was considered desirable for several reasons. Some were 
simple practical considerations; weeding kept the physical records held at the CROs down 
to manageable levels, reduced storage costs and maintained a level of operational 
functionality. However, weeding has never been about merely restricting the space 
required to hold records. Extensive collections can give rise to policy concerns; MP Harry 
Cohen summarised that criminal record weeding was important because: 
 
The public need to be reassured that police records are not being kept for too long 
and that they are being used properly. There is also the widespread risk of such 
data being used for all sorts of different purposes that have more do to with big 
brother than effective policing.5 
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Moreover, the development of data protection legislation also appeared to provide further 
important backstops for the weeding of old records via the legal requirements that data 
held not be ‘excessive’ nor ‘held for longer than necessary’.6  
 
The purpose of this chapter is being to address the fourth, and arguably most difficult, 
research question. Here, the research intends to provide a critical evaluation of the 
retention of old, minor and ‘inactive’ criminal records by identifying, and evaluating, the 
key legislative, common law and policy developments which have resulted in the 
extensive, and near continuous, reformulation of weeding policies undertaken. This will 
provide the essential context required to address the fourth research question by the 
analysis which begins here but which follows more extensively in the following two 
chapters. 
 
7.2 Weeding in the pre-data protection legislation period 
By the middle of the 20th Century, it was evident to anyone seeking to establish the fact 
that old and minor criminality data was being weeded, but the precise procedures by which 
this was undertaken were far more difficult to ascertain. Indeed, as recently as 1964, a 
Home Office minister responded (somewhat reluctantly) to the threat of a writ being issued 
against a police force and the Home Office itself by confirming that: 
 
…old or trivial past convictions may be expunged from the record and [this] is 
carried out periodically...I believe that the House will bear with me if I refrain from 
disclosing in detail the circumstances in which that process is carried out.7 
 
What emerged was that the police retained an absolute discretion on what, when and how 
data was ‘weeded’ from central records. It was only when James Rule observed staff in 
1970 that a clear picture of the weeding ‘policy’ in place at the National CRO emerged. 
He saw that a juvenile record showing only one offence would be ‘weeded’ after ten years 
of no subsequent offending (referred to as a ‘clear period’). For adults, records were 
weeded after a twenty-year clear period if the individual had only one conviction. 
Exceptionally, any record which showed a sexual offence was retained until the subject 
reached age seventy. Records with more than one offence were kept until age seventy, 
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Protection Act 1998.  
7 Above n.5 
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at which time they were weeded so long as the record showed a ten year clear period 
since the last offence.8 Acquittals were supposedly deleted upon determination but there 
was significant variance between CROs; some deleted all acquittals, others exercised a 
discretion to retain files ‘if police considered the matter exceptionally serious or sexual in 
nature’9 while some simply ‘routinely retain[ed] files on those acquitted’.10  
 
Rule reported that National CRO staff claimed to have ‘weeded’ some 46,000 records 
between 1970–1971.11 The problem, so far as Rule could see, was that there was no 
obvious means of identifying records which might be due for weeding, other than 
identifying the oldest records and checking to see if they met the weeding requirements. 
As a result, and in light of the obvious constraints of cost and manpower, Rule doubted 
that any systematic programme of record weeding existed, but rather that ‘probably the 
staff exclude superannuated files as they encounter them, but little more’.12 Parliament, 
again somewhat reluctantly, confirmed in 1972 that what Rule had identified was broadly 
accurate, save that single conviction records would only be deleted after the applicable 
clear period if the conviction resulted in a sentence of six months imprisonment or less.13 
 
7.3 Weeding during the DPA 1984 period 
When asked in Parliament immediately prior to the implementation of the DPA 1984, the 
Home Office confirmed that the (then) NIB implemented the same weeding policy as the 
CROs had operated in the 1970s.14 In 1985, it was claimed by a Home Office minister that 
weeding was undertaken ‘continuously, not only by NIB staff but also by individual forces 
and by the PNC itself’.15 Quite how the PNC was able ‘itself’ to weed records is not clear 
– the PNC has never had an automatic deletion facility – and it is very likely that the 
minister spoke in error. In the same speech, the minister claimed that any PNC record 
against any individual who was subsequently acquitted and had no previous convictions 
recorded against them would be deleted.16 What was not disclosed, until a further 
Parliamentary question required it, was that a microfiche record, falling outwith the scope 
of the DPA 1984, was retained by the NIB containing the original identifying number for 
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any such deleted record. This was allegedly retained to ‘prove that a record was 
deliberately destroyed and not lost or corrupted by the computer’.17 Quite how data 
retained on a microfiche might reasonably be described as having been ‘deliberately 
destroyed’ is something the minister might have wished to clarify further. 
 
Weeding of criminal records garnered wider media attention18 in 1985 when the Home 
Secretary announced that new weeding procedures were being implemented ‘to 
substantially reduce the number of criminal records held centrally without significantly 
impairing police effectiveness’.19 These involved an expansion of the weeding policy to 
include the deletion of any record which showed a twenty year clear period, irrespective 
of the age of the offender and the number of previous offences, provided that the record 
contained no disposal of six months imprisonment or more, nor any homicide offences or 
sexual offences.20 
 
This weeding procedure was justiciable in several ways. In an era of hard-copy recording, 
selective deletion would obviously save storage space and costs.21  It also removes from 
searchable records those which are least likely to yield something of value. But it is 
submitted that this weeding criminal records was not, and was never, simply about saving 
space or money. Where a central data collection involves a significant proportion of the 
population, as was the case for the criminal record collection by the late 1980s, 22 weeding 
helps to assuage civil liberties concerns. 
 
Moreover, this new weeding policy was an executive recognition that, although a small 
minority of individuals commit a disproportionately large number of crimes, very many 
individuals also come into contact with the criminal justice system a small number of times 
(or even just once) and then never do so again. The Government was merely reiterating 
that which the police had long predetermined; such records have little police operational 
value and there was, therefore, no pressing reason to retain them. This must explain why, 
at the time that computerisation opened up the potential for far greater storage than 
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previously conceivable, the initial response of the Government and the police was to 
delete, rather than retain, more criminal records. 
 
The process was also a recognition by the police that they were conscious of, and 
apparently keen to adhere to (or at least be seen to be adhering to), the Fourth and Sixth 
Data Principles outlined in the DPA 1984. If the Government and the police both accepted 
that old, inactive criminal records have little operational value, then the lengthy retention 
of them might conceivably be challenged as ‘excessive’. The police certainly thought so, 
and highlighted their weeding policy as evidence of compliance with the DPA 1984 in their 
1987 Code of Practice, issued after direct consultation with the Registrar.23 Indeed, the 
Registrar gave his cautious approval in a foreword latterly paraphrased as reading that 
the guidelines ‘sounded all right, but that he would like to know what was happening in 
practice’.24 
 
What was ‘happening in practice’ was that the problems identified by Rule persisted. MP 
Harry Cohen, one of the few MPs routinely questioning police use of the PNC, laid the 
charges to the Home Office in February 1987. He alleged that the Home Office recognised 
that weeding should take place but ‘is not taking it seriously’.25 This explained why, 
according to Cohen, since the introduction in 1985 of the more expansive weeding policing 
intended to ‘significantly reduce’ the number of records held, the collection had actually 
increased.26 Indeed, the number of records weeded since 1985 was just 23,059; this 
equated to each member of staff allocated to the task weeding seven records per day.27 
This, Cohen claimed, pointed to a ‘feeble weeding policy’.28 The response of the Home 
Office was to retreat behind the lack of activity on the part of the Registrar; if there really 
was a problem, said the Minister, then ‘individuals may make a complaint to the registrar, 
and the registrar has the power to look into it’.29 
 
In 1987, ACPO agreed, subject to some very limited exceptions for homicide and sexual 
offences, that PNC records for individuals whose record showed a single offence would 
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be deleted after twenty years if there were no more offences recorded. Single caution 
records would be deleted after a three year clear period.30 However, anecdotal evidence 
continued to surface supporting the contention that weeding was not being rigorously 
carried out; in 1992, the Home Office boasted that 60,000 records had been weeded in 
three months.31 Closer examination reveals that this amounted to around 38 records per 
day weeded by each of the 18 staff supposedly engaged in the process. Meanwhile, 
Liberty complained that they had seen instances of cautions and convictions being 
referred to by police long after the period in which they should have been weeded.32  
 
The Registrar was certainly conscious of the issue and was wary that records not be 
retained ‘excessively’; in his evidence to the 1990 Home Affairs Committee he warned 
that the retention period for old, minor and inactive records should be ‘carefully set’.33 
Despite this, and Cohen’s allegations about the ‘feeble’ police weeding process, the 
Registrar did not take a more forceful approach to the issue and certainly no enforcement 
notices were issued against the NIB or individual chief constables.34 It is not clear why the 
Registrar did not issue enforcement notices against the police where s/he was not satisfied 
that weeding was being undertaken in accordance with the approved procedure. It may 
be that the majority of the records to be weeded were not computerised, in which case the 
provisions of the DPA 1984 would not apply, but when in 1995 the PHOENIX application 
saw the computerisation of the majority of the records, the Registrar would have had the 
authority to intervene. It is submitted that the failure to do so, and the inherent flaws in the 
weeding processes, very likely meant that records were retained which should have been 
deleted and it is at least plausible that the police were emboldened by the lack of 
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7.4 Weeding during the DPA 1998 period 
With PNC2 in situ and plans well advanced to add the NIB criminal record collection to it, 
in 1995 ACPO amended their weeding policy alongside their updated PNC Code of 
Practice35 to incorporate ‘general rules for criminal record weeding on computer 
systems’.36 These maintained the general ‘twenty year clear’ rule for deletion but 
increased the exceptions to include certain specified violent offences, drug-related 
offences or those where the victim was a child or a vulnerable adult. The retention period 
for cautions was increased to five years.37  
 
By late 1999, two important developments persuaded the police to again reconsider their 
weeding policy. The first was the passing of Part V of the Police Act 1997, which 
foreshadowed an imminent regime for employment and voluntary sector vetting on a 
hitherto unheralded scale. The second was the passing of the DPA 1998, which 
strengthened the enforcement powers of the Registrar/Commissioner to investigate 
instances of excessive data holdings38. Conscious of their apparent requirement to comply 
with the DPA 1998, in September 1999 an ACPO ‘Crime Committee’ approved a new 
‘Criminal Record Policy’, specifically aimed at the retention of criminal records on 
PHOENIX, rather than merely incorporating this as part of the wider ‘data protection’ 
policy. This formed the substantive basis for the publication by ACPO in November 2000 
of national guidance for the ‘weeding’ of PHOENIX criminal records data (‘the 2000 
Weeding Rules’).39  
 
The 2000 Weeding Rules made provisions under the general principle that ‘the period of 
retention…will depend on the disposal types that it contains’.40 The general rule was that 
an individual’s nominal record would be deleted after a clear period of ten years.41 This 
halved the time period which records would be held as compared to the previous regime. 
However, the exemptions to the new ‘ten-year deletion’ rule were much wider than 
previously; any record which showed a total disposal record of six months imprisonment 
or more (including suspended sentences),42 three or more convictions (regardless of 
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punishment on disposal),43 an inability to plead due to insanity,44 or any convictions for 
indecency, sexual, violent or one of the more serious drug offences45 would not be weeded 
at all. Nor would any record which showed an offence involving the deliberate targeting of 
a child, elderly person or a disabled person46 or any terrorism offence.47 In all but one of 
these circumstances, the record was to be kept either until one year after the subject died48 
or until the subject of the record reached the age of one hundred years.49 The exception 
was where the record contained three recordable but otherwise minor offences. These 
records were to be weeded after twenty years if no further offending was recorded.50  
 
Any record which contained cautions but no convictions would be deleted after five years 
unless the record was accompanied by an ‘offends against vulnerable person’ marker.51 
The criteria for defining ‘vulnerable person’ was not expressed. Juvenile offenders who 
were given reprimands or warnings would have their record deleted once they reached 
(or passed) age eighteen and a five year clear period had passed.52 The remainder of the 
2000 Weeding Rules consisted of a list of offences which were to be ‘retained for life’.53 It 
was a lengthy list; fully eighteen pages detailing nearly 500 specified offences including 
those which are violent,54 sexual,55 involving serious damage to property56 or serious drug 
offences.57 No nominal records containing these would be deleted.  
 
The 2000 Weeding Rules are important. They demonstrate that, at a time that the 
Government was pressing ahead with plans to enormously expand criminal record 
checks,58 the police were implementing a national policy intending to continue the weeding 
of certain disposals out of the criminal record collection. Although in some ways more 
restrictive than previous policies, it nonetheless provided an implicit, continued concession 
from the police that not all records needed to be retained and that, over time, some lost 
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their operational value sufficiently that their continued retention was not justified. So far as 
minor offending was concerned, the guidance effectively created a ‘three-strike rule’; a 
tacit admission that the ACPO view was that a person is entitled to make two ‘mistakes’ 
until a third indicated a recidivistic nature justifying more extensive retention. It created a 
systematic procedure for ‘weeding’ based on three key denominators; the total number of 
disposals, the seriousness of the offence(s) and the time passed since the most recent 
disposal. Arguably the most important point, or at least the point which was to become 
more pertinent as the extended vetting regime began to permeate into society, is that the 
guidance related merely to the retention of criminal records, rather than the disclosure of 
them. Retention is far more justiciable than disclosure, and at the time that the 
Government was proposing for the widespread disclosure of criminal records, the police 
were implementing a policy which didn’t see fit to even retain some of them. 
 
The 2000 Weeding Rules were incorporated, almost in their entirety, into the ACPO Code 
of Practice for Data Protection 2002 (‘the 2002 Code’).59 The 2002 Code, like the 1987 
and 1995 Codes, was endorsed by a foreword from the Commissioner after discussions 
between ACPO and the Data Protection Registry/Information Commissioner’s Office. On 
17 September 2003, the Home Office issued formal guidance to the police relating to their 
few remaining vetting obligation which made specific reference to the importance of the 
2000 Weeding Rules in helping ‘to achieve compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 
[by ensuring] that information should not be retained for longer than is necessary’.60 The 
Home Office specifically warned police officers that records due for weeding were no 
longer of ‘operational value’ and that, where a request for a police check brought such a 
record to attention, it must be deleted and the check should show a ‘record of no 
convictions’.61  
 
This could, and arguably should, have been the end of the matter. Formal weeding rules 
had been agreed between the three principal stakeholders and, so long as the police 
undertook their obligations under them, the ICO and the Home Office agreed that 
compliance with the two Data Principles would inevitably follow. 
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7.5 Bichard and the first defeat of the Information Commissioner 
This apparent unity was, however, a façade. This became apparent in the immediate 
aftermath of the Soham murders, which occurred almost simultaneous to the introduction 
of the 2002 Code. David Westwood, the Chief Constable of the force (Humberside Police) 
that had investigated four allegations of sexual offences against Ian Huntley in the 1990s, 
infuriated the Commissioner by publicly blaming him, and the DPA 1998, for their decision 
to delete the records from their local systems.62 These claims were furiously refuted by 
the ICO, who sent out an Assistant Commissioner, David Smith, to retort that the decision 
by Humberside Police to delete records such as those relating to Huntley was 
‘astonishing’.63 When the Home Office intervened by opining that they disagreed that the 
DPA 1998 hampered vetting, Westwood found himself defending his position on BBC’s 
Newsnight. This culminated in him walking off set after telling Jeremy Paxman that his 
‘future was not in his own hands’.64  
 
Tensions continued to simmer. In a (very) thinly veiled attack, the Commissioner told news 
media in January 2004 that his office intended to issue as much plainly drafted guidance 
as possible on the DPA 1998, so that ‘people can never again use the excuse of hiding 
behind data protection’.65 ACPO, for their part, proclaimed that the ICO was ‘compounding 
confusion’ on the issue by making representations to them to ‘delete records’ and further 
complaining that the Commissioner ‘wants less offence details recorded on the PNC, not 
more’. This confrontational tone was more than simply an attempt to deflect attention from 
police errors uncovered by Bichard; ACPO had by this time formulated a new proposal for 
retaining criminal records which would allow them to retain all convictions on the PNC until 
the offender was dead or reached 100 years old.66 
 
As part of his commission, Michael Bichard was tasked with investigating the ‘record 
keeping’ processes of the police as pertained to the Soham murders.67 This inevitably 
meant a review of the weeding rules. Bichard found that individual forces were treating 
the weeding rules almost as if they were a type of malleable guidance, rather than fixed 
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‘rules’ to be followed, and there was a wide variance in policy between constabularies.68 
Bichard also noted that the round of inspections into criminal records, conducted by HMIC 
to help rectify the chronic inaccuracies on PHOENIX, made no attempt to inspect or 
assess weeding procedures, it ‘never previously surfacing as an issue’.69 Giving evidence, 
Westwood admitted that neither the DPA 1998 nor the ICO were at fault for the deletion 
of Huntley’s data. He also conceded that he had twice been warned not to blame the DPA 
1998 for the deletion of the Huntley data; once by the Commissioner and again by the 
ACPO lead officer on sex offences.70 The entire affair was most unseemly; Bichard 
commented that ‘the unhelpful disagreement’ was ‘damaging to both [the ICO and ACPO] 
and is likely to have left the public, and serving police officers, less confident about how 
the legislation should be applied’.71 
 
Bichard then considered the issue of retaining records and ‘weeding’. He noted that 
criticism from ACPO at interventions by the Commissioner in respect of complaints made 
by the public was ‘not fair’, because that is the Commissioner’s statutory role and because 
he had forewarned ACPO that he would do so in his foreword to the 2002 Code.72 
However, he chided the Commissioner for the tone of some of his interventions, saying ‘it 
is one thing to ask searching and necessary questions. It is another to do so in an 
unnecessarily aggressive manner’.73 Bichard recommended that a new Code of Practice 
be instituted, to ensure that any further ‘confusion’ as to the policy of record retention be 
alleviated. The policy needed to be ‘clear, simple and designed to help police officers on 
the ground’74 and should be drafted by the Home Office in conjunction with ACPO and the 
Commissioner.75 At no stage did Bichard suggest, let more decree, that weeding be 
abandoned. 
 
Nonetheless, Bichard opened his address as to the apparent conflict between the police 
position on criminality data and data protection by stating that ‘data protection concerns 
are relevant but should not dominate the [new] code’.76 He recognised that retention of 
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data, being less intrusive than using it (disclosure to third parties, for example) is ‘easier 
to justify’.77 Critically, Bichard noted that the Commissioner, in his evidence, had ‘clearly 
and helpfully’ indicated that ‘the police are the first judge of their operational needs’78 and, 
therefore: 
 
Police judgements about operational needs will not likely be interfered with by the 
Information Commissioner; his office cannot and should not substitute their 
judgement for that of experienced practitioners. His office will give considerable 
latitude to the police in their decision making. If a reasonable and rational basis 
exists for a decision, that should be the end of the story.79 
 
What was evident was that Soham had significantly shifted the dynamic so far as criminal 
record retention was concerned. It is submitted that the Commissioner made two 
fundamental errors. The first was to misjudge the changed tenor of the retention debate. 
The Home Office and the police, both universally hostile to data protection for as long as 
it had been mooted, had found at last a way of justifying the circumvention of it. Concerns 
about excessively held data could be made to look misguided or even pernicious when 
portrayed as a barrier to the protection of children from dangerous sex offenders and 
murderers. The Commissioner seemed, it is submitted, not to have recognised the 
importance of this new justification for criminal record retention, and the difficulty he might 
have in attempting in future to circumvent it.  
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Commissioner erred in making comments in evidence 
which needlessly conceded ground to the very same chief police officers who had been 
flouting data protection legislation for two decades and against whom the blame for the 
vetting failures which led to Soham lay squarely and entirely. He allowed Bichard and the 
police to determine that data protection was, so far as police operational discretion is 
concerned, effectively a marginal concern. He accepted that the police are the principal 
judges of how to use their criminal record data, and those best placed to determine how 
long they might need to retain it. In doing so he conceded the very things to the police that 
the Lindop Committee had expressly refused to concede fully three decades earlier. The 
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gravity of these errors only became apparent in the various legal disputes which followed 
the publication of the Bichard report.  
 
Perhaps understandably, the Commissioner was not especially pleased by Humberside 
Police’s attempts to scapegoat him for their failures which contributed to Soham. The CRB 
opened in 2002 and, with Soham fresh in the public consciousness, was immediately 
inundated by millions of applications for criminal record checks.80 The disclosure of very 
old and minor convictions on the new certificates issued by the CRB finally alerted 
members of the public to the fact that the police had retained criminality data on the PNC 
for a very long time. Some of those affected made formal complaints to the Commissioner, 
who duly instigated investigations into them and, when these bore little fruit, ultimately, 
and finally, resulted in the Commissioner issuing Enforcement Notices against a number 
of chief constables for alleged breaches of the DPA 1998 in respect of their PHOENIX 
collection of criminal records. 
 
The Chief Constables of West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Wales Police v The 
Information Commissioner81 saw the police appeal to the Information Tribunal (‘the IT’) 
against three such Enforcement Notices. In the case of SY, a conviction for assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm from 1979 was recorded. SY was fifteen years old at the 
time of the conviction and was given a conditional discharge. No other convictions were 
recorded.82 This came to light as part of a complaint made by SY against a neighbour, 
who was then a serving police officer. As part of the complaint process, the police force 
had checked SY’s PHOENIX record.83 By early 2003, the Commissioner had made 
various representations to the police data protection officer to have the conviction weeded 
to no avail and eventually an Enforcement Notice was served on 27 July 2004.84  
 
A second complaint was made by WY, who had four offences recorded from April 1978 
relating to theft of, and from, a motor vehicle and driving without insurance and whilst 
disqualified and another cluster of eight similar offences in February 1979. For two of 
these offences WY was sentenced to three months in a detention centre, to run 
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concurrently.85 WY was 18 years old at the time of the second cluster of convictions. The 
designated police force data officer received correspondence from the Commissioner and 
duly refused to weed out the convictions.86 An Enforcement Notice was issued on the 
same day as that regarding SY.87 
 
A third complaint was raised by NW, who was convicted in 1967 (at age 18) of an offence 
under s.16 of the Larceny Act 1916. In August 1967 he was convicted of three further 
dishonesty offences and placed under a probationary order. A further larceny conviction 
was recorded in July 1968 and then, finally, three more offences were recorded in January 
1969. These included taking a motor vehicle without consent and another larceny offence. 
NW was sentenced to (among other disposals) six months’ custody during this period of 
offending and convictions.88 A request to weed these convictions, the last of which was 
some 34 years subsequent, was refused and an Enforcement Notice issued on 5 October 
2004.89 
 
After almost two decades, the Commissioner had finally decided to take a stand against 
chief constables in respect of the PHOENIX collection. It is submitted that the 
Commissioner might have chosen his battle more carefully. In the cases of all three 
complainants, the police relied upon the 2000 Weeding Rules as justification for retaining 
the records. In all three instances, the police were prima facie so entitled; the single 
conviction against SY was expressly included in the list of specified violent offences which 
were to be retained for life90 and both WY and NW were convicted for more than three 
recordable offences.91 The offences in respect of WY and NW might have fallen to be 
weeded under the older policies of the 1970s and 1980s except that in both cases a 
cumulative total of six months custody was shown in the disposals, meaning that the 
records would be retained.  
 
Quite why the Commissioner, after two decades of inertia regarding inaccurate, 
incomplete and unlawfully retained criminal records chose to issue Enforcement Notices 
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in three circumstances which fell squarely within the exceptions to the rules that he had 
endorsed only four years earlier is not clear. What is clear is that his assertion, in the case 
of SY, that the chief constable was in breach of the 2000 Weeding Rules by refusing to 
‘weed’ out the conviction92 was patently false and perhaps demonstrated a concerning 
lack of understanding of the very rules he had endorsed. That notwithstanding, it is also 
clear that the Commissioner himself (as he was then) took a personal interest in matters, 
attending a conference with the chief officers involved in the SY case in an attempt to 
persuade them that the record should be weeded.93 
 
The IT found that there existed a difficult conflict between, so far as the police were 
concerned, the position that there ‘could and can be no doubt that conviction history forms 
an integral part of the investigative operations of the police force’94 and that vetting, as a 
form of crime prevention, constitutes a policing purpose,95 as compared to the view of the 
Commissioner that, once a sufficiently significant ‘clear period’ of non-offending is 
evidenced, there exists ‘no reasonable grounds for considering that the conviction data 
remained relevant for policing purposes’.96 To support this, the Commissioner made 
reference to a Home Office study in 2001 which found that a significant proportion of the 
population had at least one conviction but that very few progressed to become recidivistic 
offenders.97 So far as the police were concerned, however, a lack of further convictions 
did not necessarily mean that the individual was no longer offending but might mean 
simply that the person has ‘learned how to avoid detection and conviction’.98  
 
The view of the IT was that the Home Office study was not ‘particular instructive’.99 It also 
noted that two of the three cases involved multiple convictions, while the study focused 
on those with only a single conviction.100 The IT was concerned that the ‘empirical 
evidence on cessation [of offending after clear periods] is minimal, if not non-existent’101 
and that generally the actual tangible evidence provided by both parties was ‘both sparse 
and over-generalised’.102 Nonetheless, it accepted that criminal convictions, even ‘minor’ 
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(and the IT emphasised the lack of clear definition as to what this constituted)103 or aged 
convictions, had some operational value in policing activities, whether in offender 
profiling,104 or in aiding investigating officers to ‘trigger specific recollections’ of use in 
individual cases105 or even ‘in general investigative work’.106 The IT also recognised the 
use, and value, of convictions in the criminal justice process.107  
 
Although concerned as to the over-generalisations offered regarding the quantitative value 
of the data in these purported uses, the IT reminded the Commissioner of his assurance 
to Bichard that he would not interfere lightly in the police judgement as to their operational 
needs.108 Therefore, even though several of the purported uses were not formally 
recorded as purposes registered by chief constables with the ICO,109 the IT was prepared 
to quash all three enforcement notices and permit the police to retain the data in 
accordance with the 2000 Weeding Rules.110 However, in an amended order, chief officers 
were ordered that the retained data must be designated as not ‘open to inspection other 
than by the data controller’.111  
 
In short, the IT ordered that the data could be retained and utilised for police purposes, 
but it must not be disclosed (for example, as part of CRB vetting). This was, effectively, 
the fall-back position conceded by the Commissioner as an alternative, tenable position;112 
a ‘step-down’ process by which data would be retained by the police for their purposes 
but which, in certain specified circumstances, would be ‘stepped down’ on PHOENIX so 
that it could only [author’s emphasis] be utilised for that purposes and not accessible by 
anyone else for anything else.113 The IT were told that the police were in an advanced 
stage of producing such a ‘step-down’ model and they agreed that new guidance should 
be drafted to incorporate this, in co-operation with the Commissioner,114 which should also 
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dispense with the language of ‘weeding’ and make clear what is being retained and what 
is being deleted.115 
 
So far as WY and NW were concerned, the decision of the tribunal was, to all practical 
intents, a victory. The police were prohibited from making the data available for vetting 
purposes, and so although the records would be retained, they would not have the 
immediate damaging impact on the lives of WY and NY that disclosure had created. For 
SY, the decision was a defeat. SY had not been subjected to a disclosure, and had wanted 
his data deleted. His data was to be retained. In all three case, the decision of the IT was 
a comprehensive defeat for the Commissioner. He had wanted the police to delete the 
data of all three subjects. Quite simply, the Commissioner had failed to persuade the IT 
that the retention of the data breached either the third or the fifth Data Principles. The 
police were told they could retain all three records in full. 
 
It is submitted that the Commissioner failed because he made four fundamental errors 
which fatally undermined his case. The first is that he chose three cases where the 
individual records did not fall to be weeded in accordance with the 2000 Weeding Rules 
that his predecessor had expressly approved. To criticise the police after the event for 
applying these rules in the prescribed manner might reasonable be perceived to be 
churlish and gave the chief officers an extremely straightforward, and persuasive, defence 
to the Enforcement Notices and it is submitted that the Commissioner might have been 
better to have selected instances, or even waited (if necessary) to issue notices where 
complaints arrived where the 2000 Weeding Rules had been contravened.  
 
It is further submitted that the Commissioner erred in failing to either identify or undertake 
the necessary research to demonstrate, at least on the balance of probabilities, that the 
retention of such data does not, as the police claim, have anything other than a notional 
benefit in operational policing purposes. The empirical weakness of the police case on 
this point was highlighted numerously by the IT but the Commissioner was unable to 
exploit this because his own counter-arguments were equally weak nor sufficiently 
evidence-based. That the IT was able to determine that there is a ‘non-existent’ empirical 
base for the desistence of most offenders from conviction, when there exists a significant 
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repository of studies which show this as a near ‘criminological constant’,116 illustrates 
sharply the Commissioner’s failure to prepare accordingly. 
 
The timing of the Commissioner’s actions could also, it is further submitted, hardly have 
been worse. His Enforcement Notices against all three forces were issued in the 
immediate aftermath of the Soham trial and the subsequent Bichard report. At a time of 
heightened public fear of dangerous offenders, general sympathy (whether this be public, 
political, judicial or otherwise) for those who had criminal records could hardly be lower. 
In fact the rhetoric regarding ‘protecting vulnerable people’ from those who posed a 
‘known risk of offending’ had hardened significantly and a ‘vetting epidemic’ had set in.117 
Quite simply, in an almost unprecedented atmosphere of heightened (indeed, at times, 
febrile) public concern regarding individuals who ‘slipped through the net’ because of a 
failure by police to properly record and use criminality data, the Commissioner chose to 
ask an IT to support his contention that the police must delete information of that very 
kind. A more mistimed tactical manoeuvre is difficult to envisage. 
 
The Commissioner also found himself hoisted by his own petard so far as his comments 
to the Bichard Inquiry were concerned. He had promised that he would not ‘lightly interfere’ 
with the judgement of experienced police officers. He had also said that he would not 
substitute his own judgement for that of experienced practitioners. In this case, he could 
not show that the police were in breach of the rules, so instead he tried to argue that their 
view that the data had operational use was wrong. This allowed the police to paint a 
narrative of a Commissioner going back on the promise he gave to Bichard. It was, 
therefore, hardly a surprise that the IT could not support him. He was trying to do that 
which he said he wouldn’t. 
 
For all of these reasons, it is submitted that the Commissioner’s decision to take a stand 
against chief officers in these three cases was misguided. In this author’s view, he made 
a series of grave tactical missteps; as regards his decision to take action in the fact-
specific circumstances of these particular cases, his decision to act at the time he did and 
also to represent on the basis that he did. Even accepting for the benefit of hindsight, it 
was not surprising that his challenge failed. 
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7.6 The decisive second defeat of the Information Commissioner 
In light of the Bichard recommendations, the legislative amendments which permitted the 
permanent retention of other sensitive criminality data, such as DNA and fingerprints, even 
where the suspect is acquitted118 and doubtless emboldened by their victory over the 
Commissioner at the IT, ACPO pressed ahead with the creation of their replacement for 
the 2000 Weeding Rules. Published in 2006 (‘the 2006 Guidelines’),119 these expressly 
superseded all previous rules and guidelines120 and deviated quite substantially from that 
which they had postulated as forthcoming during the South Yorkshire case. The 2006 
Guidelines entirely abandoned the process of weeding any records and were instead 
‘based on restricting access to PNC data, rather than the deletion of that data’.121 In short, 
the new guidelines provided that where a nominal record was created on PHOENIX, 
regardless of whether it related to a conviction, caution, PNfD, acquittal or even an arrest, 
then the record was to be retained on PHOENIX until the subject reached the age of 100 
years.122 This was justified as ‘providing the police service with continuous access to data 
that will allow it to discharge its responsibilities’.123  
 
The general disclosure principle underpinning the 2006 Guidelines was that access would 
be controlled via a ‘step-down’ process. This meant that retained data would, after 
specified time periods, be marked ‘for police eyes only’ and so not disclosed to any non-
police body unless the data fell to be released under the s.115 Police Act 1997 provisions 
regarding ‘enhanced’ CRB certificates.124 The ‘step-down process’ itself was extremely 
complex. The most serious offences were described as ‘Category A’ offences and where 
an adult125 or a young person126 was convicted such an offence and subsequently received 
any custodial sentence then the entire criminal record of that individual would never be 
stepped-down. The list of Category A offences consisted of fully 37 A4 pages127 and 
included the more grievous violent, sexual and drug-related offences as well as somewhat 
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more unusual crimes, such as ‘violating the King’s wife’ and ‘slaying the Lord High 
Chancellor’.128 Differing step-down periods applied for Category B and Category C 
offences depending on the age of the offender and the disposal on conviction; an adult 
committing a Category C offence which resulted in a six month sentence (or longer) would 
be stepped down only after 30 years. These included such disparate offences as 
neglecting to maintain a wife,129 misconduct on a railway,130 knowingly failing to cause 
regular attendance at school of a pupil131 and selling cigarette lighter fluid to persons aged 
under 18.132 
 
Far more stringent though this new regime was, there remained a recognition that those 
with minor disposals should be treated with more leniency than more serious offenders, 
with ‘minor’ being seemingly determined in accordance with the disposal made in 
individual cases; indeed, even Category A offences committed by adults would be stepped 
down after twenty years if no custodial sentence was handed down.133 The stepping down 
period for similar offences committed by juveniles was fifteen years.134 Non-custodial 
disposals in Category C offences would be stepped down after twelve years for adults135 
and ten for juveniles.136 Cautions were to be stepped down in either ten years (Category 
A offences)137 or five years (Category B and C)138. The same periods applied to 
reprimands and final warnings.139  
 
The 2006 Guidance marked a significant change in tack on the part of the police. What 
was apparent was that the almost lackadaisical attitude evident in the maintenance and 
general retention of criminal records evident prior to Soham had metamorphosized into a 
hitherto unprecedented, hard-line approach which aimed to solve the problem of 
inconsistent record deletion by deleting nothing at all. The decision to start from the 
position of holding records until the subject is aged 100 years appeared entirely arbitrary 
and marked a significant departure from all past guidance and procedures and had not 
                                                          
128 Ibid, 40 
129 Ibid, 100 
130 Ibid 
131 Ibid, 101 
132 Ibid 
133 Ibid, para.4.13 
134 Ibid, para.4.16 
135 Ibid, para.4.15 
136 Ibid, para.4.18 
137 Ibid, para.4.19 
138 Ibid, paras.4.20–4.21  
139 Ibid, paras.4.22–4.24  
183 
 
been expressly supported by anything said or done in either in Bichard nor the South 
Yorkshire case. With the benefit of hindsight, this policy should be viewed, it is submitted, 
as flagrant attempt by an emboldened ACPO to revert to the position they held prior to the 
implementation of data protection legislation; making decisions entirely of their own accord 
and unfettered by any imposition from any external body. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Commissioner was wholly unimpressed by the 2006 Guidelines. He 
had been consulted by ACPO during the construction of them but his position was so 
contrary to that of ACPO that he refused, for the first time, to endorse the published 
guidance.140 In the meantime, more complaints were being made by members of the 
public who were distressed to find that aged criminal disposals were still being kept on the 
PNC. In response, the Commissioner elected again to issue Enforcement Notices against 
data controlling chief constables. The Commissioner seemed to have learned from his 
prior mistakes; he at least selected five more ‘meritorious’ possible candidates for record 
deletion. The first, HP, was aged sixteen when he was convicted, alongside another 
juvenile, in 1984 of a shop-theft and fined £15. This conviction was retained on the PNC 
in 2006, when it was disclosed for employment vetting purposes.141 It is perhaps worth 
noting that this conviction should not have been held on the PNC by that time. In fact, it 
should have been deleted in 2000, which was the expiration date of the ten-year clear 
period established by para.5 of the 2000 Weeding Rules for such single, minor offences. 
 
The second individual, SP, was given a reprimand at age thirteen for punching and kicking 
a fifteen-year old girl in 2001. This was disclosed to a potential employer in 2006.142 This 
reprimand, being the single police contact on the record, would also have been deleted 
under the old weeding rules and indeed SP was told it would be at the time it was issued,143 
but it was evidently retained because the rules in force at the time of issue were not the 
rules in force at the time SP reached eighteen years of age (at which point the reprimand 
would have been expunged under the old rules). A third individual, NP, was convicted of 
two obtaining by deception offences in 1981.144 No other offences had been recorded so, 
once again, this record fell to be expunged in 2000 when the 2000 Weeding Rules came 
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into force. The revelation of the offences on an employment vetting check confirmed that 
the record was still held.145  
 
The fourth individual, WMP, was convicted of two attempted theft offences and an offence 
of criminal damage when, as a fifteen-year old in 1978, he inserted ‘mental blanks’ instead 
of coins into an arcade machine.146 No other convictions were held against WMP but this 
record did not stand to be retained under the 2000 Weeding Rules as it contained three 
separate offences. However, it ought to have been due for deletion in 1998, as the record 
had been inactive for twenty years at that point and therefore a candidate for weeding 
under the 1995 ‘twenty-year rule’. The final individual, GMP, had been convicted at age 
19 of theft in 1983, and asked for two other offences to be taken into account. No other 
convictions were recorded but, under the ‘three strikes’ rule, the record stood to be 
retained under the 2000 Weeding Rules. That the record still existed only became evident 
when GMP made a DPA 1998 subject-access request to support her plan to emigrate to 
St. Lucia.147 
 
The IT convened to hear the appeals against the Enforcement Notices made by all five 
chief constable Data Controllers recognised that four of the records should have been 
weeded long ago. In response, the police admitted, for the first time, that ‘weeding did not 
take place proactively’ and in actuality this only occurred after a request for removal was 
made by an individual. Even the ‘stepping down’ of data was not done proactively and 
only took place after a request to do so.148 This, it is submitted, illustrated that ACPO’s 
policy as regard the retention and deletion of criminality data was nothing less than 
fraudulent: written policies, drafted in consultation with, and in an attempt to assuage 
concerns raised by, the Information Commissioner to ensure compliance with the DPA 
1984 and the DPA 1998 were, in fact, little more than a paper exercise. The reality was 
that the concerns raised by Harry Cohen as early as the 1980s were entirely justified and, 
if anything, had underestimated the scale of the problem. The police were not even 
pursuing a ‘feeble’ weeding policy. They were, in fact, pursuing no weeding policy of any 
material kind whatsoever and were instead simply retaining records until or unless they 
were told not to.  
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The reality was that the 2000 Weeding Rules, like all of those before them, were a sham; 
simply documents to which ACPO could point to ‘demonstrate’ data protection compliance 
but which had no practical impact on the retention of criminal records or compliance with 
the DPA 1984 or the DPA 1998 at all. In actuality, the police had never been in compliance 
with the third and fifth Data Principles. It is little wonder that the Commissioner felt 
compelled to issue Enforcement Notices. He had approved repeated retention policy 
documents under false pretences. For decades, he and his predecessors had been 
entirely misled. 
 
The IT was asked to consider whether the retention of all criminal records under the 2006 
Guidelines was excessive and/or for longer than necessary. To answer this question, 
regard was given to the purposes of holding the data. The chief officers argued that this 
must be read in accordance with all of the possible uses of the data149 (particularly the use 
of records for criminal vetting purposes).150 The Commissioner took an entirely different 
view, and argued that compliance with the DPA 1998 should be read in accordance only 
with what he called ‘core’ police purposes; namely the prevention and detection of crime, 
the investigation and apprehension of offenders and the maintenance of law and order.151 
 
On this point, the IT found in favour of the Commission. It held that ‘in data protection 
terms, this processing requires holding criminal intelligence on the PNC for so long as it 
is necessary for the police’s core purposes’.152 Where this impacts on the ability of the 
police to provide data to the CPS, courts or other external agencies, it is immaterial 
because ‘Chief Constables are not required under their statutory obligations to hold data 
they no longer require for core purposes. They are only required to provide data they do 
hold at the time of the request’.153 
 
In short, ‘Chief Constables cannot be expected to incorporate other bodies’ purposes as 
part of their own, even if there is some common objective’.154 This was substantiated by 
reference to the Police Act 1997, which authorises criminal record use for employment 
vetting purposes, and which states155 that ‘any person who holds records of convictions 
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or cautions for the use of police forces generally shall make them available to the 
Secretary of State’. The IT found that ‘if the information is no longer held [because it has 
been deleted because it no longer serves use for police purposes] then there is no 
obligation [to provide it for vetting purposes].156 The IT concluded on this point by noting 
that the PNC ‘had evolved over the years and it is now regarded as the main source of 
criminal intelligence for a variety of organisations’.157 However, it is bound by no statutory 
framework and those involved predominantly in its administration, such as ACPO and 
NPIA are not registered as data controllers. The Tribunal’s view was that if the intention 
was for the PNC to be used in this manner, it was for Parliament to legislate accordingly 
as this would ‘provide the opportunity for Parliamentary debate on how best to provide an 
appropriate and proper legislative framework so that there is a clear understanding of data 
ownership and obligations with proper safeguards’.158 
 
The IT then moved to consider the other police ‘justifications’ for retaining old and minor 
criminal data beyond the ‘core’ police purposes. The Chief Constables argued that they 
were also obligated to retain all conviction data for the ‘prosecution of offenders’; in short, 
the PNC record was required to assist the CPS in prosecutions and for ‘bad character’ 
purposes.159 The Commissioner, with whom the IT agreed,160 argued that the police had 
always deleted old and minor criminal records so that they must not have previously felt 
obligated to hold all records, nor do the police have any legal obligation to do so and, in 
any event, that retaining criminal records which no longer serve any useful function for 
‘core’ policing purposes can only be justified if a specific legislative provisions mandates 
it.161  
 
Similarly, the ITT accepted the Commissioner’s view that the proper interpretation of the 
police role in MAPPA and other work was ‘that the police are cooperating with other 
agencies in order to achieve the objective of preventing crime’, not that this work had 
‘extended’ the purposes for which police hold criminality data.162 The Tribunal was also 
not convinced that retaining old and minor conviction assisted in the location of missing 
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persons, despite police claims to the contrary.163 That is hardly surprising; it is difficult to 
envisage how a twenty year old conviction for theft might assist in the location of missing 
persons in any manner whatsoever. This left for consideration the use of criminal records 
for employment purposes. The IT accepted that the disclosure of criminal records might 
play a part in the prevention of crimes against vulnerable children and adults, but the 
Commissioner argued that where records no longer have any use for that purpose so long 
as the police are considered, it must follow that they also serve no concurrent purpose to 
employers. The IT agreed, and provided that ‘it is not the function of the police to run an 
information service for prospective employers helping them to assess, in general terms, 
whether they wish to employ particular individuals’.164 
 
The remaining question, then, was whether the retention of old and minor conviction data, 
such as that held against the five named individuals, did, in fact, continue to serve some 
useful purpose so far as the ‘core’ policing purposes were concerned. On this issue the 
Chief Constables once more relied, almost entirely, on the submissions made to Bichard 
by the Commissioner that they, not anyone else (and certainly not the Commissioner) are 
the first judges of their operational needs.165 This position was bulwarked by the Home 
Office, which had by now completely reversed their position from that in 2003 which 
provided that the police needed to continue to delete data, and were instead postulating 
that the provisions of the Police Act 1997 effectively meant that Parliament had considered 
the issue of whether holding all convictions was DPA 1998 compliant and answered in the 
affirmative.166  
 
Once again, however, on this point the Commissioner had clearly learned from his 
mistakes in the South Yorkshire case. This time he argued that, although he stood by his 
comments to Bichard, these had to be read, as did the third and fifth DPA 1998 principles, 
in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights which enshrined 
a right to privacy167 which might only be displaced when ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’.168 
The chief officers adduced evidence which suggested that past convictions had helped 
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solve longstanding investigations, but the Tribunal found that ‘few, if any, of these 
examples seemed to relate to the sorts of offences committed…in this case’.169  
 
By contrast, the Commissioner adduced evidence from an Assistant Information 
Commissioner, who had thirty years of experience as a police officer, which claimed that 
none of the retained information in the instant cases had any continuing value for policing 
purposes.170 Indeed, it was accepted in evidence by the chief officer in the GMP case that 
the initial response to the Enforcement Notice issued in that matter had been a 
recommendation to delete the data as required; it was only two days later that this position 
was reversed at the insistence of ACPO171 who were keen to ensure that the chief officer 
presented a ‘united front’ in the defence of the general position provided by their 2006 
Guidelines.172  
 
Moreover, the Commissioner, doubtless chastened by his failure to adduce persuasive, 
empirical evidence in support of his claim that the holding of old and minor criminal records 
was excessive to the IT in the South Yorkshire case, this time commissioned two 
academics to make the point for him. He asked the same two academics who the Home 
Office had commissioned to review patterns of offending in 2001, Brian Francis and Keith 
Soothill, to undertake a detailed statistical analysis of the old police adage that ‘old records 
attach new crimes to old criminals’.173 Francis and Soothill’s evidence was sufficiently 
robust that the expert commissioned by the chief officers to counter it was unable to much 
dispute it, instead electing to try to ‘add’ to it.174 It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that 
the Tribunal determined the evidence as providing ‘an objective basis upon which [they] 
can consider the Enforcement Notices in this case’.175  
 
This evidence suggested that, taking into account the relatively minor nature of the 
convictions recorded, the age of the convictions, the age of the individuals at the time of 
the convictions and the disposal of the court in each case, that HP had no more than a 
1.6% of reoffending in the next five years, as opposed to a general rate among non-
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offenders of 0.7%.176 Identical analysis showed that the likelihood of reoffending for WMP 
to be exactly the same as HP,177 while that of NP was halved to 0.8%.178 The reoffending 
probability of GMP was held to be the same as NP.179 A similar analysis of SP could not 
be carried out because of the relative recency of her reprimand but the Tribunal heard 
that, in one further year, based on her age, her being female (whose offending rates 
generally are much lower than men) and the minor nature of the offence, there would be 
‘little difference’ in terms of her propensity to reoffend as compared to a non-offender.180 
 
The question for the IT, then, was what to do about the Enforcement Notices. The Home 
Office, intervening alongside the chief officers, argued that the ‘step down’ model was 
incompatible with the requirement to disclose all records held on the PNC in the specified 
circumstances laid down in Part V of the Police Act 1997.181 That, it is submitted, was a 
logical and irreconcilable position, and it was therefore left for the IT to accept that the 
police were indeed obliged to release all conviction data held. In practical terms, this 
meant that the ‘step-down’ procedure could not stand unless the police were able and 
willing to ‘step down’ the relevant material to some resource outwith PHOENIX. The 
obligation on chief officers is to release all data held in ‘central records’ – if the data was 
held elsewhere, the obligation might not apply.182  
 
In any event, however, the Enforcement Notices required the data be ‘stepped out’ (i.e. 
deleted completely), rather than ‘stepped down’. The Tribunal, for all of the reasons 
offered by the Commissioner, ultimately upheld each notice.183 It summarised the reasons 
for doing so as being that: 
 
Chief Constables are required to process personal data, including conviction data, 
in accordance with their statutory obligations under the DPA. If such compliance 
requires the erasure of conviction data…then that information will no longer be held 
on the PNC.184 
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The judgment of the IT was an extremely detailed and measured one. It was also 
commendable in numerous respects. The IT’s reading of the applicable legislation was 
extremely detailed and persuasive. It is submitted that their reading of s.27(4) PACE 1984 
was of particular importance. That provision is permissive, not mandatory.185 It says that 
a central record of convictions ‘may by regulation’ be kept, not that it must [author’s 
emphasis]. Parliament, in drafting s.27(4), simply must have known that the police have 
never attempted to make a complete collection of all criminal records, to be held to all 
intents and purposes for the life of each individual concerned. Certainly, that was not the 
policy of the NIB when PACE 1984 was drafted.  
 
Similar considerations must, it is submitted, be brought to bear as regards the Police Act 
1997. Parliament must have known there existed a policy of weeding at the time that 
legislation was passed and this, it is submitted, is required in the language of the 
legislation, which provides that the information used for disclosure purposes is simply that 
‘held in central records’. There is no legislative requirement to record all conviction and 
other disposal data indefinitely. Furthermore, the continued implementation of Regulations 
relating to recordable offences illustrate that Parliament do clearly know, and must 
continue to intend, that the collection of criminal records remain incomplete. If it intended 
otherwise, it is submitted that it must surely legislate as such. 
 
Additionally, the decision of the IT not to simply defer to the police on the supposed 
operational value of the PHOENIX collection was perhaps the first time that anyone had 
done so in a public forum. For well over a century, Parliament had simply accepted, 
apparently without any critical thought, the police assertion that criminal records helped 
them ‘do their job’, therefore the records should be retained. Bichard had done almost 
precisely the same when assessing the matter after Soham, as did the tribunal in the 
South Yorkshire case, which accepted almost entirely the same blithe assertions the 
police had made on this point to Bichard.  
 
Here, the IT took a different approach. It heard detailed evidence from experienced police 
officers and the tribunal examined them on precisely how these records actually assist at 
operational level. In response, the police officers were unable to provide any specific 
answers or persuasive explanations. They continued to rely upon anecdotal and irrelevant 
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examples which bore little or no resemblance to the issues at hand. The reality – that very 
old and minor criminal conviction data has little, or indeed no, operational benefit in the 
prevention of crime and the detection of offenders – which had been suspected by some 
for decades but never fully brought into a public forum, was laid bare in the starkest terms. 
When pressed, for the first time, to properly account for their assertions, the police were 
found wanting. 
 
The justification for that approach lay not just in the weakness of the police’ case but also 
in the ITs willingness to admit, and to accept, expert evidence on just how much 
operational value old and minor convictions are likely to have for policing purposes. This 
marked the first, and to date the only, time any tribunal or court in England and Wales has 
heard any empirical, quantitative evidence pertaining to the ‘usefulness’ of old and minor 
criminal data as a means of preventing further offences or investigating existing ones. 
What it found was that the data had either very little or no value whatsoever for those 
purposes. The evidence of Soothill and Francis was so persuasive that the police expert, 
appointed no doubt to discredit it, found himself largely agreeing with it. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that the tribunal found the evidence as appealing as it did.  
 
The Commissioner deserved some credit. After making several fundamental errors in the 
preparation of his first set of challenges in the South Yorkshire case, here he rectified 
these and brought a far more persuasive case. He saw that the South Yorkshire IT had 
felt unable to displace the statement the Commissioner had made to Bichard in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary and so sought expert evidence to try do so. He 
adduced evidence from ex-police officers in an attempt to counter the anticipated police 
assertions as to the value of the data. His selection of individuals’ records to contest was 
far better, and indeed, this also demonstrated the duplicitous police position as to the 
actual weeding of records. The police position lacked credibility because the 
Commissioner was able to show that the police had been lying, consistently, for decades.  
 
The Commissioner was rewarded with a comprehensive victory. He had sought to have 
the 2006 Guidance declared as unlawful and he entirely succeeded. He elected made his 
fight public from the outset; while the South Yorkshire case passed almost without anyone 
much noticing, the Commissioner in the latter case announced publicly his issuing of 
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Enforcement Notices.186 In doing so he risked making a second failure to take the police 
to task a very high-profile one. Instead, his success attracted widespread press 
attention.187 After years of apparent deference to the police as regards possible data 
breaches, the Commissioner had finally challenged the police and won. The implication 
of the decision was clear – records, potentially millions of them, would have to be deleted. 
 
An ICO Assistant Commissioner told the media that the IT had passed a ‘landmark’ 
judgment which would prevent further ‘harm and distress caused by the retention of this 
data’.188 ACPO, meanwhile, declared themselves ‘disappointed’ with the decision and 
reported that chief officers would discuss what to do next.189 What they ultimately decided 
to do was appeal to the Court of Appeal. It was the first time any question of data protection 
had reached the appellate courts and the decision in what became known as the Five 
Constables case190 must have dealt a devastating blow to the Commissioner. The lead 
judgment was delivered by Waller LJ, whose pronouncements must be sharply contrasted 
with the detailed and precise scrutiny offered by the IT at first instance. He opened his 
decision in auspicious fashion; immediately demonstrating his lack of understanding of 
record weeding by claiming that ‘his reading’ of the background ‘leads me think that ACPO 
(without consultation with, for example, the CPS and the courts) were persuaded that data 
protection principles should lead them to have what was termed a ‘weeding policy’’.191  
 
As this research has shown, ‘his reading’ was demonstrably wrong: a policy of weeding 
records has existed long before data protection, or indeed ACPO, were formed. His 
understanding of the PNC and PHOENIX seemed little better, with it being claimed that 
s.27(4) provides ‘the statutory authority’ for the PNC. That statement is also demonstrably 
false – the provision makes no reference to the PNC and, indeed, the PNC went live some 
eleven years prior to the provision’s enactment: presumably then the PNC had no 
‘statutory authority’ during that inception period. 
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Undeterred, after summarising the arguments on both sides (which remained largely 
unchanged), the applicable facts and the relevant legislation, the Court then considered 
the detailed findings of the IT as regards the permissive nature of the collection. It did so 
in precisely one paragraph, noting that ‘[the Tribunal found that] the PNC would not be 
complete record of all conviction. That may be true, but I am doubtful as to its 
relevance’.192 That, it is submitted, was unfortunate, because the IT had, in the most 
explicit and persuasive terms, detailed precisely why the permissive nature of the 
PHOENIX collection was very relevant indeed. In fact, it is submitted that the proper 
reading down of the legislation requires a detailed consideration of precisely that point. 
 
This oversight was especially important, because the Court then moved to consider the 
Commissioner’s view, accepted by the IT, that criminal record data could only be held for 
‘core’ police purposes. It rejected these arguments and said that, in having accepted this 
base proposition regarding ‘core purposes’, the IT had ‘got itself off on the wrong foot’.193 
Indeed, such an approach: 
 
…misconstrues the Data Protection Act 1998…The data controller must specify 
the purpose for which data is retained [but] there is no statutory constraint on any 
individual or company as to the purposes for which he or it is entitled to retain data. 
I would accept that the purposes must be lawful…but, that apart, a data controller 
can process data for any purpose’.194  
 
The police had registered their PHOENIX repository under a variety of different ‘purposes’. 
Waller LJ accepted the view that the police registered purpose of ‘rendering assistance to 
the public in according with force policies’195 ‘clearly covers the role’ that PHOENIX has in 
providing complete lists of convictions to the CPS, the courts and the CRB (further 
evidenced by the listing of recipients to include ‘employers’, ‘the courts’ and ‘law 
enforcement agencies).196 Once more it is not difficult to find fault with such an analysis; 
quite what ‘force policies’ encompass such a role was never explained and this author 
suggests that no such policies exist, while it is also not clear how providing a list of 
convictions to the CPS or to the Courts provides assistance to ‘the public’. This very point 
                                                          
192 Ibid [23] 
193 Ibid [36] 
194 Ibid [31] 
195 Ibid [34] 
196 Ibid [35] 
194 
 
was, in fact, conceded by Carnwath LJ, who recognised that these might best be 
described as ‘public agencies’, rather than ‘the public in general’.197 
 
Nonetheless, the view of the court was that the police had registered these purposes and 
these were as valid a reason to retain criminal records as ‘core policing purposes’.198 With 
this in mind, and so long as these reasons were those which had been registered at with 
the ICO (which they were),199 then ‘if one then poses the question whether the Data being 
retained is excessive or being retained for longer than necessary for the above purposes 
there is, it seems to me, only one answer, since for all the above a complete record of 
convictions, spent and otherwise, is required. That seems to me to be a complete answer 
to the appeal’.200  
 
Even if the this analysis was incorrect, and that the data retention could only be justified 
as regards ‘core’ policing purposes, then nonetheless the view was that the IT ‘went wrong 
in this case’.201 Waller LJ declared that the view the IT had taken regarding the statistical 
evidence offered by Soothill and Francis being ‘helpful’ was simply ‘wrong’.202 His 
subsequent review of the ‘evidence’ concerning ‘core purpose’ of the data was very 
different to that of the IT. Instead, he reverted to the position offered by the IT in 2005 in 
the South Yorkshire case; namely that the Commissioner had told Bichard that he would 
not substitute his judgment for that of the police. That, he said, was ‘the correct 
approach’.203 He accepted the evidence, rejected as too vague by the Tribunal, provided 
by officers that old and minor data can be of use in profiling offenders, identifying possibly 
dangerous individuals or providing evidence in current or future cases.204 Where the IT 
had criticised this evidence as vague and unpersuasive, by contrast the Lord Justice found 
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that ‘the evidence is very much that the information might be of value in certain 
circumstances and of value when taken together with other information.205 
 
Even if the IT had been correct in its approach so that only the ‘core purpose’ was relevant, 
then their reliance on statistics showing the risk of future offending in such cases to be 
very slightly greater than for non-offenders ‘was not something I [the judge] would pray in 
aid’.206 The Lord Justice concluded that: 
 
If the police say rationally and reasonably that convictions, however old or minor, 
have a value in the work they do that should, in effect, be the end of the matter. It 
is simply the honest and rationally held belief that convictions, however old and 
however minor, can be of value in the fight against crime and thus the retention of 
that information should not be denied to the police.207 
 
Therefore, unless the view of the police was perverse or unreasonably held (which the 
Court did not believe it to be), then the data should all be retained.208 Any attempt by the 
Commissioner to insist otherwise was, said the court, an attempt to misconstrue the 
purpose of the DPA 1998 in an attempt to ‘overrule the will of Parliament by a side wind’.209 
Quite how the DPA 1998 might be described as either a ‘side wind’ or not itself the will of 
Parliament – it was primary legislation enacted after an extensive process of debate and 
amendment – is not immediately apparent. Nonetheless, the decision of the IT was 
overturned and the Enforcement Notices all quashed.210 
 
7.7 The aftermath of the Five Constables decision 
The Five Constables judgment proved to be a decisive defeat for the Information 
Commissioner. Having acted to prevent the police from operating their compromise ‘step-
down’ procedure, which he believed to be contrary to the DPA 1998 because it meant the 
deletion of too few criminal records even if records were ‘stepped-down’, he inadvertently 
invited an appellate court to decree that the police were not required to delete any records 
at all and that they did not need to step-down anything, either.211 In short, the 
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Commissioner was told that his complaint was entirely without merit; no more than a 
‘sidewind’, in fact. Having brought his challenge to the public consciousness at the outset, 
his defeat was also played out in full public view. In the immediate aftermath of the Five 
Constables judgment, the ICO responded by effectively stonewalling it; making no 
comment to the media212 and making no reference whatsoever to it in his subsequent 
annual report213 (having previously cited with approval the IT decision which 
foreshadowed it).214 
 
The police, meanwhile, were far more effusive. Ian Redhead, ACPO’s Director of 
Information, told the media afterwards that ‘the loss of such valuable information would 
have been detrimental to preventing crime and protecting the public’.215 For the police, the 
judgment was a victory beyond any realistic expectation. Not only were they told they 
could retain all the data they had been ordered initially to delete but they were also told 
they didn’t need to step anything down at all. In reality, the judgment provided the police 
was an absolute carte blanche ‘to maintain all the records they thought necessary’.216 
 
The decision, however, was met with widespread criticism elsewhere. Liberal Democrat 
MP Chris Huhne told the media that ‘criminal convictions are of operational value to the 
police but it is hard to explain why keeping records of minor transgressions for 100 years 
is proportionate’,217 while Anna Fairclough, lawyer for Liberty, claimed that ‘people will be 
forever haunted by the minor indiscretions of their youth…This judgment forgets the 
privacy rights of millions of people’.218 Another civil liberties group, Big Brother Watch, 
described the decision as ‘a criminal ruling on criminal records’ and ‘absolutely crazy’.219  
 
Academic and practitioner comment was also largely critical. Anita Bapat noted that the 
case ‘highlighted the potential detriment such retention may cause to individuals’,220 while 
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O’Connor claimed that while he agreed ‘with the sentiment’ that criminal records offered 
operational assistance to the police, ‘surely there is another way [than 100-year 
retention]? Benefits to the police are minimal, but a huge cost to the individual…One can 
only hope that the legislature addresses the matter sooner rather than later’.221 Treacy 
and Terlegas focused on the data implications, noting that the judgment offered data 
controllers the opportunity to provide upon ICO registration ‘a wide range of processing 
activity, sometimes with only marginal relevance to the broadly stated purpose’ which in 
turn means that the requirement that data be held for only lawful purposes provides ‘only 
a limited check on the scope of data processing activities’.222  
 
On 13 November 2009, almost a month after the Five Constables decision was handed 
down, the ICO finally broke their silence to announce that they intended to make an 
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming in a press release that the 
case: 
 
raises important issues not just for these and the many other individuals about 
whom very minor and aged conviction details are held but also about how the Data 
Protection Act 1998 is interpreted in practice. It also engages serious questions 
about the applicability of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to 
conviction data held by the police’.223  
 
One academic noted that the latter was clearly ‘a significant issue’ and that many would 
‘watch the progress of the Commissioner’s application with great interest’.224 They would 
watch in vain: on 24 February 2010 the Supreme Court refused the application for leave 
to appeal.225  
 
The Government, perhaps pre-empting an unfavourable determination in the Five 
Constables case which was not forthcoming, appointed Sunita Mason as their 
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‘Independent Advisor for Criminality Information Management’ in September 2009.226 
Mason waited until after the decision in that case was made to commence her review, 
which was published in March 2010.227 In this she recognised the ‘strong views’ that the 
police were the primary arbiters of what should be kept and for how long in the Five 
Constables case.228 She then conducted a ‘review’ which showed that retention periods 
in other countries offered ‘little consistency’ in how long, and what, records were 
retained229 and that there existed ‘limited research and analysis that can be drawn upon 
which looks at the impact of differing retention periods on public protection 
arrangements’.230 On this basis, and because the Five Constables decision has been 
based on ‘information, evidence and statements from a range of sources’,231 Mason felt 
she did not have sufficient ‘clear evidence’ to depart from ‘the steer provided by the Court 
of Appeal’, and so recommended that all records be retained until the subject reaches 100 
years of age.232 She did also suggest that the Government may wish to conduct some 
research into the effectiveness of lengthy record retention on public protection issues.233 
 
It is submitted that Mason’s review was fundamentally flawed in a number of regards. The 
first is that, in accepting as the starting point the position taken by the Court of Appeal in 
the Five Constables case, Mason effectively exculpated herself of one of the most 
pressing of her terms of reference – namely to conduct an independent [author’s 
emphasis] review into the policy of retention of record on the PNC.234 An ‘independent’ 
review would not, it is submitted, ordinarily accept as a starting point and at face value the 
decision taken by the very arbiter which had given rise to the review being commissioned. 
In doing so, she likely got herself off on the wrong foot. This is further evidenced by her, it 
is submitted, inaccurate representation and analysis of the rationale of the Court of Appeal 
in the Five Constable case. It is difficult to see why she concluded that the Court in that 
case considered information and evidence from ‘a range of sources’. As has been shown, 
that is simply not the case; the Court of Appeal instead accepted at face value the various 
assertions of serving police officers that the information had ‘operational value’, in spite of 
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their being unable to provide any detailed exposition or actual examples of how that 
manifested itself in practice. 
 
Mason’s review of the various detention periods in other EU countries also, it is submitted, 
provided her with an overly-simplistic analysis which rather befits her ‘starting point’. 
Mason provides a tabulated summary of the retention periods in other EU countries at the 
time of her review.235 While this does indeed show a lack of consistency across different 
countries and their respective retention periods, what is also clear is that the majority of 
other countries did not retain as much data, or for such lengthy periods, as that held on 
PHOENIX. Indeed, only seven236 retained all criminality data for broadly comparably 
lengthy periods of time, though two of those countries which did retain all criminal 
convictions (Greece and Lithuania) deleted records earlier than ‘death or at age 100 years’ 
(81 and 75 years of age respectively).237  
 
It is submitted that a more accurate analysis (or, at least, one alternative view to the 
‘inconsistent approach’ analysis offered by Mason) of the comparative data showed that 
the retention policy for criminality data held on PHOENIX was, at that time, the joint most 
extensive in the European Union (in terms of what information was being held and how 
long it was held for). Indeed, of the other 26 countries surveyed, only five had comparably 
extensive retention policies to that of police in England and Wales; each of the other 
twenty-one nations either deleted some records, deleted all records after set periods or 
deleted records at an earlier age than those stored on PHOENIX. It is not entirely clear 
why Mason’s review failed to comment on this obvious and, it is submitted, critical, 
differential and instead focused on there being ‘a lack of consistency’. 
 
As for Mason’s inability to find any ‘research or analysis’ on how effective such lengthy 
retention might have on either police operational effectiveness or public protection, it is 
submitted that she might perhaps have considered the extremely lengthy, detailed and 
cogent research produced by Soothill and Francis which the Commissioner had put before 
the IT in opening the Five Constables litigation. Her report does not mention this at any 
point. It is arguably instructive that in commissioning her report, which bemoans a lack of 
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research or analysis on this point, Mason’s list of contributors238 includes not a single 
academic or professional researcher; precisely the sort of contributors who might be able 
to have offered her some insight into that very pertinent issue. Indeed, her list of 
contributors is somewhat instructive generally: in order to complete her ‘independent’ 
review, she consulted no fewer than twenty-five senior police officers or other senior law 
enforcement officials and seventeen members of either the Home Office or other 
Governmental departments. It is not difficult to envisage the kind of input these 
‘contributors’ were offering. By contrast, in addition to omitting entirely any academic input, 
only eleven charitable organisations were consulted, along with three members of the 
ICO.239 It is submitted that such an imbalance legitimately calls into further question the 
‘independence’ of her review. 
 
Whatever the merits of Mason’s review, the police had already pressed ahead. Waiting 
neither for Mason’s review to conclude (and fully aware it was taking place as they were 
contributing to it), nor for the decision of the Supreme Court on the Commissioner’s 
application to appeal the Five Constables judgment, the police formally abandoned their 
‘step-down’ model and notice was sent to all chief constables that data would be retained, 
and used for all purposes, until death or the subject reached 100 years. This was sent just 
three days after the Five Constables decision was handed down.240 The notice warned all 
chief constables not to step down any convictions and stated that the judgment ‘in 
particular…confirms the power of the police service to retain conviction and caution data 
in the long term’, entitles police to take a ‘broad interpretation of the policing purposes’ 
and that, in future, ‘if any member of the public continues to query the retention of PNC 
records’, they should be advised to write to the Information Compliance Unit’.241 
 
Although the ‘step-down’ model was effectively defunct, and doubtless even less 
concerned than previously as to the interference of the Information Commissioner, no 
further formal guidance was administered regarding the retention of criminality data on 
the PNC until 19 March 2015 when the National Police Chief’s Council (‘the NPCC’), who 
had by this time replaced ACPO, issued a formal written policy for the retention and 
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deletion of criminal records held on the PNC (‘the 2015 Policy’).242 So unconcerned were 
the police by data protection by this point that they effectively abandoned all pretence 
towards adhering to the DPA 1998: the phrase ‘data protection’ appears only once in the 
entire document (in a section confirming that chief officers remained Data Controllers)243 
while, for the first time, the NPCC did not even consult the Information Commissioner prior 
to drafting and issuing the 2015 Policy; indeed, the Commissioner was conspicuously 
absent even from the circulation list.244  
 
The 2015 Policy confirmed that ‘PNC records are retained until a person is deemed to 
have reached 100 years of age’, and though a chief constable had a discretionary power 
to delete records, s/he must do so only ‘in exceptional circumstances’.245 Records would 
only be deleted if an individual requested it and persuaded the Chief Constable to do so. 
A prescribed form was provided for the individual applicant to outline the grounds upon 
which an application to delete was being made.246 The individual was firstly required to 
meet the ‘eligibility’ criterion, outlined in Annex C of the 2015 Policy.247 This provided that 
any conviction for any recordable offence would never be deleted, whether the individual 
was an adult or a child at the time of conviction, but that a person requesting the deletion 
of an ‘out-of-court’ disposal or an ‘event history’ record from the PNC met the ‘eligibility’ 
criterion.  
 
That left the applicant with the requirement to make out a suitable ‘ground’ for deletion. 
These were set out in Annex A of the 2015 Policy. This provided that chief officers had 
the discretion to use their ‘professional judgement’ on whether to delete records or not. A 
requirement to decisions ‘on balance of probabilities’ or ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ was 
expressly excluded.248 No definition or guidance on what constituted ‘professional 
judgement’ was required and it is difficult to not see this as conferring an almost unfettered 
discretion on decisions to the chief officer. An exhaustive list of ‘grounds’ for deletion were 
then laid down. These included where a chief officer was satisfied that, after an 
investigation, no crime had actually taken place, that an allegation made had been done 
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falsely or maliciously, where the individual had established a proven alibi absolving them 
from an offence, where an individual was arrested as part of an incident but is later found 
to be a victim or a witness, rather than a suspect, where a judicial recommendation is 
made to delete the record, where an alternative person is subsequently found guilty of the 
same offence the individual was originally suspected of or where it was in the ‘wider public 
interest’ to delete the record.249  
 
Once more, almost no guidance was provided as to when each of these might be made 
out, particularly the latter, which might potentially include a wide range of issues which 
were simply not highlighted in any significant manner. What was clear, though, was that 
record deletion would only be realistically considered if the individual to which the nominal 
record related could show ‘positive evidence’ that they had effectively been ‘eliminated as 
a suspect’ for the offence to which a record relates.250 NFAs, for example, might be issued 
because a crime is found not to have taken place (in which case the record might be 
deleted upon request) or because the CPS believe there is insufficient evidence to charge 
the individual (in which case the individual remains a ‘suspect’, so the record will be 
retained).251 Similarly, those acquitted at court or whose convictions are successfully 
appealed were not considered to be automatically ‘eliminated as a suspect’; those 




For well over a century of criminality data collection by the police, there was a widely and 
publicly recognised acceptance by officers that criminal records lost operational 
importance as the record aged and where the record showed that the individual named 
was no longer committing further offences (or, at least, was no longer being convicted of 
them). Exceptions were made for those who committed the most grievous – sexual and 
violent – offences, but as such offences (and offenders) are rare, to all intents and 
purposes the principle of ‘diminishing usefulness’ was afforded general applicability and 
the police proactively deleted (or ‘weeded’) those records which were too old, too minor 
and too isolated to warrant retention for policing purposes.  
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The increased importance of, and implementation of legislation relating to, data protection, 
particularly requirements that data holdings must not be ‘excessive’ or held ‘longer than 
necessary for stipulated purposes’ might reasonably have been expected to ensure a 
tightening of the ‘weeding’ process; certainly, some MPs and the Data Protection 
Registrar/Information Commissioner thought so. Yet, by the 1990s, the opposite began to 
be evidence, and the police began to incrementally retract their position and instead 
elected to retain more and more records for longer periods. Exceptions to the ‘diminishing 
usefulness’ rule grew so that more and more records were retained and indeed formal 
guidance was issued by police chiefs to ensure consistency among forces. This occurred 
despite the police offering not a single piece of qualitative or empirical evidence to show 
that the general principal which had guided record deletion for over a century as having 
been proved to be incorrect. It is submitted that the introduction of the PNC, and 
particularly the creation of the PHOENIX application in 1995, must therefore have 
encouraged police forces to retain records at least in part because they now had the 
means to store and access them more readily. 
 
Despite this, it was only after the Soham murders, and the subsequent public inquiry into 
them which found the police processed for the collation, retention and sharing of 
criminality data to be wholly inadequate, that the police abandoned their practice of 
deleting records and instead they elected to retain all records until each data subject 
reached age 100 years or died. This was done despite there still being no evidential or 
legislative basis for making such a determination; once more, nothing was offered by 
police to show that the general principal of ‘diminishing usefulness’ was misplaced, no 
statute passed mandated such a policy, there was no public clamour for such (and indeed 
many members of the public were so set against the policy that they sought redress from 
the ICO and the Courts) and no such recommendation was made to the police by Bichard 
either during or after his inquiry into Soham.253  
 
The Information Commissioner, who had long considered the storage of criminality data 
on PHOENIX to be part of his remit, reacted by attempting to take the police to task. He 
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was ultimately told that he was, in fact, mistaken. This was because he found an IT, and 
then later the Court of Appeal, willing to accept at face value the vague and unempirical 
evidence offered by police officers that these old records did, in fact and contrary to 
everything the police had said for decades, have an operational usefulness for the life of 
the subject. Moreover, he was ultimately undone by what in actuality amounted to little 
more than a ‘throwaway’ remark he himself made in evidence to the Bichard Inquiry, at 
the height of a media frenzy and public panic caused by an extraordinarily unpalatable, 
but mercifully rare, child abduction murder case.254  
 
Since then, the Commissioner has retreated entirely from any policing role so far as 
criminal records are concerned, instead limiting the ICO contribution to poorly-disguised 
sniping from the side-lines, such as the lament presented to the NPCC in 2017: 
 
There are plenty of questions I feel police forces are still struggling to answer. Let’s 
start with the retention of PNC records. Why are records being kept so long? It’s a 
full year since my predecessor was asking in a foreword to this event how it could 
be proportionate for an arrest record to be held on PNC until an individual reaches 
100 years of age. My view is no different. The law requires proportionality. That 
gives plenty of room for police forces to hold some data longer... But that does not 
mean that you can ignore data retention principles.255 
Yet, as has been shown, that is precisely what the police are now doing. Given an effective 
carte blanche to do so by the decision in the Five Constables case, and with the ICO 
limited to making pleas to proportionality but lacking any realistic enforcement authority 
whatsoever, the police have returned to a position of holding a near unfettered discretion 
to ignore data protection so far as any limits on their criminality data holdings are 
concerned.  
 
They have utilised that discretion to build an enormous repository of criminality data which 
now encompasses over twelve million individuals. They have abandoned the deletion of 
any records except in strictly limited circumstances far removed from those undertaken 
through their earlier weeding policies. They proactively now delete no PNC records. Only 
if a data subject applies for review will one be considered. And the number of review 
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applications received are very small indeed: perhaps unsurprisingly, given the extremely 
limited circumstances in which a chief officer is able (or even likely) to exercise their 
discretion to delete. Indeed, the ACRO Criminal Records Office, which deals centrally with 
all PNC deletion requests, received just 4,216 applications for deletion between the 
implementation of the 2015 Policy and May 2018. Of these, just 1,208 saw records either 
partially or entirely deleted.256  
 
It is submitted that the present situation regarding the near indefinite retention of criminality 
data, facilitated by the decision in the Five Constables case, is unjustifiable with regard to 
data protection principles and should be revisited. The reasons why the author believes 
this to be so are outlined at length in the remaining substantive chapters of this research. 
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It is, at the time of writing, almost a decade since the decision in the Five Constables case. 
In the intervening period, and freed from the constraints of effective external oversight, 
the police controllers of PHOENIX have compiled an enormous repository of criminality 
information on their systems, encompassing over twelve million citizens.  
 
The critical analysis which follows in this chapter aims to directly address the fourth 
research question. It is submitted that the passage of time has demonstrated that certain 
key elements of the court’s reasoning in the Five Constables case are not correct, and 
that the common law principle set down by that case should now be reconsidered.  Indeed, 
as will be seen, subsequent Supreme Court judgments have, by accident rather than 
design, already rendered significant passages of that judgment obsolete. This chapter will 
highlight these, along with other principles elucidated in the Five Constables case which, 
it is submitted, do not stand up to close scrutiny, including offering a critical evaluation of 
the police claims that the retention of old and minor criminality data aids in their operational 
processes and offering a brief comparison with the position on criminality data retention 
in Scotland. 
 
8.2 The criminal justice system does not require a complete record 
In the Five Constables case, Hughes LJ cited the use of criminality data on the PNC 
for sentencing purposes and for the credibility of witness as being part of the ‘common 
coin’ of the criminal court: 
 
the common coin of the criminal court depends upon access by the court, through 
the prosecution and thus through the PNC, to a reliable and comprehensive record 
of convictions and their circumstances...the criminal justice system thus depends 
on the maintenance of the PNC. If the PNC is not complete, the court can never 
know of a relevant old conviction.1 
                                                          




Indeed, this, said Waller LJ, was a ‘complete answer’ to the question of whether the data 
being held until the nominal record subject reaches 100 years of age was either 
‘excessive’ or ‘retained longer than is necessary’ for the intended purpose.2 
 
The truth is less straightforward that that overview suggests and has been examined at 
some length in chapter 4.4 of this research. It is not intended to reiterate that analysis here 
but it will simply perhaps suffice to state that criminal trials proceeded for centuries, on 
broadly comparable lines, while an incomplete antecedent record was retained and that 
even today there exists no express statutory requirement to retain a complete record of 
all convictions for any part of the criminal process. Moreover, while antecedents certainly 
do play an important role generally in the criminal process, it is submitted that there are 
no obvious (statutory or otherwise) reason why trivial and aged offences might be relevant 
to any charging decision, application for bail, hearing regarding ‘character’ evidence or a 
committal for sentence. 
 
8.3 The ‘Ian Huntley myth’ 
The century old policy of police to delete old records was never presumed to have caused 
any manifest injustice to anyone, nor to have contributed in any meaningful way to a failure 
of public protection, until in August 2002 two schoolgirls were abducted and murdered in 
the village of Soham by Ian Huntley.3 Huntley’s crime drew considerable public revulsion 
amidst an almost frenzied mass media coverage and his name, or alternatively simply 
‘Soham’, has entered ordinary lexicography as an examples of what might go wrong when 
those disposed to commit extremely grievous acts are given an opportunity to do so in 
circumstances they should not have had.4 
 
Over time, Huntley’s crime has given rise to an emotive and largely erroneous narrative 
regarding the retention of criminality data which does not stand even the most basic 
scrutiny. Where that narrative is driven by the media, it is perhaps understandable, but it 
is submitted that where significant elements of it are repeated as fact by the judiciary, 
seeking to justify decision which allow for continued criminality data retention, it is 
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inexcusable. Examples abound. One of the more common misconceptions is that Soham 
created the legislative regime for disclosing criminal records to third parties.5 This is 
entirely false; the Police Act, which is provides the statutory basis for disclosing criminal 
records, was enacted in 1997 while the Criminal Records Bureau – the organisation 
tasked with dispensing criminal checks – opened in March 2002,6 five months before 
Huntley committed his offences.  
 
These inaccuracies even permeate the highest echelons of the judiciary. One is the notion 
that the two victims of Huntley’s crimes were ‘murdered by their school caretaker’.7 This 
is also entirely false; the two murdered girls St Andrew’s Church of England Primary 
School, while Huntley was employed at Soham Village College. He had no contact with 
his victims through his employment position, but instead through Maxine Carr, who worked 
at the primary school and who did know the two girls.8 In fact, and contrary to common 
perception, Huntley did not know the two girls, nor they him.9   
 
What makes these ‘myths’ damaging is that they, and indeed ‘Soham’ generally, are very 
often used to justify the present system of criminality data retention. Indeed, it is submitted 
that they are so often used, and in such emotive manner, that their use has become trite. 
The general proposition which emerges, perhaps best summarised by Baroness Hale, is 
that: 
 
We do not need any reminding, since the murder of two little girls by a school 
caretaker in Soham and the recommendations of the report of the Bichard Inquiry 
which followed, of the crucial role which piecing together different items of police 
intelligence can play in preventing as well as detecting crime. 
  
The central tenets of this position are two-fold, and both, it is submitted, ill-founded. The 
first is that Ian Huntley was able to commit his crimes because the police were obligated 
by the DPA 1998 to delete data which might have otherwise have been retained and, 
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therefore, they were unable to prevent him being employed as a school caretaker. This 
was addressed directly in the Bichard report, and found to be entirely incorrect. The inquiry 
found that Huntley had never been convicted of any offence but had come into contact 
with the police on eleven separate occasions between 1995 and 1999, including four 
sperate allegations of rape (one of which proceeded to Court, but not trial).10  
 
It transpired that some of the contacts were not properly recorded.11 In evidence, the Chief 
Constable of Humberside Police largely responsible for the missing records admitted in 
evidence to Bichard that ‘he was unaware of the guidance or rules concerning when a 
record should be reviewed and when it should be deleted’ and that he ‘was unaware of 
the weeding rules and considered these a level of detail which he could not reasonably 
be expected to know’.12  
 
That did not stop him attempting to blame the Information Commissioner and the DPA 
1998 for the failure of police to record the contacts with Huntley or to utilise these to identify 
a possible pattern of offending which might give rise to a policing concern.13 This, 
according to Bichard, was ‘seriously misjudged’14 and ‘wrong’.15 In fact, the Chief 
Constable later admitted to the Inquiry that ‘the Information Commissioner’s views on the 
issue had little or nothing to do with that information not being on the Humberside Police 
systems’.16 
 
The wide dissemination by police of the notion that the DPA 1998 caused the deletion of 
records which resulted in Ian Huntley being able to commit murder17 is, it is submitted, 
likely to have played a major part in its later, and continued, reiteration. It is, however, a 
myth. In truth, had the police not been committing repeated breaches of the DPA 199818 
then they would have held accurate, up-to-date records on Huntley in accordance with the 
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applicable Weeding Rules in force at that time which could have been utilised in an 
accurate criminal record check against his name 
 
On no reading of the Weeding Rules in force at that time would such a pattern of 
behaviour, particularly one involving such serious allegations, have been deleted from the 
PNC; the allegations of rape alone should have been sufficient to allow all of the contacts 
with Huntley to be recorded and retained. The reason why records were not retained were 
rather, according to Bichard; inadequate training of staff, poor database maintenance, 
ineffective management, poor auditing and inefficient intelligence functioning.19 These are 
police operational failings, not failings in the operational framework itself, and it was these 
police operational failings (described by Bichard as ‘deeply shocking’20) which meant that 
the records were not available. 
 
Very much linked to the myth that data protection resulted in the deletion of important 
police data is the proposition that ‘the police stopped deleting records because Bichard 
said they should’; alluded to by Waller LJ in the Five Constables case.21 This too is 
inaccurate. Bichard made thirty-one recommendations based on his investigation and not 
one of these suggested that the police stop deleting old, minor and inactive records. Eight 
of the recommendations did relate directly to either the PNC or to data management 
generally22 but that most oft cited in that which recommends the police produce a ‘clear, 
concise and practical’ Code of Practice to replace the existing guidance on data retention23 
which should ‘take into policing purposes and the rights of the individual and the law’.24  
 
There is nothing, however, which says that the police should stop deleting records. Indeed, 
there is implicit acceptance throughout that records, or at least some of them, will still be 
deleted; the new code was expected to deal with ‘record creation, retention, deletion 
[author’s emphasis] and information sharing’.25 Moreover, Bichard then went on to 
consider ‘factors which should be taken into account in reaching retention or deletion 
decisions’ in sexual offence matters.26 He considered that the nature of the allegation,27 
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the reliability of the allegation28 and the age of the allegation29 were all pertinent factors in 
determining how long a record should be retained before deletion. The last of these might 
be especially important, as an initial contact should be retained ‘for a sufficiently long 
period for it to be seen whether a pattern emerges, even if that first allegation is to be 
judged at the lower end of the reliability scale’.30 The Information Commissioner accepted 
these general policing principles but suggested that a retention period of more than ten 
years in this regard might give rise to data issues.31 
 
All of this clearly implies that Bichard anticipated that at least some records would be 
deleted, even where these related to very serious offences. If Bichard had expected for 
the police to introduce a new code which essentially allows them to retain all records on 
PHOENIX (save the exceptional circumstances where an application to delete might be 
made), he would not, it is submitted, have taken the time to note factors to take into 
account when reaching ‘retention or deletion decisions’. 
 
Data protection did not cause the police to delete records they would have otherwise 
retained, nor did the inquiry convened order that the police stop deleting records. Ian 
Huntley did not commit his crimes because of data protection or record deletion; as Turner 
noted in 2009, ‘it was pure mischance rather than the exploitation of an employment 
opportunity that landed the girls in his fateful company’.32 The use of Soham as justification 
for the continued retention of criminality data on PHOENIX has become trite and does not 
stand close scrutiny. The myths are powerful and have persisted as time has passed. 
However, it is submitted that the time has come for them to be dispelled. 
 
8.4 Why indefinite retention might be considered ‘excessive’ 
In the Five Constables case, the police were offered the opportunity to explain in evidence 
precisely why old or minor criminality data was to be retained. Evidence was adduced 
which claimed that the convictions might be utilised to place a suspect in a geographical 
area at a period of time in a historical investigation or that these might in time reveal a 
pattern of criminal behaviour,33 but these are theoretical examples and, as even Waller LJ 
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conceded, ‘that the information might be of value in certain circumstances and of value 
when taken together with other information’.34  
 
There is a long-standing police assertion that criminal records assist them in preventing 
and detecting crime. If this is true, then the continued retention of criminality data cannot 
reasonably be considered ‘excessive’ for data protection purposes. However, it is not clear 
what evidence, if any, supports this contention other than the word of police officers who 
reiterate it as fact. The problem with such a position was expounded at length by Lord 
Kerr (albeit in a dissenting judgment in a case involving the retention of biometric 
criminality data): 
 
If we continue to define ex-offenders throughout their lives on the basis of their 
offending, we deprive them of reintegration into society on equal terms with their 
fellow citizens. The only reason proffered to justify the denial of that hope is the 
assertion that those convicted of offences may reoffend. The premise which must 
underlie this claim is that those convicted of recordable offences are more likely to 
reoffend than those who have not been. But no evidence has been presented to 
support that claim. Unsurprisingly, therefore, no attempt to quantify such a risk has 
been made.35  
 
It is not easy to quantify the risk of former offenders committing further offences, but some 
indications which indicate that the usefulness of old and minor criminality data to policing 
purposes is far less than claimed will be considered below: 
 
8.4.1 The back-record conversation programme was never completed 
It will be recalled that, at the inception of the PHOENIX, PCL Group were contracted to 
input all of the paper records held by the NIB onto the computerised system.36 PCL 
Group struggled almost immediately to convert the records at volume and the contract 
with them was terminated ‘by mutual consent’ in October 1996 with only 300,000 
records converted.37 Responsibility was transferred back to the Metropolitan Police, 
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who added a further 200,000 records by 1999 but who soon-after effectively stopped 
converting the records, instead adding them on a ‘come to notice basis’, so that anyone 
who came to the attention of the criminal justice system would have their back record 
converted, while those who did not would not.38  
 
Despite police claims that these old records are an invaluable resource to their 
operational processes, by August 2005, some 1.28 million records were still 
unconverted from microfiche.39 Around the time that Waller LJ was accepting as fact 
the essential quality of old and inactive records for policing purposes in the Five 
Constables case, some 1,094,000 old (and presumably inactive) criminal records were 
still being held on microfiche and were not input onto the PNC, save by reference to a 
‘marker’ which informed the PNC user that a microfiche record was held if required.40  
 
By this time, comment on the ‘back record conversation’ process had effectively ended 
and it was not clear who was responsible for it or indeed whether it was still ongoing. 
Indeed, in the course of this research the only reference to be found to it was that 
provided by the ACRO Criminal Records Office in their annual reports, which indicate 
that they continue to convert some of the microfiche collection, albeit in very small 
numbers; in 2017/18, 4,626 records were added to the PNC.41  
 
In the course of this research, investigations into the microfiche collection were 
conducted under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. What these 
revealed is that in October 2012, at the authority of NPIA, these records, supposedly 
essential to the prevention and detection of crime, were transferred out of police hands 
and into storage by the Digital, Data and Technology Department of the Home Office, 
although Chief Constables remain the Data Controllers. While the ACRO Criminal 
Records Office ‘provide a back-conversation service on behalf of some organisations’, 
it remains unclear who, if anyone, is still otherwise actively engaged in converting the 
records. If someone is, then they do not appear to be making much progress; at April 
2018, some 1,005,242 individuals with nominal listings on PHOENIX have no more 
information recorded other than a marker advising that a microfiche record exists 
                                                          
38 T. Thomas, Criminal Records: a database for the criminal justice system and beyond (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2007) 37 
39 Ibid 
40 S. Mason, ‘A Common Sense Approach: a review of the criminal record regime in England and Wales. 
Report on Phase 2’ (Home Office 30 November 2011) 25 
41 ACRO Criminal Records Office, ‘Annual Report 2017 – 2018’ (2018) 1 
211 
 
relating to them. If police need to access the old data, a request is made to the 
‘Microfiche’ team on a specified form.42 
 
What these investigations indicate is that, so far as some one million or so data subjects 
are concerned, criminality data is being held by the police, and a nominal listing on 
PHOENIX made, relating to individuals who have been of no interest to the police, or 
the criminal justice system generally, whatsoever since, at the very latest, PHOENIX 
went live in 1995. These are individuals who have not ‘come to notice’ for at least 
twenty-three years. It is not clear, therefore, what ‘operational use’ this data has for 
policing purposes; indeed, the police have deemed this data sufficiently unimportant 
that they elected to transfer it to the Home Office, rather than retain it themselves. This 
appears entirely inconsistent with the premise that this type of data is essential for 
placing certain individuals in geographical areas or establishing patterns of criminality 
and it seems highly implausible to suggest that this data is helping in ‘crime prevention’; 
the police do not even have ready access to it save completing and returning a specified 
form. 
 
If, as appears to be the case, the vast majority of this data has little (or no) operational 
value, it is not clear why the holding of this data is not ‘excessive’ for the purposes of 
data protection legislation. It is, therefore, equally unclear why this data could not simply 
be deleted. 
 
8.4.2 Scotland does not retain a complete collection 
As has been show in the previous chapter of this research, the police themselves felt it 
unnecessary to retain certain criminal record data once it lost its operational value. This 
determination, based on the nature of the record itself and the length of time passed 
since the individual named came to the attention of the police, predated data protection 
legislation and was abandoned for reasons that the police have never properly 
explained. 
 
                                                          
42 Home Office, ‘FOI Request. Collection of historic microfiche criminal records’ (FOI Case Ref: 49433 
What Do They Know? 17 July 2018) 
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/collection_of_historic_microfich#incoming-1205670> 




In the Five Constables case, Waller LJ placed considerable weight on his determination 
that the 1995 Directive43 which ultimately resulted in the passing of the DPA 1998 
permitted the state to collect a ‘complete register of criminal convictions’ as long as this 
was controlled by official authority.44 This, he said, was sufficient to show that the 
PHOENIX collection was not excessive but was, instead, ‘important’45 in allowing the 
police to apprehend offenders and prevent crime.46 He also claimed that the complete 
collection allowed for the CPS and courts to have access to ‘the full information’ 
required of them.47 
 
If he is correct, and that a complete collection is required for all of these purposes, one 
wonder’s what he would make of the system of criminal record retention in Scotland, 
where, in applying precisely the same European Directive, the same Parliamentary 
legislation relating to bad character, antecedents and court proceedings generally and 
where presumably police have a very similar understanding and approach to crime 
prevention and detection as colleagues in England, a markedly different approach is 
taken. 
 
Scotland, like England, has a lengthy history of collecting criminality data and indeed 
the Scottish Criminal Record Office (‘the SCRO’) was formally opened in 1960.48 
Scotland, like England, implemented a centrally administered computer system for the 
collation, storage and retention of criminality data; in 1988 the ‘Criminal History System’ 
(‘CHS’) went ‘live’49 and remains the equivalent of PHOENIX for police in Scotland 
today. It is, like PHOENIX, intended as an investigatory tool, containing personal details 
and modus operandi details on suspects and offenders as mandatory data fields.50 
Markers for serious offenders, such as sex offenders, are added to nominal listings51 
and, also as is the case on PHOENIX, officers are trained to utilise the data as a crime 
                                                          
43 See ch.6.2 of this research for a detailed examination of this. 
44 Art 8(5) of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995  
45 Above n.1 [9] 
46 Ibid [48] 
47 Ibid 
48 Above n.38, 24 
49 ‘Report of the Working Group on the Recording and Weeding Policy for the Criminal History System’ 
(Scottish Criminal Record Office 2004) 4, para.1.5 
50 Scottish Parliament, ‘Justice 2 Sub-Committee: Child Sex Offenders Inquiry’ (HMSO 3 October 2006) 
33 
51 Ibid, 29 
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prevention tool, to conduct searches on suspicious individuals giving rise to concern 
for officers on patrol, for example.52 
 
Unlike PHOENIX, however, CHS makes no distinction between ‘recordable’ and non-
recordable offences; there is no such distinction in Scottish law so all offences are 
recorded to CHS.53 Crucially, however and unlike PHOENIX, Scottish police weed data 
from CHS. In November 2001, the SCRO established a ‘Recording and Weeding 
Group’ to examine aligning a retention and weeding policy with that in force for the 
PNC. That group recommended that an alignment be made but it’s report was never 
submitted to the Scottish equivalent of ACPO because of the tumult which began to 
envelop criminal records in England and Wales, outlined in the previous chapter. 
54Instead, the group elected to suspend all future meetings and wait for matters to settle 
in England and Wales, before recommencing their review in October 2004.55 
 
The Group noted that ‘the feeling in ACPO is that the weed policy for PNC should 
change to retention policy for all information; i.e. weed nothing’ and that this ‘was being 
met with a certain level of resistance by both the Home Office and Information 
Commissioner’.56 Noting that the Scottish executive had ‘intimated’ that they did not 
necessarily intend to follow England’s lead, the Group concluded that it would be best 
to ‘continue to monitor the situation in England and Wales to identify any benefits or 
conflicts for Scotland’ because the Group could ‘see no possibility at this time of aligning 
the weeding policy of the CHS with that of the PNC’. Therefore, it recommended that 
‘SCRO does NOT [original emphasis] align its weeding policy with that of the PNC at 
the present time’.57 
 
It seems clear that SCRO were, at that time, concerned to balance policing operational 
requirements against the perceived threat of enforcement action by the Information 
Commissioner; indeed, the Group warned data must be held for a proportionate time 
to facilitate policing purposes and not be excessive and that the IC had begun to take 
action against English police forces for excessive data held on the PNC.58  
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Even when that threat passed, through Bichard and the Five Constables case, police 
in Scotland resisted the opportunity to align their retention policies with forces in 
England. A policy document was drafted in February 2011 which approved the 
recommendations of the SCRO Group.59 This resulted in the intimation on 23 
November 201160 of what was (and indeed still largely is), by any measure and certainly 
by comparison to the weeding and step-down guidance previously produced by ACPO 
in England, a remarkably straightforward policy for the weeding of criminality data. This 
document has undergone four revisions (at the time of writing) and the current version 
was published 2 August 2018.61 
 
The guidance for the storage and retention of criminality data in CHS contrasts sharply 
with that offered by the NPCC for PHOENIX. It opens with an affirmation that Data 
Protection has been considered and that the document is considered complaint with 
those obligations.62 Like PHOENIX, a nominal listing is created on CHS whenever a 
case investigation is opened. However, unlike PHOENIX where police create an ‘event 
history’ which is almost always retained until the data subject reaches age 100, new 
listings on CHS are marked as ‘pending’63 and, where the case to which the listing 
relates results in a ‘non-finding of guilt’ of the data subject (NFA, discontinuance, 
acquittal etc.), the data is re-marked ‘temporary retention’64 and is thereafter 
automatically weeded after six months65 unless the case involved a sexual or serious 
violent offence, in which case the files are automatically weeded after three years.66  
 
Two notes should be made at this point; firstly, ‘weeded’ takes the old meaning, in that 
the data is deleted (i.e. ‘completely removed’)67 from CHS, not ‘stepped-down’ for police 
eyes only, and, secondly, that CHS has an automatic deletion function. Unlike 
                                                          
59 Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland (ACPOS), ‘Recommended Record Retention Periods’ 
(February 2011) 104 at s.(1) 
60 Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland (ACPOS), ‘Recording, Weeding and Retention of 
Information on Criminal History System – Guidance’ (v.1.0, 23 November 2011) 
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67 Safer Scotland, ‘Discussion paper on the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974’ (APS Group Scotland 
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PHOENIX, which requires human input to ensure review and deletion, CHS simply 
deletes the data when the requisite time elapses. Such a system ensures that no data 
is retained which should not be and will evidently reduce the administrative burden on 
police forces to manually review and weed data – one of the various reasons cited by 
police in England for their historical failures to weed PHOENIX in accordance with their 
own policies. 
 
As regards other disposals, there are once more considerable discrepancies in 
approach between CHS and PHOENIX. While in England and Wales there is a starting 
point which presumes that all conviction data will be retained until the subject is aged 
100 years or dies, in Scotland the starting point68 is that where a data subject reaches 
aged 40 years, a court conviction will be weeded if twenty years have passed since the 
conviction. If the data subject reaches aged 40 but the conviction is more recent than 
twenty years, the conviction is retained until twenty years pass and it is then 
automatically weeded. This is the so-called ‘40/20 rule’.69 There are limited exceptions 
for ‘higher-level offending’, which provide that convictions on indictment, those 
disposed under the Mental Health Act or where a sentence of imprisonment is 
imposed70 are all subject to retention until the subject reaches aged 70 and thirty years 
have passed since the conviction; the so-called ‘70/30 rule’.71 Again, once both 
conditions are met, CHS will perform an automated weed of the data and it is deleted.72  
Only where a data subject is given a life sentence, detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure, 
given an indeterminate sentence or where the conviction is a sexual or sexually 
aggravated offence is a CHS record to be retained for the life of the data subject or until 
the subject reaches aged 100 years.73 Sexual offences were originally categorised 
within the 70/30 rule but were recategorized in 2013 after the police considered 
evidence which showed that 1.5% of enhanced disclosure checks in Scotland related 
to the over-70s.74 
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Other CHS weeding provisions offer stark comparisons to PHOENIX retention 
principles. While police cautions are recorded on PHOENIX until the data subject dies 
or reaches age 100, the Scottish equivalent – the ‘police warning’ – is only retained on 
CHS for two years from the date of insertion. The same retention period, and therefore 
the same comparison, applies in respect of the Fixed Penalty Notices – the Scotland 
equivalent of PNDs.75 An entirely different approach to juvenile offending is taken in 
Scotland as compared to England; rather than prosecution, children are instead 
diverted to a system of ‘Children’s Hearings’ which take place largely outwith the Court 
system.76 This means that the majority of juvenile offenders are not formally convicted 
by a court but rather a finding is made by a tribunal at a Children’s Hearing. Where this 
occurs, it is recorded on CHS and then weeded two years after insertion,77 unless the 
record relates to a sexual or serious violence offence, in which case they are retained 
for three years and then reviewed. If not manually deleted, the record is reviewed 
annually thereafter until (or unless) it is deleted.78 
 
The contrast between the approach taken in Scotland and in England is very stark 
indeed. What is intriguing about the Scottish system is that it provides for police 
retention of varying categories and types of criminality data for differing periods based 
on a simple approach to determining what might be proportionate or excessive. It uses 
the criminal justice system itself as the principal demarcation points. It accepts that data 
relating to those who are not convicted should not be retained for a lengthy period 
because those who are not convicted should not be treated the same as those who are 
– a notion considered in considerable length in the next chapter of this research.  
 
It then uses the criminal justice system itself as a metric against which proportionality 
can be measured, so that non-court disposals, which by their nature indicate a very low 
level of criminality (alleged or otherwise) are retained for the shortest period, while court 
disposals are themselves subcategorised in accordance with the seriousness of the 
offence as determined by the criminal justice system. Crimes on indictment are more 
serious than summary offences, so data relating to these should be retained longer and 
doing so is more proportionate. Offenders who receive custodial sentences have 
committed more serious offences than those who commit summary offences, so data 
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relating to these should be retained longer and doing so is more proportionate. There 
is a greater need to protect the public from violent and sexual offenders than others 
offenders, so data relating to these should be retained longer and doing so is more 
proportionate.  
 
Although in themselves not evidence based, the principles which underpin the Scottish 
approach to CHS are neither discretionary nor subjective. They do not require an 
evaluation of matters by a chief officer or indeed anyone else. They are instead a set 
of inherently simple, universally accepted notions which underpin the criminal justice 
system in both Scotland and England, articulated clearly and utilised to create a 
straightforward policy for data retention and deletion which is clear, logical and, it is 
submitted, a significantly more proportionate (and data protection compliant) approach 
than the blanket approach offered by the NPCC in respect of PHOENIX.  
 
It is not clear why the extensive retention of minor and aged criminality data considered 
an essential part of operational intelligence underpinning crime prevention and 
detection in England and Wales, as is routinely claimed by chief officers and accepted 
in the Five Constables case, but such data is considered sufficiently unimportant by 
chief officers ten miles north of Berwick that they feel it appropriate to simply delete it 
from their systems after a sufficiently lengthy period of time passes.  
 
If Soham is the justification for that divergence of practice, then it must be a 
fundamentally weak one, because Scotland has not, to this author’s knowledge, 
suffered a deluge of Ian Huntley-type offenders infiltrating schools and murdering 
school-children. Indeed, it is difficult to see the crime prevention and detection 
justification carrying much weight at all. Whilst accepting that direct and detailed 
statistical comparison is fraught with difficulty,79 the most recent official data suggests 
that, in Scotland, recorded crime is at its second lowest level since 1974,80 homicides 
are at their lowest levels since 1976,81  crime levels overall have ‘been on a downward 
                                                          
79 This is because the two jurisdictions have, among other things, different means of measuring crime 
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inevitably influence crime statistics.  
80 National Statistics (Scotland), ‘Recorded Crime in Scotland, 2017 – 18’ (25 September 2018) 1  
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trend’82 and that fear of crime in Scotland is at its lowest level since records began.83 
Police ‘clear-up’ rates for recorded crime84 were 49.5%.85  
 
In England and Wales, meanwhile, recorded crime increased by 7% between 2017 – 
18, homicide rates increased by 14% in the same period86 and have been on an upward 
trend since 2014, as has recorded crime generally.87 One Ipsos Mori poll found that 
fear of crime is now one of the most important concerns of citizens in England and 
Wales and indeed the most pressing concern for Londoners88 while official statistics 
showed that police forces were closing investigations after having identified no suspect 
in 48% of crimes reported to them.89 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the 
chairman of the Police Federation told the BBC in January 2019 that ‘society just isn’t 
as safe as it once was’.90 
 
It is not clear whether this apparent divergence between fear of crime, recorded crime 
levels and crime detection rates in Scotland as compared to England and Wales has 
anything to do with the respective collation, retention and use of criminal records by 
police forces in each jurisdiction. What can be seen is merely that crime rates are rising 
and undetected offences remain high even though the police are collecting and 
retaining more data on PHOENIX than ever before.  
 
8.4.3 Recidivism studies support the deletion of old, inactive records. 
The most commonly cited justification for the police retention of criminal records in an 
operational sense is based predominantly upon the presumption that previous criminal 
convictions are a valid predictor of future criminal behaviour. Indeed; ‘there is strong 
evidence that individuals with a criminal history are more likely to commit future crimes 
than individuals with no criminal history’.91  
                                                          
82 Above n.80, 12 
83 ‘Scots feel safer than ever before’, The BBC (London, 27 March 2018)  
84 A definition of what constitutes a ‘clear-up rate’ is provided at above n.80, 67 
85 Ibid, 3 
86 ‘Crime figures: Violent Crime recorded by polices rises by 19%’, The BBC (London, 24 January 2019) 
87 M. Weaver, ‘Homicides in England and Wales rise by 14%’, The Guardian (London, 24 January 2019) 
88 R. Wright, ‘UK fears over rising crime muddied by contradictory statistics’ The Financial Times 
(London, 8 August 2018) 
89 Home Office, ‘Statistical News Release: Crime Outcomes in England and Wales, year ending March 
2018’ (19 July 2018) 
90 Above n.86 
91 R. Karl Hanson, ‘Long-term recidivism studies show that desistance is the norm’ (9 September 2018) 




This ‘strong evidence’ is ordinarily taken from academic studies into reoffending (or 
‘recidivism’). Recidivism, taken from the Latin recidere (‘to fall back’) is the trait of 
offenders who, having been convicted of an offence; ‘are not rehabilitated. Instead, he 
or she falls back, or relapses, into former behaviour patterns and commits more 
crimes’.92 Recidivism is a widely researched academic discipline, and it is not the 
intention of this research to duplicate or add to the existing literature on it. Rather, what 
follows is a (very) brief summary of some of the key issues as might pertain to the 
notion that criminal records data should be retained as it is on PHEONIX as it will assist 
in the prevention and detection of crime. 
 
The general starting point is perhaps that there is a wealth of data which suggests that 
a significant proportion of those who are convicted of an offence are soon-after 
convicted of another offence. This is particularly noticeable so far as those convicted 
and imprisoned as a result are concerned and various figures for this group are 
available and appear relatively stable over time; a study in 1995 found recidivism rates 
of 58% among the study sample within a two year period,93 while another in 2016 
suggests that ‘around 50% of prisoners go on to reoffend within one year of being 
released’.94  
 
Even where the subject group is expanded to include ‘low-level’ offenders who commit 
offences but are not imprisoned, the re-offending rates remain high. The Ministry of 
Justice produces quarterly statistics on ‘proven re-offending’ rates which show that the 
rate of individuals handed a court conviction or caution one year or less after having 
received an earlier court conviction or caution fluctuated between 29 – 32% since 
statistics started to be collated in 2009.95 Moreover, there is a general suggestion 
among the studies that ‘many offenders are generalists when it comes to committing 
crimes’.96 The position was summarised by Redmayne as being that: 
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Previous offenders—whatever their offence—are more likely to steal than are 
members of the general population; this holds for just about any offence. This 
affirms what we know from other sources: criminals tend not to be narrow 
specialists but have a general propensity to commit crime.97 
 
This trait is often referred to as ‘propensity’.98 One landmark study conducted by 
Redmayne calculated that the propensity rates within two years of last conviction for 
various offences (with a custodial sentence imposed) ranged from 36 times more likely 
than those without any conviction for drug-related offences, 80 times more likely for 
sexual offences up to 125 times more likely for robbery offences. Where a non-custodial 
disposal is made, the propensity figures increase significantly for sexual offences and 
robberies, up to 250 and 400 times more likely respectively.99  
 
It is the propensity of offenders to reoffend that gave rise to the introduction of 
‘propensity’ evidence in the context of bad character applications at trial. It is also the 
justification police cite when arguing that a collection of criminality data is essential in 
allowing them to prevent crime (by monitoring known offenders who have a propensity 
towards committing offences) and to detect crime (by identifying suspects from a pool 
of individuals with a known propensity for committing offences).  
 
Taken at face value, the tenets which emerge from these studies appear to give rise to 
a strong argument that the retention of data on PHOENIX for police operational 
purposes cannot be ‘excessive’ on any measure, let alone so far as data protection is 
concerned. However, it is submitted that taking these studies at face value is an 
erroneous proposition for a number of reasons. The first is that the argument in favour 
of retention must accept that the police actually utilise the data for closely monitoring 
known offenders and crime detection purposes. Indeed, many forces do not use the 
PHOENIX collection as ‘intelligence’ at all and there is considerable evidence to show 
that the police simply see criminal records collection as a repository of administrative 
data.100    
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That notwithstanding, even the empirical data itself is subject to considerable question. 
Studies on recidivism are naturally based on ‘known’ offenders and ‘known’ offending. 
It is widely accepted that significant proportions of total criminality are not reported to 
the police, that significant proportions of crime reported go unsolved and that significant 
numbers of ‘resolved’ crime does not lead to a conviction. Even Redmayne concedes 
that his studies relate to ‘convictions’, rather than ‘commissions’ of crime101 and that, 
therefore, his propensity figures must be treated ‘with a degree of scepticism’.102 
 
Even putting aside the empirical concerns, the very nature of policing and the 
introduction of propensity evidence in the criminal justice system means that supposed 
propensity traits must be evaluated with a very critical eye. For those police forces who 
do use PHOENIX data as an investigatory tool, it is difficult to see how useful it can be 
other than to provide a ‘pool’ of possible suspects in a reactive police investigation.  
 
The potential problem here is obvious; such an approach inevitably leads the police to 
‘round up the usual suspects’ in the hope that one will yield a successful clear-up. There 
is little question that such an approach is broadly taken by the police; Gill found 
precisely this approach being taken when he studied two police forces in the 1990s and 
commented that the preferred investigative method generally consisted of police 
officers deciding; ‘'Oh I know who it is, it's Joe Bloggs, he's bang at it … that's one of 
the favourite sayings, he's bang out, he's well at it…’103 Another study saw a police 
officer admit that ‘the whole intelligence led process can be corrupted by the banter that 
goes on and the self-fulfilling prophecy. You know that someone can become a [target] 
because everybody talks about them, and then we start targeting them and because 
we target them they become something that they are not’.104 Statisticians and analysts 
hired by police forces are often derived, with one reportedly told by an experienced 
officer conducting an investigation that ‘it’s all right you sitting there but you don’t have 
a nose for what’s going on’.105 
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It is not even in reactive police investigations that this ‘usual suspects approach’ takes 
place and is likely to skew general propensity figures towards showing something that 
might not necessarily be as prevalent as claimed. There is evidence to show that, where 
PHOENIX data is used at all by police to help prevent crime, this is done by police 
focusing resources on ‘target groups’, such as those with previous convictions, who are 
likely to yield ‘results’.106 This will inevitably mean that those with previous convictions 
are more likely to find themselves caught committing offences than those without prior 
convictions, who might still be committing offences but are not being watched.  
 
Even beyond policing itself, the use of propensity in the criminal justice system might 
well have an adverse impact on the data upon which it is based. The admittance of bad 
character evidence at trial has an obvious potential to bring to trial cases which are, in 
themselves, inherently weak but which might ‘get over the line’ where propensity 
evidence is adduced.107 There are other reasons why individuals with criminal records 
might be more readily convicted. The CPS might be more prepared to prosecute ‘known 
offenders’ than those who are not.108 Some defence lawyers might not pursue the 
defence of their client with particular vigour if they know their clients have previous 
convictions, particularly of a ‘similar’ type; this has been referred to as lawyers taking a 
‘presumption of guilt’ approach.109 
 
Darbyshire, meanwhile, in several studies of practice in the magistrates court 
highlighted what she saw as a significant problem regarding ‘the regulars and their 
friends and family’.110 She saw that each court ‘had a hard core of regulars, who were 
often part of large extended families and/or gangs of friends’111 which meant that 
magistrates inevitably became familiar with them. This led to entire family names, and 
those associated with them, become ‘notorious’ among benches as ‘persistent 
offenders’; one clerk in Nottingham told her that: 
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If your name is Bane or Pain in Nottingham, then you're notorious. Some of them 
have changed their name by deed poll. The Banes and the Pains provide a lot of 
work for this court and everybody knows them. If it's a problem at this court, the 
biggest Bench in the country, with over 450 justices, then it could be a problem 
anywhere.112 
 
It is not difficult, therefore, to suppose that the notion of ‘criminal propensity’ as a 
general position may over-exaggerated in the bare empirical which if oft cited to support 
it. If the police use this as a means of focusing resources towards ‘suspect groups’, 
then it is hardly surprising that these individuals are caught committing more offences 
than those who are not so ‘targeted’, so are convicted more often. If the police 
investigate crime by rounding up a pool of ‘usual suspects’, it is hardly surprising that 
these individuals are more liable to conviction than those who are not. Equally, it is not 
difficult to image how more liable to conviction an individual might be if magistrates are 
considering particular family groups ‘notorious’.  
 
None of this is to say that these individuals are not committing offences. They may well 
be. The criticism here is that they are more likely to be convicted (or cautioned) than 
those who do not have criminal records because they are more likely to be caught, 
more likely to be prosecuted and more likely to be found guilty than the unconvicted 
who are not being so subjected to the criminal justice system. This is important because 
it is precisely with this group that comparisons are being drawn. It has led to come 
claiming that ‘criminal propensity’ has become a ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’ based on 
‘nothing more substantial than the prejudices of the criminal justice system’.113 While 
an extreme view, it is submitted that the idea is not without merit and must be taken 
into account when analysing the usefulness, or otherwise, of the PHOENIX collection. 
 
Even if it is accepted that criminal propensity is a genuine and measurable trait, and 
that this justifies the extensive collection of criminality data by the police because it 
allows them assistance in preventing and detecting crime (where it is even properly 
used for such purposes), then there remain three key caveats which, it is submitted, 
offer empirical support for the proposition that at least some of the nominal listings on 
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PHOENIX offer such a disproportionately small benefit in this regard that their holding 
until the data subject reaches aged 100 years is ‘excessive’ on any interpretation of 
that term, and certainly as regards data protection legislation. 
 
The first that there is a widely accepted, empirical acceptance that juveniles and young 
adults are a special category of offender to whom ordinary principles might not apply. 
This is because of two key, measurable and correlating factors. The first is that juveniles 
historically commit a disproportionately high volume of offences. One Home Office self-
reporting study in 1995 found that one in two males aged 14 – 25 admitted to having 
committed one or more offences,114 while another Home Office paper published in 2012 
used the PHOENIX repository to conduct a statistical analysis which concluded that 
young people aged between 10 – 17 years had in 2009/10 committed around 1.01 
million offences; 23% of the total number of offences recorded.115  
 
Young people have a disproportionate tendency towards ‘acquisitive offences’, such as 
shoplifting, robbery and offences against vehicles, and offences of criminal damage.116 
They are also far more likely to be reconvicted than adult offenders. The most recent 
Ministry of Justice statistics show that, while 28.1% of adult offenders were reconvicted 
within a year,117 39.9% of juvenile offenders were reconvicted in the same period.118 
This trend has been borne out in countless studies of recidivism in juveniles and is 
marked regardless of offence severity or disposal; an Audit Commission study in 1996 
found that 60% of those arrested by police on suspicion of an offence had at least one 
prior warning or caution119 while another study in 1998 found that 28% of those issued 
police cautions were either cautioned again or convicted in court over a five year 
period.120 In 2017, 28.3% of juvenile issued cautions  were proven to have reoffended 
within one year.121  
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The reoffending rates where a custodial disposal is given are very high indeed; a 1997 
Government study found that 84% of 14 – 17 year olds released from custody were 
reconvicted within two years,122 while in 2011 – 12, juveniles released from custody 
had a proven reoffending rate within one year of 72.6%.123 A comparable data study in 
2017 showed the rate to be only slightly less at 68.2%.124  
 
The net result is that juvenile and young adult disposals form a significant proportion of 
the PHOENIX collection. Moreover, most of the nominal listings will have been created 
during the data subject’s youth – ‘adult-onset’ offending is comparatively unusual; 
around 70% of all offenders start their offending behaviour as juveniles and those who 
engage in ‘adult-onset’ offending tend to do commit different types of offences, such as 
sex offences, thefts from work and fraud125 – and very many will include multiple 
disposals; statistically, juveniles who are reconvicted tend to be reconvicted for more 
than one offence; in 2017 the average number of offences committed by reconvicted 
children and juveniles was 3.92.126 
 
However, so far as the retention of these records for operational policing purposes is 
concerned, some discernible and distinctive patterns of criminality among offenders 
then emerge. The first is that there is a generally accepted starting point that there is a 
statistically increased probability that an individual convicted of an offence is likely to 
commit a further offence. The probability is greater in males than females, but very high 
in both, even if the individual has only committed one previous offence.127  One of the 
ultimate extensions of this proposition is that a number of offenders ultimately become 
recidivistic offenders and commit a disproportionately large number of offences; a 
Ministry of Justice analysis of PHOENIX in 2010 found that 18% of juveniles convicted 
of first offence in 2000 went on to be reconvicted of ten or more offences by 2009,128 
while the Home Office has previously claimed that some 5,000 recidivists commit 10% 
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of all crime, and that 100,000 persistent offenders commit half of all recorded 
offences.129  
 
So far as these individuals are concerned, the retention of criminality data might 
logically assist the police in an operational sense. These are active offenders and the 
police might reasonably need access to an extensive repository of criminality data to 
assist them in identifying where these offenders are most likely to offend, how they are 
likely to commit offences and what type of offence is likely to be committed by that 
offenders. Properly used, such data might allow for persistent offenders to be monitored 
by police or apprehended after having committed offences. 
 
However, the number of such persistent offenders is very small and, by contrast, almost 
all other offenders eventually ‘desist’. Desistance is ‘the long-term abstinence from 
criminal behaviour among those for whom offending had become a pattern of 
behaviour’130 and is far more common than might be imagined; indeed, Farmer et al  
simply state that ‘there is no longer any debate in the field that criminality is a pattern 
of behaviour from which most individuals eventually desist’.131 Some general 
desistance trends are equally well recognised. The first is that offending behaviour 
tends to peak very early in life. Individual studies offer different ages for ‘peak’ levels of 
offending, but these almost always point to an early age – some claim an age of 
sixteen,132 others seventeen133 and others eighteen134 - after which point offending 
almost always decreases markedly. This is referred to by criminologists as the ‘age-
crime curve’ and is universally recognised as a criminological constant; Manuna claims 
that ‘one of the few near certainties in criminal justice is that for most people, offending 
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behaviour peaks in their teenage years, and then starts to decline’,135 while Delisi is yet 
more blunt: 
 
The association between age and criminal offending is a brute fact. It does not require 
explanation because it is a constant seen in offending data across nations, across 
historical periods, across data sources, across sample composition and across forms 
of problem behaviour.136 
 
For some offenders, desistance comes after a brief pattern of offending137 which usually 
lasts not more than five years,138 after which time no further convictions are obtained. 
Offenders who reach age thirty and are still committing offences are generally rare, and 
such individuals will usually only desist after a ‘career’ of ten years, where they desist 
at all.139 Individuals who commit their first offence after age thirty are rare. One study 
into these found that they usually have short criminal ‘careers’ lasting less than three 
years in total, with recidivism rates of 42.1% and commit less than two offences each 
on average.140 By age forty, almost all offenders desist and rates of new convictions for 
those aged forty or over are very low indeed; one official study found that of the 
population of England and Wales born in 1953, only 3% were convicted of a first offence 
after reaching aged 38.141 
 
For a majority of those convicted of an offence, desistance occurs very quickly indeed 
and it is the case that ‘most offenders only have one court appearance resulting in a 
conviction’.142 Even among juvenile offenders, single-conviction records have a high 
prevalence; one Ministry of Justice longitudinal study in 2001 found that 44% of 
juveniles convicted of a first offence in 2000 had no further convictions when their 
records were re-examined in 2009.143 Indeed, a further Ministry of Justice study of all 
aged, known offenders and offending rates showed that, among members of the 
population born in 1953, 33.2% had a criminal record containing at least one conviction. 
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Of that proportion of individuals, 51.8% had only one conviction. Of the remainder, most 
offenders desisted relatively quickly; 16.6% of those with a criminal record had two 
convictions while only 18.1% had five or more convictions.144 Analysis of subsequent 
cohorts of individuals born in five-year intervals from 1953 to 1973 showed an almost 
identical pattern, with around 50% of those with convictions by age thirty having only 
one conviction.145  
 
What emerges, then, is that juveniles are more disposed to criminality than adults, that 
juveniles and young adults are more likely to be convicted of offences than adults, that 
criminality tends to tail off at around the mid-twenties or early thirties (at the latest) and 
that although reconviction rates are high, there are significant proportions of those 
convicted of offences who are either not reconvicted at all or are reconvicted of only 
one or two further offences. Only a very small, but nonetheless significant, proportion 
of those who are convicted of an offence go on to commit significant numbers of further 
offences. 
 
It follows, then, that PHOENIX must contain a significant number of records, likely in 
the millions, of individuals who have committed either one single offence or who have 
committed a small number of offences and have since been of no interest to the police 
whatsoever. Very many records, again likely numbering in the millions, will likely show 
a ‘cluster’ of offences committed by individuals in their youth who have since desisted 
from offences and not come to the attention of the police since. The records much more 
likely to have operational value to the police are those of recidivistic offenders who have 
not yet desisted. These are statistically significant, but a minority of the total holdings 
nonetheless; perhaps one-fifth of the PHOENIX holdings will relate to such individuals, 
but not much more than this.  
 
The key additional variable here is time since last conviction; the so-called ‘clear 
period’. Most of the studies undertaken use a ‘follow-up’ period of between six months 
and two years because to properly measure reconviction rates over a lengthy period 
requires a difficult and necessarily longitudinal study, but it is nonetheless widely 
accepted, even by keen proponents of ‘propensity’ as an evidential tool, that the longer 
a person goes without reconviction, the less likely they are to commit a further offence. 
                                                          




Convictions are likely to have probative value where they are ‘recent’; although a 
convicted person will remain statistically more likely to commit another offence than an 
unconvicted person for the remainder of their life, the relative likelihood will decrease 
steadily over time.146  
 
In 2012 the Ministry of Justice conducted a comprehensive analysis of recidivism rates 
over a nine year period following proven re-offending rates among the 617,024 or so 
individuals convicted, cautioned, reprimanded or warned in 2000.147 All of the data was 
taken from the PNC.148 It found similar patterns to those found in the shorter studies; 
namely that re-offending rates were higher among juveniles than among adult 
offenders,149 that those who committed four or more offences committed the most re-
offences (56% of the total) and that a small number of prolific recidivists (the most 
prolific 1% of re-offenders) committed 7% of re-offences.150   
 
What the study also showed, though, was that re-offending rates continued to increase 
beyond the ordinary two-year follow-up period. By the end of two year, the overall re-
offending rate for all offenders was 38.9%. After a further year, this increased to 45.6%, 
and to 50.2% after a fourth year. Interestingly, although re-offending rates continued to 
increase throughout the nine-year study, these began at five years to flatten quite 
markedly, with subsequent increases of 2%, 2%, 1.5%, 1.2% and 1% up to 58.9% 
overall after nine years.151  
 
While this certainly shows that re-offending rates over time are higher than those 
indicated in the shorter follow-up studies, what is also shown, it is submitted, is that 
after five years the rate of increase is very markedly smaller, and following a consistent 
downward trend. It must be presumed, therefore, that subsequent years would show a 
similar reduction in re-offending rates, until eventually the increase either stops or 
becomes sufficiently negligible as to be statistically insignificant.  
 
What is also significant, it is further submitted, is that even after nine years, the number 
of individuals who are not re-convicted of further offences remains very high. In short, 
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41.1% of all those convicted in 2000 had committed no further offences in the nine-
years subsequent. Presuming that the studies highlighted early are correct, this should 
mean that these individuals (or at least a very large proportion of them) had desisted, 
and would thereafter be of very little value to police in either crime prevention or crime 
detection. 
 
The 2012 study also provided an interesting analysis of re-conviction rates as 
compared to the original 2000 disposal. These show that re-conviction rates among 
those disposed of by caution showed a similar pattern to the general re-conviction 
trend, so that well over half of those re-convicted were so disposed in the first two years, 
and that by five years the vast majority of those who were reconvicted at all had been 
so, but also that re-conviction rates were much lower than the overall rate; 23.3% after 
two years, 34.7% after five years and 38% after nine.152 Although they too followed the 
same pattern of diminishing likelihood over time, re-conviction rates for those handed 
a custodial sentence were much higher; 59.4% at two years, 72.5% at five years and 
78.4% at nine.153  
 
This seems to support a dual contention. The first is that those who commit less serious 
offences (and are subsequently cautioned) are far less likely to be reconvicted of a 
subsequent offence than those who commit more serious offences (and are 
subsequently given a custodial sentence). This might support the position taken in 
Scotland, where ‘serious’ offences are retained under the ‘70/30 rule’, rather than the 
‘40/20 rule’. That notwithstanding, even the most serious offenders often desist; one 
recent study in Canada found that even those convicted of sex offences will often desist 
to almost the same level of non-reconviction risk as non-offenders, albeit at roughly 
double the ‘clear-period’ as those convicted of non-sex offences.154 
 
It is submitted that there exists a significant body of academic literature to show that 
desistance is sufficiently evidenced that there must exists a significant question mark 
over police claims that the retention of records on PHOENIX until each data subject 
reaches age 100 years aids in police operational processes. What this literature shows 
is that, while a criminal disposal does increase the likelihood of re-conviction, and that 
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this might allow police to focus resources on ‘known’ offenders, this likelihood 
decreases significantly over time even among those who do actually commit further 
offences or among those who commit serious offences.  
 
It therefore follows that there are many individuals, likely numbering in the millions, who 
are subject to PHOENIX listings which are now entirely inactive because the individuals 
listed either are not committing offences or are not being suspected of offences or in 
any event being reconvicted of them. There exists, therefore, a strong argument in 
favour of deleting at least some of these nominal listings from PHOENIX once a suitably 
lengthy ‘clear-period’ has passed to show that the individual has desisted.  
 
It is precisely this argument that was made by Soothill and Francis during the Five 
Constables case, and, it is submitted, the Court of Appeal were in error in treating it so 
dismissively. If the police contend that this position is in error, and minor and entirely 
inactive PHOENIX listings really are of ‘operational value’, then surely it is for them to 
make their case far more persuasively than the various anecdotal attempts that have 
been made to date. It should not be hard for them to do so; as the data controllers for 
the PHOENOX data they are uniquely placed to use their own data to show the value 
of their repository of criminality data. That they have failed entirely to do so, despite 
numerous opportunities afforded to them, must indicate that they are unable to show 
this, and their continued reliance on Parliamentary and judicial deference to them on 
their ‘operational needs’ further strengthens this contention. 
 
It is submitted that there remains no empirical support for the position offered by chief 
officers in England that the PHOENIX collection meaningfully assists in preventing and 
detecting crime. In truth, it is further submitted, the position is that described by Lord 
Kerr (albeit in reference to biometric criminality data): 
 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the fact of conviction merely provides the 
pretext for the assembly and preservation of a database which the police 
consider might be useful at some time in the future and that it has no direct causal 
connection to the actual detection of crime and the prevention of future offending.155 
 
                                                          
155 Above n.35 
232 
 
8.5 The deletion of certain records would solve the disclosure problem 
The problems inherent in the police retention police for criminality data have, over the last 
fifteen years, manifested themselves most abundantly when the PHOENIX data is used 
to perform a criminal record check on an individual subject to a nominal listing. There is a 
general, and it is submitted, mistaken, view that the retention of criminality data, and the 
subsequent use of it for criminal vetting purposes, are analogous. This error was made by 
Waller LJ in Five Constables case, who claimed that: 
 
It is important to emphasise at the outset that the complaint about retention flows 
in reality not from the retention itself but from the fact that, if retained, disclosure 
may follow. 
 
For reasons that will be made explicit in the next chapter of this research, such a simplistic 
approach is manifestly incorrect, because the (arguably unlawful and/or disproportionate) 
retention of data is a ground for legal challenge. Data Protection legislation affords legal 
rights and obligations in respect of unlawful data processing per se, where ‘processing’ 
includes collection, recording and storage.156 That disclosure follows from it is merely 
incidental, or perhaps better described as a different form of processing, to which near 
identical data protections apply157 and which ought additionally be borne in mind when 
determining the lawfulness of the retention itself.  
 
This is why this research has intentionally refrained, to as large an extent as possible, to 
refer to the disclosure of PHOENIX data in criminal record checks. The purpose of this 
research has been to highlight data protection deficiencies in the PHOENIX collection 
itself, rather than its use for vetting purposes, which, unlike the data retention deficiencies 
highlight in this research, has now began to attract extensive academic, judicial and 
legislative attention. However, it would be remiss not to at least address one particular 
issue in criminal record disclosure which could be rectified almost immediately if the 
recommendations of this research were to be implemented, even in part. 
 
This author has already outlined elsewhere the extensive, historical use of police 
collections of criminality data for vetting individuals applying for employment and voluntary 
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positions, as well as for visa applications and other safeguarding concerns.158 This was 
despite a police and Home Office supposition that the collection of criminal records was 
not to be used for vetting purposes unless exceptional circumstances justified 
otherwise.159  
 
This position was bulwarked by statute. In 1972, an independent committee, set up by 
NACRO, the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Ministry of Justice and headed by 
Lord Gardiner, published a report160 which provided that ‘most civilised countries 
recognise that it is in their interest to accept back into the community a person who, despite 
one or more convictions, goes straight for a sufficient number of years’.161 At the time the 
UK was the only western European country who did not limit the disclosure of criminal 
records in any way.162 Gardiner’s recommendation was that where a person has shown 
by their conduct subsequent to their conviction for an offence that they have rehabilitated 
themselves, the law should (subsequent to limited exceptions) treat that person as 
rehabilitated and ‘restore the offender to a position in society no less favourable than that 
of one who has not offended’.163  
The result was the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (the ‘ROA 1974’), intended ‘to 
support the rehabilitation into employment of reformed offenders who have stayed on the 
right side of the law’.164 The ROA 1974 does this by allowing a convicted person to 
consider that a conviction is ‘spent’, and therefore does not have to be disclosed when 
asked to disclose a criminal record,165 so long as they were not reconvicted of a new 
offence during the designated clear period.166  
 
This relatively simple premise has, in practice, become a set of incredibly complex 
provisions, due in part to the differing rules which try to balance the severity of the original 
offence and the qualifying period which should be attached. The original provisions have 
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been repeatedly amended,167 with the most recent coming in March 2014 when Chapter 
8 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 came into force. 
This provides that a conviction which results in a custodial sentence of forty-eight months 
is automatically never spent.168 Reductive changes to almost all other rehabilitation 
periods were made, so that convictions resulting in custodial sentences of between thirty 
and forty-eight months are spent seven years after the day that the relevant sentence is 
completed. The rehabilitation period for offenders sentenced to between six months and 
thirty months was reduced to four years and the period where the sentence imposed was 
less than six months was reduced to two years. The period of rehabilitation where an 
offender was fined was reduced to one year.169 Cautions are spent as soon as they are 
issued.170 
 
The ROA 1974, however, has never been universally applicable. Shortly after the creation 
of the ROA 1974, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975171 
(‘the 1975 Order’) was enacted172. This provides exemptions from the spent conviction 
rules because ‘while it is generally desirable to effect the rehabilitation of offenders and 
help them into employment, the public must be adequately protected in certain 
respects’.173 These occur, broadly speaking, when someone applies to a post involving 
contact with children174, vulnerable adults175 or large sums of money176 or when a question 
is asked relating to any of the professions listed in Schedule 1 of the 1975 Order (which 
includes teachers, solicitors/barristers and many other professional positions). As 
Carnwath LJ said in the Five Constables case: ‘there are many (arguably too many) 
exceptions to the principle of spent convictions.177 The excretions into the spent conviction 
principle seem to perpetuate routinely – some of those now included are stewards at 
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football matches, members of the Master Locksmiths Association,178 traffic wardens, taxi 
drivers and vets.179 
 
Until 1992, all answers to ‘exempted questions’ could be obtained by asking the police to 
check their records and return a ‘police report of character’ on the individual in question. 
The police bore the cost of these and issued them almost entirely at their discretion.180 
Where the police refused, or where the employer wanted to ask a question which was not 
‘exempted’, many individuals were told to make subject access requests181 to obtain 
copies of their police record prior to employment. These ‘DIY checks’ were only outlawed 
in March 2015.182 Such unlawful checks are not uncommon: one investigation found that 
some 11% of checks requested in 2005 were illegal (i.e. they did not relate to an exempted 
question)183 
 
In September 1993, the Government issued a consultation document184 proposing to put 
criminal record disclosure on a statutory footing.185 Largely resultant of police complaints 
that they were wasting valuable time and resource conducting checks and simultaneous 
pressure from employers and voluntary groups who wanted increased access to police 
records,186 the consultation proposed opening up criminal record checks to largely anyone 
who wanted them187 and commodifying them; allowing them to be ‘sold’ by a new 
organisation independent of the police.188  
 
The Government initially hesitated for fear of a public backlash, but the reaction instead 
was one of ‘complete indifference’.189 Duly emboldened, the Government then moved to 
pass the Police Act 1997,190 which created the statutory framework for criminal record 
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disclosure. The regime, which has been amended so often since that the Law Commission 
described it in 2017 as ‘hard to understand and inaccessible to users’,191 broadly provides 
for three different types of criminal record disclosures. The first is the ‘basic check’, which 
provides all unspent convictions and conditional cautions192 held in ‘central records’.193 
These can be obtained by any employer in any circumstance.194 A ‘standard check’ 
provides details of ‘all relevant matters’ held on police records.195 As originally enacted, a 
standard check was intended to answer exempted questions,196 therefore ‘all relevant 
matters’ were all convictions, cautions, reprimands and warnings, spent or unspent, kept 
in ‘central records’.197 It is perhaps worth noting that there is nothing in the legislation 
which provides that ‘central records’ are themselves a ‘complete record’ and certainly they 
were not supposed to be so in 1997 when the Police Act came onto the statute book; the 
police were (allegedly) weeding records at that time with Home Office complicity and 
occasional Parliamentary debate on that subject.  
 
The most stringent check is the ‘enhanced check’. As originally prescribed, these were 
intended only for those with regular contact with children,198 vulnerable adults199 or one of 
many specified positions listed in the statute or in other legislation.200 These also included 
all convictions and cautions, spent or unspent,201 as well as information provided by a 
chief officer, which in the chief officer’s opinion, ‘might be relevant’ and ‘ought be 
included’.202 The ‘information’ included as a chief officer’s discretion was to later found to 
be largely taken from both the PNC ‘event history’ and the Police National Database, such 
                                                          
191 The Law Commission, Criminal Records Disclosure: Non-Filterable Offences (Law Com. No.371, 31 
January 2017) 9 
192 Per s.112(2)(a) of the Police Act 1997, as amended by s.84(a) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012. Simple cautions are therefore not disclosed on a basic certificate, nor are spent convictions. 
193 Defined by s.112(3) of the Police Act 1997 as ‘such records held for the use of police forces 
generally’. 
194 ‘DBS checks: guidance for employers’ (Disclosure and Barring Service, 3 April 
2019.<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/dbs-check-requests-guidance-for-employers#overview> 
(accessed 16 April 2019) 
195 Per s.113(3)(a) of the Police Act 1997 
196 Per s.113(2) of the Police Act 1997 
197 Per s.113(5)(I)(ii) of the Police Act 1997 
198 Per s.115(3) of the Police Act 1997 
199 Per s.115(4) of the Police Act 1997 
200 Per s.115(2)(b) of the Police Act 1997 
201 Per s.115(6)(a)(i) of the Police Act 1997 
202 Per s.115(7)(a)(b) of the Police Act 1997 
237 
 
as allegations made which resulted in no charge,203 acquittals,204 criminal contacts with 
family members205 and contact with social services.206 
 
The entire system of disclosure was to be administered by an independent, public/private 
body who would have ‘read-only’ access to PHOENIX for the purpose of conducting 
checks and issuing disclosure certificates.207 The Criminal Records Bureau (‘the CRB’) 
was opened in March 2002208 and was immediately deluged by disclosure applications in 
the wake of the Soham murders.209 The subsequent opening of the vetting floodgates led 
to what this author has described elsewhere as ‘a vetting epidemic in England and 
Wales’,210 with criminal record disclosures rising from around 900,000211 in 1992, 1.76 
million in 2002212 to 3.3 million in 2007.213  
 
The CRB was plagued by controversy from its inception and was closed December 2012 
and replaced by the Disclosure and Barring Service (‘the DBS’) in December 2012.214 The 
DBS has continued the commercialisation and expansion of criminal record disclosure 
started by its predecessor; it’s most recent annual accounts proudly boasting of adding 
the issuing of basic checks (which were only finally ‘launched’ in January 2018) to its 
‘existing Disclosure products’. Last year it issued a total of 4.6 million criminal disclosure 
checks.215 
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Those subjected to disclosures which cost them employment opportunities were 
understandably less impressed by the CRB/BDS’s ‘product’, and very quickly the police 
found themselves facing legal challenges to the disclosure of records under the Police Act 
1997. These have followed two broad lines. The first involve challenges to the ‘additional 
information’ included on enhanced certificates.216 These saw a reconfiguration of the test 
to be used when deciding whether such disclosure is Human Rights compliant,217 
recommendations to reformulate the statutory framework218 and ultimately primary 
legislation to have resulted in amendments to the legislative framework219 which made the 
test for disclosure more stringent220 and introduced an independent monitor221 to oversee 
disputes over intelligence data use. 
 
This line of criminality data dispute largely lies outwith the scope of this research, save a 
passing interest in the possible use of ‘event histories’ as part of disclosures.222 The 
second line of challenge, which has far more relevance to this research, involves the 
disclosure of old and minor convictions as part of ‘standard’ criminal record checks. As we 
have seen, until 2006 the police were in the habit of deleting old and minor criminal records 
(or at least they had a policy which stated that they were supposed to do so). This, 
presumably, must have been in the knowledge of Parliament when they passed the 1997; 
as has been shown, ‘weeding policies; had been discussed by Government ministers and 
backbenchers alike in Parliament for many years prior to the passing of the Police Bill in 
1996. It must reasonably be presumed, therefore, that Parliament intended for the new 
criminal record regime to disclose the criminality data available on the PNC, rather than 
any complete record. 
 
That notwithstanding, once the police abandoned their weeding policy, endorsed by the 
decision in the Five Constables case, judicial review challenges, based on a lack of 
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proportionality as balanced against human rights concerns,223 began to emerge against 
the disclosure of minor or aged criminality data on standard certificates.  
 
In R (on the application of T and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept. and 
another,224 an individual who had been given two police warnings for bicycle thefts as 
juvenile and another who had been given a police caution for the shop-theft of a packet of 
false fingernails contested the inclusion of these on a standard criminal record check 
which had resulted in their removal from a university course and employment as a care 
sector worker respectively.225 The Supreme Court held that the disclosure of this 
information was ‘not in accordance with the law’ because the blanket nature of the 
statutory regime meant that there were no safeguards against the kind of arbitrary 
interference in rights which occurred in these cases.226 It also found that such disclosure 
was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’, because these disposals bore ‘no rational 
relationship to the aim of protecting the safety of children’ or ‘’was disproportionate to the 
likely benefit in achieving the aim of protecting people receiving care’.227 
 
What no-one, including the Government, seems to have recognised is that these warnings 
and cautions would have been deleted until the 2002 Weeding Rules, had these remained 
in force, and so would not have been available for disclosure. Had the Government 
recognised this, it might have found a ready answer to the problem the Supreme Court 
had set for it.  
 
Instead, the Government decided to try and implement a statutory ‘filter’228 to allow the 
police to retain all of the PHOENIX data but to disallow the inclusion of certain aged, minor 
criminality data on standard disclosure certificates. These created ‘protected cautions’,229 
which are those cautions which do not relate to a ‘listed offence’ and were issued two or 
more years ago (for juveniles)230 or six or more years ago (for adults).231 These were not 
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be to disclosed.232 A protected conviction233 is one which does not relate to a ‘listed 
offence’,234 which did not result in imprisonment or a detention order235 and which was 
disposed five and half (for juveniles)236 or eleven years (for adults) previously.237 These 
would not be disclosed as long as no other convictions or cautions were recorded.238 
‘Listed offences’ included almost all serious sexual and violence offences and a wide array 
of other ‘non-filterable offences’.239 The list is very inaccessible, according to the Law 
Commission, as it is variously contained in different statutes and in an ‘operational list’ 
maintained by the Home Office.240 The list is very substantive, and seems to expand 
exponentially; this author submits that there are, at April 2019, some 1,000 or so ‘listed 
offences’ offences which are never filtered. 
 
What is of interest to this research is that what the Government had effectively attempted 
to do was to implement a statutory ‘step-down’ process, similar in nature to, but wildly 
more restrictive than, the step-down process initiated by ACPO in 2006 and abandoned 
after the Five Constables case. Remarkably, and almost by accident, the decision in R(T) 
and the Government response to it has effectively overturned the decision in the Five 
Constables case, or at least that portion of it which relates to the step-down process.  
 
However, it was immediately apparent that the new ‘filter’ would be challenged; one 
analysis described the filter as ‘slightly more nuanced but still very restrictive and does not 
reflect an adequate balance…two minor offences will always be disclosed’.241 In 
Gallagher’s Application for Judicial Review,242 that concern was deemed sufficient to 
declare that the filtering system was still unlawful, but this time on the limited grounds that 
a ‘multiple conviction rule’ does not properly reflect the severity of offences or propensity 
to offend and may produce ‘eccentric consequences’ which are disproportionate.243 The 
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majority of the Supreme Court also found that the potential disclosure of reprimands, 
warnings and youth cautions was a ‘category error’ and ‘an error in principle’ because the 
disclosure of these was in direct contravention of the rehabilitative and redemptive 
purpose of these disposals.244 
 
The net result is that the Government will once more have to revisit their ‘filter’. Early 
indications are that they intend to add more ‘filters’, so that less disposals, especially those 
involving juveniles, will be disclosed.245 The merits or otherwise of such an approach are 
for a different research piece to this, but it is submitted that the Government might want 
to consider a simple point of principle elucidated by the European Court of Human Rights 
which might offer a far less complex solution to the problem it has created: 
 
It is clear that if the applicant was able to have her data deleted, then it would no 
longer be capable of disclosure.246 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
The decision in the Five Constables case is open to criticism in many regards. It 
misrepresents the use of criminality data in the criminal justice system; a disingenuous 
position offered by the very individuals who ought to know the true position. It further 
makes the common error of relying on Soham as justification for iniquitous practices which 
disproportionately impact on the rights of citizens not to be subject to excessive data 
collation. This error is perhaps understandable among news-media and internet writers. It 
is fundamentally obtuse when made by appellate judges. 
 
The most damaging error, however, is in deferring entirely to the word of police officers 
on the ‘usefulness’ of criminality data which does not stand to scrutiny when placed 
against the countless academic studies which show that old, inactive criminal records offer 
little assistance in either the prevention of new offences or the detection of these. If the 
police, who in PHOENIX hold the single largest repository of criminality data in England 
and Wales, continue to claim that this data is of operational use, the onus must now be 
on them to offer empirical support for that proposition, particularly in light of the widely 
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accepted consensus positions that most offenders, even the most serious ones, desist 
from their offending behaviour after a sufficiently lengthy passage of time.  
The police posit that an isolated conviction for theft recorded a decade or more previously 
is of operational value to them. This position is contrary to both academic research and 
common sense. It cannot continue to be left unchallenged by the very organs of the state 
whose role is to afford members of the public an opportunity to put police processes under 
scrutiny. 
For decades, the police accepted that deleting certain records was of no operational 
impact to them. That position remains extant in Scotland, where presumably police have 
the same operational values and processes but where records continue to be deleted 
once a sufficient passage of time indicates that these are of sufficient irrelevance that their 
continued retention is excessive, for data protection (and indeed any conceivable) 
purposes. There are no suggestions that deletion there impinges upon the prevention or 
detection of offences, the processes of the criminal justice system or that these raise the 
spectre of child abduction offences.  
 
The risk of deleting such records, based on the experience of Scottish criminal justice and 
scores of criminological studies, is extremely small. The continued retention of that data 
conflicts with data protection principles and is causing significant problems with the 
disclosure of criminality data, which both could be simply avoided if a deletion process, 








The scope for a European jurisprudential challenge 
to the Five Constables decision 
 
9.1 Introduction 
If the decision in the Five Constables case cannot be successfully revisited on the grounds 
outlined in the previous chapter, it may in the alternative (or perhaps even concurrently) 
be possible to do so by an alternative means linked to, but not strictly limited by, the 
applicable Data Protection legislative provisions. 
 
In this final substantive chapter of this research, which concludes the substantive analysis 
and evaluation of the fourth research question, the author will return to themes identified 
and analysed in Chapter 2 and consider whether the indefinite retention of criminality data 
by the state on PHOENIX might contravene human rights provisions. This will be done by 
examining the legislation and jurisprudential developments in respect of the police 
national collections of DNA and fingerprints (‘Biometric Criminality Data’ or ‘BCD’) and 
custody images – the historical and contemporary bedfellows of the collection of 
criminality data held on PHOENIX – which have transpired since the Five Constables case 
and analysing how the principles posited in these might reasonably be transferred to the 
PHOENIX data collection in future. 
 
9.2 The ‘Right to Privacy’  
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (‘the 
ECoHR’) provides a number of fundamental rights and freedoms applicable to citizens of 
each state (which includes the United Kingdom) which is a signatory. Of particular 
relevance is Article 8(1) of the ECoHR, which provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
  
This is a qualified right, as per Article 8(2) it is provided that: 
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
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society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 8(1) is usually expressed as providing a qualified ‘right to privacy’. It had long been 
presumed that criminality data, particularly that collected on PHOENIX, did not ‘engage’ 
Article 8(1) because convictions occur in court, which is open to the public and press, so 
that a conviction (and data relating to it) could not constitute ‘private’ data1 and so any 
challenge relating to the lawfulness of the data must fail. ‘ 
 
9.3 Criminality data and Art.8: the decision in MM 
In the Five Constables case, the Information Commissioner made detailed 
representations that the retention of criminality data engaged Article 8(1). These were 
dismissively rejected in two paragraphs of the judgment. Firstly, Waller LJ simply stated 
that ‘I am not persuaded that Article 8(1) is engaged at all in relation to the retention 
(original emphasis) of the record of a conviction…Even if that were wrong, the processing 
is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society’.2 The judge rather 
unhelpfully offered no further explanation as to why either of these views were expressed.  
 
Carnwath LJ agreed,3 positing that the public nature of court proceedings meant the fact 
of conviction must be public information, before dismissing any analogy to the almost 
simultaneous litigation4 brought regarding the indefinite retention of all DNA samples by 
police, because he believed that a distinction should be drawn between data held on those 
whose guilt had not been formally determined and those with convictions whose guilt had 
so been.5  
 
While certainly more balanced than the position offered by Waller LJ, this analysis rather 
ignores the matter of cautions, which are not legally considered ‘convictions’ (although 
they do involve an admission of guilt on the part of the recipient), warnings and reprimands 
(which require no admission of guilt at all) and PNfDs (which imply no finding of guilt 
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whatsoever) – all of which are held in the PHOENIX repository and which are not formally 
issued in the public forum of the courtroom. Indeed, as has been shown, one of the 
predominant advantages to the recipient of these disposals is that they are usually issued 
in private. It should be recalled, perhaps, that one of the five individuals in the Five 
Constables case was seeking the deletion of a reprimand, rather than a conviction, which 
makes this oversight rather more surprising. 
 
The notion that Article 8 was not engaged by the mere retention of criminality data was 
fatally undermined a matter of days after the Five Constables decision, when the Supreme 
Court passed its judgment in R (on the Application of L) v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner.6 Although this case involved the retention and disclosure in a CRB criminal 
record check of non-conviction data, Lord Hope fully addressed the issue of conviction 
retention: 
 
Information about an applicant’s convictions which is collated and stored in central 
records can fall within the scope of ‘private life’ within the meaning of Article 8(1). 
It is, in one sense, public, because the convictions took place in public. But the 
systematic storing of this information in central records means that it is 
available…long after the event when everyone other than the person concerned is 
likely to have forgotten about it. As it recedes into the past, it becomes part of the 
person’s private life which must be respected. Moreover [many of the disposals 
recorded] …takes place behind closed doors. A caution takes place in private [or] 
it may include allegations of criminal behaviour where there was insufficient 
evidence to prosecute.7 
 
The notion that the collation and retention of criminality does not engage Article 8(1) was 
definitively shown to be misconceived by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the 
ECtHR’) in MM v the United Kingdom.8 The facts in MM bear a rather striking similarity to 
those in the Five Constables case. MM had made an ill-advised attempt to help reconcile 
the separation of her son and daughter in law, the latter having intimated that she was to 
leave Northern Ireland and return to Australia with the applicant’s grandchild, by taking 
her granddaughter and not returning the child to her mother at an appointed time.9 The 
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police were called and the child was found, unharmed and with the applicant, and returned 
to her mother the next morning. The decision was taken not to charge MM but instead to 
issue a caution for ‘child abduction’,10 which was duly recorded on ‘Causeway’; the 
Northern Irish equivalent to PHOENIX.11  
 
In response to a query raised by MM three years later, the police confirmed that the caution 
would be retained for a total of five years in accordance with the 2000 Weeding Rules.12 
However, that caution was not deleted because the police in Northern Ireland appeared 
to have taken lead from, and followed, the 2006 Guidelines so that nothing was ‘weeded’ 
from the system at all after these were implemented.13 MM became aware of this when 
she subsequently applied for a position as a family support worker. Her criminal record 
check revealed the caution and her application was refused, notwithstanding an additional 
clarification provided by the Northern Ireland Criminal Records Office explaining the 
circumstances of the caution.14  
 
She duly complained to the Criminal Record Office and the police data controller, both of 
whom sympathised and offered to provide additional information to assist for vetting 
purposes, but both refused to delete the caution.15 When she applied, and was rejected 
after a criminal record check, for a second similar employment post, she issued 
proceedings directly to the ECtHR to have the caution deleted from her record.16 
 
The Government initially represented that MM should have her case struck out as an 
abuse of process, arguing that she should have first either complained to the Information 
Commissioner, issued judicial review proceedings against the police, or both.17 This 
argument was dismissed for reasons abundantly apparent from the analysis provided in 
chapter seven of this research; any judicial review proceedings, brought at considerable 
cost and time, would inevitably fail under the applicability of the precedent set in the Five 
Constables case, while an application to the Information Commissioner would have 
amounted to little more than a fruitless paper-chasing exercise for much the same 
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16 Ibid [19] 
17 Ibid [154] 
246 
 
reasons.18 The Court then moved to consider whether Article 8(1) was engaged by the 
collation and retention of criminality data. They concluded definitively that it was,19 
clarifying that: 
 
Both [author’s emphasis] the storing of information relating to an individual’s private 
life and the release of such information come from within the scope of Article 
8(1)…Even public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is 
systematically collected and stored in files held by authorities…This is all the more 
true where the information concerns a person’s distant past…The data in question 
constitute both ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ for the purposes of the 
DPA 1998. In this regard, although data contained in the criminal record are, in one 
sense, public information, their systematic storing in central records means they 
are available for disclosure long after the event…Thus as a conviction or caution 
itself recedes into the past, it becomes part of a person’s private life which must be 
respected.20 
 
With Article 8(1) therefore engaged, the question to be resolved was whether the 
imposition into a person’s private life made by the retention of the data was in ‘accordance 
with the law’. After reviewing the extant jurisprudence on this point, the ECtHR reiterated 
that this means that ‘the measure must have some basis in domestic law and [authors 
emphasis] be compatible with the rule of law’.21 Statutory provisions necessarily satisfy 
the former, while the latter implies that the measure be ‘accessible and foreseeable, that 
is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his conduct’, and 
also ‘afford adequate protection against arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity 
the scope of discretion conferred to competent authorities’.22  
 
As to whether the UK had met these requirements, the Grand Chamber made a number 
of pertinent points. Firstly, it noted23 that the 1987 Recommendations relating to police 
held data24 provided that open-ended and indiscriminate data collection must only be 
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undertaken where specific [author’s emphasis] legislation is enacted to authorise it.25 It 
also noted26 that the 1987 Recommendations provided that the duration of storage must 
take into account rehabilitation of offenders, spent convictions, the age of the data subject 
and the category of data concerned.27 Against this backdrop, the court noted that both 
conviction and non-conviction data was being retained, that retention was effectively 
automatic and that the data was being retained until the subject was aged 100. This, said 
the Court, showed there to be ‘no doubt that the scope and application of the system for 
retention and disclosure is extensive’.28 
 
In light of such an extensive collection, and recognising that this may [authors emphasis] 
be justiciable for the purposes of criminal record checks, the court then summarised the 
position to be that: 
 
The indiscriminate and open-ended collection of criminal records is unlikely to 
comply with Article 8 in the absence of clear and detailed statutory regulations 
clarifying the safeguards applicable and setting out the rules governing, inter alia, 
the circumstances in which data can be collected, the duration of their storage, the 
use to which they can be put and the circumstances in which they may be 
destroyed. Further, the greater the scope of the recording system, and thus the 
greater the amount and sensitivity of the data held…the more important the content 
of the safeguards to be applied.29 
 
The Court then finally considered whether or not there had been a violation of Article 8, 
considering particularly the system in operation in Northern Ireland (which largely mirrored 
that in England and Wales). It held that there was, because there was an 
 
…absence of a clear legislative framework for the collection and storage of data 
[and an] absence of any mechanism for independent review of a decision to retain 
or disclose data. The cumulative effect of these shortcomings is that there are 
insufficient safeguards in the system for retention and disclosure of criminal 
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records data…the retention and disclosure of the applicant’s caution data cannot 
be regarded as being in accordance with the law.30 
 
The decision in MM resulted in Ireland passing legislation to introduce a principle of ‘spent’ 
convictions where ‘spent’ meant that the conviction would be retained but not disclosed 
as part of a criminal record check.31 This legislative response, which effectively created a 
‘step-down’ process similar to that created by ACPO in England and Wales in 2006, has 
been criticised by one commentator as a ‘partial resolution’…a minimal statement of what 
is required which may not fully meet the requirements of Article 8 of the ECoHR’.32  
 
So far as England and Wales is concerned, it is submitted that the judgment places the 
legality of the system of collation and retention of criminal records in England and Wales 
into significant question. Quite simply, it is submitted that the system is demonstrably 
incompliant with Article 8 because the current policy for retaining criminality data on 
PHOENIX involves indefinite retention of all criminality data. This must constitute a blanket 
retention policy and ‘the blanket disclosure and [author’s emphasis] retention of records 
violates Article 8’.33  
 
Additionally, compliance with Article 8 requires that there be a ‘clear legislative framework’ 
for the collection and retention of criminal records data. While there are certainly 
numerous pieces of legislation relating to the disclosure of criminal records, so far as 
collation and retention is concerned, no such framework exists. As has been shown, the 
only legislative provisions for the retention of criminality data are those offered by data 
protection legislation,34 s.27(4) of PACE and the various statutes relating to recordable 
offences outlined in chapter 3 of this research. What these provide is that the Secretary 
of State may by regulations make provision for recording in police national records 
convictions, cautions, reprimands and warnings35 and it also provides an exhaustive list 
of what type of offences might be recorded but there is nothing as to the duration of 
                                                          
30 Ibid [206 – 207]  
31 Per s.5 – 6 of the Criminal Justice (Spent Convictions and Certain Disclosures) Act 2016 
32 T.J. McKintyre and I. O’Donnell, ‘Criminals, Data Protection and the right to a second chance’ (2017) 
58 Irish Jurist 27, 55 
33 R. Easton, ‘The Right to be Forgotten’ (2014) 178 (27) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 408 
34 The use of this for the purpose of satisfying Article 8 so far as criminal records is concerned was 
considered, and rejected as insufficient, by the Court in MM (at [199][203]) 
35 For the purposes of s.27(4), ‘convictions’ include cautions, warnings and reprimands. This 
‘clarification’ was not part of the original enactment and, in fact, was only added by s.85 of the Protection 
of Freedoms Act 2012, presumably to rectify what had been a fairly glaring omission from the statute 
books up to that point. 
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storage, their use or circumstances in which they might be destroyed, nor does it provide 
any mechanism for seeking to remove data held on the PNC.  
 
All of that is left to the police, who continue to deal with this through the issuing of guidance 
documents but they do not, because they cannot, provide ‘a clear legislative framework’ 
for this. The police guidance, it is submitted, is therefore insufficient for this purpose; the 
ECoHR in MM made it abundantly clear that police (and indeed Home Office) guidance 
alone was insufficient to satisfy Article 8(2).36  
 
The decision in MM, which is merely persuasive in England and Wales, has not permeated 
into domestic jurisprudence as perhaps might be hoped. Arguably the leading authority in 
domestic law which offers a consideration of MM is R (on the application of Catt) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another.37 Catt was not strictly speaking a 
‘criminal records’ case; rather, it involved a complaint that a record had been created on 
the ‘National Domestic Extremism Database’ which referred to the political activities of a 
91 year old ‘peace activist’ appellant who had been arrested twice, but not charged with 
any offence. Although not himself subject to a nominal listing on PHOENIX, his name 
appeared in the nominal records of two other data subjects who were listed on 
PHOENIX.38  
 
Despite accepting that ‘things have moved on’ since the decision in the Five Constables 
case and that there was ‘no longer any doubt as to the applicability of Article 8 on the 
systematic retention of processible personal data’,39 the Supreme Court then, it is 
submitted, made precisely the same errors that the Court of Appeal did in that earlier 
judgment. It heard anecdotal evidence from police officers as to the ‘operational value’ of 
the data held, and accepted this almost prima facie as being justification for retaining the 
data for ‘the protection and detection of crime’.40 The Court referred the appellant to the 
viability of making a complaint to the Information Commissioner under the DPA 1998,41 
even though such a complaint surely would have fallen on stony ground in light of the 
decision in Five Constables case. 
 
                                                          
36 Above n.9 [203] 
37 [2015] UKSC 9 
38 Ibid [18] [22]  
39 Ibid [16] 
40 Ibid [29 – 30] 
41 Ibid [34] 
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Moreover, the Court then made, it is submitted, two fundamental errors of applicability as 
regards the decision in MM. The first was to make the critical error which continues to 
permeate this area of data protection law and to deal with retention of personal data as 
inexplicably linked to its use and, more specifically, the disclosure of it. In MM, as outlined 
above, the two issues were (it is submitted, correctly) treated as interlinked, but separate, 
issues; that is to say that the simple retention of criminality data must be ‘in accordance 
with the law’ on its own merits. The Supreme Court did not seem to agree, and 
distinguished the instant case with MM on the grounds that: 
 
There has been no disclosure to third parties, and the prospect of future disclosure 
is limited by comprehensive restrictions. It is limited to policing purposes, and is 
subject to an internal proportionality review and the review by the Information 
Commissioner and the courts.42 
 
This analysis fails in three regards. Firstly, this type of information is precisely the kind 
which is liable to be disclosed as part of the discretion permitted to chief officers in the 
issuing of an enhanced DBS certificate,43 so is perfectly disclosable to third parties in 
certain circumstances and therefore not strictly limited to ‘policing purposes’. Secondly, 
the Information Commissioner has no authority to enforce any possible data breach 
invoked by the retention of this type of criminality data because s/he is bound by the Five 
Constables decision and, thirdly, the Courts are equally bound by the decision in that case 
until or unless an appellate court overrules it. All of that notwithstanding, there is nothing 
in MM which indicates that this is a pertinent, let alone the distinguishing, determining 
factor in considering whether data collation and retention is of itself is ‘in accordance with 
the law’. 
  
The second error of applicability, it is submitted, was that the Court erred in accepting that 
the various piecemeal statutory provisions outlined above, and the applicable guidelines 
supplementary to them, were sufficient to satisfy the requirement outlined in MM that there 
must be a ‘clear and detailed statutory regulations clarifying the safeguards applicable 
and setting out the rules’ governing the storage of data generally, and particularly 
criminality data. This was justified, without any reference to any legal authority, as being 
                                                          
42 Ibid [15] 
43 A fuller examination of these is offered below and at C. Baldwin, ‘Necessary intrusion or Criminalising 
the Innocent? An exploration of modern criminal vetting’ (2012) 76 (2) Journal of Criminal Law 140 
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because ‘the rules do need not be statutory, provided that they operate within a framework 
of law and that there are effective means of enforcing them’.44 It is difficult to reconcile that 
position with that in MM; indeed, it appears to be a rather clear and contradictory 
misapplication of it.  
 
It is perhaps little wonder that one commentator later lamented that the decision in Catt 
was ‘rather frustrating, particularly bearing in mind the non-statutory nature of the 
database and the criticisms made in MM’45 while another suggested that ‘perhaps there 
is a need for a Police Ombudsman in England and Wales to whom parties might appeal 
on such questions in a timely and cost-free manner, rather than use the courts. The 
current policy seems to give a great deal of discretion to the police – perhaps too much? 
[If appealed] It would not be surprising if the ECtHR took a less flexible view’.46 
 
Whatever the merits of creating an independent body with (presumably) statutory powers 
to oversee the use of criminality data by the police, what remains unclear is why, in light 
of the continuing judicial reticence to apply fully the principles enunciated in MM, 
Parliament has not legislated on this issue. Perhaps it remains the case that Parliament 
(and indeed the judiciary) prefer to give the police ‘the whip hand’ on matters which they 
consider to be police operational issues,47 and this has resulted in a ‘broad discretion in 
relation to the retention of data about both convicted criminals and those who are merely 
suspects’,48 but it is submitted that it is now time for Parliament to legislate. It would not 
only ensure compliance but would also give Parliament a welcome, and it is submitted, 
long-overdue opportunity to debate the issue properly.  
 
The suggestion that the retention, storage and use of criminality data is due Parliamentary 
consideration and legislation is a long-standing proposition; in the IT decision which 
preceded the Five Constables appeal, the IT commented that, so far as the expanding 
use of criminality data on the PNC was concerned: 
 
                                                          
44 Ibid [11] 
45 M. Oswald, ‘Joining the dots – intelligence and proportionality’ (2013) 13 (5) Privacy and Data 
Protection Journal 6 
46 H. Johnson, ‘Data Retention – scope of police powers’ (2015) 2 Communications Law 56, 58. In 
January 2019, the ECtHR did precisely that and found a violation against Mr. Catt. This is analysed in 
brief in the next chapter of this research. 
47 See the lead pronouncements in the Five Constables case and also H. Johnson, ‘Data Retention – 
scope of police powers’ (2015) 2 Communications Law 56, 58 
48 Ibid, 56 
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If the government wishes the PNC to have that role then it needs to legislate 
accordingly. This would provide the opportunity for Parliamentary debate as to how 
best to provide an appropriate and proper legislative framework so that there is a 
clear understanding of data ownership and obligations with proper safeguards.49 
 
That proposition was rejected in the Five Constables appeal by Waller LJ, who claimed 
that ‘I see no reason why it needs to be authorised by specific legislation. The Data 
Protection Act 1998 already provides an appropriate framework, in accordance with the 
Directive, for regulating data ownership and providing proper safeguards’.50 This approach 
was expressly that rejected by the ECtHR in MM and it is submitted, therefore, that it is 
now time for the legislature to conduct that reconsideration in full.  
 
9.4 The ECtHR rejection of unfettered police powers regarding the 
collation and storage of biometric criminality data 
As has been illustrated in chapter two of this research, the police collection of criminality 
data has never consisted solely of collating and storing data relating to offences, suspects 
and convicted individuals. The police have for centuries also retained extensive 
collections of photographs, fingerprints and, more recently, bodily samples, including DNA 
(collectively now referred to as ‘Biometric Criminality Data’, or ‘BCD’), which were 
intrinsically linked to the ‘bare’ criminal record data to provide a fuller picture of each 
individual listed. 
 
For almost the entirety of that collection, as with the ‘criminal records’ data now stored on 
PHOENIX, the police have enjoyed an almost unfettered discretion on what they might 
collect, store and retain. The same permissive PACE provisions which authorised the 
collection of criminal records, also authorised the collection of fingerprints and other 
samples51 which might be retained indefinitely if the suspect was convicted but which had 
to be destroyed if a person was not subsequently convicted of the offence52 but no further 
guidance on the collation or storage of this data was provided. 
                                                          
49 The Chief Constable of Humberside (and four others) v The Information Commissioner, Information 
Tribunal Appeal Numbers EA/2007/0096, 98, 99, 108, 127 (21 July 2008) [99] 
50 [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 [66] This position should be contrasted with that offered by Hughes LJ, who 
suggested that amendments could conceivably be made to the regime, but that ‘none of that is for me. 
It is for Parliament’ [112] 
51 Per ss.61 – 63 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as originally enacted. 




The police penchant for ignoring the requirement to delete PHOENIX data in a timely 
manner also seemed to have permeated their approach to their BCD repository. This 
became apparent in May 2000 when DNA was used to implicate two separate individuals 
to a rape and a murder respectively; however, both convictions were overturned on appeal 
because the DNA samples which had linked them to the offences had been unlawfully 
retained after acquittals in prior investigations.53 Rather than admonish the police, 
Parliament instead elected to legislate to significantly expand the retention powers of the 
police as regards BCD in 2001 so that these could be taken from anyone arrested in 
connection with a recordable offence and subsequently retained indefinitely by police for 
use in crime detection, prevention, investigation and prosecution.54 
 
In a similar vein to those who complained to the Information Commissioner about the 
indefinite retention of their PHOENIX data, the new legislative provisions gave almost 
immediate rise to complaints from individuals who objected to their BCD being indefinitely 
retained. The issue was ultimately considered by the House of Lords in 2004 after two 
individuals challenged the police retention of their BCD despite the conclusion of 
prosecutions against them which did not result in convictions.55 The Judicial Committee 
ruled unanimously that the provisions were not contrary to Article 8 and that the samples 
could be retained. Indeed, only Baroness Hale believed that the collation and retention of 
such criminality data even engaged Article 8,56 but in any event that the collation of a ‘DNA 
database’ was justified because the ‘whole community, as well as individuals whose 
samples are collected, benefits from there being as large a database as it is possible to 
have’.57 The analogy with the police criminality data collection on PHOENIX is self-evident, 
where an almost identical approach can be, and indeed has been, taken. 
 
However, in a widely-publicised judgment, that position was disapproved by the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR in 2008.58 Here it was noted that the United Kingdom was the only 
signatory state which permitted the near automatic collation, and indefinite retention, of all 
                                                          
53 R v Weir (26 May 2000) CA (Crim) and R v D (Attorney General’s reference No.3/1999) [2001] 2 AC 
91 
54 Per s.64(1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, inserted by s.82 of the Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 2001. 
55 R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, R (on the application of Marper) v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 [11 – 12]  
56 Ibid [73] 
57 Ibid [78] 
58 S and Marper v UK [2008] ECHR 30562/04 
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BCD for both convicted and acquitted persons.59 The Court affirmed that the mere storage 
of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference for the 
purposes of Article 8(1) and that the subsequent use of that data is only instructive as to 
whether ‘private life’ aspects are being adversely affected.60 Both cellular and DNA 
samples are ‘personal data’ for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998 where they 
are held by those who might identify individuals from them61 and the retention of these 
constitute an interference with Article 8 rights.62 The same determination was made in 
respect of fingerprints.63 
 
The question was, therefore, whether Article 8(2) might justify the interference. After 
considering the Lady Hale’s proposition that the public interest in retaining information 
which assisted in crime prevention and detection against the rights of individuals under 
Article 8(1), the Court held that it did not and that a violation of Article 8 had occurred.64 
The ratio decidendi of that decision, which has been oft cited subsequently, was that: 
 
the Court is struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of 
retention... The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravity of the 
offence with which the individual was originally suspected or of the age of the 
suspected offender [and where an individual is] arrested in connection with a 
recordable offence, which includes minor or non-imprisonable offences. The 
retention is not time-limited…Moreover, there exist only limited possibilities for an 
acquitted individual to have the data removed from the nationwide database of the 
materials; in particular, there is no provision for independent review of the 
justification for the retention according to defined criteria, including such factors as 
the seriousness of the offence, previous arrests, the strength of the suspicion 
against the person and any other special circumstances.65 
 
The similarities between the ratio for finding the regime for collating, storing and retaining 
BCD in S and Marper as unlawful and that cited in respect of the collating, storing and 
retaining of criminal record data four years later in MM are striking. In both cases the Court 
                                                          
59 Ibid [47 – 48] 
60 Ibid [67] 
61 Ibid [69] 
62 Ibid [77] 
63 Ibid [86] 
64 Ibid [126] 
65 Ibid [119] 
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recognised that the mere storage of such data amounted to an engagement of Article 8, 
that the indefinite and blanket retention of such data constitutes an unjustifiable 
interference with private life, that the absence of an independent review to challenge the 
retention further exacerbates the unjustifiable interference, as does the failure to make 
accommodations to retention periods commensurate to the seriousness of the offence to 
which the data relates. In short, the Grand Chamber appear to have applied a near 
identical set of factors as a means of testing the legality of the collation and storage of 
BCD as they did four years later to criminal conviction data. This, it is submitted, shows 
that the Grand Chamber were elucidating principles of general applicability, rather than 
anything particular to specific datasets and databases. 
 
What followed, then, is also of some considerable interest. In direct contrast to the 
complete inertia which has followed the decision in MM, Parliament responded to the 
decision in S and Marper by introducing primary legislation to significantly amend the 
PACE retention regime for collating, storing and retaining BCD. Part 1 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012, which came into force on October 31 2013, inserted 63D into PACE 
1984 and created a new, prescriptive and far more restrictive statutory regime for the 
retention and destruction of BCD. The overarching provision was that BCD may still be 
obtained where an individual is arrested for a qualifying offence but that it must 
subsequently be destroyed unless any of the exceptional circumstances laid down in 
ss.63E – 63P are met.66  
 
These ‘exceptional circumstance’ provisions created statutory retention periods for BCD. 
Any BCD lawfully obtained and stored by the police on the National DNA Database 
(‘NDNAD’) must now be deleted immediately after an investigation into a minor offence 
concludes without the suspect being convicted,67 and likewise where a voluntary sample 
is provided but which results in no conviction.68 Where an individual is arrested in 
connection, but not charged, with a qualifying offence,69 BCD can only be retained for 
                                                          
66 Per s.63D(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.1 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012 
67 Per s.63H of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.4 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
68 Per s.63N(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.10 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
69 Per s.63F(5)(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.3 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
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three years if authorised by the Biometric Commissioner,70 with a potential extension of a 
further two years only after obtaining an order from District Judge.71 Similarly, where an 
individual was charged with, but not convicted of, a qualifying offence, a three year 
retention period applied,72 though this could be extended by a further two years if 
permitted by a District Judge.73  
 
BCD obtained as part of a PNfD must be deleted after two years,74 while data obtained 
during the successful prosecution of a juvenile for a minor offence can be retained for five 
years.75 A ‘minor offence’ for this purpose is one where the individual receives a custodial 
sentence of less than five years.76 However, all BCD is still retained indefinitely where any 
person is arrested or charged with any qualifying offence after having been previously 
convicted of any recordable offence,77 irrespective of the disposal in the earlier matter, or 
where a juvenile is convicted of a qualifying offence78 or where an adult is ultimately 
convicted of any recordable offence.79 
 
These provisions are instructive in a number of respects. They are a clear and direct 
attempt to rectify at least some of the criticisms of the BCD system made in S and Marper 
(which were later made in almost identical terms in MM). Parliament provided differing 
retention periods based on the gravity of the offence to which the material relates, the age 
of the offender and the strength of the allegations made against them (noting the 
                                                          
70 The new post of ‘The Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material’ was created by 
s.20 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and his remit bears a more than striking resemblance to 
that of the Information Commissioner in their respective data fields. The Biometric Commissioner offers 
oversight to the use of biometric data, an avenue of complaint in the event of a dispute and s/he 
produces annual reports to Parliament (per s.21 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012). 
71 Per s.63F(7) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.3 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
72 Per s.63F(5)(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.3 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
73 Per s.63F(7)(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.3 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
74 Per s.63L(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.8 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
75 Per s.63K(1)(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.7 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
76 Per s.63K(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.7 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
77 Per s.63F(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.3 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
78 Per s.63K(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.7 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
79 Per s.63I(1)(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as inserted by s.5 of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. 
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distinction between those arrested but not charged, and those charged but not convicted, 
specifically).  
 
This can be directly contrasted to the regime for data held on PHOENIX, where there is 
absolutely no differentiation made whatsoever between material relating to conviction and 
non-conviction data, the gravity of the allegation (or conviction) made against the data 
subject or the age of the subject of the Nominal Record. Everything is simply retained until 
the suspect reaches age 100 years. A juvenile given a simple caution for a shop-theft will 
have his BCD deleted after five years. His Nominal listing, however, will remain until s/he 
reaches 100 years of age. This significant divergence in retention period is difficult to 
reconcile, particularly noting that the failure to provide this kind of differentiation was the 
reason why such a ‘blanket collection and retention’ regime was unlawful in MM.   
 
It is submitted that Parliament’s willingness to legislate to accommodate such a regime as 
regards BCD, but not as regards the PHOENIX criminality data, is therefore clearly 
unsatisfactory. Quite simply, if retention periods need be varied regarding BCD because 
a blanket retention regime is disproportionate, it is difficult to understand why such a 
position (which in effect remains in situ) is acceptable so far as the PHOENIX data is 
concerned. In fact, it might reasonably be supposed that the early deletion of BCD might 
be more prejudicial to crime detection and public protection than the deletion of PHOENIX 
data; the linking of suspects to historical offences by DNA and fingerprints many years 
later seems a far more plausible and useful application of criminality data than holding 
some aged and merely textual information relating to an offender in an Event History 
section of a nominal listing.  
 
Additionally, BCD may be more ‘intrusive’, so far as the raw data itself is concerned, but 
it is difficult to envisage it being used for anything other than policing and criminal justice 
purposes. PHOENIX data, by contrast, has a potentially far more ‘intrusive’ impact on the 
data subject, both by its permanency and particularly in its use for vetting purposes outwith 
the criminal justice sphere. BCD will rarely, if ever, be disclosed to third parties and any 
use of it subsequent to the instant criminal proceedings will almost always take place 
without the knowledge of the data subject. PHOENIX data has neither of these 
characteristics; it is widely used and disclosed to numerous authorised bodies, to 
employers and to voluntary groups and the data subject will be routinely aware that it is 




It is, therefore, submitted that the application of near identical principles laid down by the 
ECtHR to two separate, yet intrinsically intertwined, collections of criminality data reveal 
and highlight the wide discrepancy in the way which that data is treated in England and 
Wales which do not appear to stand well to close scrutiny. Parliament, as part of any 
legislative reconsideration of PHOENIX, might therefore wish to consider that a more 
consistent approach be taken to more accurately reflect the authority laid down in the 
European jurisprudence, the nature and use of the data itself and the likely impact of that 
retention on the individual data subject. 
 
9.5 Does S and Marper and MM apply only to the unconvicted? 
What is also notable is that, like the police retention guidelines for PHOENIX, the BCD 
legislative regime offers little prospect of deletion for those convicted of an offence. For 
the purposes of BCD, cautions, reprimands and warnings take the meaning ascribed to 
them by s.27(4) PACE80, so that they are considered to be analogous to ‘convictions’.  
 
Notwithstanding the legal contradiction inherent to that position,81 it is not immediately 
apparent why Parliament has drawn such a marked distinction between data held relating 
to convictions and that of those not convicted. It appears that they have taken their lead 
from jurisprudence. In the Five Constables case, the applicability of the principles set 
down in S and Marper was raised by the Information Commissioner but this was shortly 
rebuffed; Waller LJ dismissing it on the basis that he believed that the latter case involved 
only a ‘particular concern’ regarding the retention of criminality data relating to ‘the 
unconvicted’.82 This position is further reflected in the Parliamentary debates which led to 
the implementation of the BCD regime, where the (then) Home Secretary Theresa May 
told the Commons during the second reading of the Bill that ‘we will be taking innocent 
people off the DNA database and putting guilty people on’.83  
 
It is submitted that the presumption that the S and Marper and MM principles apply only 
to the unconvicted is not correct. Certainly, there is nothing in the judgment to indicate 
that the principles apply only to the unconvicted and the appellant in MM had, in fact, been 
                                                          
80 National Police Chief’s Council, ‘Deletion of records from national police systems 
(PNC/NDNAD/IDENT1)’ (18 October 2018) 5, para.2.3.3  
81 See chapter 3 of this research for further analysis on this point 
82 Above n.2 [80] 
83 HC Deb 1 March 2011, vol.524, col.205 
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cautioned and her appeal was ultimately decided in her favour based on those principles. 
In R (on the application of F) and Thompson v the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department84 the Supreme Court, in determining that indefinite notification requirements 
for convicted sex offenders were a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights, 
certainly seemed to suggest that the principles did not apply just to the unconvicted.  
 
In fact, the rationale for their decision was based largely on the decision in S and Marper, 
which was applied throughout. This focused on the lack of any right to review the 
notification requirement (described as ‘highly relevant to the question of compliance with 
Article 8’)85 and also on the disproportionality resultant from the presumption that all of 
those convicted posed a life-long, continuous risk of re-offending despite there being 
almost no empirical support for the proposition. Indeed: 
 
If some of those who are subject to lifetime notification requirements no longer 
pose any significant risk of committing further sexual offences and it is possible for 
them to demonstrate that this is the case, there is no point in subjecting them to 
supervision or management or to the interference with their Article 8 rights 
…Indeed subjecting them to these requirements can only impose an unnecessary 
and unproductive burden on the responsible authorities…No evidence has been 
placed before this court or the courts below that demonstrate that it is not possible 
to identify from among those convicted of serious offences … some at least who 
pose no significant risk of re-offending.86 
 
It seemed that the principles set down in S and Marper, and therefore by extension, MM, 
applied even to those convicted of the most grievous, sexual offences. It was, therefore, 
something of a surprise when the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in 
Gaughran’s Application for Judicial Review,87 which involved a review of BCD obtained by 
the police in Northern Ireland under the (near identical) Northern Irish equivalent of the 
statutory BCD retention provisions when a man was convicted in court of a drink driving 
offence, fined £50 and given a twelve month driving suspension and found that his BCD 
would be held indefinitely.88 
                                                          
84 [2010] UKSC 17 
85 Ibid [34] (Lord Phillips) 
86 Ibid [51] [56] 
87 [2015] UKSC 29 




After accepting that Article 8(1) was engaged89 Lord Clarke, giving the lead judgment of 
the majority of four, then asserted that the interference was ‘in accordance with the law’ 
because it was proportionate. He found as such on several grounds. Firstly, it was 
asserted that the delineation marker of retention for all recordable offences to be ‘sufficient 
to meet the requirement that consideration be duly given to the nature of the offence’.90 
Secondly, he also found that, although there was no process of review, this did not matter 
much, because it was said that ‘very few states have a process of review’.91 
Notwithstanding that multiple breaches of the ECoHR do not give rise to a defence to an 
action brought under it, it is not at all clear where this information comes from; certainly 
an article92 cited by the Court as ‘evidence’ to this point does not support such a finding. 
 
Moreover, Lord Clarke further asserted that the decision in S and Marper cannot apply 
because ‘the ECtHR was not considering the position of convicted people’93 and indeed 
there was ‘no indication that the Strasbourg Court was considering the position of those 
who had been convicted at all’.94 This, it is submitted, is an erroneous proposition which 
fatally undermines the judgment. Jurisprudence subsequent to S and Marper, (even if that 
in MM and R(F) are excluded, which are difficult to reconcile so excluding) clearly shows 
the applicability of the principles posited as equally applicable to those with criminal 
convictions. In both W v Netherlands95 and in Peruzzo v Germany96 the ECtHR applied 
almost identical considerations to the provisions for the retention of criminality data 
relating to convicted persons in the respective member states, and in each the Court 
applied S and Marper directly in assessing whether the provisions were Article 8 
compliant. In Peruzzo, particularly, the difference between the unconvicted and convicted 
was noted97 but only as one factor which the court took into account before considering 
all of the others laid down in S and Marper.  
 
                                                          
89 Ibid [19] 
90 Ibid [34] 
91 Ibid [43] 
92 Santos et al, ‘Forensic DNA databases in European countries: is size linked to performance?’ (2013) 
9 Life Sciences, Society and Policy 12 
93 Above n.88 [29] 
94 Ibid [31] 
95 20689/08, 20 January 2009 
96 (2013) 57 E.H.R.R SE17 
97 Ibid [44] 
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Ultimately, the system in Germany was declared lawful because it contained a periodic, 
ten-year process of independent review,98 it only retained BCD on those convicted of an 
offence of ‘a certain gravity’ (and these included only the more serious offences, as 
contrasted to English equivalent of ‘recordable offences’) or where a pattern of offences 
showed that the ‘certain gravity’ threshold was reached, whether there are sufficient 
grounds to suspect that the offender will commit future offences, in light of ‘the 
circumstances of a particular case, the personality of the convict’ and reasons must be 
provided explaining why future proceedings in each individual case are assumed.99 The 
existence of a viable route for legal challenge was also highlighted as a determining 
factor.100 
 
It is these safeguards which prevent the German system being considered a ‘blanket and 
indiscriminate’ system101 of the type identified in the UK in S and Marper and, indeed, in 
MM, which prevented there being a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights. 
Each of these is plainly missing from the system in the UK, even under the amended 
version for BCD created by the 2012 revisions.  
 
Each of these is also plainly missing from the system of retaining criminality data on the 
PHOENIX database, which, it is submitted, therefore still constitutes nothing less than a 
‘blanket and indiscriminate system’ as described in the relevant jurisprudence. What is 
evident, it is submitted, is that the principles in S and Marper do, in fact, apply to the 
convicted, albeit that the fact of conviction itself will be a relevant factor to consider, rather 
than the determining factor. This view is shared by Coghlan, who provides simply that 
‘there is no support for Gaughran’s view that the principles in S and Marper do not apply 
to the convicted’102 and that ‘it is likely that Strasbourg will find a violation in Gaughran’.103 
Reed, meanwhile, postulates that ‘the retention net is cast perhaps rather wider than is 
necessary’ and that the threshold of recordable offences is ‘a low one’,104 while Johnson 
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simply comments that, so far as the Supreme Court view that the interference is 
proportionate and so justified, ‘one doubts that the ECtHR will agree’.105  
 
The Gaughran judgment has been appealed to Strasbourg and the decision of the ECtHR 
is likely to be handed down very soon after the completion of this research. It is not difficult 
to imagine that the Court are likely to find an Article 8 breach, and it is to be hoped that it 
will take the opportunity to clarify, definitively, whether there is a distinction to be drawn in 
the principles which apply to criminality data pertaining to the convicted and those who 
are not, and, if so, what that distinction is. The applicability of such a judgment to the 
PHOENIX data is obvious, and potentially very welcome. 
 
9.6 The developing challenge to the police hegemony on custody image 
data. 
Although the collection of photographs to accompany the ‘criminal records’ can be traced 
to the nineteenth century, no formal statutory provision authorising the collection, storage 
and retention of custody images was enacted until s.64A was inserted into PACE by s.92 
of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which permitted the taking of custody 
photographs (or video recording)106 of any person arrested for an offence107 or issued a 
fixed penalty notice.108 The statutory provisions provide an almost identical justification for 
use as those for BCD109 and that ‘after being so used or disclosed, images may be retained 
but may not be used or disclosed except for a purpose so related’.110 Custody images are 
now stored on local police systems and uploaded from these to the Police National 
Database (‘the PND’), rather than PHOENIX.111 
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The legislation was silent as to retention periods other than that custody images ‘may be 
retained’.112 This led Michael Zander to comment that ‘the words appear to mean that they 
may be retained indefinitely, regardless of the outcome of the case’.113 Whether this 
reading was correct or otherwise, general guidance on the overarching principles relating 
to the collection, management, sharing and retention of police information was provided 
by a Home Office Code of Practice,114 issued in accordance with the relevant statutory 
enabling provisions,115 but the more detailed provisions were provided by the 
supplementary Guidance on the Management of Police Information (‘the MOPI 
Guidance’), issued firstly in April 2006, then in revised form in 2010.116  
 
It is perhaps worth noting that the MOPI Guidance is produced by the police, for the police 
– it is precisely the sort of internal policy document that the police have relied on for 
decades to ‘manage’ their collections of criminal records. That notwithstanding, the MOPI 
Guidance provides general principles of police data retention. The first two editions 
contained nothing specific relating to custody photographs, but instead provided a general 
system of categorisation which police forces were presumed to apply to them. ‘Category 
1’ offences, subtitled ‘certain public protection matters’, related to any allegation, proven 
or otherwise, of murder or any other ‘serious offence’ as specified in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, a ‘potentially dangerous’ person or any information relating to an individual who 
had been managed under a MAPPA. Such information, though scheduled for automatic 
police review every ten years to ensure relevance and that records are up-to-date, would 
be kept, similar the PHOENIX records, until the named individual reached age 100 years 
unless there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ to delete it.117 
 
Other information was divided into two main further categories. ‘Category 2’ offences were 
‘other sexual, violent or serious offences’. Data relating to these was to be retained until 
the offender was no longer judged to pose any risk of harm. This was to be judged by a 
chief officer review of the information at each ten-year clear period. If a risk was thought 
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to still exist, the data would be retained and the cycle restarted.118 All other records were 
considered ‘Category 3’ and the guidance proposed that these ‘do not necessarily have 
to reviewed’ but that forces might optionally elect to dispose of these on a time basis if the 
cost of maintaining them outweighed the risk of disposal. Any force which elected to have 
a time-based review must retain these records for at least six years.119 
 
The contrast with the policies for retaining PHOENIX data are once more instructive, at 
least in a theoretical context. Unlike the PHOENIX data, which is simply collated and 
stored automatically regardless of the nature of the criminality in question, here the police 
implemented a general system of police data management which offered differentiated 
retention periods and processes based predominantly on the seriousness of the alleged 
offence and the potential risk of harm posed by the data subject. There are also elements 
of discretion offered, with individual chief constable data controllers being advised to 
implement their own policy regarding ‘Category 3’ data based on their own operation 
needs and with an almost tacit acceptance that the cost of maintaining data related to low 
level, low risk criminality might outweigh the benefits of retaining it. Additionally, there was 
a review system, albeit an internal rather than independent one, for most of the data being 
held, with specified time-frames stipulated. 
 
These differences, however, were almost certainly more theoretical than practical. One 
potential alternative reading of the MOPI guidance was that the police had the potential to 
retain all data in all circumstances; a chief constable may believe that all ‘Category 2’ 
subjects remain a potential risk at each ten-year clear period review (and so their data is 
retained) and they may also determine that the cost of ‘Category 3’ retention is not 
outweighed by the ‘operational benefit’ offered by the data, so no review or disposal of 
such data would be necessary (and so all images are retained). In light of the police 
fondness for retaining criminality data generally, it is likely that data was retained for 
lengthy periods in all cases and it is not, therefore, perhaps surprising that a judicial 
challenge to the retention of custody images was eventually brought against the police.  
 
In R (on the application of RMC) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,120 claims were 
brought by two individuals whose custody images and BCD had been obtained, and 
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subsequently retained, by the police after they were arrested in connection with an 
offence. In the case of RMC, a woman of good character was arrested on suspicion of 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm against a community support officer who had 
stopped her cycling on a footway.121 In the case of FJ, a fifteen year old boy was arrested 
on suspicion of raping his second cousin.122 Neither individual was ultimately charged with 
an offence. In both cases, the police elected to retain BCD and custody images (and, in 
the case of FJ, to add an ‘Event History’ to PHOENIX) which the police refused to delete 
when asked to do so.123 
 
It was accepted by the applicants that the relevant provisions of PACE permitted the police 
to retain the photographs, so the basis of the judicial review application was that the 
continued retention of them under PACE was a breach of Article 8 because Article 8(2) 
was not satisfied as such retention was not ‘in accordance with the law’.124 After noting 
the aforementioned MOPI provisions which governed the retention of custody images,125 
Richards LJ considered the evidence provided by the police as to how those guidance 
documents were implemented in practice. He found a ‘confused picture’, with senior 
officers claiming to make decisions concordant with the MOPI Guidance but whose 
internal processes and documentation did not explicitly refer to them.126 He also noted 
that, in evidence provided by the decision-making officer, no mention was made of the 
MOPI guidance at all. This, said the court, was ‘a surprising omission’,127 though this might 
have been perhaps less so had the Court thought to consider the police’s somewhat 
lackadaisical attitude to following their own weeding guidance regarding their PHOENIX 
data collection. 
 
It was also noted that the police response to the solicitor’s letter sent by RMC’s 
representative took ‘a long time’ and even then ‘the retention of photographs was not dealt 
with’. This, it is submitted, might perhaps suggest a procrastination on the part of the data 
controller. It might also perhaps suggest that the police were emboldened by their success 
in the Five Constables case to believe that the Courts would continue to defer to their 
‘operational needs’, so far as data collection was concerned. When asked to address the 
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issue in evidence, Commander Gibson gave evidence that ‘I do not accept the argument 
that no policing purpose is served by the retention of the information’.128 No further 
elaboration, exposition or evidential basis for this point was made. In FJ’s case, responses 
were quicker, but all requests for deletion were steadfastly refused.129  
 
This was because, even had the Guidance been followed, then the categorisation of these 
‘offences’ (as Category 2 and 1 for each applicant, respectively), meant that RMC’s 
custody images would have been held for at least six years, with periodic reviews every 
ten, while FJ’s data would be held until he was aged 100 years. In essence, therefore, the 
real question wasn’t whether the guidance had been properly followed (though, it is 
submitted and indeed as was heavily inferred throughout the judgment, it almost certainly 
was not) but whether the guidance itself was sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 
8(2).130 
 
As to whether the question need be asked at all, because Article 8(1) was engaged, the 
court found that, applying the principles enunciated in S and Marper, ‘it is plain that the 
ECtHR considers that the retention of photographs in police records engages Article 8’.131 
This is because ‘the photographic images go further than simply displaying physical 
appearance at a particular age: they disclose that [s/]he was in police custody…Thus they 
contain, and convey, both his physical appearance and [original emphasis] the fact of 
police arrest and detention’.132 Once more, then, the question fell as to whether such an 
interference might be justified by reference to Article 8(2) ECoHR.  
 
After accepting that s.64A PACE had to read in parallel to the MOPI code (even if it was 
not actually followed by the police)133 and that a finding that the police failure to reference 
the MOPI Code directly in their own decision-making processes might be sufficient to find 
an unjustified interference but could be easily rectified and offer no actual relief to either 
applicant (which would be ‘deeply unsatisfactory’)134 the Court ruled that the retention 
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policy under the MOPI guidance was sufficiently disproportionate as to constitute an 
unlawful interference under Article 8.135  
 
This was because the provisions ‘did not strike a fair balance between the competing 
public and private interests and meet the requirements of proportionality’.136 Although 
‘more structured’ than the system considered in by the ECtHR in Marper, the MOPI 
guidance still drew ‘bright-lines’ which did not sufficiently distinguish between the 
convicted, those charged but acquitted and those not charged at all, that retention periods 
were ‘on any view for a long period, is likely to be in practice much longer and potentially 
indefinite’ and makes no provision for the age of those photographed.137  
 
The judgment in RMC follows an almost identical path to that taken in S and Marper and 
MM. There is a police determination to retain their unfettered discretion to collate and 
retain whatever criminality data they wish. There is an insistence, uncorroborated by any 
empirical evidence whatsoever, that such data is required to allow them to perform ‘core’ 
crime prevention and detection functions. There is an apparent presumption that anyone 
who comes to police attention does so because they are likely criminal and, therefore, 
they should be treated as a potential suspect for at least a very long time, or, more 
probably, until they die or are so old as to be highly unlikely to ‘offend again’.  
 
There is a reliance on documented guidance procedures which prima facie provide for 
review and appeal against data retention but which, in reality and exactly like the police 
weeding guidance documents, were little more than obfuscatory devices intended to 
convey an illusion of data protection and human rights compliance. In practice, the policies 
had little or no relevance to police decision making processes. That notwithstanding, the 
guidance policies themselves made no distinction between the convicted and those who 
are not or the juvenile and the adult. The police position was made, once more, in vain. 
Once more it was heavily criticised by the Court and ultimately declared unlawful by direct 
application of the principles in Marper to another set of police held criminality data; the 
unfettered discretion was to be removed and the indiscriminate and indefinite retention of 
data was to end. 
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The decision in RMC reached the wider public consciousness as it was routinely reported 
in national news media.138 The judgment was expected to trigger an expedient change in 
retention of custody images; Richards LJ had warned the police that he expected a new, 
Article 8 compliant policy to be formulated and implemented ‘in months, not years’.139 His 
warning was in vain. It wasn’t until October 2014 that further MOPI guidance, which 
superseded the 2010 Guidance,140 was published but the new policy made no changes 
whatsoever to the retention regime for custody images.  
 
In fact, the police appeared to be ignoring entirely the decision in RMC and were by 2014 
in an advanced stage of uploading every one of their custody photographs to the PND 
with the express intention of creating a searchable, facial recognition database. This state 
of affairs so alarmed Alastair MacGregor, the Biometric Commissioner, that he, without 
official remittance, conducted his own investigations into the issue and reported in his 
2014 Annual Report141 that, without any public or Parliamentary consultation whatsoever, 
he understood that some twelve million custody images had been uploaded onto a live, 
searchable system in March 2014.142  
 
He was sufficiently alarmed by developments that he began raising concerns with the 
Information Commissioner, chief police officers and the Home Office. His especial concern 
was that the new police database included images of ‘hundreds of thousands of individuals 
who had never been charged with, let alone convicted of, an offence’ and that ‘more are 
being loaded to it each day’.143 This was ‘notwithstanding the fact that, in light of judgment 
in RMC, it seems likely that many of these images should no longer be held by the 
police’.144 In order to protect civil liberties, he concluded that ‘urgent steps should now be 
taken to ensure that they [custody images] be governed by an appropriate regulatory 
regime’.145  
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The Biometric Commissioner was sufficiently concerned by what he found that he felt 
compelled to enter his reservations into evidence before a Commons Science and 
Technology Committee convened in the autumn of 2014 to review the use of biometric 
data and technologies.146 When asked to address the Biometric Commissioner’s concerns 
and inform the committee about the searchable PND database, Chief Constable Chris 
Sims, giving evidence on behalf of ACPO, claimed that he was ‘not aware of force use of 
facial image software at the moment’.147 The Biometric Commissioner described this 
evidence as ‘surprising’,148 before Sims attempted to qualify his statement by stating that 
facial recognition was ‘not my area of speciality’.149  
 
The Committee were sufficiently confused by the apparent lack of understanding of police 
data systems by the chief officer sent by ACPO to provide evidence to them about 
precisely that issue that they asked the Home Office directly to clarify matters. Contrary to 
Sims’ claims, they confirmed that they knew the police were considering a facial 
recognition system in 2012 and ‘that functionality was made available to all PND users’ 
(i.e. all police forces in England and Wales were able to use it) on 28 March 2014’.150 Quite 
whether Sims was genuinely mistaken or was attempting to obfuscate matters is not clear. 
What is clear is that he entirely misrepresented the police position on the retention, storage 
and use of custody images, many tens of thousands (at least) of which, by this time, the 
police had been unlawfully retaining for some thirty months. 
 
The Committee noted that ‘two and half years later [since the judgment in RMC] and still 
no updated policy [on retention of custody images] has been published’.151 The committee 
was therefore ‘dismayed to learn that, in the known absence of an appropriate governing 
framework, the police have persisted in uploading custody photographs to the PND to 
which facial recognition software has been applied’.152 The Committee recommended that 
statutory oversight to the use of custody photographs be added to the remit of the 
Biometrics Commissioner.153 
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When pressed about the apparent procrastination on the part of the Home Office in 
rectifying the legislative defects highlighted in the RMC case, Lord Bates told the 
Committee that the Home Office was instituting a ‘policy review’ into the matter which 
would involve a consultation of ‘key stakeholders’.154 That review took two years and a 
report was finally published in February 2017.155 This contained, almost five years after 
the decision in RMC, an amended and detailed policy for the retention of custody images 
which is now fully incorporated into the 2014 MOPI Guidance156 
 
The provisions are complex. In broad terms, there is now a ‘presumption in favour of 
deletion’ for custody images taken of individuals who are ultimately not convicted of an 
offence. However, such images are not automatically deleted, but rather eligible data 
subjects may make an application for deletion at the conclusion of the proceedings against 
them.157 The police may discretionarily refuse the application for deletion, but they must 
justify that decision where a risk assessment shows a continuing ‘substantial risk of harm’, 
where evidence shows the individual may be ‘dangerous’ (such as entry on the Violent or 
Sexual Offenders Register), where an active investigation against the individual is 
ongoing, where the individual has known links of organised crime or terrorism or where 
there is a need to enforce a civil order.158 As the vast majority of suspects are likely to fall 
outwith those parameters, it is submitted that these provisions should enable the majority 
of unconvicted persons to have their custody image(s) deleted (if they apply to do so). 
 
For those convicted of an offence, different rules are applicable. There exists a 
presumption in favour of deletion for those convicted of a non-recordable offence, but only 
after six years have passed since the conviction. Where no request for deletion is made, 
a review of the image, with a presumption that the image will be deleted, should take place 
after six years and every five ‘clear’ years after the first review (if the image is to be 
retained). Retention must only be justified on the same grounds as those for unconvicted 
individuals159   
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However, where an individual is convicted of a recordable offence, there is no presumption 
in favour of deletion.160 Those convicted of a ‘Group 3’ offence161 must also wait for six 
years before applying for image deletion. Those convicted of ‘Group 1’ or ‘Group 2’ 
offences must wait ten years from conviction (or release from custody, if a custodial 
sentence was passed). If no application is made a police review should take place after 
the same time periods, but without a presumption in favour of deletion162. A new review, 
or application for deletion, can only be made after the passing of five ‘clear’ years (for 
Group 3 offences) or ten ‘clear’ years (for Group 1 and 2 offences).163 
 
Different rules apply to juveniles. Applications made to delete images taken of juveniles 
who are not convicted are subjected to a ‘strong presumption in favour of deletion’ at the 
conclusion of proceedings against them.164 The same exceptions apply as to adult 
suspects, except that the risk of harm must be ‘very [original emphasis] substantial’, rather 
than ‘substantial’.165 However, where no application to delete is made, then the image will 
be retained and reviewed after the same ‘clear’ periods as for adult offenders, depending 
on the ‘Group’ of the alleged offence,166 albeit that there will be a strong presumption in 
favour of deletion at that review.167 The same rules apply in respect of juveniles convicted 
of an offence save that there is a presumption in favour of deletion at the first review stage 
for recordable offences168 and a strong presumption in favour of deletion for non-
recordable offences.169 
 
Although a full critical evaluation of the updated policy regarding custody images falls 
largely outwith the scope of this research, some general comments ought to be made. 
The review, and the implementation of the recommendations within it, has been widely 
criticised in a number of respects. The failure to implement legislation similar to that for 
the BCD regime was justified by reference, among other things, to the ready availability 
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of facial imagery in general and on social media, and the diminishing usefulness of 
photographs over time.170 This, it is submitted, is rather spurious. There is a marked 
difference between people consenting to using their own image on Facebook or Twitter 
(notwithstanding the millions of people who chose not to do so) and the statutory 
imposition of providing an image to the police to be stored on a central police database 
for a period of years. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the diminishing of 
usefulness over time of a photographic image (as compared to BCD, particularly) should 
lend itself to a lengthier retention period, rather than a shorter one; if the data becomes 
less and less useful, it is submitted that the justification for retaining it must become lesser, 
not greater. 
 
The new proposals considered, and rejected, creating an automatic deletion process (as 
happens for BCD) largely on grounds of ‘cost to the taxpayer’.171 Quite how the new 
proposals are more cost effective, considering that each application for deletion will be 
manually handled, is not clear; a point reinforced by the Biometric Commissioner in his 
response to the review.172 The Biometric Commissioner was unimpressed generally by 
the review, noting among other reservations that in their refusal to extend his remit to the 
use of custody photographs (though this is still being ‘considered’)173 the Home Office had 
left ‘the governance and decision making of this new process entirely in the hands of the 
police’174 and claiming that the discretion afforded to chief officers might result in decisions 
to delete images amounting to a ‘postcode lottery’.175 
 
The Home Office’s own Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group were not much more 
supportive. At the written invitation of the Home Office, the Group were asked to respond 
to the review. They provided that they too could not support the view that facial images 
were less intrusive than other biometric data, that they were ‘disappointed’ at the absence 
of a public consultation prior to the review’ (in spite of Home Office assurances made to 
the Science Committee that ‘key stakeholders’ would be consulted. Presumably the Home 
Office ‘consulted’ with the police and not many others besides) and recommended that a 
system should be built with automatic deletion capability. The latter was especially 
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important because the Home Office, presumably by design, had ‘not publicised the new 
retention regime and it was likely that there was a general lack of public awareness of 
it’.176  
 
This, it is submitted, is perhaps the most critical failure in the new regime; the need for 
individuals to apply for deletion, rather than mirroring the BCD system where data is 
automatically deleted after the applicable qualifying criteria are met. This means that, in 
actuality, hundreds of thousands of unconvicted people almost certainly still have custody 
images retained in police records, particularly after the Home Office’s promised ‘publicity 
campaign’177 amounted to practically nought. This point was made by Baroness Jones, 
who asked in a House of Lords debate on the review: ‘surely it would be easier for the 
police to just delete those innocent people without putting them to the trouble of 
applying’?178  
 
If the database still holds countless images of unconvicted individuals, it is difficult to 
reconcile it with the judgment in the RMC case. It is, therefore, submitted that even the 
updated regime is likely to be unlawful and subject to successful challenge if (or when) 
such a challenge is brought. That is the view of the Biometric Commissioner179 and it is 
the view of the Science and Technology Committee, who returned in 2018 to the issue of 
custody image retention and scathingly concluded that: 
 
The Government’s approach is unacceptable because unconvicted individuals 
may not know that they can apply for their images to be deleted, and because 
those whose image has been taken should not have less protection than those 
whose DNA or fingerprints have been taken.  
 
The Government must ensure that its planned IT upgrade under the Home Office 
Biometrics Programme is delivered without delay, and is used to introduce a fully 
automatic image deletion system for those who are not convicted. If there is any 
delay in introducing such a system, the Government should move to introduce a 
manually-processed comprehensive deletion system as a matter of urgency. 
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[They] should also set out the Home Office’s assessment of the lawfulness of its 
deletion-on-application response to the ‘RMC’ case, and the legal advice 
underpinning that assessment.180 
 
This author respectfully concurs with that position in its entirety and cannot add anything 
meaningful further to it. 
 
9.7 Conclusions 
In many respects, this research has now ‘turned full-circle’. As has been shown, the police 
have collected various criminality datasets for almost two centuries. Although today these 
are stored in separate repositories and used for slightly different purposes, the central 
tenet which governs each is that they are used as a conjoined means of detecting and 
preventing crime and apprehending offenders. It is not correct to see them as separate 
entities in their own right. Indeed, and as has always been so far as the police are 
concerned: ‘the fingerprints, DNA and PNC record are treated as an integrated whole’.181 
 
This is why developments in the legislative and jurisprudence regarding each of these 
datasets has a direct relevance and applicability to the others. What emerges is a clear 
pattern in almost all areas. For a very long time, the police were given an unfettered 
discretion to collate, store and retain whatever data they saw fit. The judiciary seemed 
reluctant to impose upon that discretion while Parliament, and more specifically the Home 
Office, have actively supported and facilitated it. This state of affairs survived even through 
the creation of PACE, was accelerated in the legislative developments immediately after 
the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 and was latterly bulwarked by the findings into 
the Soham murders in 2003. 
 
The decision in the Five Constables case may, in time, come to be seen as the high-
watermark of that approach and change is coming from without, rather than within. While 
those with a vested interested in expanded data collection, storage and retention (the 
police and the Government, particularly) remain predictably resistant to changing the 
parameters (except to expand them, where possible), they are nonetheless shifting 
towards a more regimented retention process driven predominantly by European, rather 
                                                          
180 Science and Technology Committee, Biometrics strategy and forensics services (HC 800, 2017 – 
19, 5 – I) [44] [45] 
181 Per Commander Gibson in evidence to the court in RMC, above n.120 [22] 
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than domestic, jurisprudence. Unconstrained by the traditional deference afforded to the 
police by Parliament and the English judiciary, the European Court of Human Rights is 
casting an increasingly critical eye on both the data retention practices of the police and 
the legislative provisions which facilitate them. Their scathing dismissal of the House of 
Lords’ judgment in S and Marper led to a complete legislative overhaul to the law 
governing biometric criminality data and significant limitations being placed upon the 
police, particularly as regards juveniles and those who are not convicted of offences.  
 
Domestically, the English judiciary, despite some missteps (such as that in Gaughran), 
have consequently developed a hitherto critical attitude towards police attitudes on, and 
general handling of, criminality data, and adverse judgments are now being handed down. 
The most significant of these domestically has resulted in the centuries old practice of 
collating and storing custody images being declared unlawful and a new (albeit limited) 
regime being implemented regarding these, restricting the police capacity to retain these. 
This regime is especially protective of juveniles and those who are not convicted of 
offences.  
 
Of the three main bulwarks of police criminality data collections, then, only the PHOENIX 
collection now remains untouched. This is despite the decision in MM, which expressly 
dealt with an identical collection in Northern Ireland (and the same retention regime as 
that in England and Wales), and which the judiciary have so far managed to avoid 
addressing by restricting their application of the principles contained in that judgment only 
to the ‘unconvicted’. That is an approach rejected by many in the academic community 
and which this author finds no express support for in the decision of MM itself; a case 
which dealt with a caution record, no less. If, as this author anticipates, the ECtHR finds 
error in that approach when making a decision in the Gaughran appeal, the English 
jurisprudence will likely become untenable and a renewed litigation attack on the 
PHOENIX retention regime will be inevitable, unless Parliament acts to prevent it. 
 
Even if it does not, then it is difficult to reconcile the present position so far as PHOENIX 
is concerned. If the ‘unconvicted’ do not deserve to have their BCD held once proceedings 
against them conclude, or their custody image held likewise, how can it be justiciable to 
hold their data on PHOENIX until they reach age 100 years? A similar critical comparison 
may be made in respect of juvenile offenders and those juveniles issued reprimands and 
warnings. The regime for PHOENIX data is now so much more intrusive as regards the 
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length of retention of data as compared to its bedfellows that legitimate questions as to 
why this is so now need to be addressed.  
 
Quite simply, as was acknowledged by Commander Gibson in RMC. ‘If the DNA and 
fingerprints continue to be retained, then so too should the PNC data’.182 That is a sensible 
proposition. But the question which requires consideration now is: if the DNA and 
fingerprints have been destroyed, then why should not the PNC data be too? 
 









This research set out to answer four research questions. It is submitted that each of them 
has been answered. It is not intended for this chapter to regurgitate earlier findings, but 
instead to consolidate the answers that have been revealed and, where possible, to make 
recommendations for the future concurrent to these. Each of the research questions will 
be dealt with in the chronological order provided in the opening chapter of this research. 
 
10.2 Answering the first research question 
The ‘traditional’ definition of ‘criminal record’ takes the noun version of the word ‘criminal’; 
‘to be convicted of a crime’.1 It was hypothesised at the outset of this research that this 
‘traditional’ view that a ‘criminal record’ consisting simply of a list of court convictions 
against a named individual would not be borne out. It is submitted that this hypothesis has 
been shown to be correct.  
 
In reaching that conclusion, particular trends can be evinced. As chapter two of this 
research shows, the embryonic collections of criminality data which emerged in the middle 
of the eighteenth century were not built by statutory mandate, nor constrained by 
legislative boundaries. They were collections built by individuals with an involution in the 
criminal justice system; magistrates, local policing groups, prison governors and the like. 
These individuals clearly saw merit in collating criminal convictions but only as part of a 
wider collection of other criminality data which might potentially assist them in their duties; 
warrants for arrest, allegations of crime, suspicious activity, photographs and ‘distinctive 
marks’ were also just some of the data recorded against named individuals.  
 
The first legislative mandate for the collection of ‘criminal records’ imposed an obligation 
on police to make a ‘register of those convicted of an offence’.2 Parliament, it seems, was 
only interested in knowing about those who committed crimes and in doing so instituted, 
literally, a record of convicted criminals; a ‘criminal record’. The repeal of that provision 
                                                          
1 B. A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, Thompson Reuters 2009) 430 
2 See ch.2.4 of this research 
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and replacement in 1871 with a more limited requirement to record only those convicted 
of two or more offences did not change the fundamental tenet of the Parliamentary 
constraint, which was that the central ‘record’ simply list those who had been convicted of 
a crime (or more than one, in the strict prescribed legislative form) and that a photograph 
of each listed person be attached so that the correct record be matched to the correct 
individual.  
 
This, it is submitted, forms the basis for the traditional view of ‘criminal records’. The 
traditional view that a criminal record is a list of court convictions listed against an 
individual must stem from the legislative requirements which instituted a register on 
precisely those grounds. That traditional definition certainly has a deep-rooted core; the 
legislative mandate for the collection of a central ‘criminal record’ lasted for ninety-eight 
years.3    
 
However, what also clearly emerges is that the police, taking their lead from the early 
criminality data collators, were contributing to this centralised ‘criminal record’ but were 
also simultaneously collecting their own vast repository of criminality data, independent of 
any statutory obligation to do so; criminal convictions, arrest details, warrants, fingerprints 
and modii operandi were just some of the reams of personal data relating to known and 
suspected offenders being stored by the developing police forces in England and Wales. 
 
Not only were the police not obligated to make such a collection, but they were also, 
conversely and concurrently, not constrained by any legislation from making such an 
extensive collection of data. Such lack of constraint largely stemmed from the underlying 
principles which had birthed those early police forces; the largely permissive legislation 
which allowed, but did not mandate, the creation of local (rather than a single centralised) 
police forces,4 the notion of ‘policing by consent’, rather than by overt force,5 and the 
establishment by the turn of the twentieth century of almost complete autonomy of chief 
constables, who by that time were constrained neither by the public nor local or central 
                                                          
3 The Habitual Criminals Act 1969 first instituted the register on these terms, and it was only in 1967, 
with the implementation of the Criminal Law Act 1967, that the amended requirements of the Prevention 
of Crimes Act 1871 were repealed.  
4 See predominantly the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 and the County and Borough Police Act 1856. 
For a thorough examination of both, see D. Taylor, The New Police in Nineteenth Century England: 
Crime, Conflict and Control (Manchester University Press 1997) 12 – 43  
5 J. Jackson et al, Just Authority? Trust in the Police in England and Wales (Routledge 2013) 7 – 9  
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government, save where legislation expressly provided as such.6 Indeed, by the turn of 
the twentieth century and the opening of the National CRO, the police had become ‘an 
important and significant influence on their own development and this influence grew as 
the police surrounded themselves in mystique and began to be accepted as experts on 
questions of crime and order’.7 
 
Independent of either obligation or constraint, the police therefore built their own extensive 
repository of criminality data. These records were far more expansive than the centralised 
‘criminal records’ kept by the Metropolitan Police under their statutory imposition related 
to monitoring habitual offenders. They were an attempt to build a comprehensive police 
intelligence repository, purportedly useful in the investigation of crime and suspected 
offenders. These, it is submitted, were the ‘police records’ to which Uglow referred.8 
 
This research indicates that these separate, but interlinked, collections, continued to be 
expanded into the middle of the twentieth century. The statutory ‘criminal records’ register 
continued to be compiled at the National CRO under the Metropolitan Police and the 
‘police records’ were greatly expanded, both by individual forces and in considerable 
depth at the various ‘clearing houses’ and Regional CROs which opened in the middle of 
the twentieth century.  
 
In 1967, the statutory obligation to maintain a register of criminal convictions was repealed. 
However, as has been shown, the police (or, more accurately, police officers at the various 
CROs) simply continued to collate, store and retain a vast repository of criminality data, 
independent entirely of any statutory obligation to do so. The register of criminal 
convictions was not deleted or even discontinued – it was instead simply subsumed into 
the CRO data collection exercise. This, it is submitted, is the point at which the 
demarcation between ‘criminal records’ and ‘police records’ ceased to exist, both in a legal 
and a practical sense. In 1967, the ‘police records’ became the ‘criminal records’.  
 
This process was accelerated when the PNC gave the police the opportunity to store all 
of their criminality data in electronic form, including all criminal conviction data and their 
‘supplementary data’; arrests, warrants, descriptions, modii operandi, police markers and 
                                                          
6 M. Brogden, The Police: Autonomy and Consent (Academic Press Inc. 1984) 39 – 73  
7 C. Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History (Routledge 2014) 5 
8 See ch.1.2 of this research. 
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all of the other data which now must properly be considered part of the ‘criminal record’. 
The implementation of the permissive provisions of s.27(4) of PACE did little more than 
close a legal lacuna which might have arisen out of the DPA 1984; the police had never 
stopped collecting conviction data and were still recording it centrally at the NIB in 
preparation for uploading to the PNC one year later. The entire circle turned when 
PHOENIX became operational in 1995; the former ‘police records’ became the central 
repository of criminal data for all police forces in England and Wales. For police officers 
today, there must be no demarcation whatsoever between a ‘police record’ and a ‘criminal 
record’. They are simply different screens of data on the same computer application. 
PHOENIX, it is further submitted, is the ‘criminal record’ and the nominal listings within it 
are the ‘criminal records’. 
 
If further proof were required that PHOENIX nominal listings are now properly considered 
the ‘criminal records’, then one need only look at what the process is involved in the 
production of certificates after a ‘criminal record check’; indeed, of the three types of 
‘criminal record’ check permissible by statute,9 only the ‘basic’ check will return a 
certificate concurrent with the ‘traditional’ view of criminal records.  
 
The standard’ check, meanwhile, will provide details of reprimands, cautions and 
warnings. These are not ‘court convictions’10 in that they are neither disposals made in 
court, nor are they ‘convictions’,11 but they are nonetheless stored in the central records 
and disclosed on the standard check. In any practical or legal sense of the word, these 
must also now be rightly considered as part of an individual’s ‘criminal record. The 
discretionary element of the enhanced check, meanwhile, potentially allows the for the 
inclusion of information contained within the ‘event history’ section of PHOENIX; arrests, 
warrants, PNfDs and acquittals are all routinely included on this type of ‘criminal record’ 
check.12 
 
                                                          
9 See chapter 8.5 of this research. 
10 Despite the rather feeble attempt by the Government to make them so, by amending s.27(4) of PACE 
to include them as ‘convictions’ for the purpose of retaining criminal record data (inserted by s.85 of the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012). The retrospective inclusion of warnings and reprimands, which were 
expressly confirmed to not be convictions by successive Home Office guidance, is particularly 
questionable. 
11 See chapter 4.4 of this research. 
12 See chapter 8.5 of this research. 
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For the purposes of a ‘criminal record’ check, therefore, potentially any of the information 
included in PHOENIX might be disclosed, depending on the check being requested. For 
the vast majority of the four million or so citizens who receive a criminal record certificate 
from the DBS each year,13 their ‘criminal record’ is not a simple review of their court 
convictions. It is a check of their entire PHOENIX nominal listing. 
 
Recommendation 1 
In order to resolve the pervasive confusion as to what constitutes a ‘criminal record’, a 
new, statutory definition of ‘criminal record’ should be provided which accurately reflects 
the records that are being collated, stored and retained on PHOENIX and which might be 
used for the purposes designated of them.  
 
Interestingly, in the Data Protection Act 201814, ‘personal data relating to criminal 
convictions and offences’ is defined as: 
 
Personal data relating to the alleged commission of offences by the data subject15 
or proceedings for an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the 
data subject or the disposal of such proceedings, including sentencing’.16 
  
This, it is submitted, is a much better definition of ‘criminal record’ than any other extant 
statutory attempt to define one, in that first part encompasses information held in the ‘event 
history of PHOENIX’ and the second encompasses all cautions, reprimands, warnings 
and convictions. If, in meeting this recommendation, Parliament elects to try and utilise an 
extant statutory provision, it is submitted that this is perhaps the best present example 
suitable for adaptation. 
 
Recommendation 1(a) 
On this basis, it is supplementarily recommended that the definition provided by s.11(2)(b) 
of the Data Protection Act 2018 either be the definition of criminal records to which all 
other applicable legislation now be directed or, alternatively, be the basis for a slightly 
                                                          
13 In 2017/18, over three and a half million of the four and a half million checks carried out were 
‘enhanced’ checks. That pattern was repeated in each of the two preceding years; see Disclosure and 
Barring Service, ‘Annual Reports and Accounts for the period 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018’, (HC 1367, 
19 July 2018) 8 
14 2018, c.12 
15 S.11(2)(a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 
16 Ibid, s.11(2)(b) 
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reworded version to include reference to PHOENIX and the specific categories of data 
contained within it. 
 
10.3 Answering the second and third research questions 
It was hypothesised at the outset of this research that the thesis would likely show that 
that the police did not comply with all of their obligations pursuant to the various Data 
Principles outlined in the Data Protection Act 1984 and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
It is submitted that the research has confirmed both hypotheses. In chapter five, it was 
shown that the concern of unlawful access to the PHOENIX data identified as early as the 
1970s by James Rule persisted throughout the following decades.17 Despite a relative 
reduction in press attention, the problem has not been fully eradicated; a ‘Freedom of 
Information Request’ to Gloucestershire Constabulary in 2017, for example, showed that 
five officers and support staff were found to have unlawfully accessed PNC data between 
2014–17,18 while a further ‘Freedom of Information Request’ to the British Transport Police 
showed that, in the same period, they had investigated two instances of unlawful staff 
access to the PNC. These resulted in a caution being issued to one individual and a 
successful prosecution against the other.19 A Home Affairs Committee reporting in July 
2012, meanwhile, found that there still existed a ‘close inter-marriage’ between 
investigators and the police, which represented a ‘significant risk’.20 The Committee found 
copious evidence that investigators were paying officers for access to police data and 
concluded that there existed ‘an unacknowledged but deep-rooted intertwining of a private 
and unregulated industry with our police forces’.21 
 
These reoccurrences suggest strongly that the problem is persistent and that additional 
measures are required to ensure data protection compliance. They also, it is submitted, 
suggest that there is a police tolerance of such unlawful access, so long as the issue is 
                                                          
17 See ch.5.5 and ch.6.5 of this research. 
18 Gloucestershire Police, ‘FOI Request. Officers and Staff illegally accessing PNC’ (Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, 9 February 2017) <https://www.gloucestershire.police.uk/more-on-us/freedom-of-
information/disclosure-log/operational-policing/officers-and-staff-illegally-accessing-pnc/> accessed 29 
May 2019 
19 British Transport Police, ‘Illegal access to the PNC’ (Request 0051 – 17, British Transport Police 
Online Log February 2017) 
<http://www.btp.police.uk/about_us/your_right_to_information/publication_scheme/disclosure_log/com
plaints_and_discipline.aspx> accessed 26 April 2019 
20 Home Affairs Committee, Private Investigators (HC 100 2012 – 13, 4 – I) 11, para.27  
21 Ibid, 12 
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one of ‘access’, rather than unlawful ‘use’. This was postulated by Lister and Rowe, who 
believe that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that ‘this is particularly so where access 
is motivated by professional curiosity, rather than malicious intent or nefarious 
motives…the idea that police members are entitled [original emphasis] to access 
information may be culturally ingrained within police forces’.22 Not only, therefore, is there 
a lengthy history of breaches in this regard, but there appears little prospect of them being 
prevented in future. 
 
It is clear, according to this research, that unlawful access to the PHOENIX data continues, 
that it may even be tolerated by certain officers or forces and that whatever measures are 
in place to prevent this, that these are insufficiently robust to eliminate them. The 
responsibility for preventing this lies with the data controller/processor; i.e. Chief Officers. 
It is submitted that the failure of the Commissioner to issue Enforcement Notices against 
Chief Officers at all,23 and particularly when the most egregious examples of unlawful 
access emerged, has discouraged Chief Officers from taking a more proactive, 
preventative approach to the problem.  
 
Recommendation 2 
It is, therefore, recommended that the Information Commissioner take a far more pro-
active approach to instances of unlawful access to PHOENIX data. Enforcement action 
should be considered whenever appropriate and Enforcement Notices should be issued 
to deal with particularly egregious examples. This will encourage better practice among 
forces in preventing unlawful access, and should decrease the number of data breaches. 
 
The problem of the data quality,24 on the other hand, appears to have been resolved. The 
Home Office certainly thinks so: a recent Home Office assessment claimed that the ‘PNC 
currently has a good data quality regime and this should be maintained…’25 This is 
achieved, say the Home Office, by a combination of data input predominantly by a 
specially trained team of central administrative staff26 and by a process of periodic internal 
auditing by police data processors.27 
                                                          
22 S. Lister and M. Rowe, Accountability of Policing (Routledge 2016) 94 
23 See chapter 6.5 of this research. 
24 See chapter 5.4 and 6.4 of this research 
25 Home Office, ‘National Law Enforcement Data Programme: Law Enforcement Data Service – Privacy 
Impact Assessment Report’ (July 2018) 25 





It is submitted that these assurances ought not to be taken at face value and that questions 
must remain as to the quality of the PHOENIX data. One reason for this is that, as this 
research has shown,28 the police hardly have an enviable record of ensuring good data 
quality when left to their own devices. If the picture is as rosy as the Home Office suggest, 
then it only is so because the police were inspected, repeatedly, to ensure that their house 
was put into sufficiently good order. Another reason for doubt is that the ‘auditing’ process 
appears to be entirely internal, and wholly opaque. None of these audits appear in the 
public domain and therefore are not subject to external scrutiny.  
 
Another, and perhaps the most persuasive, reason for casting some doubt as to the 
veracity of these claims, is that the quality of the data on the PND – the ‘other’ principal 
police database for which police forces are responsible for data collation and management 
and for which chief officers are responsible as processors – is almost as parlous as the 
data once was so publicly found on the PNC.  
 
It is not necessary as part of this research to conduct detailed research into the data quality 
of the PND, but some general comments will be made. The implementation of mobile data 
terminals, as a means of inputting data onto local systems which would then be added to 
the PND, has exacerbated some of the pre-existing problems as to the quality of data but 
Lindsey et al had suggested that the implementation of the PND in 2010 might ‘place 
additional pressure and serve as a key driver for ensuring good data quality’.29 It did not. 
HMIC, conducting an inquiry into the intelligence failings into the investigation of Jimmy 
Saville, found a significant variance between forces and their respective timeliness of 
inputting data to the PND,30 so that the availability of data on the PND information relating 
to suspect depended largely on which police force had dealt with the suspect.31 Moreover, 
‘accurate and comprehensive information…remains elusive’.32 Quite simply, the 
applicable MOPI guidance on police data systems ‘is not being given full effect in all 
forces’.33  
                                                          
28 See chapter 6.4 of this research. 
29 R. Lindsay, T. Jackson and L. Cooke, ‘Mobile access to information systems in Law Enforcement: An 
Evaluation of its implications for Data Quality’ (2010) 13(2) The Electronic Journal of Information 
Systems Evaluation143  
30 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Mistakes were made: HMIC’s review into allegations 
and intelligence material concerning Jimmy Saville between 1964 and 2012’ (London, March 2013) 34 






As recently as 2018, the Home Office lamented that, as regards the PND, ‘data quality 
and consistency are important parts of privacy…and poor data quality is a barrier to this. 
Data which is incomplete, inconsistent, not meaningful or misinterpreted can lead to poor 
decisions, wasted time or missed opportunities’.34 Work to ‘encourage forces to achieve 
the highest possible standards in this area is continuing’ and there are proposals to 
introduce national data standards to try and bring up the quality of the data.35 
 
There is an almost depressingly familiar tenor to the criticisms regarding data quality for 
the PND; lack of timeliness, inconsistent input, the need for HMIC inspections and a 
variety of other, not insignificant criticisms all form part of the ignoble history of PHOENIX 
data quality. It appears that the proverbial leopard has not changed its spots, so far as the 
attitude to data quality is concerned. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to accept at face 
value the claims that the PNC data is quite as in order as the Home Office and the police 
claim it to be, and a degree of healthy scepticism must be exercised. 
 
Recommendation 3 
It is recommended that an external organisation be charged with conducting periodic 
inspections of the PHOENIX data to ensure that data quality is of a suitably high standard, 
measured against the Data Principle requirements of relevancy, adequacy,36 accuracy 
and currency.37 These will improve police operational efficiency. 
 
Previous inspections by HMIC have helped to drive and maintain improved data quality, 
and it is further recommended that HMICFRS (as they are now) conduct these inspections. 
Reports should be released into the public domain, to ensure transparency and increase 
public confidence in the police data collection processes. The Information Commissioner 
should be included on the circulation list of these reports and where these indicate that 
police data collections are of insufficient quality, Enforcement action should be considered 
to ensure Data Protection compliance. 
 
This research has also found that the police are making unlawful arrests. These are 
extremely difficult to quantify but these are nonetheless occurring and the resultant arrest 
                                                          
34 Above n.25, 14 
35 Ibid 
36 Per s.37 of the Data Protection Act 2018. 
37 Per s.38(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018. 
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data is being included in criminal records. Examples highlighted by this research include 
the common police practice of arresting those who attend the police station voluntarily to 
assist in police investigations and people who have been arrested without lawful 
justification under s.24 of PACE. The former should not be ordinarily arrested until or 
unless sufficient evidence emerges to justify that arrest under s.24 PACE or a warrant is 
obtained, while the latter is demonstrably unlawful under the applicable statute. In both 




It is recommended that the NPCC provide detailed guidance to all police officers as to the 
appropriate means of dealing with volunteers. Where such an individual is arrested, it is 
recommended that arrest data not be added to the ‘Event History’ section of PHOENIX 
unless that arrest results in a charge being issued. Any arrest data currently being held 
on PHOENIX relating to volunteers who were not subsequently charged, or any such data 
collated contrary to this recommendation in future, should be pro-actively deleted. If such 
‘arrest-only’ data is to be retained instead on the PND, that data should be reviewed in 
accordance with MOPI guidance to ensure its retention continues to be compliant with the 
applicable Data Principles. 
 
It is also evident from this research that there are legitimate concerns regarding the issuing 
of cautions. Some individuals accept cautions because they believe, erroneously, that are 
an ‘easy option’ which allow them to go home without further adverse consequences, while 
others are effectively induced into accepting them after investigating officers intimate that 
a confession may result in a caution being issued, rather than a prosecution being 
brought.39  
 
The issue is compounded by the nature of cautions; they are intended for first-time, minor 
and usually juvenile offenders.40 Such individuals will often be unrepresented at the police 
station and have little knowledge or experience of the police investigatory process. Many 
will be in a heightened emotional state when deciding whether or not to make a confession 
in the ‘hope’ of being cautioned.41 
                                                          
38 See chapter 6.3.1 of this research. 
39 See chapter 6.3.2 of this research. 
40 See chapter 4.4.3 of this research. 




The Ministry of Justice issued formal guidance on the issuing of ‘simple cautions’ in 
2015.42 It was intended to replace all previous guidance and provides that it must [original 
emphasis] be applied to all decisions relating to simple cautions.43 It provides detailed 
guidance on the administration of simple cautions, including the provision of a ‘simple 
caution form’ which the offender should sign and which is ‘a form setting out the 
implications of the simple caution’.44 A template or other exemplar is not provided, but it is 
stated that the form must include information which informs the recipient that they have 
admitted an offence45 and that the admission and caution will form part of the individual’s 
criminal record46 which may be used in future legal proceedings47 or disclosed via a DBS 
criminal record check.48 The form should also inform the suspect that: ‘the caution will be 
retained on the PNC. ACPO guidelines set out how long this information should be 
retained for’.49 
 
The introduction of a ‘simple caution form’ is welcome but difficulties persist. Although the 
offender should be informed before signing that they are entitled to take legal advice,50 
this is likely to be limited to either telephone advice or advice from a duty solicitor, where 
either is available. Where a delay in access to either occurs, a suspect may elect not to 
take legal advice in the hope of ‘going home’ more expediently. Moreover, many suspects 
do not utilise their right to legal advice at the station, and so will sign without receiving this.  
 
Additionally, it is not clear why an exemplar form cannot be provided, so that there is a 
consistency among forces and to ensure best practice. Poorly drafted forms may cause 
confusion among those to whom the form is intended to be issued and give rise to 
subsequent judicial challenge. It is not difficult to envisage a potential challenge where the 
form includes unnecessarily technical or legal language – the reference on a form to 
‘ACPO guidelines’, and even ‘the PNC’, will mean little to the non-expert reader. Moreover, 
it is submitted that such terms do not properly outline the full implications of the retention 
of the caution. Indeed, they may even (unintentionally or otherwise) obfuscate those 
                                                          
42 Ministry of Justice, ‘Simple Cautions for Adult Offenders’ (13 April 2015) 
43 Ibid, 3 
44 Ibid, 17, para.80 
45 Ibid, 14, para.63 
46 Ibid, para.64 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid, 15, para.65 
49 Ibid, para.66 
50 Ibid, 16, para 78 
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important ramifications; the currently guidelines set the retention period as being until the 
suspect reaches age 100 years or being deceased. In essence, the caution will be retained 
for the life of the data subject, even though it will become ‘spent’ as soon as it is issued. 
This is critical information which needs to be expressed clearly to the intended recipient 
prior to the imposition of the caution. 
 
Recommendation 5 
The Ministry of Justice should draft, and circulate, an ‘exemplar’ simple caution form to be 
used by all forces for use in the administration of all simple cautions. This should include 
all of the baseline information intimated in the official guidance but should be drafted in 
plain English to ensure that those who sign the form understand fully the ramifications of 
the caution.  
 
In particular, the caution form should avoid reference to ‘ACPO Guidelines’ and instead 
make clear that the caution will be retained until the suspect is aged 100 years and, subject 
to the ‘protected caution’ regime and the ROA 1974, is liable for disclosure if the individual 
applies for a subsequent criminal record check.  
 
The form should also explicitly advise an individual to take independent legal advice before 
signing it, and make provision for the individual to explain, in writing, why they have not 
received this if they do not.  
 
This will reduce the number of individuals who are unlawfully, or ‘illegitimately’ cautioned 
and, by ensuring that a higher number of individuals who receive cautions have actually 
committed offences, offer greater opportunity to police forces to utilise the data more 
effectively for their operational purposes. 
 
10.4 Answering the fourth research question 
It was hypothesised that the approach taken in the Five Constables case, which afforded 
an almost complete operational discretion to the police in determining how long their 
criminal record data is to be retained is flawed in several respects. It is submitted that this 
research has illustrated, at least, that there are considerable doubts as to the necessity of 




This research has demonstrated that criminal record data was originally collated because 
the earliest protagonists believed that doing so would enable them to prevent and better 
investigate criminal behaviour.51 Such a position found favour over the next century or so 
as statistical evidence emerged to show that large volumes of crime were committed by 
small numbers of recidivistic offenders.52  
 
However, what this research further shows is that the police do not appear to have utilised 
this knowledge to operational effect, other than by collating a huge mass of criminal 
records data. Although well-supported in criminological theory, attempts to envoke 
‘intelligence-led policing’ largely failed in practice53 and the question which remains 
entirely unresolved, even after over a century of extensive criminal record data by the 
police, is how the knowledge that a small number of highly active recidivists commit 
disproportionately voluminous offences has actually translated into police operational 
processes which prevent, or investigate, crime more effectively.  
 
Indeed, what this research has shown is that, if anything, many forces have largely 
desisted from engaging in any analytical or pro-active forms of policing,54 instead 
preferring to rely on ‘local knowledge’, ‘experience’ and reactive investigation techniques 
which often amount to little more than responding to a reported crime by identifying a pool 
of ‘usual suspects’ and interrogating these to see if this will ‘get results’.55  
 
Indeed, some forces recently simply eschewed criminal investigations into serious 
offences in favour of picking ‘low-hanging fruit’ in order to meet disposals targets and ‘get 
results’. For example, an HMIC investigation56 in 2013 found that Kent Constabulary had 
deliberately prioritised ‘clear-up’ targets over other policing concerns, incorrectly recording 
reported rapes as ‘no-crimes’57 and instead prioritising cannabis users to whom they could 
administer formal warnings, cautions and PNfDs (often unlawfully)58 which raised disposal 
numbers and maintained high ‘clear-up’ rates. Meanwhile, a specialist team of officers 
                                                          
51 See chapters 2.2 and 4.2 of this research. 
52 See chapter 2.4 of this research. 
53 See chapter 4.2 of this research 
54 N. Cope, ‘Intelligence led policing or policing led intelligence’? (2002) 44(2) British Journal of 
Criminology 188, 191 
55 See chapter 4.3 of this research 
56 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Crime Recording in Kent’ (2013) 
57 Ibid, 16 
58 Ibid, 19 – 20  
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engaged in a pro-active preventative scheme to tackle burglary found themselves 
reassigned to issue formal cautions to shoplifters.59 
 
What emerges from this research is that there is significant evidence to suggest that the 
police have amassed a vast repository of criminality data but do not appear to be using it 
for the purpose it was primarily intended. Indeed, despite having repeated opportunities 
to do so in each of the cases brought against them relating to the allegation that PHOENIX 
data was being held ‘excessively’, the police were either unable, or unwilling, to 
demonstrate precisely how this mass of data actually assists them in preventing and/or 
detecting crime. Instead, they relied, and continue to rely, on anecdotal examples of how 
a particular piece of data assisted in a case or other, extremely weak rationale, such as a 
record placing an individual in a particular place at a particular time.60  
 
It is very difficult, therefore, to accept at face value the police assertion as to the usefulness 
of this data, and it is submitted that the reality is that criminal record data plays little, if any, 
operational part in police investigations save for the limited uses identified in this research. 
The Court of Appeal in the Five Constables case insisted that the police be permitted to 
collate and retain data so long as the rationale is ‘reasonable and rational’. It must now be 
time for the police to provide actual evidence of the ‘reasonable and rational’ actual, rather 
than theoretical use, of the data. Continuing to defer to the police as to the ‘operational 
usefulness’ of the data is not, it is submitted, acceptable in light of the legal constraints 
placed upon them by both the data protection legislation and the ECoHR. 
 
Recommendation 6 
An independent review ought to be conducted into the actual use of criminal records data 
by the police in the prevention and detection of offences. The purpose of this review should 
be to determine precisely how the data is being used and how effective it is in those uses. 
Police anecdotal reports will have some bearing on determining these but should not be 
decisive; an attempt should be made to establish a quantitative measure of utility to justify 
the retention of records under the present policy.  
 
Even if it is accepted that data relating to recidivistic offenders might have some 
operational use for police, and further accepting that such data will nonetheless have a 
                                                          
59 Ibid, 5 
60 See chapter 7.5 – 7.6 of this research. 
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continuing utility in the criminal justice system61 or for disclosure purposes,62 then the most 
pertinent question must be whether the data has any value where it relates to offenders 
who have desisted from offending. This research has highlighted that there is a 
criminological consensus that most offences are committed by juveniles or young adults 
and that most offenders desist from offending once they reach age thirty. This holds true 
even among those who are quite persistent offenders in their youth – the number of 
offences committed do not indicate a lengthy recidivistic nature unless they continue long 
into adulthood.63  
 
The net result is that there must be literally millions of records on PHOENIX which are 
effectively in abeyance in that they have not been added to or amended in any way for 
years, and in many cases, for decades. This is likely the basis for the 40/20 rule in 
Scotland, where such records are simply deleted as they are deemed to offer little, or no, 
further operational use to police officers.64 The deletion of these records is not perceived 
in Scotland to have any contrary effect on the validity of their vetting processes, which are 
identical to England and Wales except that the deleted records cannot be disclosed, or on 
their operation of the criminal justice system, where such deleted records are not 
considered useful for sentencing or character purposes. 
 
It is submitted that the research shows that these old, inactive records must have an 
extremely limited use for policing purposes, and certainly much less use than those which 
show that an individual is a recidivistic offender. Except in very limited circumstances, 
once a record is inactive for a sufficiently lengthy period of time, the presumption must be 
that the individual has desisted from offending and is, therefore, of very little operational 
interest to the police or the criminal justice system generally. If this position, based on an 
extensive criminological evidence base, is not correct, then it is submitted that the onus is 
on the police to show otherwise and justify their 100-year retention period as not 
‘excessive’. 
 
This is especially pertinent in light of the judicial trends highlighted in chapter nine of this 
research. The position taken in the Five Constables case must be now viewed against a 
backdrop of continued incursion into the fields of related criminality data by challenges 
                                                          
61 See chapter 4.4 of this research. 
62 See chapter 8.5 of this research. 
63 See chapter 8.4.3 of this research. 
64 See chapter 8.4.2 of this research. 
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brought under Article 8 of the ECoHR. These have seen successful limitations placed on 
biometric criminality data and custody image data, so that only the PHOENIX data remains 
entirely under the discretion of the police.  
 
The Home Office continues to take solace in the repeated deference to the police afforded 
by domestic jurisprudence,65 but this has proven almost entirely misplaced. The ECtHR 
has repeatedly declared that the interpretation of Article 8 by the appellate judiciary in 
England and Wales to be incorrect, and that various data retention policies implemented 
by the police (or by the Legislature) are in violation of the protection afforded by the 
ECoHR.  
 
Further illustration was provided as this research was being compiled, when the ECtHR 
made their determination on the appeal brought in the case of Catt.66 This author had 
suggested that the ECtHR would take a ‘less flexible view’ than that taken by the Supreme 
Court in that case and that analysis was shown to be correct when, in January 2019,67 the 
UK was found to be in violation of Article 8 in allowing the police to retain Mr. Catt’s data. 
The judgment in that appeal was handed down rather too late for detailed consideration 
as part of this research, but it perhaps suffices to highlight some important principles which 
might be brought to bear in a future challenge to the PHOENIX collection. 
 
The ECtHR highlighted once more that data protection principles will naturally interlink 
with Article 8, particularly so far as collections of criminality data by the state are 
concerned and the appellate courts of the UK should have that in mind, and be prepared 
to afford greater protection to special categories of personal data, such as criminal records 
data.68 The critical question when determining whether such a data collection satisfies a 
‘pressing social need’ is not whether the establishment or maintenance of the database is 
itself necessary, but rather whether the collation and retention of the data being 
maintained is justified.69  
 
There are two fundamental, separate but interlocking considerations. Data may be 
legitimately collected initially, and then assessed as to its usefulness and therefore 
                                                          
65 Above n.25, Annex C 
66 See chapter 9.3 of this research. 
67 Catt v The United Kingdom, 24 January 2019 App. No. 43514/15 
68 Ibid [112] 
69 Ibid [116] 
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retained for a period of time as there is a ‘pressing need’ to do so70 but a violation of Article 
8 may occur where the data is retained beyond the point where the ‘pressing need’ to hold 
it has passed.71 It was on this basis that the Court held a violation in Mr. Catt’s case, 
because although the MOPI Guidelines offered a process for considering the future 
deletion of the data: 
 
Where a state chooses to put in place such a system, the necessity of the effective 
procedural safeguards becomes decisive. Those safeguards must enable the 
deletion of any such data, once its continued retention becomes disproportionate.72 
 
It is not difficult to envisage the applicability of that principle to a successful challenge 
against the retention of old, minor and inactive PHOENIX nominal listings.  
 
This is the latest in a line of ECoHR jurisprudence which strengthens, it is submitted, the 
likelihood of a successful future challenge to the current regime for retention of criminal 
records data. The key issues which will determine that challenge is whether the ‘until age 
100 years’ retention period is proportionate to the legitimate aims of crime prevention and 
detection and the function of the criminal justice system73 and whether there is a ‘pressing 
need’ to retain all data for that period. In light of the findings in chapter 8.4 of this research, 
it is submitted that the ECtHR are likely to find that retaining all data is disproportionate 
and not required to meet a ‘pressing need’, particularly so far as arrest data, cautions, 
reprimands, warnings and minor conviction data is concerned, and even more so where 
there is a lengthy ‘clear’ period since the last disposal which indicates desistence or where 
the record largely consists of juvenile offences. The Home Office and the NPCC might 
consider it advisable to revisit their policy now, rather than expending resource fighting 
litigation it is unlikely to successfully defend. As both have failed repeatedly in the past to 
make concessions of their own accord, and to legitimise the process, it is submitted that 
issue be considered by Parliament before any new regime be implemented. 
 
                                                          
70 Ibid [117] 
71 Ibid [119] 
72 Ibid 
73 Any attempt to defend the action on the basis of the need to retain data for vetting purposes is almost 
certain to fail; the Government have recognised that certain information has no relevance for vetting 
purposes (see chapter 8.5 of this research) and even the ACRO Criminal Records Office have re-
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Chief’s Council, ‘ACRO Criminal Records Office, Step Down Model, Filtering of offences for Certificates 





It is recommended that an independent review be conducted into the retention of criminal 
records data. The purpose of that review should be to advise Parliament as to the optimum 
retention periods for criminal record data, concurrent with legitimate police and criminal 
justice system operational requirements and proportionately struck against data protection 
legislation and human rights considerations. 
 
The review should be an independent one. It should consult widely with all possible 
stakeholders, including the NPCC, the Home Office, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, 
social services, academics, civil liberty groups and the Information Commissioner as a 
minimum base. The view of the police is important, and reference should be made to the 
findings of the report produced per recommendation 6 of this research, but they should 
not be decisive in determining what the optimum retention period is. 
 
In light of the consistent failure of the appellate courts in England and Wales to properly 
apply the European jurisprudence to criminality data collections, the review should not, as 
occurred during the previous ‘independent’ review commissioned by the Government, 
simply defer to the decision in the Five Constables case.  
 
A new review should, at the very least, consider the possibility that some records be 
deleted. Particular attention should be given towards arrest records, out-of-court disposals 
and summary court convictions which do not result in the imposition of a custodial 
sentence, along with disposals issued when the data subject is a juvenile. The review 
should consider whether there it would be proportionate to delete such records after a 
sufficient ‘clear period’ passes that indicates that the individual has desisted and so is 
highly unlikely to be relevant to future police or court operational processes. The review 




Upon receipt of the report recommended above, the Government should present primary 
legislation to give full statutory footing to a new retention regime concurrent to the 
recommendations made in the independent review. This statutory regime should be 
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similar in nature to that provided for the collation, storage and retention of biometric data.74 
The new legislation should also include an independent oversight to ensure compliance 
with the new regime. The Information Commissioner, armed with the strengthened 
regulatory powers provided to her/him in 2018, might be best placed to provide this 
oversight but other alternatives, such as the creation of a ‘Police Ombudsman’, should 
also be considered. 
 
10.5 Looking to the LEDS and the LED: some concluding remarks 
The PNC is, at the time of writing, forty-six years old and, save for the upgrade to PNC2 
in 1991,75 is effectively still running on the same hardware as when it was built in 1973. 
 
In March 2016, to almost no fanfare whatsoever and buried among the latter pages of a 
Home Office publication on ‘crime prevention strategy’,76 the Home Secretary revealed 
that it was planning to switch off both the PNC and the PND and intended to replace both, 
combined with the system for automatic number plate recognition, with a new, single 
online ‘platform’ called the Law Enforcement Data Service (‘LEDS’).77 This, according, to 
the minister, meant that the police would be able to perform advanced ‘data analytics’ 
because ‘we need to help the police forces and their partners handle and use data as 
easily as companies or members of the public…to help prevent crime’.78 One suggested 
technique was to deploy officers to ‘known hotspots’ as part of ‘predictive policing’.79 
 
The programme to build the LEDS was called the ‘National Law Enforcement Data 
Programme’ (‘NLEDP’).80 Civil libertarians were alarmed; The Register immediately 
proclaimed the project as an attempt by the ‘police [to] create a mega crime database to 
rule them all’.81 Concerns are exacerbated by the shroud of secrecy surrounding the 
project; there appears to have been precisely no Parliamentary scrutiny on the NLEDP 
and information in the public domain concerning what is being done, by whom and how is 
very sparse indeed. 
 
                                                          
74 See chapter 9.4 of this research. 
75 See chapter 3.2 of this research. 
76 Home Office, Modern Crime Prevention Strategy’ (March 2016) 
77 Ibid, 38 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
80 H.C. Deb 15 December 2016, vol.618, col.61WS 
81 K. Hall, ‘Police create mega crime database to rule them all. Is your numberplate in it? Could be’ The 
Register (London, 23 March 2016) 
294 
 
What this author has been able to determine is that the programme is being led by the 
Home Office, though the police have designated their PNC, PND, ANPR and BCD lead 
officers to the ‘reference group’ tasked with overseeing the project.82 The Government is 
providing significant public funding to finance it; in September 2016, the Home Office 
estimated that some £518,300,000 would be required over the lifetime of the LEDS83 and 
indeed the cost of merely building the system has been put at £430m.84 Applications are 
being developed by software company IBM (at a cost of £12m)85 but details on precisely 
what these will consist of do not appear to be in the public domain. It is intended that the 
system will be fully operational by 2020.86 
 
There is little doubt that the police need more up-to-date technology to help fight modern 
crime and criminals. Chief officers are clearly supportive and believe that the LEDS will 
enable a far better, quicker and more efficient sharing of data across the country.87 Relying 
on systems from the 1970s is clearly inadequate; a Commons Committee in 2018 
concluded that ‘police forces’ investment in and adaption of new technology is, quite 
frankly, a complete and utter mess’.88 In theory, LEDS should help solve long-standing 
operational data sharing problems. It could also provide a very timely opportunity to take 
a ‘clean-slate’ approach to the longstanding problems of data quality, storage, retention 
and oversight, supported by new policies drafted after a comprehensive public and 
Parliamentary consultation ensuring compliance with the ECoHR and modern data 
protection legislation. The Home Office clearly thinks that the latter is a formality; it 
‘confirmed’ DPA 2018 compliance for the LEDS in Parliament in November 2018.89 
 
The basis of that pronouncement was the findings of the ‘first in an annual series of LEDS 
privacy assessments’ conducted by the Home Office in July 2018.90 This Privacy Impact 
Assessment (‘PIA’) is perhaps the only document in the public domain which provides any 
                                                          
82 ‘Chief Constables Project, EMSCP and NLEDP Update’ (14 July 2016) Agenda item: 4.3.1 
83 Home Office, ‘Transparency Data: HO Government Major Project Portfolio data, September 2016’ 
(18 July 2017) 
84 R. Anderson and R. Stoneman, ‘GlobalData on Home Office funding for the law enforcement data 
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85 Home Office, ‘Home Office (HO) National Law Enforcement Data Programme (NLEDP) Application 
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86 Above n.26 
87 Home Affairs Committee, Policing for the Future (HC 515 2017 – 19, 10 – I) Oral evidence at Q485 
88 Ibid, para.186 
89 HC Written Question 185654, October 30 2018 
90 Home Office, ‘National Law Enforcement Data Programme: Law Enforcement Data Service – Privacy 
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detail on what the LEDS will be once it is operational and is the first time that any PIA has 
ever been conducted in respect of the PNC and it’s data.91  
 
The Home Office claims that it intends to ‘privacy-friendly, not just privacy-compliant’.92 To 
this end, the ICO were consulted and ‘ongoing liaison’ was intimated.93 However, scrutiny 
of the document reveals immediate potential problems. The PIA confirms that all of the 
data from the PNC and the PND is to be migrated onto LEDS,94 which clearly risks the 
importation of poor quality data and will certainly include all of the arguably excessive data 
highlighted in this research. It is intended to mark all LEDS data as ‘OFFICIAL’, rather 
than ‘SENSITIVE’.95 This will allow far greater access to the data, internally and externally 
and potentially via mobile devices, and is not, it is submitted, concurrent with the nature 
of data specifically described in the DPA 2018 as ‘sensitive personal data’. 
 
Interestingly, the PIA recognises that ‘although the retention periods for arrest, conviction 
and caution data has been subject to legal challenge’ but that the continued retention of it 
‘was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2009’, that  
  
Nevertheless, it is recognised that the retention of information concerning those 
arrested but not charged or who are charged but subsequently not convicted of 
any offence and who have no previous convictions could be seen as 
disproportionate in the context of data protection, as could the retention of a 
number of old records relating to individuals with a small number of minor historical 
offences with no recurrence which have been retained.96 
 
Following this, it is then claimed that ‘the retention of arrest only records is currently under 
review with consideration being given to the removal of a number of such records from 
the system’.97 Who is conducting this ‘review’, what the terms of reference are for it or 
when it is expected to conclude is not specified but the publication of the findings are 
certainly to be eagerly anticipated. The PIA then further notes that the moving of both PNC 
and PND data to LEDS ‘may be an opportunity to devise a single retention regime, based 
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92 Ibid, 9 
93 Ibid 
94 Ibid, 5 
95 Ibid, 11 – 12  
96 Ibid, 20 
97 Ibid, 21 
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on the MOPI code of practice, for the application of all police data on the platform’.98 Were 
this to be done it could result in one of two possible outcomes; either large chunks of PNC 
data will have to be reviewed and potentially deleted because the current retention policy 
for this is scrapped, or, alternatively, large tranches of PND data which would otherwise 
have been deleted will be retained because it is decided to make the current PNC retention 
guidance applicable to all LEDS data. 
 
While potentially useful on paper, there is, however, some considerable doubt as to 
whether the police will actually use the LEDS for anything other than an opportunity to 
collate and retain yet more data, this time on one, rather than disparate, databases. There 
remains no proposal to introduce a statutory framework for the collation, storage and 
retention of data on the LED comparable to that for biometric data (and which this author 
believes will inevitably be need to be introduced regarding custody images if the current 
process is not revisited) and there are no proposals to introduce effective, independent 
oversight of the use of the LEDS. The charge must be laid, therefore, that in reality, the 
LEDS will simply be ‘business as usual’, so far as criminal records data is concerned. 
 
More concerningly, such a charge might transpire to be the best-case scenario. It has now 
become clear that the police intend to press ahead with proposals to include their 
collection of custody images on the LEDS as a searchable feature, albeit now linked to all 
of the data currently held on the PND and PNC.99 This is despite continued reservations 
as to the lawfulness of that collection and the refusal of the Government to yield to calls 
to revisit their 2017 Custody Image Review; in fact, they have even refused to furnish the 
Commons Science and Technology Committee with a copy of their legal advice on their 
new custody image deletion process, retreating instead behind legal professional 
privilege.100 One Parliamentarian told a House of Lords debate that they feared that 
‘without regulation or oversight there is the potential for Nineteen-Eighty Four to become 
a reality, albeit 34 years later than originally envisaged’.101 
 
                                                          
98 Ibid, 25 
99 H.L Deb 1 March 2018, vol.789, cl.793 
100 ‘Government’s Response to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee: 
Biometrics strategy and forensics services’’ (HC 800, 2017 – 19, 5 – I ) 
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Rather more alarmingly, on 1 October 2018 Liberty removed itself from the ‘Open Space 
Consultation’ Group established to consider the privacy impact of the LEDS. In an open 
letter to the Home Office, it offered a damning assessment of the privacy ramifications for 
the proposals the Home Office were outlining; the system did not have an agreed retention 
policy for the data being moved to it, that data which is being held which the Home Office 
know to be unlawful was being migrated to LEDS nonetheless and the Home Office were 
proposing to provide access to non-police organisations where a ‘business case’ is made 
out. This led Liberty to reach a conclusion that they had to withdraw, warning that: 
 
a new policing super-computer is in the works – and it puts our rights at serious 
risk. The Home Office has failed to respond sufficiently to Liberty’s concerns. We 
can’t be part of a process that gives a free pass to the creeping expansion of digital 
policing that shows contempt for our privacy rights.102 
 
In spite of these concerns, and further concerns from a Commons Committee that the 
project is ‘welcome, though woefully unambitious’,103 the Home Office is pressing ahead 
with the development of the LEDS. It is submitted that there is perhaps a need to pause 
and to consult, before it reaches a point of no-return. The lack of information being 
provided to the public and to Parliament remains a significant concern. It is submitted that 
the sooner the Home Office and the police begin to inform the public about what they are 
doing, and what safeguards they are putting in place to protect the rights of data subjects, 
the less likely they are to face foreseeable legal challenges relating to the LEDS in the 
immediate future. 
 
In the Five Constables case, Waller LJ dismissed data protection generally as ‘a 
sidewind’.104 Whether he was correct in 2009 to describe data protection as such is a 
debate for a different piece of research, what is abundantly clear is that such a description 
is not apt in 2019. In fact, with the possible exception of the UK’s impeding departure from 
the European Union, data protection has dominated the legal and economic discourse 
over the life of this research to a hitherto unprecedented degree.105  
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103 Above n.33, 63 
104 [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 [44] 
105 At the time of writing, ‘data protection remains in the news’; S. Stokes, ‘Data protection, information 
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The responsibility for what one author describes as ‘much hullabaloo’106 lies almost 
entirely with the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulations (‘GDPR’)107 
which repealed the 1995 EU Directive on Data Protection on 25 May 2018.108 The GDPR 
is the European Union’s attempt to completely harmonise data protection provisions 
across all member states, offering a ‘consistent and high level of protection’ to all EU 
citizens109 and was enacted to address the enormous growth in the collation, flow and 
utilisation of personal data by electronic means (particularly as regards the internet) which 
was simply not in contemplation when the 1995 Directive was passed.110 The internet has 
turned data into a valuable commodity – one commentator has described it as ‘the oil of 
the internet’ – and ‘big data’ is now a multi-billion pound industry.111 The GDPR was 
enacted to redress some of the balance back towards the data subject112 and the 
implementation of a Regulation rather than a Directive, meant that harmonisation was to 
be achieved by provisions which had direct effect in all member states.113 
 
The GDPR, however, do not apply to ‘the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties’.114 Instead, criminal record data is 
to governed by the Law Enforcement Directive (‘LED’)115, which operates alongside, but 
not part of, the GDPR. This recognises that ‘the scale of the collection and sharing of 
personal data has increased significantly. Technology allows personal data to be 
processed on an unprecedented scale…’ so far as police operational processes are 
concerned116 and the LED intends ‘to harmonise protection for all EU citizens whilst 
facilitating judicial co-operation and police data-sharing throughout the EU’.117 
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The LED applies to the processing of criminal record data by a ‘competent authority’, 
which expressly includes the police.118 This clearly indicates that PHOENIX now falls 
under the ambit of LED, rather than the GDPR. It is perhaps worth noting that there is 
nothing in the LED which provides that states can (or cannot) compile and retain a record 
of all criminal convictions against individuals. It does, however, state that ‘a clear 
distinction, where applicable and as far as possible, be made between personal data of 
different categories of data subjects such as; suspects and persons convicted of a criminal 
offence’.119 A supervisory body is required to oversee compliance120 and one instituted to 
ensure compliance with the GDPR may also fulfil this purpose. The Information 
Commissioner remains, therefore, the official supervisory authority for criminal record 
data. 
 
The LED required that member states publish laws which brought the LED into national 
law by 6 May 2018.121 The UK Parliament waited a little longer, and implemented the Data 
Protection Act 2018122 (‘the DPA 2018’) on 25 May 2018; the same date that the GDPR 
came into force. The DPA 2018 repealed the DPA 1998 almost entirely123 and runs parallel 
to GDPR, intended to supplement one another and both being applicable simultaneously. 
Unlike GDPR, however, the DPA 2018 does apply to criminal records, as Part 3 of the Act 
intends to bring into domestic law the provisions of the LED.124  
 
Part 3 of the DPA 2018, entitled ‘Law Enforcement Processing’, contains the legal 
provisions which are now applicable to the collection of criminal records currently on 
PHOENIX (and soon to be transferred to the LEDS).125 This provides for six applicable 
Data Protection Principles.126 These look rather familiar; processing has to be, inter alia; 
‘lawful and fair’,127 for a specified, explicit and legitimate purpose,128 ‘accurate and kept 
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up-to-date’,129 securely stored130 and, most pertinently to this research, ‘adequate, 
relevant and not excessive’131 and ‘not kept for longer than is necessary’.132  
 
Interestingly, in among the numerous subsequent provisions which offer guidance and 
further provision regarding each of these data principles, s.37 of the DPA 2018 does 
nothing more than simply repeat the principle; Parliament has offered no further guidance, 
clarification or definition whatsoever. As regards the requirement that data not be kept for 
longer than is necessary, the DPA 2018133 provides that ‘appropriate time limits must be 
established for the periodic review of the need for the continued storage of personal data 
for any law enforcement data’. It is submitted that the police are therefore in prima facie 
breach of the fifth Data Principle, as the current retention regime for the PHOENIX data 
offers no review periods whatsoever. One might expect the Information Commissioner to 
be considering enforcement action, considering the significantly expanded powers 
afforded to him by the DPA 2018.134 
 
In truth, neither the LEDS nor the DPA 2018 materially affect the present unsatisfactory 
state of affairs regarding the criminal record collection. The LEDS affords the police and 
the Home Office an opportunity to implement a new regime for data collation, storage and 
retention. Early indications are that they do not intend to take it. The DPA 2018 is likely to 
provide the new backdrop to challenges against the police record retention regime, but 
the fundamental tenets of these are likely to remain the same.  
 
The recommendations made in this research would, if implemented, alleviate some of the 
problems and potentially head off fresh legal challenges. In any event, the status quo 
simply cannot be maintained. The next developments in criminal record data law are 
awaited, by this author and around twelve million other citizens in England and Wales, 
with considerable interest. 
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